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Stalin's Ecclesiastical Background*

Mikhail Agursky

THERE are numerous biographies of Stalin.[1] All of them share one failing: they dismiss as virtually irrelevant an important and formative period of Stalin's youth—his ecclesiastical background.

Although all biographies of Stalin do provide the reader with a more or less impressionistic description of his life in the ecclesiastical seminary in Tiflis, this is done only to stress that Stalin then left the seminary in order to join the revolutionary movement. The biographies emphasize the oppressive system of rules in the seminary, the practice of denunciation and so on. However, the biographies do not consider Stalin's ecclesiastical background to have had a formative influence on him, with the exception of its influence on his literary style. Even Edward Ellis Smith, the biographer of Stalin's early years, does not analyse Stalin's ecclesiastical background, his main interest being in Stalin's alleged police connections.

Faced with these cursory treatments, there is good reason to search deeper into Stalin's ecclesiastical background: in fact it had an extremely important influence on his life, and this influence not only did not diminish, but grew in time. A number of historically puzzling questions become clear if one takes a closer look at this period of Stalin's life.

It is not sufficient to perceive Stalin's life only as a reflection in a Marxist mirror. In spite of the existence of an abundant literature of the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Church, no one has attempted to investigate the historical importance of Stalin's ecclesiastical background. Unfortunately, the limits of this first attempt are set by the author's not having a knowledge of the Georgian and Armenian languages, whose sources could also be very revealing, and thus it is based only on Russian language sources. Furthermore, an important historical source, the Georgian diocesan newspaper *Dukhovnyi vestnik gruzinskogo eksarkhata*, was not available to him. Nonetheless, even this first attempt to explore the *terra incognita* of Stalin's ecclesiastical background seems to open up new vistas of Russian and Soviet political history.

THE ecclesiastical seminary of Tiflis was founded in 1873. It prepared Orthodox priests mostly but not exclusively for Georgian parishes.

* The author wishes to express his deep gratitude to the late Professor Aleksei Ostapov of the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy who first gave him the opportunity in 1965 to consult the titanic bibliographical dictionary of Russian Orthodox Bishops composed by Metropolitan Manuil (Lemeshchevsky) which at that time existed only in manuscript form. The author's sincere thanks are also due to the Library of Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum in the Vatican where in 1984 he discovered some important sources.

[1] See for example B. Souvarine, *Staline*, Paris, 1977; R. Tucker, *Stalin as a Revolutionary*, New York, 1973; A. Ulam, *Stalin*, New York, 1973; R. Hingley, *Stalin*, London, 1974; R. Payne, *The Rise and Fall of Stalin*, London, 1968; E. Smith, *The Young Stalin*, London, 1967.

Priests who graduated from this seminary could serve anywhere, and could also become teachers. Georgia did not have an ecclesiastical academy, nor did it have a university. Since training in a seminary also gave pupils the legal right to enter into a university, the Tiflis seminary and later the Kutais seminary were for a long time the only outlets for Georgians wishing to receive a good secular education. The Russian authorities viewed ecclesiastical training in Georgia as an instrument of Russification and a bastion of conservatism, fearing as they did the consequences of a secular education. However, as a direct result of this the Tiflis seminary soon became a hornets' nest of revolutionary activity in Georgia as early as the 1880s. Among its students were many future leaders of the Georgian revolutionary movement, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, such as Noe Zhordania (the future president of the independent republic of Georgia), Philip Makharadze, Silvester Dzhibladze, Isidor Ramishvili, Mikha Tshakaya, and others.[2] In 1886 the rector, Archpriest Pavel Chudetsky, was assassinated by a student from the seminary.[3] Three years later, Zhordania and Makharadze led a strike in the seminary.[4] A major demand of the Georgian students was the introduction into the curriculum of the Georgian language, and also of Georgian history and Georgian literature. Their demand was systematically rejected. All teaching at the seminary was conducted in Russian while the religious services in Georgian churches were held in Church Slavonic and could not be understood by the local congregation at all. Thus the seminary became a hotbed of Georgian striving for ecclesiastical independence—for autocephaly.

With a few exceptions, all the posts in the ecclesiastical hierarchy appointed by the Holy Synod for Georgia (nominally known as the Georgian Exarchate) were filled with Russians. Bishops of Georgian origin, if ordained, as a rule served outside Russia. Almost all of them later became ardent Georgian nationalists. Furthermore, the majority of the teaching staff in the seminary was also Russian. Russian bishops and teachers who were sent to Georgia regarded all Georgians with deep contempt.

On one occasion, Archimandrite Seraphim (Meshcheryakov), the rector of the seminary, insulted his students by describing the Georgian language as a language of dogs. Naturally, this provoked a rebellion among the students and Archbishop Vladimir (Bogoyavlensky), then the

[2] Cf. G. Uratadze, *Reminiscences of a Georgian Social-Democrat* (Hoover Institution Press, 1968), pp. 58–59; Noe Zhordania, *My Life* (Hoover Institution Press, 1968), pp. 12–15.

[3] The assassination of Chudetsky was a turning point in Georgian political history and had many implications. The Georgian Exarch Pavel, as was widely believed, cursed all Georgians for this assassination. Dmitry Kipiani strongly protested at the formulations used by Exarch Pavel and was expelled from Georgia. Cf. *K. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1923), pp. 612–17; *Pisma Pobedonostseva k Aleksandru III*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1926), pp. 114–17; E. K. (Episkop Kirion), *Kratkii otcherk istorii Gruzinskoi Tserkvi i Ekzarkhata* (Tiflis, 1901); " Une lettre du catholicos Léonide au patriarkh Tikhon," in *Echos d'Orient*, No. 167, 1932, p. 359.

[4] Zhordania, op. cit.

Georgian Exarch, had to come to the protection of Archimandrite Seraphim.[5]

This was during the time when Joseph Dzhugashvili, the young Stalin, was a student at the seminary (1894–99). There exists from this period only one book of memoirs by a fellow-student of Stalin's, published outside the USSR, and some brief apologetic accounts by his fellow-students, which were published by a Soviet magazine of atheism in 1939 in order to illustrate Stalin's greatness at every point of his life.[6] Therefore, almost all the evidence which the author of the present work managed to acquire is of a secondary nature.

During the relevant period, the Georgian Exarchate was ruled first by Vladimir (Bogoyavlensky)—from October 1892 until February 1898[7]—and later by Archbishop Flavian (Gorodetsky), who ruled from February 1898 until November 1901.[8] The Exarch of Georgia was the real boss of the Tiflis seminary, visiting it often and exercising his personal control over it. In this same period, the rectors of the seminary were: Archimandrite Seraphim (Meshcheryakov)—1892–98; Archimandrite Hermogen (Dolganev)—1898–1900; and Archimandrite Stephan (Arkhangelsky)—from 1900.[9]

As far as the seminary inspectors are concerned, one must first remember that according to the rule-book, Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical school inspectors were above all assigned to carry out administrative duties and maintain discipline among the students. Since the Tiflis seminary had for a long time been an important revolutionary centre, its inspectors were most certainly closely connected with the Russian political police—the Okhrana.

It was said that Stalin admitted betraying some of his friends in order to make them into revolutionaries.[10] If this were the case, he could have done it through the above-mentioned Hermogen, who before his appointment as rector had, since 1893, served as the seminary inspector.[11] His successor as inspector from 1898 until 1900 was Hieromonk Dmitry (the Prince David Abashidze) who taught the Holy Scripture in the seminary from 1896–97.[12]

Another person who exercised an important role in the seminary, but was not a full-time employee, was Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov, a

[5] Metropolitan Manuil (Lemeshchevsky), *Die Russischen Orthodoxen Bishöfe von 1893 bis 1965*, Vol. 2 (Erlangen, 1981), p. 203. This huge collection of biographies of Russian Orthodox Bishops is being published with the present author's participation. To date only two of the six volumes planned have been published.

[6] " Neopublikovannye materialy iz biografii tov. Stalina," in *Antireligioznik*, Moscow, 1939, No. 12. The book by J. Iremashvili, *Stalin und die Tragödie Georgiens*, Berlin, 1932, was not available to me and was consulted via secondary sources.

[7] Manuil, op. cit. pp. 197–209. See also *Pravoslavnaya Bogoslovskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 4, St Petersburg, 1903 (the entry " Gruzinskii ekzarkhat ").

[8] *Pravoslavnaya . . .*, op. cit.

[9] E. K., op. cit.

[10] Smith, op. cit. p. 219.

[11] Manuil, op. cit. pp. 336–45.

[12] Manuil, op. cit, Vol. 3 (in print), pp. 27–28.

prominent and probably a leading priest and missionary of the Georgian Exarchate. He was later made responsible for Georgian ecclesiastical schools. He taught the Holy Scripture in various schools in Tiflis and was also an advisor to Georgian governors. He remained in Tiflis until 1905.[13]

SURPRISINGLY enough, this list includes the names of three prominent spiritual leaders of the Russian Radical Right after its formation in 1905: Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoyavlensky), Metropolitan Flavian (Gorodetsky) and Archbishop Hermogen (Dolganev).[14] Archbishop Stephan (Arkhangelsky) also became a member of this movement, although he was less prominent.[15]

Such a concentration is highly unusual. Only a small number of Russian bishops belonged to the Union of the Russian People or to the Union of the Archangel Mikhail—both militant Radical Right parties. Moreover, not all its leaders were Radical Right bishops.[16] This over-representation of Radical Right spiritual leaders among the Russian clergy who had served in Georgia was hardly accidental since it was probably the policy of the Holy Synod to select ardent Russian nationalists to serve in rebellious Georgia.

Metropolitan Vladimir was Metropolitan of Moscow at the height of the 1905 revolution and contributed much to the formation of the Russian Radical Right. In 1912 he was nominated Metropolitan of St Petersburg and the leading member of the Holy Synod. In 1915, retaining his position as leading member of the Synod, Metropolitan Vladimir was sent to Kiev, probably as a result of opposition there to Rasputin. On 24 January 1918, Metropolitan Vladimir was murdered in Kiev by unknown assailants whom his congregation naturally took to be Bolsheviks.[17] He was the first Russian bishop to be murdered in the course of the revolution and was probably the most senior Russian bishop ever to have been assassinated. The Bolsheviks denied responsibility for this murder and even as late as 1941 they were still trying to lay the responsibility for it on Ukrainian nationalists.[18]

The fact that the elderly Metropolitan Vladimir (he was 70 when he was murdered) was a Black Hundred* spiritual leader is not sufficient to explain his assassination at the hands of the Bolsheviks. Several leading Black Hundred bishops and priests were within easy reach of the

[13] See for example Vostorgov's biography in the index printed in *Padenie Tsarskogo rezhima*, Vol. 7 (Moscow, 1927), p. 319.

[14] See the author's article, " Caught in a Cross-fire: the Russian Church Between Holy Synod and Radical Right (1905–1908)," in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 1984, No. 1.

[15] See for example his appeal to the clergy of the Mogilevan diocese in *Russkoe Znamya*, 1907, No. 204. For his biography see Manuil (in print).

[16] Agursky, op. cit.

[17] Cf. Johannes Chrysostomus, *Kirchengeschichte Russlands der neuesten Zeit*, Vol. 1 (Munich, 1965), pp. 117–19.

[18] G. Denisov, " Yanvarskoe vosstanie 1918 g. v Kieve," in *Bezbozhnik*, Moscow, 1941, February, 2.

* This was the name given to reactionary populist groups in the early twentieth century. While endorsing national representation and the need to improve the life of peasants and workers, they also supported absolutism and anti-semitism. They organized pogroms directed against the Jews and general terror against university students and members of the free professions.

Bolsheviks and were left unharmed. Even a prominent ecclesiastical official like Metropolitan Seraphim (Chichagov) served in his full ecclesiastical capacity in Leningrad right up until the 1930s.[19]

When the Bolsheviks came to power the First Russian Council held its sessions in the Kremlin and was permitted to remain in the Kremlin until 1918, when it was moved to another site in Moscow until July 1918.[20] The outspoken monarchist and one of the main spiritual leaders of the Russian Radical Right, Metropolitan Antoni (Khrapovitsky) was not only an active participant in it but was elected Patriarch by a narrow margin. He later became head of the militant anti-Soviet Russian Church abroad, which had its headquarters in Yugoslavia.

None of the members of the Council was touched. Metropolitan Vladimir took part in the Council until January and was chairman at the time of Patriarch Tikhon's election. He then spent three months in the hands of the Bolsheviks. He was murdered in Kiev by unknown persons during the short-lived Bolshevik uprising there. Retrospectively, his murder seems to have been selective.

Several months later, on 16 June 1918, another " Georgian " bishop was cruelly murdered. This time it was Archbishop Hermogen (Dolganev), inspector and later rector of the seminary during Stalin's time there, and an Okhrana watchdog in the seminary. This time the murder took place in the Siberian town of Tobolsk. The archbishop was thrown into the river with a stone tied around his neck. The Bolsheviks denied responsibility for this murder too.[21] With reference to this, one must remember that the Bolsheviks boasted quite openly about their exploits during the Red Terror and published extensive lists of their victims, even in the case of innocent hostages. The assassination of the Tsar with his entire family was widely publicized. Thus, the very wish to deny responsibility for the assassination of two overtly monarchist and hostile bishops is a cause for suspicion.

Archbishop Hermogen was an extremely active Black Hundred leader, and his militancy soon led him into opposition with the government. He made violent attacks against Stolypin, for example, and was also an obdurate enemy of Rasputin.[22] His name was associated before the revolution with various sensation-creating affairs.

Almost at the same time, another " Georgian " mentioned above was executed. This time it was Archpriest Ioann Vostorgov, likewise a prominent leader of the Union of the Russian People. Vostorgov was widely known in pre-revolutionary Russia. In 1908 he was appointed a member of the Holy Synod. The revolution found him in Moscow where he was Dean of St Basil's Cathedral in Red Square and chairman of the

[19] See A. Levitin-Krasnov, *Likhiye Gody* (Paris, 1977), pp. 110–15.

[20] Johannes Chrysostomus, op. cit. pp. 67–112.

[21] Cf. L. Regelson, *Tragediya Russkoi Tserkvi* (Paris, 1977), pp. 238–42; Manuil, op. cit.

[22] There is an abundant literature on Hermogen. See for example Iliodor (Trufanov), *Svyatoi Chort*, Moscow, 1917; P. Stremoukhov, " Moya bor'ba s episkopom Germogenom i Iliodorom," in *Arkhiv Russkoi revolyutsii*, 1925, Vol. 16, pp. 5–48. There is much information about him in the collection *Padenie Tsarskogo rezhima*, Vols. 1–7, Moscow, 1924–27.

local branch of the Union of the Russian People. Besides his Black Hundred activities, Vostorgov had acquired notoriety for his militant anti-Georgian policies. He claimed that Georgia was a multi-national country in view of the numerous Armenians, Ossetins, Meingrelians, Abkhazians and other minorities who occupied the same territory as the Georgians but spoke different languages. For this reason, according to Vostorgov, it was unreasonable from the point of view of Russian state interests to transform the local multi-ethnic Orthodox Church into a national Georgian Church. On the contrary, everything must be done to encourage local ethnic groups and nationalities against the Georgians. It was particularly important to support the Armenians who were the urban majority over the Georgians in all the Caucasus. Vostorgov revealed that as early as 1897–98 the governors of Georgia had reached the conclusion that the local ecclesiastical school was harmful to Russian national interests and must therefore be shut down.[23] Vostorgov was the initiator of a far-reaching development in Georgian ecclesiastical education. He advised against the sending of Georgian priests and teachers to serve in non-Georgian Orthodox minority communities. In addition to this, the Ardon ecclesiastical seminary was founded in neighbouring Northern Ossetia to prepare priests for non-Georgian Caucasian minorities. Eventually, the second-ranking ecclesiastical seminary in Georgia, the Kutais seminary, was shut down in 1905; it was followed by the closing down of the Tiflis seminary in 1907. Thus was terminated the ecclesiastical school of Georgia. Vostorgov did his best to undermine the national and territorial integrity of Georgia.

I UNCOVERED an anonymous pamphlet written by a former Russian teacher at the Tiflis seminary which gives a chilling account of the situation at the seminary just one year after Stalin had left.[24] There was a deliberate policy to expel all able and talented Georgian students from the seminary and to admit in their place all manner of Russian riff-raff who had been expelled from seminaries in Russia. One can find the same claim in a pamphlet of a Radical Right journalist who was critical of Vostorgov.[25] Vostorgov was " legally " executed in July 1918 together with such pillars of the Old Regime as Minister of Justice Ivan Shcheglovitov and Head of the Police Department Beletsky.[26]

It is curious that a fraudulent document, allegedly written by the non-existent " Imam Raguza," claimed that Stalin had personally taken revenge on Vostorgov for a humiliation he had inflicted on him.[27] This was a fabrication, as were many other testimonies allegedly written by " Akhmed Anba," " Budu Svanidze " etc., perpetrated by former Soviet defectors who most certainly did this as part of a Soviet

[23] Vostorgov, *Tserkovnaya shkola v Zakavkazie*, St Petersburg, 1905.
[24] *Iz vospominanii russkogo uchitelya pravoslavnoi gruzinskoi dukhovnoi seminarii*, Moscow, 1907.
[25] N. Durnovo, *Sud'by Gruzinskoi Tserkvi*, Moscow, 1907. Cf. Baron (Bibineishvili) " Za chetvert' veka " (Moscow, 1931), pp. 19–20.
[26] M. Polski, *Noviye mucheniki rossiiskie*, Jordanville, 1949, Vol. 1.
[27] Imam Raguza, *La Vie de Staline*, Paris, 1938.

disinformation campaign. It is interesting that this fabrication tried to establish a Stalin–Vostorgov connection. Russian ecclesiastical history was virtually unknown and a claim such as this, plausible enough, about Stalin's involvement in the execution of Vostorgov may well have had its origin in a well-informed source.

According to church historians, four other Russian Orthodox bishops (mostly marginal) were murdered in 1918, out of a total number of several hundred Russian bishops.[28] They were: Archbishop Andronik (Nikolsky) of Perm; Bishop Efrem (Kuznetsov) of Selenga; Bishop Pimen (Bogolikov) of Alma-Ata; Bishop Feofan (Il'insky) of Solikamsk. They were not all necessarily murdered by the Bolsheviks. The biographies of Bishops Efrem, Pimen and Feofan were not available to me. But Archbishop Andronik had the same connection with Georgia—although not with the Tiflis seminary—as Archpriest Vostorgov. He served as the inspector of the Kutais seminary from 1895–96, and was therefore an Okhrana man, and he then served two years in the neighbouring anti-Georgian seminary at Ardon. It is interesting to note that Archbishop Andronik was not a militant anti-Bolshevik and even made appeals against joining the counter-revolution.[29]

As far as Metropolitan Flavian (Gorodetsky) is concerned, also an active supporter of the Union of the Russian People and once chairman of its congress in Kiev, he died naturally in 1915, while another "Georgian" who was hated there, Archbishop Stephan (Arkhangelsky), and who was also a member of the same political organization in Mogilev, but not as prominent a one, also died in 1914.[30]

SINCE the proportion of bishops and priests with a Georgian connection in their backgrounds is far greater than any other group among First Russian Orthodox martyrs in 1918, it is difficult to believe that this is nothing but sheer coincidence. Was this selective extermination of "Georgians" a Georgian revenge in full accordance with an old Georgian rite? One can say nothing definite, but one can suggest that a gang of Georgian avengers might commit itself to such a cause or that it might be used for such a purpose. Such gangs of Georgians really did exist before the revolution and they carried out notorious expropriations, in which Stalin's involvement is beyond doubt. Moreover, Stalin had extensive connections in the Caucasian underworld and would not have hesitated to use Georgian criminals for any purpose.[31]

Some sources do place the responsibility for the assassination of Archbishop Nikon (Sofiisky) in May 1908 on Stalin. Archbishop Nikon was the Georgian Exarch at that time. (His biographical details were not

[28] Regelson, op. cit. p. 523.
[29] Regelson, op. cit. p. 243. One can find Andronik's biography in Manuil, op. cit. Vol. 1, pp. 256–58.
[30] Manuil, op. cit. (in print).
[31] This is recorded in several sources. Cf. Smith, op. cit. p. 221.

available to me.) Stalin publicly approved this assassination but did not take personal responsibility for it.[32]

Stalin may have had personal motives for avenging all the above-named bishops and priests for his personal humiliation, for the ethnic discrimination which he suffered in the seminary. Such an explanation seems plausible enough if one remembers his revengeful character and his choice of pseudonym—Koba—a man committed to revenge.

One could also put forward the suggestion that all these people were not the victims of revenge but were exterminated because they were dangerous witnesses of something that Stalin did not wish to be exposed. However, this theory does not stand up in every case.

But why, for instance, was Seraphim (Meshcheryakov), the rector of Tiflis seminary from 1893–98 who later became a metropolitan, not avenged immediately after the revolution? It was he who had called the Georgian language a language of dogs, thus provoking a student rebellion during Stalin's time there. After the revolution he served in a number of cities, including Kostroma, Nizhni Novgorod, Tambov, Stavropol, and he was a member of the Living Church for a short period. Eventually, he too disappeared but this was only in 1933 when many other people who had known Stalin personally also disappeared.[33]

Vostorgov's closest collaborator in Tiflis was the priest Sergei Gorodtsov.[34] He was dean of the Tiflis Cathedral and in 1905 he organized the Tiflis branch of the Union of the Russian People as its chairman. Gorodtsov was extremely militant and was well known throughout Georgia. He organized numerous monarchist demonstrations and pogroms which took human lives. His influence was so great that it was claimed that he was the real boss in the Georgian Exarchate after 1905.[35] After the February revolution of 1917, when the Georgian Church officially declared its independence (autocephaly), Gorodtsov was expelled from Georgia. It is not known exatly what happened to Gorodtsov under the Bolsheviks but it seems that he spent a number of years after the revolution in camps and prisons. All of a sudden, and most surprisingly, this notorious Black Hundred was given a parish in the town of Klin near Moscow in 1935.[36] This was soon after Kirov had been assassinated, at a time of mass terror against the clergy—both liberal and conservative. Stalin knew the name of Gorodtsov only too well and no one would have dared to protect him without Stalin's personal approval. Beria, as the boss of Georgia during this time, would certainly also have

[32] Archbishop Nikon was extremely hostile to Georgians and was positively opposed to the use of the Georgian language in seminaries. Cf. " Une lettre du catholicos Léonide . . ., " op. cit. p. 361. Regarding Stalin's responsibility, see Payne, op cit. p. 127. For Stalin's remark, see his *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1953), p. 129.

[33] Manuil, op. cit. (in print).

[34] D. M. Lang, *A Modern History of Georgia* (London, 1962), p. 155; J. Davrichewy, *Ce qu'on rigolait bien avec mon copain Staline* (Paris, 1979), p. 216; I. Brikhnichev (ed.), *Khodite v svet*, Vol. 1. (Tiflis, 1906?), p. 6.

[35] N. Durnovo, op. cit. p. 75

[36] See Gorodtsov's biography in Manuil, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 67–70.

been involved in this strange protection. It seems that in 1917, and for some time afterwards, Gorodtsov was in Baku, since one of his publications was printed there. If this was the case, he would have been known to Beria since the latter served in Baku, initially with the Azerbaidzhan Mussavatist intelligence and later as deputy chairman of the Azerbaidzhan branch of the Cheka.

After 1935, Gorodtsov's ecclesiastical career really took off. In 1942 he was ordained as a bishop and in 1943 he was put in control of all Siberia. Later he became the Metropolitan of Novosibirsk. Until his death at the age of 90 in 1956 he belonged to the narrow circle which ruled the Moscow Patriarchate and he was a prolific author of ecclesiastical publications. His Black Hundred activities were carefully concealed and even turned into a manifestation of his patriotism.[37] There is no explanation available to us as to why Gorodtsov was given such protection. However, his case is not unique.

IN contrast to Gorodtsov, who is not known to Stalin's biographers, Hieromonk Dmitry (Abashidze) is mentioned in almost all the biographies.[38] Indeed, as noted above, he was Stalin's teacher and then inspector of the seminary in the fateful year 1899. According to Stalin's fellow-students he was an obscurantist. He made personal searches of Stalin's belongings.[39] The details of Abashidze's biography are extremely revealing and informative.[40] He was a Georgian prince and belonged to a small group of committed Russophiles among the Georgian clergy; in his capacity as an inspector he was most certainly linked with the Okhrana. The fact that he searched Stalin's things confirms this view.

Four years after Stalin left the seminary Dmitry was ordained as a bishop and served in Poti as a priest of the Georgian Exarch. At the beginning of 1905, he was recalled from Georgia because of his extreme Russophilism, which provoked the indignation of his congregation. Subsequently, Bishop Dmitry served in the Ukraine, in Tashkent and from 1913 he was Bishop of Simferopol. His patriotism was so great that in 1914 he joined the Russian navy as an ordinary chaplain on a battleship in the Black Sea. He was a participant in the First Council in Moscow in 1917–18. He was the only Georgian who did not recognize Georgian autocephaly and as an ardent Russophile he did not later return to Georgia. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Whites in the Civil War and he left the Crimea together with the remnants of Wrangel's army. Soon afterwards he returned to Soviet Russia in spite of the potential danger of such a move. He probably took his lead from the notorious White general Yakov Slashchev who was the pillar of the White terror in the Crimea and returned to Soviet Russia in 1920.[41] The exact date is not

[37] See for example, A. Levitin-Krasnov, *Ruk tvoikh zhar* (Tel-Aviv, 1979), p. 101.
[38] For example, Smith, op. cit. p. 32.
[39] *Neopublikovannye materialy* . . ., op. cit. pp. 20–21 (memoirs of Ramadze).
[40] For his biography, see Manuil, op. cit. Vol. 3 (in print). See also Durnovo, op. cit. p. 95.
[41] About Slashchev, see M. Agursky, *Ideologiya natsional-bolshevizma* (Paris, 1980), p. 58.

known, but at the end of the 1920s Dmitry moved to Kiev, although he did not have an ecclesiastical appointment there, and there he took another very unusual step.[42] He took the vow of " shema "—the second monastic vow by which a monk must become a hermit and break all links with the outside world. Dmitry, who once more changed his monastic name, this time to Antoni, was then not yet 60. At any rate, Antoni-Dmitry survived the Great Purge in Kiev when all members of the Kievan clergy without exception were arrested and the majority executed. He also survived the German occupation but, according to Nazi sources, he was then already very ill.[43] He died in December 1943 soon after Kiev was liberated from the Germans by the Red Army. He was buried in the Kievan Monastery, which had been reopened by the Nazis, and an anonymous benefactor had a beautiful marble monument erected on his grave.[44] According to a verbal testimony of 1966 by the late Moscow poet Nadezhda Pavlovitch, pious Orthodox Christians in Kiev were puzzled by the fact that Archbishop Antoni had escaped the Great Purge. According to Pavlovitch, the archbishop hermit explained that he had been Stalin's seminary inspector. He valued Stalin's achievements as a very able student and the teaching staff at the seminary were very upset when Stalin decided to leave the seminary of his own free will. But more important than this, the archbishop allegedly reported that it was he who had given Stalin material support when he left the seminary, as the young Stalin found himself in a difficult situation. Nadezhda Pavlovitch had no knowledge of the book by Edward Ellis Smith about the young Stalin, in which the author raises the problem of Stalin's source of income when he left the seminary. Finding no explanation, Smith decided that Stalin would have to have been supported by the Okhrana.

If this was indeed provided by Dmitry (Abashidze), the Okhrana would have been directly involved, which confirms Smith's proposition. According to Pavlovitch, Stalin let it be known to Dmitry (Abashidze) that it would be best for him if he stayed away from any public activity, including ecclesiastical matters. If he did not, Stalin could not guarantee his safety. That is why Dmitry became a hermit.

There is also an interesting additional link which has its origins with Dmitry. While he was Bishop of the Crimea under General Wrangel, Dmitry managed to ordain as bishop Archimandrite Veniamin (Fedchenkov) who was at that time rector of the Simferopol ecclesiastical seminary.[45] Archimandrite Veniamin was a participant in the Moscow Council who then, and later, showed himself to be a militant anti-Bolshevik. In 1919 he was nominated to be bishop of the White Russian Army and Navy in the south of Russia. In 1920 he became a member of

[42] However, he was arrested and put on trial in Simferopol in October 1922 at the height of the anti-religious terror, but we do not know what the outcome of the trial was. See the newspaper *Naukai religiya*, Moscow, 26 Oct. 1922.

[43] Rosenberg Archive, CXXXVIII, Einsatzgruppe C, p. 3.

[44] I saw it myself.

[45] For Veniamin's biography, see Manuil, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 155–64.

the Council of Ministers in Wrangel's government.[46] He left Russia with the men who were left in Wrangel's army. At the end of the 1920s Bishop Veniamin suddenly changed sides and recognized the canonical authority of the Moscow Patriarchate which was being rejected by almost all the faithful at that time. After 1930 he was the head of a number of parishes which had remained loyal to Moscow. In 1932 he was ordained by Moscow as an archbishop and in 1938 as a metropolitan. In 1933 he went to the USA where he was an extremely committed fellow-traveller who defended the Soviet Union in every respect. In April 1936 Veniamin read an address to a meeting of the Society of Friendship with the USSR in which he said, " the time will soon come of open and friendly cooperation between the Church and Soviet State." An atheist Soviet commentator, P. Zarin, who soon afterwards disappeared in the Purge, claimed that this was " a political manoeuvre " on Veniamin's part.[47]

Since every bishop regards himself as being spiritually indebted to the bishop who ordained him, it may be suggested that Veniamin received either a blessing or a recommendation from Dmitry (Abashidze) to take this new course. In 1946 Metropolitan Veniamin was granted Soviet citizenship and after 1947 he served in various places in Russia, including Rostov and Saratov, and in Latvia. He retired in 1958 and died in 1961 at the age of 81. Nowadays Metropolitan Veniamin, who was also a prolific theologian, is highly venerated in the Russian Orthodox Church.[48]

Stalin had other ecclesiastical connections from his youth but the question of their relevance is controversial. For example, he met on two or more occasions the young Pavel Florensky in the circle of students led by Lev Rosenfeld (Kamenev) at the Tiflis gymnasium. This was in 1899 or 1900.[49] This may well explain why it was that Florensky, who later became a most influential Russian Orthodox theologian and who was also a prominent mathematician and physicist, was tolerated for so long and was only arrested in 1933, and similarly Metropolitan Seraphim (Meshcheryakov), when the purge of those who had known Stalin personally in his youth was at its height. It was believed that Florensky had the protection of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and if this was so it was indirectly protection from Stalin himself.

ONE can discern the influence of Stalin's ecclesiastical background in Soviet politics already in 1923, when Lenin's and Trotsky's influence was beginning to fade. First of all, there was a radical change in Soviet policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church in June 1923.[50] By then the Soviet authorities had already succeeded in destroying the traditional

[46] About his activity in the Crimea, see the extremely unfavourable report by B. Kandidov, *Tserkov' i Vrangel*, Kharkov, 1931.

[47] *Antireligioznik*, Moscow, 1936, No. 4, p. 11.

[48] Cf. his works in *Bogoslovskie trudy*, Moscow.

[49] Davrichewy, op. cit. p. 114.

[50] See M. Agursky (B.B.), " Die misslungene Versuch zur Vernichtung der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche in den Jahren 1922–1923 und die Niderlage des linken Kommunismus," in *Ostkirchliche Studien*, No. 2/3, 1973. See also M. Agursky, *Ideologiya* . . ., op. cit. pp. 106–113.

Russian Orthodox Church and had substituted it with the so-called Living Church which was openly pro-communist and introduced many radical innovations, which according to secret Soviet design was to be a first step towards the eventual dissolution of the Church. Patriarch Tikhon was arrested; yet although his trial was postponed several times, his fate seemed to be sealed and no one doubted that he would be sentenced to death. However, at the end of June 1923 he was suddenly released from prison. It is widely believed that this step was taken as a result of pressure from Britain. Such an explanation may account for his release but not for the fact that he was given the opportunity to restore his ecclesiastical authority and contest the legitimacy of the newly-established pro-communist Living Church. This was a mortal blow to Church renovators from which they never recovered. It was perpetrated by the Soviet authorities themselves. When Stalin acquired more power he made the conservative Russian Orthodox Church the chief spokesman for Russian Orthodoxy, although the Living Church had not yet been outlawed.[51] Some remnants of this Church were compulsorily dissolved as late as 1943. Stalin had the power to impose on the Russian Orthodox congregation any kind of ecclesiastical authority he wished, but already in the 1920s he showed a preference for the traditional Russian Orthodoxy. He did, however, suppress any radical theology which linked Christianity with revolution; this strain was partially resurrected only towards the end of the 1960s. Although it was able to and did serve Soviet interests better than the traditional conservatism of Russian Orthodoxy, Stalin, educated in a strict and rigid Church conservatism, did not favour ecclesiastical radicalism.

Contrary to what is widely believed to be the case, Stalin began to recognize this new ecclesiastical policy as early as 1939, and perhaps even earlier. One can see the signs of his new policy emerging before the outbreak of the war (1941), when new bishops were ordained for the first time to serve the Russian Orthodox believers in territories captured from Poland, and in the Baltic states and Bessarabia.[52]

Stalin's " concordate " with the Russian Orthodox Church was by no means imposed as a result of the war alone. It was a long-term policy which was upheld for the rest of his life and only Khrushchev began to alter the status quo. Stalin could easily have renounced this " concordate " after the war was over but in fact the Russian Orthodox Church's real honeymoon period only began after the war, when the Church was even exempted from paying taxes and became fertile soil for many fortune-seekers.

At the historic meeting in 1943 with the three Metropolitans Sergei, Aleksei and Nikolai, Stalin boasted about his ecclesiastical training. He went so far in his proposals to these Church leaders that he even

[51] M. Agursky, *Ideologiya* . . ., op. cit. pp. 246–50.

[52] For example Bishop Veniamin (Novitsky) was ordained on 15 June 1941. See Manuil, op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 151.

suggested that future priests be trained not in seminaries but in special basic schools which existed before the revolution.[53] This suggestion of Stalin's did not come to anything. To appreciate the extent of Stalin's favour towards the Russian Orthodox Church one must take note of one, virtually unknown fact: the first and only favourable summary of Nikolai Berdyaev's ideas ever to be printed in the Soviet Union after his expulsion in 1922 was published in 1947 by the Moscow Patriarchate.[54] This was Berdyaev's theodicy of the Soviet system.

It is as well to remember that the Russian Orthodox Church did not recognize Georgian ecclesiastical independence—autocephaly—in 1917 and neither did it recognize Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence.[55] In restoring the old Russian Imperial Church, which embraced the entire Soviet territory, Stalin somehow seemed to have reflected the feelings of the young Georgian seminary student who had protested at the Russian oppression of the ancient Georgian Orthodox Church and who had supported its drive for independence. It was probably for this reason that the Georgian Orthodox Church turned out to be the only Orthodox Church on Soviet territory that managed to maintain its independence, unilaterally declared in 1917. Soon after his meeting with Stalin on 4 September 1943, the newly-elected Patriarch Sergei went to a Georgian Kanossa and during the solemn reconciliation on 31 October 1943 he confirmed Georgian autocephaly.[56]

In April 1945, Stalin received an official delegation of the Georgian Orthodox Church. But according to official Soviet sources, Stalin had some contacts with the Georgian clergy even before that date. In 1926, for example, when he was on holiday in Georgia he met up with an acting Georgian priest, Pyotr Kapanadze, one of his former classmates at the seminary.[57]

EVEN a cursory look at Stalin's ecclesiastical background suggests that it might have had important consequences for the understanding of certain problems of Soviet political history, and of Soviet policy towards religion in particular. One can see that the young Dzhugashvili had an intense exposure in his formative years not only to Orthodox theology but also to the strident Russian nationalism and anti-semitism of the prominent spiritual leaders of the Russian Radical Right. Moreover, it was through his ecclesiastical supervisors that the Okhrana was able to

[53] Personal communication made by Prof. Aleksei Ostapov (d. 1975), the academic secretary of the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy. Ostapov was a family member of the late Patriarch Aleksei. According to a legend among Russian Orthodox believers, Stalin changed his attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church in the desperate situation of the summer of 1941 when three Russian saints, Metropolitans of Moscow Pyotr, Aleksei and Yona, appeared to him in a dream and warned him that he would be defeated unless he changed his attitude to the Church. Personal communication of F. Nikolai Glebov in 1962.

[54] *Patriarkh Sergei i ego nasledstvo* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 251–52.

[55] See for example, " Une lettre . . .," op. cit.

[56] Patriarkh Sergei . . ., op. cit. pp. 279–80.

[57] *Pravda*, 20 April 1945; *Neopublikovannye materialy* . . ., op. cit. p. 21.

maintain its hold over the young Dzhugashvili with whatever success it could achieve.[58] Stalin rebelled against the Church and its Russian leaders and avenged them in the spirit of his model hero—Koba. But after he had won his victory and become the undisputed leader in Russia, he again espoused his old values.[59] Stalin's anti-semitism, unprecedented for a Georgian, was observed as early as 1902–1903 and may be explained chiefly by the impressions made on him at the seminary.[60] However, many revolutionary Georgians graduated from the Tiflis seminary and practically none was infected with anti-semitism to the extent that Stalin was. The difference between Dzhugashvili and, for example, the Menshevik Noe Zhordania or the Bolshevik Philip Makharadze was probably in the intensity of their original religious faith and the confidence they put in their teachers and supervisors. Official Soviet sources affirm that during this initial period of study in the seminary Stalin was deeply religious and disciplined.[61] Thus he was more receptive than other students to what was taught in the seminary. His exposure to Russian nationalism by such a committed Georgian Russophile as Dmitry (Abashidze) was also extremely important. As Svetlana Alliluyeva indicated, Stalin later identified himself completely as a Russian and not as a Georgian.[62] Dmitry's career shows clearly that he enjoyed Stalin's protection despite the fact that Stalin approved the publication in 1939 of his former classmate's memoirs in which Dmitry is referred to as an obscurantist.

Stalin did not emerge as a political personality in a void. He came to Marxism after a strong exposure to militant Russian nationalism. He was not just a *tabula rasa* written over by Marxism. He obviously did not forget the lessons learned in his seminary. Later in his life these again rose to the surface. They found their expression when his political interests and calculations coincided with his old sentiments. His early conditioning persisted and culminated before his death in the anti-semitism of the Doctors' Plot period.

[58] Smith, op. cit.
[59] Tucker, op. cit. p. 140.
[60] R. Arsenidze, " Iz vospominanii o Staline," in *Novyi Zhurnal*, No. 72, 1963, p. 221.
[61] Stalin's early religious piety was indicated by his authorization of the memoirs by Glurdzhadze, *Neopublikovannye materialy* . . ., op. cit. p. 19.
[62] S. Alliluyeva, *Twenty letters to a Friend* (New York, 1967), pp. 119–20.

A Good Fabian Fallen Among the Stalinists

David Dunn

GEORGE Bernard Shaw, the lionized Irish playwright and influential Fabian socialist, had been reticent about Soviet communism before the summer of 1931. It is true that he had not been as antipathetic to the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 as had many of his Fabian colleagues, or to the reported horrors and tragedies that had followed in its wake; moreover he had publicly stated his admiration for the statesmanship of Lenin (who called him " a good man fallen among the Fabians "). On the other hand, he had been repeatedly critical of two facets of Soviet communism: its offers to fund various British socialist movements and the activities of the Third International. Overall, however, what seemed to characterize his attitude during the early years of Sovietization was a relative silence. The constant stream of Shavianisms dried up when he was confronted with the USSR. In 1924, for example, he had declined to contribute a chapter on " Communism in Russia " to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* for its two-volume history of the twentieth century entitled *These Eventful Years*. He was an obvious choice for the assignment: he loved submitting definitive pieces, and was an expert on socialism.[1] But he wrote back to the editor modestly:

> The article on the Communist experiment in Russia which you suggest is quite beyond me. I do not know what has happened in Russia, and cannot find out. Even if I were to visit Russia as I have been invited to do, I should come back not much wiser than I came as to the economic moral of the experiment. Besides, the experiment is not yet consummated. I have not the least notion of what " the maximum Britannica rate " comes to in figures; but situated as I am at the present, with a heavy budget of permanently remunerative work waiting to be completed, I do not believe that anything I could do would be worth what it would cost you to induce me to do it. . . . None the less, I am much obliged to you for the invitation to contribute, and I should do the particular job you propose for its own sake if I were qualified to do it justice.[2]

Here is clear proof that Shaw was positively reluctant to discover anything about Russia above and beyond what naturally came his way.

[1] See, for example: " Letter to the Editor of *The Spectator*," 17 Oct. 1925, British Library, Additional Manuscript (Add. MSS.) 50697, pp. 201–202; " Communism Defined," *National News Letter*, No. 552, 6 Feb. 1947; *Socialism: Principles and Outlook* [Reprinted from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th Edition, 1929] and *Fabianism* [Reprinted from *Chambers's Encyclopaedia*], *Fabian Tract* 233; Reprinted, *Shaw Tract* 4, 1956.

[2] Quoted in R. le Clerc Phillips, " With Great Men Behind the Scenes," *The New York Times*, 14 Sept. 1924, IV, 4:2.

Although as a journalist his reticence may appear disingenuous, as a Fabian socialist there could scarcely be any political rationale in his devoting time to the antics of Bolshevism. Shaw's concept of socialism was Fabian socialism. He shared the Fabian municipalist dream.

In its early stages the Fabian Society represented a forum for a great variety of political doctrines—many of these not even socialist in the widest sense. From the ranks of the Fabian Society, however, there gradually arose an elitist core of practical-minded socialists, among them Graham Wallas, Sydney Olivier, Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw, who shared a common goal of the radical transformation of society by local and national government. They believed in restructuring the distribution of goods and services according to municipal rather than private interests.

The Fabian unit, as such, certainly did not have a homogeneous thought process; yet the members of its policy-making machinery were united by several deeply-held beliefs: among these, that socialism was indispensable and efficacious, but could only be achieved through non-violent, parliamentary liberal-democratic means. Fabians perceived their task as being to change the form of society without changing the fundamental structure of the system of government. The change in government would be largely one of composition—loading it with Fabian ideas and representatives. This process was labelled " permeation " by Sidney Webb.

THE purpose of this article is to look at how and why Shaw's own expectations of Fabianism changed—and therefore by implication Fabianism itself. By the summer of 1931 Shaw had landed in the Stalinist camp, but he had not simply stepped straight across from British parliamentary liberal-democracy to Soviet autocracy. Throughout the 1920s he had questioned the assumption that social reform could be achieved through parliamentary means, and prior to that had begun to re-examine his own belief in the democratic ideal. Several critics have attempted to answer the question, when did this re-examination start? Alfred Turco, for instance, supported Alan McBriar's argument that " The Illusions of Socialism," written as early as 1896, contained Shaw's first suggestion of disillusionment with democratic procedure.[3] Margaret Dower argued that Shaw's 1908 preface to *Fabian Essays* was optimistic in its attitude towards democracy; the 1931 preface was pessimistic. She saw pessimism in his advocating the selection of rulers by examination and limiting their powers by constitutional checks without government based on adult suffrage.[4] In fact this was a well-established Fabian tradition. Shaw was always a very Fabian democrat. Dower was wrong, and her mistake indicates just how difficult it is to date the beginning of the change in Shaw's attitude towards traditional democratic procedures.

[3] Alfred Turco, Jnr, *Shaw's Moral Vision* (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 118–9; Alan M. McBriar, *Fabian Socialism and English Politics 1884—1918* (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 82–3.

[4] Margaret Winifred Dower, " The Political and Social Thinking of George Bernard Shaw," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Boston University, 1957), p. 13.

Shaw always considered that the widest input into decision-making was extremely important. He also advocated participation at all levels of decision-making from all classes of society. He was himself for many years a busy vestryman in the borough of St Pancras, discussing the common or garden aspects of local government, its drainage, rates, sewerage and street lighting. His belief in the democratic process was practical as well as logical: to take the decisions and then make them work by the most efficient method possible and by their strict implementation. Inevitably this would exclude public participation, which would reduce the efficiency of the operation. For example, in the case of commuters wanting to reach a city centre, it was only natural that they should decide upon having an efficient rail service with adequate trains; but they would not expect to drive the trains themselves. In the interests of the safety of all passengers, none of them should be allowed near the driver's cabin. A professional should be appointed to do the work.

Shaw extended this concept to government when he wrote that " democracy as the thing to be done may be inevitable (hence the vital need for a democracy of supermen); but democracy as the way to do it is like letting passengers drive the train: it can only end in collision and wrecks."[5] However much he changed his attitude it is important to stress that the Shaw of 1908 was never a subscriber to the Gettysburg Lincoln ideal of government for, of, and by the people; and there could scarcely be discerned any advancement in his views when in 1925 a sympathetic Shavian commentator, John Collis, described some of the implications thus:

> So at length Shaw perceived that Democracy was impossible if it meant not only Government of the people but *by* the people. He perceived that it was useless to wait till the majority was converted for they would never be converted, and that it was as ridiculous to expect the ordinary man to frame laws for himself as to write plays for himself—and said so. He changed his views and took the point of view that the select minority must force the majority to do its will. That is the Toryism à la Ruskin and Carlyle. He then perceived that unless the select minority *does* force the majority to do its will things will remain in a state of democratic chaos. That is the Bolshevism à la Lenin and Trotsky and all true Bolshevists. So he became a Bolshevist. It must always be remembered that Toryism and Bolshevism are the same thing in the first sense, and that in that sense Baldwin is a Bolshevist and Trotsky a Tory. That is why both Liberals and mild Labour men so bitterly hate Toryism on the one hand and Communism on the other, for they know in their hearts that they are but wanderers in the middle mist falsely pretending to believe in the people. . . .
>
> The point to grasp about the modern Shaw is that, while taking the Tory view of the hopelessness of Democracy, he insists that the minority (not a dictator like Mussolini but a group) must force the

[5] Bernard Shaw, " Preface," *Getting Married*, in *The Complete Prefaces of Bernard Shaw* (London, 1965), p. 14. All future references to Shaw's prefaces come from this source.

majority at the point of a bayonet to do what they (the minority) consider for the good of the state.[6]

Yet within two years Shaw was supporting the cause of an individual dictator—Mussolini. If we assume Collis to be correct in his analysis at the time, then it must have been between 1925 and 1927 that a substantial shift occurred in Shaw's attitude, allowing for the democratic institution to operate under the leadership of just one man. He had consolidated this attitude when he returned to playwriting with *The Apple Cart* in 1930.

Shaw pointed out early in his preface to *The Apple Cart* that he was unable to add substantially to what he had written in *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism* (1928). There were two inseparable main problems to be resolved: " the *economic problem* of how to produce and distribute out subsistence, and the *political problem* of how to select our rulers and prevent them from abusing their authority in their own interests and those of their class or religion." Shaw looked at capitalist democracy. It had solved the economic problem of how to produce; but its ability to distribute was not far short of non-existent. Politically, it had given " Votes for Everybody and Every Authority Elected by Vote." This had been designed to prevent tyranny; but Shaw argued that it had produced ineffectiveness.[7] Although maintaining that the widest input into decision-making lay at the centre of his democratic philosophy, by the time that he wrote *The Apple Cart* Shaw had come to consider that this concept was an impediment to democracy, even an illusion. He had become disillusioned, not only with the democratic election process, but in a far more radical fashion with the day-to-day parliamentary procedure. He had convinced himself that it was not the way to effect social change. Both E. Strauss and Margaret Dower have argued that, between 1894 and 1914, one of the most important factors influencing Shaw's interpretation of the method of implementing socialism was the innate resistance to it from even those sectors of British society which ought to have espoused Fabianism, a fact emphasized by the Labour Party's failure officially to endorse socialism as part of its programme until 1918.[8] By 1929, I believe, it was the effect of parliamentary procedure on the Labour Party in office that was the strongest factor influencing his interpretation of capitalist democracy.

AS a participant in the founding of the Labour Party, which became attuned to progress through parliamentary methods, Shaw had been increasingly disappointed with events in British politics. The system appeared not to permit change. It was even counter-productive where changes were concerned; it destroyed the initiators of change. Looking at the now-blooded Parliamentary Labour Party, he was forced to conclude

[6] John Stewart Collis, *Shaw* (London, 1925), pp. 57–8. I am indebted to Yukiya Myoga, " G. B. Shaw's View of Democracy," in *Studies in English Literature*. (Tokyo, vol. xiii, no. 1, January 1933, pp. 66–73), for bringing my attention to Collis's work.

[7] Shaw, " Preface," *The Apple Cart*, p. 327.

[8] E. Strauss, *Bernard Shaw: Art and Socialism* (London, 1942), pp. 27–28; Dower, p. 12.

that the system changed political parties rather than the other way around. The parliamentary procedure that had originally been conceived as a force for the prevention of tyrannical usurpation of political power was now actually preventing progress. The outcome he viewed as inevitable. In order to achieve progress, small groups or individuals would reject the previous ideal of parliamentary democracy, and would take upon themselves responsibility for managing state affairs. He reasoned that such dictators were necessary because of the negligence and incompetence of administrations under democratically elected governments.

Although he still claimed to believe sincerely that democracy was in the interest of everyone, by 1929 Shaw was expressing his belief that the political activities of certain minorities were in the greater public interest. Perhaps his constant search for a political morality that might satisfy his conscience justified the simplistic descriptions of his actions as *Pro Bono Publico*, but the Public were to be protected from themselves. And the consequences for his political allegiance were exaggerated. He did not limit his support merely to socialist dictatorships but appeared to give credence to the politics of every dictator of whatever political persuasion. He supported dictatorial activity almost for its own sake. He perceived anything as being better than democracy's present posture, and appeared to commend both super-hero and super-villain alike for their skill in simply breaking the mould of liberal democracy. The common factor among the leaders of whom he approved was that they were motivated by the need to introduce social change. First the Leninist Bolsheviks, then Mussolini, then Hitler, then quite a few others, found themselves qualifying for the Shavian stamp of approval.

If their methods were violent, Shaw was not squeamish. If they simply refused to get bogged down in endless debates about ends and means, he approved. Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of Lenin's secret police, the Cheka, marked himself out for special Shavian commendation. On being put in charge of the Soviet railways, he discovered that his orders were being ignored by a particular station. He went to the station, found his telegrams piled up on the station-master's desk, pulled out a revolver and publicly shot the station-master dead. Having thus summarily ensured that no more of his commands would be ignored, he returned to Moscow. Shaw commented:

> Thus did he pick himself out as an executive officer by his readiness to pick other people off if they stood in the way of the transport system which was the circulation of Russia's life-blood.[9]

There could surely be no stronger statement of the Shavian belief that humanity was best served by immediate, direct action. Shaw accepted the need for violence, possibly not as being inevitable, but as an answer to what he considered as political futility. Needless to say, his sympathetic approach to dictators and their methods brought him into considerable conflict with the vast majority of liberal democrats.

[9] Quoted in Ruth Adam, *What Shaw Really Said* (London, 1966), p. 69.

Shaw's ultimate political objective was socialism. Was this socialism better arrived at via bourgeois democracy or via fascism? His disenchantment with the " democratic " method led him to seize hold of the fascist alternative, perhaps almost in despair. Parliament in Britain seemed to have a natural bias against socialism. The Labour Party's first short-lived and unsuccessful performance in office could be accounted for in a number of ways—among others, its inability to persuade the Civil Service that it was the legitimately elected government and should be treated as such, and the inability of its leaders and MPs in their minority position to work the system of the House to their advantage. The performance did not bode well for a second attempt. Whatever policies a dictator chose to implement, argued Shaw, he would not have to contend with the problem that had obstructed the British Labour Party. In a talk on " Democracy as a Delusion " at the Kingsway Hall on 23 November 1927, he told his audience that " Socialism must get a dictator."[10]

IN July 1931, the 74-year-old Bernard Shaw visited Russia. Upon his return journey, he began eulogizing the Soviet Union to crowds of reporters in Warsaw, Berlin and London. His stated impressions of the USSR were laudatory, uncritical, hyperbolic, and some of them he knew to be untrue: ". . . No lack of food . . . Workers happy and working for a communal good . . . The five-year plan proceeding well and will not collapse . . . I saw nothing disagreeable in Moscow . . . If eighteen, I'd stay; but I'm too old to change my domicile . . . All that the bourgeois papers write about the USSR is lies, lies, and more lies . . . In the USSR, children and grown-ups live better . . . Stalin is a very pleasant man and, in fact, a great teacher of the working class . . . Soviet Russia is the greatest actual fact in the world."[11] Shaw also refuted an idea that he had previously accepted, namely that there was forced labour in Russia. He stated that forced labour existed only in countries " where workers give up the product of their labour to others, while in the Soviet Union the workers personally use the product of their labour."[12] More fundamentally, however, henceforth he would argue that Fabianism was the governing political force in the USSR, that Soviet communism equalled Fabianism.

Why did Shaw make such claims for Soviet Russia? Louis Fischer warned that so many visitors to Russia " came to see what they wanted to see, good or bad; they came to find corroboration of views previously held and opinions previously expressed."[13] It would be difficult, however, to argue that Fischer's maxim was true in Shaw's case. He had spoken comparatively little about Russia since Lenin's death. References in *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism* (not at this stage extended to include Sovietism and Fascism) were his only writing of

[10] *The New York Times*, 24 Nov. 1927, 14:5.
[11] *The New York Times*, 1 and 2 Aug. 1931; *Welt am Abend*, 1 Aug. 1931; *Pravda*, 2 Aug. 1931.
[12] *Daily Worker*, 3 Aug. 1931, 2:1.
[13] Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1946), p. 198.

any substance dealing with Soviet Russia. In the 14 months prior to his Russian trip—in the summer of 1931—he made only four references to Russia. First, he commented on the superiority of Russian films in not having to fall back on sex appeal.[14] Second, *Izvestiya* asked him, as well as other European and American writers, about preparations in the West for an aggressive war against the USSR. Shaw informed the Russians that the Americans and British would probably hang him first as a sign that they were about to attack.[15] Third, he wrote a quite serious article—one supposes in reply to the Pope, who had recently attacked communist religious desecrations. Under the pseudonym G. B. Essippoff, Shaw pretended he was a Russian who was pained by the religious persecution in England.[16] Finally, on 20 June 1931 *John Bull* published an article Shaw had written called " Russia Is Saving Herself." In it he argued that the refusal to allow Russia into the circle of international commerce had harmed British capitalists; they could by now have been enjoying the benefits, and even the ownership, of Russian industry. Instead, Russia had been thrown back on its own resources, and these had proved to be immense. Tapped by " Communist Nationalism," they had allowed Russia to succeed with its five-year plan. Russia was showing the West the economic way forward. Shaw concluded by inquiring of the British whether they were entirely unteachable?

Although all Shaw's statements may have been sympathetic to Soviet Russia, they can scarcely be construed as views and opinions of a " convert " to Soviet communism. First, the strength of his nationalism should be noted. Second, given the prolific output of his writings, speeches and comments, his comparative silence about the USSR makes any conclusions confirming a rampant pro-Soviet orientation difficult to draw. We need therefore to look at his Soviet composed itinerary in an effort to decide whether his Soviet hosts could somehow have engineered his conversion.

SHAW spent 10 days in the USSR. He joined the party of Lord and Lady Astor at very short notice, availing himself of a long-standing offer from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers to visit Russia. On 12 July 1931, *Izvestiya* reported that the General Secretary of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers had the previous day received a telegram from " the famous English writer, Bernard Shaw," advising that he would arrive in Moscow on 20 July. The purpose of Shaw's visit, as stated by the Soviet newspaper, was for Shaw to familiarize himself with the " Socialist construction of the Soviet Union."[17]

The *Izvestiya* report was true but incomplete. Shaw had also said something to the effect that his visit would only be brief; he was due to address the Independent Labour Summer School in Welwyn at the

[14] *The New York Times*, 6 Dec. 1930, 12:2.
[15] *Izvestiya*, 23 June 1930, 2:5.
[16] *Daily Herald*, 7 April 1930, p. 8.
[17] *Izvestiya*, 12 July 1931, 2:3.

beginning of August. Moreover he had stressed that he did not want to be bogged down with receptions and such like because he would be there on " serious business." (Anatoly Lunacharsky in a Soviet newspaper was soon to speculate about the serious nature of Shaw's business.) But to what extent Shaw even modestly entertained the notion that there would be no receptions and that he would be left free to follow his own devices in the USSR is hardly worth conjecture. H. G. Wells once remarked that if Shaw didn't like publicity, then why didn't he shave off that ridiculous red beard? The beard may have whitened but it was still the same GBS.

The Soviets immediately attended to Shaw's wishes—if not to the letter, then to the spirit. They started to make ready for his arrival in a manner that was reserved for their favourite sons. No one could have expected any less. Were they seriously to let Shaw slip around the USSR in the shadows? Was he not arguably the greatest living playwright and one of the most famous Western socialists expressing a keen interest in communism, its unique form of government? The show would go on.

Admittedly Shaw was not the safe sort of socialist that the Soviet Union usually welcomed in this way. He had been, and might still turn out to be, extremely critical of many facets of Soviet society. It was always a danger; his critical faculties were best employed in ridicule. He had the worrying and, for Soviet communists, quite inexplicable habit of praising Italian fascism. In addition, there were his travelling companions. He chose as his close friends not other socialists, but Tories, members of the nobility, no less. Anatoly Lunacharsky had the unenviable task through the national press of having to reconcile the Soviet people to some of Shaw's " failings "—and it was obvious that he hoped Shaw's individualism, with his " untrammelled mind," " ironical chuckles " and brilliant use of paradox would not be directed against the Soviet interpretation of socialism during this visit. Shaw obliged and, for the most part, " quit laughing " (as Lunacharsky requested), treating his visit seriously and with due deference to the Party dogma. For him this was to be a fact-finding mission. The Russians had very properly, therefore, begun to assemble little packages of facts for him to find.

Shaw's basic itinerary was much the same as one organized for every visitor to Russia. Most of it could be repeated today through an Intourist or Sputnik holiday. The Lenin Mausoleum, the Kremlin, the Park of Culture, the Museum of the Revolution, the Hermitage, St Isaac's and the Kazan Cathedrals are standard, one might say almost statutory, fare. Shaw was shown nothing extraordinary when he went to an opera, a concert, a Rest Home and a children's centre. He also saw the Diamond Exhibition, then in the State Bank, now in the Armoury of the Kremlin.

Certain of his activities were more " specialized." He was taken to a magistrates' court, and visited two collective farms, a film studio, a prison and a sports centre.

At the sports centre, the Soviet authorities had organized a horse race meeting in honour of Shaw's 75th birthday. He, of course, was appalled. Like his vegetarianism, he assumed that his abhorrence of all sports was

well-known. His *Who's Who* entry read under " Recreation ": " Anything except sport." The Russians, however, were not going to be crushed beneath his brand of puritanism. They named a race in his honour. And one of the horses had been renamed Bernard Shaw.[18]

As the biped Shaw made his way to the track, disappointed at losing his record of being the only Irishman who had never attended a race-meeting, he muttered something about expecting to see only one horse in a race organized by a socialist state that did not believe in competition. He took his seat in the grandstand and fell asleep, while Lady Astor, anxious to highlight any disapproval that he might show for things Soviet, ostentatiously fanned the flies away from him with a brilliantly coloured scarf.[19] At the end of the race, the winning jockey was due to be presented to Shaw. The winner turned out to be an Irishman. Shaw had never cared for birthday celebrations. The Soviet Union had fortuitously compounded a forceful reminder of many of the reasons why.

The collective farm which the Shaw party visited near Tambov, several hundred miles south-east of Moscow, was not a Soviet show-piece. It became part of the standard foreign visitors' itinerary only after the Shaw visit. Maurice Hindus, who had joined the party in Warsaw, was told by Shaw how much he would like to see a collective farm. When Hindus told Shaw of a small farm he knew, run by Russians who had at one time lived in the USA, Shaw wanted to see it.

The Soviet officials had already planned a visit for Shaw to a large state farm. They had no record of the farm Hindus mentioned so they sent someone from the Ministry of Agriculture to check it. The reply came back that the farm had only two tractors. The Soviet officials had wanted to show Shaw a farm with at least 50 tractors. They told Hindus to tell Shaw that his farm was unavailable for viewing at the present time. Hindus refused; Shaw insisted on seeing it, and the whole party, plus officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, descended on the farm at Krishnavo. The officials were so impressed that they recommended that it become part of the selective Intourist itinerary.[20] The Hindus story helps to explain the absurdity of events on a particular day when Shaw and his party were rushed around a large collective farm in the Kirsanov district of Moscow, and then whisked off over 300 miles to see another one. The Soviet officials had not trusted Hindus's farm; they were determined that Shaw should see a " proper sized " farm first. As things turned out, their caution proved unnecessary.

Shaw also visited a film studio and a prison. Normally such institutions would be off-limits except to professionals. So Shaw became a " professional." His qualifications as a dramatist need not be enumerated. A number of his plays were later to be turned into films and, incidentally, he

[18] H. W. L. Dana, " Shaw in Moscow," in *The American Mercury*, Vol. XXV, No. 99, March 1932, p. 350.

[19] *The New York Times*, 27 July 1931, p. 8.

[20] Sylvia R. Margulies, *The Pilgrimage to Russia: The Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, 1924–1937* (Madison, 1968), pp. 149–150.

appeared in one of Baird's first television transmissions. Rarely at a loss for words and with an eye for the spectacular, Shaw took advantage of being filmed by some technicians as he wandered around the *Soyuzkino* studios and made an off-the-cuff speech about Lenin and what he termed " the Leninist experiment " in civilization. A few days later he edited and corrected the short film which was shown nationally in Soviet cinemas and broadcast over the radio.

IN common with many other countries, the USSR lionized Shaw as a leading figure in world literature; the receptions, the lunches, the banquets, the race meeting, all in his honour, cannot instantly be taken as evidence of alternative Soviet motives. The nature of the Soviet speeches on such occasions, however, focusing heavily—and often erroneously—on his credentials as a sympathizer with Soviet socialism, allows for a new argument to be introduced: namely, that he was being flattered and praised for the purpose of cultivating his loyalty and affection; possibly to increase his future worth to the USSR? Shaw himself admitted that he had been treated like Karl Marx in person.[21] Probably he enjoyed, and was influenced by, this aspect of his Soviet visit. He also had meetings with some of the most famous names of Soviet society, Gorky, Krupskaya, Radek, Stalin; and he was escorted on his travels by both Maksim Litvinov and Anatoly Lunacharsky. There are, however, two points that make it difficult to explain Shaw's conversion to Soviet communism in terms of his Soviet experiences.

First, there were certainly enough unpleasant incidents during his visit to make him reject the USSR forever. The USSR is a country prone to extremes: the surfeit of an item in a shop one day, its complete absence the next; the occasional lack of attention to a foreign visitor's regular meal intake most of the day, followed by a stupendous banquet in the evening, and an hour later something resembling English high tea. For the latter example, " feast or famine " is an especially apt phrase, but it can be applied to the many Soviet situations that present two such extremes. On the very first day in his Moscow hotel, having already been stuck in a lift four feet below the main floor level and then " hauled out by the ears," Shaw experienced " feast or famine." At night as he tried to sleep he found it extremely noisy in his hotel suite, and felt compelled to shut the windows to exclude the din from the street. He was now sweltering in the heat of the bedroom. He abandoned the bedcovering that "would have been warm for the South Pole."[22]

On his birthday, having travelled back overnight from Leningrad to Moscow with no restaurant car on the train, the party was not given anything to eat until about two o'clock in the afternoon at the race

[21] Bernard Shaw, " Touring in Russia," Pts. I & II, in *Nash's Magazine*, (January and February 1932), p. 195.

[22] Bernard Shaw, ' Correspondence with Mrs Charlotte Shaw,' 21–27 July 1931, British Library, Add. MSS 50550, pp. 231–2. Also Cornell University Library, Burgunder-Shaw Collection.

meeting. Shaw wrote back to his wife in England that between hunger and heat he was in anything but brilliant form.[23]

" Feast or famine " aside, by the time Shaw arrived in Leningrad he was growing tired of and bored by the multitude of visits to famous places. At the Hermitage, for example, even though he expressed an interest in the gold artifacts of the old nomadic Scythian race,[24] he found the forced route march through the art galleries tedious. His comments, valid as those of a former art critic, reflect the irritation many people have felt at being faced with a collection so enormous that, if one minute were allowed for looking at every picture, it would mean a large slice out of one's life before the second floor was reached. The Soviet newspapers did not print Shaw's remarks; but needless to say, *The New York Times* did: " We marched past acres and acres of pictures, but they all looked alike to me."[25]

He was also bored by one particular group of people—writers. Almost every day he was displayed before groups of writers and publishers, joined in their respective lunches and receptions, and spent a great deal of time at repetitive question and answer sessions in German and English.

He also had " psychological " problems coping with groups of Soviet children with their clean washed faces, brushed hair, spotless clothing and impeccable manners. His first impulse was " to denounce them as a parcel of insufferable little Marxian prigs."[26] He thought better of it, however, and tried to console himself with the idea that the children only behaved like that in the presence of distinguished visitors.

Finally, Shaw was extremely disenchanted with his experiences at *Elektrozavod*, a giant electric plant in Moscow. At first, he had been very impressed while being shown around the factory, and had taken a great deal of interest in hearing how the five-year plan had been fulfilled in two and a half years. He was then introduced to the most productive workers, and to members of the factory's literary circle. This also interested him. When the factory tour was over, he and Lady Astor were persuaded to climb aboard a truck in the forecourt to deliver a parting address to some workers having their dinner break. Lady Astor talked first, exchanging a few pleasantries, but these did not last long. The Soviet workers soon grasped the gist of her argument: the USSR should take its place in the capitalist world order and forego its proletarianism. The crowd started to heckle energetically. In face of the storm of bad tempers that seemed to be developing, Shaw intervened. He reportedly said: " The more I see of Proletarians, the more I thank God that I am not one." It certainly had the required effect. The crowd was stunned into silence.

It would be completely mis-stating the case to argue that Shaw was critical of Russian industrial workers as a whole. Quite the contrary. His next few statements emphasized that. However, he became Andrew

[23] Ibid. p. 240.
[24] *Izvestiya*, 26 July 1931, 2:6.
[25] *The New York Times*, 27 July 1931, 10:1.
[26] Bernard Shaw, *The Rationalization of Russia*, Harry M. Geduld (ed.), (Bloomington, 1964), p. 90.

Undershaft at a time like this, and thought the unenlightened industrial worker contemptible. The heckling had highlighted the uncivilized attitude of some of the workers towards other social classes. Shaw was perhaps reminded how far short of his *Major Barbara* ideal still was industrial social conditioning in the USSR.

This combination of factors, I believe, had their effect in deciding Shaw never to go back to the USSR. Of course, he was by now 75 years old; at an age when strenuous " busmen's holidays " and " fishing trips " were becoming decidedly less attractive. Yet leaving Shaw's own physical condition aside, and even allowing for the special treatment that he had received as a guest of the Soviet authorities, he came to the realization that the physical reminders of Soviet reality were decidedly less comfortable than his intellectual speculations.

THE second point is based on the premise that Shaw's " conversion " to Soviet communism could only have taken place because of the sequence of political events in Britain. We must therefore return to the question of what it was in the summer of 1931 that precipitated his desperate search for an alternative socialist model?

The British Labour Party had originally been formed from several quite different strands of political thinking: " Liberalism " in the party political sense, " socialism " of varying convictions, and radicalism. Fabianism, although by its nature a comparatively conservative ideology, was nevertheless a radical doctrine within the Labour Party. The Fabians pressed for socialism to be introduced as part of the Labour Party programme. The idea met with strong opposition until 1918, but by 1929 their brand of socialism with its admixture of nationalism had permeated the Labour Party to such an extent that in the Labour government formed that year there were 20 Fabians in office, eight of whom were Cabinet Ministers.[27]

In August 1931, left-wing parliamentary hopes received an almost mortal blow when Ramsay MacDonald, an ex-Fabian, made a coalition with the Liberals and the Tories. For him, events had created a higher priority than socialism, a crisis that he believed socialism could not cope with. He defended his actions strenuously:

> I have given my life to the building up of a political party. I was present at its birth. I was its nurse when it emerged from infancy and had attained adult years.
>
> At this moment I have changed none of my beliefs and none of my ideals. I see that it is said that I have no labour credentials for what I am doing. It is true. I do not claim to have them, although I am certain that in the interests of the working classes I ought to have them.
>
> Be that as it may, I have the credentials of an even higher authority. My credentials are those of *national duty* [my emphasis] as I conceive it, and I obey them irrespective of the consequences. . . .
>
> This threatening cloud has to be dispelled, and dispelled immedi-

[27] Stephen Ingle, *Socialist Thought in Imaginative Literature* (London, 1979), p. 109.

> ately . . . When the danger has been removed we can have an assize trial and a verdict, but my colleagues and myself are determined that the assize trial shall not be a coroner's inquest.[28]

That MacDonald was able to convince others of his sincerity comes as no less of a surprise than the fact that he seems to have convinced himself. Bernard Shaw, on 26 November 1931, at a Fabian Society lecture, implied MacDonald's genuine self-deception when he said:

> I had always given my friends MacDonald and Snowden credit for not only occasionally declaring themselves Socialists, but really knowing what socialism was and meaning it. It was a little bit of a shock to find that when it came to the point, they discovered that they were not Socialists at all.[29]

Events had forced MacDonald to believe that nationalism and socialism could not successfully be combined under the existing British parliamentary system. A variety of events over the years had convinced Shaw of exactly the same thing. Shaw had shown his awareness by voicing support for an alternative to liberal-democratic government—Italian fascism. MacDonald showed his awareness by choosing to keep a hold on national power. MacDonald's political statement on his own level was similar to Shaw's. One was the extreme Liberal reaction; the other, the extreme radical.

The general build-up to the set of events that occasioned MacDonald's August defection had months earlier occasioned Shaw to renew and extend his search for a political model that successfully combined nationalism with socialism. Italian fascism was proving good at building the nationalist ideal, but sluggish—to say the least—at adopting socialism. Although Shaw undoubtedly realized that the USSR would be a better socialist candidate, it had scarcely shown itself sufficiently nationalistic. Internationalism had long been his major complaint about the USSR. He had publicly, and on numerous occasions, objected to the activities, and even the existence, of the Third International.

Having met Stalin in person, and having been reassured that " socialism in one country " was not a vehicle for disguising the export of revolution elsewhere, Shaw was finally convinced of the USSR's nationalism. In the notes for a lecture on " The Politics of Unpolitical Animals," he described Stalin as a " Communist, [an] Opportunist, [and a] Nationalist."[30]

It is almost impossible to over-emphasize that it was the events on Shaw's own political doorstep that forced him to stand in admiration in the hallways of others. Had British parliamentary democracy been able to satisfy his wish for socialist construction, he would never have begun to look elsewhere. Looking abroad for political models contravened the

[28] Quoted in *The New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1931, 9, XX:7.

[29] Bernard Shaw, " What Indeed," in G. B. Shaw, *Practical Politics*, Lloyd J. Hubenka (ed.), (Lincoln, 1976), pp. 210–211.

[30] Bernard Shaw, ' Handwritten Notes for " The Politics of Unpolitical Animals",' 23 Nov. 1933, British Library, Add. MSS 50688, p. 258.

spirit of his nationalist Fabianism. Assured by Soviet officials in London and by his own observations of the past few years that Soviet Internationalism was practically defunct, and propelled by the circumstance of a socially and politically ineffective second Labour term in office, Shaw scarcely needed to make a visit to the USSR, were it not formally to occasion his " conversion." From almost the moment he arrived in Soviet Russia, he had now " made sure " that the maximum publicity was given to the transfer of his political allegiance. It was quite fortunate timing that, almost at the instant he returned, MacDonald's defection could be used to illustrate the validity of his long-standing pessimism about the British parliamentary model and, *ipso facto*, justify his optimism for the Soviet one.

In November, after the Labour Party had gained a new leader but lost an election, Shaw offered a different hope for British socialism. He explained to a Fabian audience in his talk, " What Indeed ": " From henceforward, owing to what has happened in Russia, you are either a Communist, or what MacDonald and Snowden are, whatever that exactly may be." He might just as well have said: " After what happened to MacDonald and Snowden, you are either exactly what they are, or a Communist as they are in Russia." The choice was the same: assuming one needed political power, the decision lay between Soviet communism and MacDonald's ideology. The choice would mostly be made on the basis of MacDonald's, not Russia's, performance.

Not everyone felt trapped in this Shavian dilemma. *The New Statesman*, for example, urged its readers to believe in the possibility of reviving the British socialist ideal with new policies. Yet it, too, was forced to decide between either Scylla or Charybdis when some of its readers pointed out that by new policies it meant old ones revamped; and the system had shown itself quite capable of defeating those policies in whatever guise they appeared.

VISITING the USSR had done one notable thing for Shaw. It led him to embrace a paradox, arguably the greatest in his life: Soviet communism was Fabianism. He thought it so good a paradox that he never let go of it, nor let anyone else forget it:

> I was one of the inventors of Fabian socialism now established as the policy of the USSR.[31]

> Stalin is a good Fabian, and that's the best that can be said of anyone.[32]

> . . . the handful of " bourgeois " Fabians meeting in each other's drawing rooms, without a fixed subscription or a banking account, successfully explored the path to Socialism on constitutional lines;

[31] " An Interview with Eleanor O'Connell," 14 Feb. 1948. Quoted in Hesketh Pearson, *Bernard Shaw* (London, 1975), p. 492.

[32] " Address to the American Shaw Society," 1 July 1950. Quoted in Lawrence Langner, *G.B.S. and the Lunatic* (London, 1964), p. 145.

> made it respectable; and lived to see the gigantic Russian experiment completely converted to Fabianism by sheer force of experience under Lenin and Stalin. But they are still, and must remain, missionaries among the savages.[33]

In the light of Shaw's insistence that Soviet communism was Fabianism, we are obliged to look at what he meant, why he forced Fabianism into this particular position, and how appropriate the theory was.

A large number of Western commentators, surveying Shaw's life from this point onwards, has been horrified by his new stance. They insisted that Shaw did the USSR a quite unmerited service by giving it his support, and that he did himself and Fabianism a great disservice. Some of them, unsurprisingly and not unnaturally, have focused on the comparatively humane, pacifist doctrine of Fabianism. Soviet commentators—generally as bewildered as their Western counterparts—have praised Shaw for his " campaign for the protection of the USSR " and suggested to their Soviet audience, by way of an explanation, that " Shaw did much in the 1930s to expand his Fabian ideology, and broaden it to include the workers' communist movement."[34] Soviet critics, as a rule, naturally interpret Shaw as performing bourgeois Fabianism a service, by extending it in the direction of Soviet communism. Both sets of commentators, East and West, are unanimous in stating that Soviet communism could not possibly have been Fabianism.

The reason Shaw created the paradox was to give the theory of Fabianism the strength of a practical doctrine, something that it had not had in Britain. Along the lines that " power corrupts," it might be argued that, in trying to strengthen Fabianism's arm, Shaw actually corrupted it. Many non-Soviet Marxist theoreticians maintain that Stalin did the same to communism. They suggest that in the process of strengthening the state, Stalin corrupted Marxism. It is conceivable therefore that Stalin's Marxism and Shaw's Fabianism could have met somewhere along the road.

The old phrase had been that Fabianism was " gas and water socialism." State control of public utilities, thought the Fabians, would lead to state socialism. Acknowledging that state control in itself only implied socialism,[35] the Fabians argued for first placing the country's natural resources and the machinery of capitalism in the hands of the state; the state would then redistribute the income in order to create socialism. William Morris argued that the socialism of the Fabians would do nothing to improve the position of the workers, and pinpointed the weakness of their ideology: they were bureaucratic collectivists mistaking the " co-operative machinery " of advanced capitalism for socialism.[36]

[33] Bernard Shaw " Sixty Years of Fabianism." A Postscript, 1947. In *Fabian Essays* (Jubilee Edition) (London, 1948), p. 230.

[34] Zoya T. Grazhdanskaya, *Bernard Shou. Ocherk zhizni i tvorchestva.* [Bernard Shaw. Life and Works] Moscow, 1965), p. 198.

[35] Leonard Woolf, " The Early Fabians and British Society," in C. E. M. Joad (ed.), *Shaw and Society* (London, 1953), p. 45.

[36] Cited in Margaret Walters, " Introduction," to Bernard Shaw, *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism, Capitalism, Sovietism and Fascism* (Harmondsworth, 1982), p. xvi.

He wrote that if Fabianism were carried out in practice, it " would still leave us in a position from which we should have to begin our attack on capitalism over again. . ."[37] Morris believed that it was fundamentally impossible for change to be made from above.[38]

In his preface to the 1931 *Fabian Essays* Shaw wrote that when Morris told the workers that revolution was their only hope, the Fabians, without converting Morris, convinced him of the power of parliament. " It is not so certain to-day as it seemed in the eighties," continued Shaw, " that Morris was not right."[39] He was still evading, however, the point of Morris's objection to Fabianism. It was the same objection that Shaw himself had raised in his formative socialist years when writing an article on " Anarchism versus State Socialism."[40] And it was fundamentally the same objection that orthodox Marxists had against Stalin's expansion of control by the Soviet state: the relative position of the workers had not changed; one set of bosses was replaced by another; the alienation continued. Both Fabianism and Stalinism employed the mechanisms of capitalism.

Marxism in the classical sense postulated the eventual disappearance of the state. Whatever " state " there was for the period after the revolution would be controlled by the workers. Stalin was carrying on a tradition begun by Lenin. Even though Lenin in his last few months may have regretted his own massive bureaucratization of Russia after the revolution, there is no evidence that he began to oppose his own concept of administrating the state " on the workers' behalf." Administration requires some type of bureaucracy. Lenin had ensured that the state could not " wither away," and Stalin reinforced the Leninist state structure.

Shaw in a postscript to *Fabian Essays*, " Sixty Years of Fabianism," made no distinction between Lenin and Stalin. He saw them as conducting the same experiment. It can be argued that Lenin's was not just an experiment in state socialism (or state capitalism), that this was the specific contribution of Stalin. In terms of the state structure, however, with which socialism along Fabian lines could be organized, both Lenin's and Stalin's models tallied. If Fabians disregarded all the Marxian rhetoric and theory, and looked at the Russian description of Soviet socialism under Stalin, it was not unlike the model that they had been advocating. Even the revolutionary phase could be thought of as an extra step that the Russian " Fabians " had had to take because of the comparative backwardness of their economic and political system. By the 1930s it could be argued that the USSR had been back on the track of Fabian gradualism for several years.

[37] Quoted in ibid. pp. xvi–xvii.

[38] William Morris, " Monopoly or, How Labour is Robbed," in *Collected Works*, XXIII (London, 1915), p. 251. Cited in Alex Zwerdling, *Orwell and the Left*, (London, 1974), pp. 34–5.

[39] Bernard Shaw, *Fabian Essays* (1948), p. ix.

[40] Bernard Shaw, *Anarchism versus State Socialism* [Reprinted from the *Anarchist*], London, 1889.

SOME of the flaws in the argument must be pointed out, although many are self-evident. For Westerners, the equation runs into difficulty the moment it is put into practice: the secret police, the purges, the autocratic control, the lack of consumerism . . . illustrate very real differences. Their effect would deter most Western liberals from accepting the idea that Fabianism could equal Stalinism.

For a Soviet audience, Ivan Maisky's comments would seem to be pertinent. He pointed out to Shaw that the Bolsheviks did not free themselves from Tsardom, or the established Russian bourgeoisie, by large doses of Fabianism. The revolution was fundamental to Soviet progress. " Shaw waved his hands impatiently as though the matter were a bothersome trifle."[41] Ernest Barker wrote a letter to *The Times* in the summer of 1931 on a British understanding of basically the same theme. He complained of Shaw dismissing the Russian revolution as a splinter in the path of Soviet Fabianism. Barker argued that he understood the necessity for Russian communism to be built gradually after the revolution; after all, when one is not making a revolution one evolves and moves gradually. But he also understood the essence of Fabian socialism to be gradualism without a revolution. Surely therefore Shaw was presenting not a paradox but a paralogism?[42]

For the Soviets a dismissal of the revolution, for the Westerners the existence of a police force maintaining a non-parliamentary system of government, made Shaw's equation of Fabianism and Soviet communism absurd. But knowing that it usually takes a clever person to present a simple argument, we can perhaps give Shaw credit for not being totally ignorant of some of these differences (even though he may have thought them less significant than we do); but why did he bother to present such an unbalanced equation in the first place?

Shaw stressed that one would have to return to old-fashioned Fabian policies if one wanted to escape the mess of British politics.[43] However, the machinery for implementing those old policies would, he claimed, have to be new. The new-style cabinet would be composed of " thinkers " led by the closest thing to a dictator that one could get. There would be a hierarchy of dictators all the way through the system. Shaw wrote:

> . . . We can walk hand in hand with Stalin and Mussolini up to this point because the Government of the future, whatever else it may be, will have to be a positive governing government and not an organization of Anarchism flying the flag of Liberty.[44]

Shaw's admiration for the freedom of the Soviet planners, indeed the whole bureaucratic apparatus of the state, to act unhampered by the

[41] Ivan Maisky, " Bernard Shou: Vstrechi i razgovori," in *Novyi mir*, I (Moscow, 1961), pp. 219–220. The article appeared in English as " Meetings with George Bernard Shaw," in *Sputnik* (November 1967), pp. 163–175.

[42] *The Times*, 14 Aug. 1931, 6:a.

[43] Bernard Shaw, " In Praise of Guy Fawkes," in *Platform and Pulpit*, Dan H. Laurence (ed.), (London, 1962), p. 250.

[44] Ibid. pp. 246–7.

traditional checks and balances of Western liberal-democratic governments, showed that he would support the adoption of a similar system in Britain. In deciding that a hierarchy of Mussolinis or Stalins was needed to implement traditional Fabian policies, Shaw never seemed to ask himself the question whether these dictators would have the inclination to implement those particular policies. He assumed that they would. He mentioned almost as an aside that (presumably because of their lack of dictatorial ability) there would be no place in the new structure for a Ramsay MacDonald, a Sidney Webb or a Bernard Shaw.

HAVING returned from the USSR, Shaw's very first talk had been to the ILP summer school at Welwyn. Beatrice Webb, also at the summer school, recorded the following impressions in her diary:

> GBS spent two nights here and gave his pleasant chatty address on Russia to the Fabian Summer School. He was tired and excited by his trip to Russia: carried away by the newness and violence of the changes wrought: here is tragedy, comedy, melodrama, all magnificently staged on a huge scale. It *must* be right! The paradox of the speech: Russian revolution was pure Fabianism—Lenin and Stalin had recognised the " inevitability of gradualness "! Also they had given up " workers' control " for the Webbs's conception of the three-fold state—citizens', consumers' and producers' organisations. What is not Webbism or Western is the welding together of all three by the *Creed* oligarchy of two million faithful, dominating a population of 120 million indifferent, lukewarm or actively hostile. That is the crux of the controversy between those who approve or disapprove of Soviet Russia.[45]

The manner in which Beatrice Webb wrote her diary for 8 August 1931 gives an interesting indication that she was not unsympathetic to what Shaw had to say. In March, she had spoken of the " fanatical brutality " of Soviet Russia.[46] Five months later, she was being asked to decide whether the USSR was a " cruel slave state " or a " beneficent experiment in organising production and consumption for the common good." The choice had to be made at a lunch with Philip Snowden, MacDonald's co-defector to be, who was forcibly arguing the first position. Beatrice Webb remarked of the occasion that, without apparently being conscious of it, Philip Snowden had completely and utterly changed his outlook on organizing society.[47] Equally remarkable, perhaps, was how the Webbs were to change theirs. Already, by mid-August, Beatrice Webb had changed her mind on the merits of employing violence as a possible necessity in enforcing social change. The occasion of the lunch with Philip Snowden may have been greatly to Shaw's advantage. As things turned out, he could scarcely have devised a better way of winning socialist

[45] *Beatrice Webb Diaries 1924–1932*, Margaret Cole (ed.), (London, 1956), p. 278. The text of Shaw's address appeared as "The Only Hope of the World," in *Platform and Pulpit*, pp. 218–226.
[46] Cited in Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, *The First Fabians* (London, 1977), p.406.
[47] *Beatrice Webb Diaries 1924–1932*, pp. 278–9.

converts to his side than by Philip Snowden taking the other. It remains to be explained, however, why the Webbs should have succumbed so quickly to an acceptance of Sovietism and, at first it seems, merely on Shaw's say-so.

Many of the factors that influenced Shaw influenced the Webbs. Three in particular stand out to explain why the Webbs of 1931 were more susceptible to Soviet communism than they had been to, say, Italian fascism. First, they were politically unemployed. Sidney Webb had held posts in both the first and second Labour governments. As a Minister he was a disaster. He had a great many strengths; but he was not a leader and he could not organize others. Realizing his weaknesses, he had planned to retire from political life. The Webbs, however, were workaholics in the Shaw mould. The opportunity to move into pastures new looked so much more appealing than being put out to grass at Passfield Corner.

Second, the Soviet Union was a socialist-sounding option. Even if fascism could solve only one problem, it was the one that seemed of paramount importance to Shaw: with what to replace obstructive parliaments. Although a few fascist policies may occasionally have seemed socially acceptable, Beatrice Webb's diaries and letters show a general bewilderment at Shaw's expectation that fascism could produce social benefits. The USSR, on the other hand, professed an almost religious bias towards socialism. Stalin's victory over Trotsky was understood by the Fabians as a victory for common sense over revolutionary Marxism. Not all professed Soviet aims seemed in themselves disquieting. (The Webbs learnt to modify their sensitivity about the methods used.)

Third was the most decisive factor: GBS. His brilliance precipitated their conversion. He pitched his arguments at exactly the right level to win them over. He told them that the USSR had put into practice some of the Webbs' own doctrines. He asserted that their conception of the three-fold state had been introduced (which it had, incidentally); moreover that the whole process of Sovietization was Fabian.

The Webbs might not have believed all that Shaw said, but they were obliged either to bow out of political life or check it for themselves. After less than a month of " checking," in what was obviously a Shavian interpretation of the alternatives, Beatrice Webb wrote that, if the choice were between the individualist capitalist society as exemplified by America and Russian " Collectivism," they sided with Stalin.[48] By January 1932 she had accepted the full Shavian concept. She was sure of Fabianism in Russia.[49] Others, in particular Beatrice's niece, have related the story of the Webbs after they had been persuaded that there was something worth examining in Soviet communism.[50] Before the Webbs went to Russia, however, they were already won over to Soviet

[48] Cited in Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, *The First Fabians*, p. 406; *Beatrice and Sidney Webb. The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb*, III, Norman MacKenzie (ed.), (London, 1978), p. 366.

[49] Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, *The First Fabians*, p. 406.

[50] Barbara Drake, " The Webbs and Soviet Communism," in Margaret Cole (ed.), *The Webbs and Their Work* (London, 1949), pp. 221–232.

communism.[51] While one would not have expected any Fabian after Shaw to go to the USSR " on spec.," they had already drafted a set of conclusions for *Soviet Communism. A New Civilization?* Their Soviet findings revised, but did not substantially change, their opinions.[52]

It is outside the scope of this article to examine all the factors that motivated the Webbs' conversion to Soviet communism. The fact that Beatrice Webb focused only on the worse aspects of Soviet society before August 1931, yet within five months was voicing support for the USSR *because it was Fabian*—and this prior to the Webbs beginning their task of collecting information for their study on Russia which concluded nothing of the sort—seems sufficient proof that George Bernard Shaw had not only a hand in the process of turning her towards Soviet communism, but initiated it. Shaw therefore both managed to maintain a following of his own when he began fellow-travelling with the USSR, and also to give birth to an even more influential one in conjunction with the Webbs.

It is possible to enumerate the names of other disillusioned British socialists whom Shaw motivated to look eastwards for their salvation. John Strachey, for instance, was but one example of an extremely disillusioned Parliamentary Labour Party member ready to grasp at the coat tails of anything radical enough. On 26 September 1931, two months after Shaw had returned from the USSR, a letter from Strachey appeared in *The New Statesman and Nation*. Strachey argued that *The New Statesman and Nation* was wrong in advocating " new labour policies " to establish socialism. Such policies had been tried and failed. What was needed, he claimed, was a communist revolution. It would be quick and efficient. And if British exports were threatened, Strachey assumed that the USSR would bail Britain out.

While one can give Oswald Mosley direct credit for persuading Strachey to support his ideas (for at least a couple of months!), no similar correlation can be made between Shaw and Strachey. Yet who was it who had just devised an escape plan for left-wing British politics via the Soviet Union? Who during the past few weeks had been most enthusiastically expounding the idea through public addresses and the national newspapers?

If one can only speculate about Strachey's motivation, there are clear-cut acknowledgments of Shaw's influence on other fellow-travellers. Some of these became " celebrities " in their own right. The vast majority, however, for whom Shaw's example and arguments proved too alluring and too attractive to resist, never became household names. Nevertheless, from the summer of 1931 until his death in November 1950, Shaw must be considered an extremely dynamic force in furthering the cause of fellow-travelling with the USSR.

[51] See, for example, the entry in Beatrice Webb's diary, 17 May 1932.
[52] See also, Norman MacKenzie (ed.), *Webb Letters*, III, pp. 375–6.

ANY political investigation necessarily involves a study of influence. Politics is the art of influence. The purpose of this article has been to look at the influence of the USSR on George Bernard Shaw and on his Fabian politics.

In " fellow-travellers " of any kind—and here I speak of fellow-travellers of the Left, sympathetic to the USSR—it is implicit that the influence is persuasive. It cannot be coercive. No one can be forced to sympathize. Fellow-travelling is a voluntary state.

In July 1931 Shaw arrived in the USSR and claimed that he saw strands of social and political activity common to his notion of Fabianism at work. In fact, he was only pressing a 40-year-old claim for a Fabian monopoly on common sense. The other things that existed were clearly not part of Fabianism: labour camps, forced collectivization, secret policing, Party purges . . . The moment that Shaw and the Webbs began to tolerate and even advocate any of these practices, they ceased to lead with their Fabianism and started to follow.

In his 1919 talk on " Ruskin's Politics," Shaw had refused to condemn not only the Bolshevik bloodletting but the history of political and religious killings. His earlier writings from the frontlines during the First World War also revealed that he had totally intellectualized the relationship between politics and death. Nor was he Quaker-minded in his views on state exterminations. In December 1921–January 1922, he had included in his essay on " Imprisonment " a solution to the supervision of the incurable criminal: the lethal chamber.[53] His persistent refusal to amend the suggestion seriously and adopt a more humane liberal approach led to the exclusion of his essay from a joint project. It was later included in the Webbs' book on *English Local Government*, although they almost certainly shared the general editorial distaste for Shaw's " solution."

Ironically, the circumstances in which Shaw believed exterminations could usefully be carried out were extended by him under Soviet influence, even though they were already far in advance of what the USSR thought necessary and tasteful to describe. The USSR wanted to be " sold " to the West along liberal-democratic lines. Presumably this was one of the reasons that it cultivated fellow-travellers. Shaw, however, tried to " sell " Russia to the West along lines that included socially necessary death *à la mode Soviétique*. The exclusion in *Pravda* of numerous Shavian references to: " bumping off " speculators, " weeding out " members of the Communist Party at a rate of 13 per cent per annum, and hauling successful capitalists, traders, and farmers before a death-tribunal at any moment, indicated the different approaches to the " sales " technique. The Soviet editors did not think Shaw's relish for death should be publicly shared, or even admitted.[54]

To the " bright young things " of Oxford University, Shaw introduced the axiom that there was always a reaction against the revolution from

[53] Bernard Shaw, *The Complete Prefaces*, pp. 297–8.

[54] Compare: " Shaw Discovers the Almost Perfect State," in *The New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1931, 9, XX; and " Plokhaya ponyataya Rossiya," in *Pravda*, 26 Oct. 1931, p. 3.

those revolutionaries who had not expected it to be so cruel.[55] He also planned to introduce the idea to all his readers:

> I do not reproach the Soviet Government for not making these angels of the revolution [Krupskaya and Gorky] perfectly happy; they would have been unhappy in the Garden of Eden because the cats played cruelly with the mice before devouring them.
>
> Much less do I reproach it for frankly shooting anarchists and syndicalists who in the old unkind days were their comrades and helpers and fellow sufferers, or for handling Socialists who are also advocates of western parliamentary methods as more dangerous to the dictatorship of the proletariat than a British Conservative Prime Minister (even an ex-Socialist one).[56]

It almost seemed as though Shaw became increasingly more *blasé* about state imposed death as he drew nearer to a natural one himself.

The Webbs, on the other hand, were originally strong believers in the sanctity of life. On her first visit (1932), Beatrice Webb was uncomfortable about the darker sides of the Soviet Union. She talked about " the repression " of heresy, not to mention the sudden " disappearance of unwanted persons." She noted an " atmosphere of fear and suspicion."[57] The Webbs criticized the way in which the secret police manipulated the courts, the prosecution, and the trials so that the defendant was denied the right to a lawyer. They condemned the trials which purged the Party of political opposition. Then gradually they began to argue the political necessity for such practices. According to Malcolm Muggeridge, Beatrice Webb became quite Shavian in her advocacy of political exterminations:

> " It is true," she said suddenly à propos of nothing, " that in the USSR people *disappear*." She accentuated the word, showing her teeth as she did so. Clearly, she would have been well content to promote the disappearance of tiresome people in the same expeditious way, with no questions asked. Some of the more difficult and obscurantist figures in local government, for instance. And among the trade union leaders, no lack of candidates. Yes, people *disappeared*.[58]

Although Beatrice Webb and Bernard Shaw reached a similarity of view with regard to political exterminations, both Beatrice and Sidney Webb had to undergo a profound change in their instinctive attitudes before reconciling themselves to the concept. For Shaw it was a relatively small intellectual step.

Shaw also justified the Soviet applications of autocratic government and forced labour. The concepts themselves he had been supporting for years: autocracy, based on the example of Italian fascism, and compulsory labour, as an extension of wartime conscription. Therefore, although

[55] *The New York Times*, 13 June 1931, 14:5. Ibid. 19 June 1931, VIII, 2:2. For the same idea, see Bernard Shaw, ' Handwritten Notes for Lecture to the Oxford Communist Club,' 28 May 1932, British Library, Add. MSS 50704, pp. 243–7. The lecture was reported in *The Times*, 30 May 1932, 14:e.

[56] Bernard Shaw, *Rationalization*, pp. 71–2.

[57] Quoted in MacKenzie (ed.), *Webb Letters*, III, p. 378.

[58] Malcolm Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time* (London, 1972), p. 209.

Shaw's fellow-travelling was remarkable for public expressions of support for numerous extreme aspects of Soviet life, what made it equally remarkable was the complete absence of radicalism with which he arrived at those sympathies. Shaw's mentality was such that he had already intellectualized autocracy, forced collectivization, exterminations and purges before being confronted by the Soviet model.

Commentaire

"Il n'y a pas de bonheur sans liberté, ni de liberté sans vaillance." Thucydide

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

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Between Trotsky and Burnham

The Strange Tale of Bruno R.*

Adam Westoby

THE original edition of Bruno Rizzi's *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* has long enjoyed a reputation as an inaugural text among theoretical writings about communist society. The purpose of this article is to provide some information on Rizzi, on the circumstances in which, in 1938–39, he wrote *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, and on the book's reception.

The first edition was published privately by its author in Paris, under the partial pseudonym " Bruno R.," during September 1939. Rizzi, an Italian, was a commercial traveller in shoes, and a man of pronounced, if difficult to categorize, political opinions. Frequently travelling outside Mussolini's Italy he was, during the late 1930s, in tangential contact and argumentative discussion with various circles of anti-Stalinist communists, followers of Amadeo Bordiga and, particularly, Trotskyists. *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* was provoked by, and consists partly of polemic against, their attempts to accommodate the Soviet state within Marxist theory.

Rizzi's book, however, was impounded by the French authorities in early 1940 (under circumstances which are explained below) and the original edition has since then been a great rarity.[1] It has acquired, none the less, a reputation as a source of social and political ideas which gained wide currency after the war, and it has frequently been cited in the literature, both of sociology and of socialist and radical ideas, as a pioneering work. An important part of its reputation stems from the fact that Trotsky, in Mexico, received a copy in 1939 and gave its arguments a prominent place in his debate with his dissident followers, James Burnham and Max Shachtman, on the nature of the Soviet regime—a debate which has proved influential upon subsequent Marxist thinking, and more widely.

Among *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*'s varied ideas and assertions are, indeed, several that gained rather broad circulation. Some arise within the loosened framework of Marxist historical and social theory as it sought to adjust to Stalin's Russia. These centre on the conception of an unanticipated social formation, " bureaucratic collectivism," intruding upon the expected transition of capitalist into socialist society. It entails the ascent of a new, bureaucratic, ruling class and the conversion of the means of production into a new form of property, owned through the state in a nationalized, " class " form, rather than privately. Collective

* The matter of this article is contained in my introduction to the English edition of Part I of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, to be published by Tavistock Publications, London, and the Free Press, New York (and in which my acknowledgments of help with research will be found).

[1] It may, however, nowadays be consulted without difficulty on microfilms made from the copy at the Hoover Institution Library, Stanford University.

property enables centralized economic planning, and, being economically more efficient than capitalism, tends to supplant it. From these conceptions others, focusing more on political phenomena, arise. The Soviet Union is the purest, most advanced form of bureaucratic collectivism, but Nazi Germany and fascist Italy are moving towards the same point along different routes; generally, the superiority of collective, state directed economy leads all modern societies to converge towards "the bureaucratization of the world." Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States expresses the same tendencies, and also harbours within its expanding state bureaucracies the unwitting germs of totalitarianism.

Such arguments can certainly be regarded as seminal. James Burnham (in his book of the same title first published in 1941) put into popular circulation the idea of "the managerial revolution": that rule based on private property was being displaced not by the working class, but by new elites grounded in managerial and technical power. And the idea of the "convergence" of opposed social systems, present in Burnham, recurred in other variants, from journalism to rather general social and economic theories; they share the notion that industrial societies are being propelled, by common economic and organizational imperatives, towards an increasing resemblance.

But perhaps the main idea which Rizzi could claim to have fathered was the neo-Marxist notion of communist society as a distinct social form (in his terminology "bureaucratic collectivism")—a claim which turned upon its being ruled by its own "new class." Milovan Djilas, Tito's wartime lieutenant, perhaps did most to make this conception prominent. Djilas acted as a theoretical tribune of Yugoslav communism after its break with the Soviet Union in 1948, but in 1952 he began to turn his criticisms against the Yugoslav political bureaucracy. He hesitated long, however, before characterizing it as a "new class." The implications for Marxist theory ran deep; as he had earlier explained, there is a crucial difference between a *caste*, based on functions of control, and a *class*, based on ownership; if the Soviet bureaucracy "were a new class, its victory could not be prevented."[2] Trotsky had drawn precisely the same implication from Rizzi's book in 1939—it was on that ground that he rejected the characterization of Stalin's Russia as a distinct social order dominated by a ruling class. And the problem of the grounds and permanence of communist rule has not become less germane since then.

Djilas' *The New Class*, smuggled out of Yugoslavia and published in 1957, in the aftermath of the Hungarian revolution, created a considerable impression and renewed interest in such conceptions in the West. This led to a partial resurrection of Rizzi by scholars interested in Marxism's pre-war, but enduring, dilemmas, and among whom Rizzi's name had a sort of "underground" reputation. In 1959 Boris Souvarine's journal *Le Contrat Social* published an article by Georges

[2] "Class or Caste?" (1952), in Djilas, *Parts of a Lifetime* (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1975), pp. 175–76.

Henein which recalled Rizzi's book, regretted that he had disappeared in the war, and awarded him posthumous credit for the idea of Djilas' " new class." This provoked a lively correspondence, including contributions from Pierre Naville, who had known Rizzi in Paris in 1938–39, from Rizzi himself, indignantly alive and asserting his originality, and from the former American Trotskyist Hal Draper, who had visited him in Italy[3]; shortly afterwards Daniel Bell explored " The Strange Tale of Bruno R." in *The New Leader*.[4] Rizzi's 1939 book remained, however, inaccessible to many of the participants.

Recognition came to Rizzi rather later in his native country, where he had continued to publish, but mainly privately and little read, after the war. However, by the 1970s a number of Italian academics had become interested in his work, and in 1977, the year of his death, Rizzi was hailed by Bettino Craxi, leader of the Italian Socialist Party, as a pioneer thinker of democratic socialism and theoretical analyst of totalitarianism.

TO a degree *La Bureaucratisation du Monde was* a pathbreaking work. However, absence of the text has combined with reliance on indirect reports and quotations to encourage various misapprehensions about the 1939 book and its author—some of which a more exact account must attempt to correct.

Although it has acquired a sociological reputation, *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* is to at least as great an extent a political tract—with all the abrasiveness and perishability of that genre. This is so in two senses. Rizzi completed and published it in great haste, in response to the fast-moving crisis of international politics in 1939. And much of its argument is cast as polemic against the Left communist groups Rizzi was in contact with. Rizzi was—despite his disclaimers—a strongly political person, who drew on theoretical concepts, but often eclectically and inconsistently, in response to the immediate political conjuncture. To elucidate the circumstances of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*'s genesis and production, therefore, requires attention to Rizzi's political career no less than to abstract intellectual influences.

Rizzi's life up to and during the war is sparsely documented. For much of our information we must rely on his own recollections long after the events and on accounts he gave to others, such as Pierre Naville, after the war—sources which, in some particulars at least, are almost certainly misleading. There exists, in addition, an Italian police file on Rizzi—though it is rather incomplete, with documentation only from 1926, 1939–40, and 1943. However, a biographical sketch may be assembled.[5]

[3] *Le Contrat Social*, issues of Nov. 1958–May 1959.

[4] 28 Sept. 1959; see also the correspondence in the 12 Oct. and 16 Nov. issues.

[5] Rizzi's introductory and additional essays in the edition which he published in Italian in 1976 of the first part of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* (*Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, 2nd edition, Editrice Razionalista, Bussolengo [Verona]) contain many comments and recollections on his career. Some information can also be gleaned from various items among Rizzi's papers deposited at the University of Turin after his death. These are cited below as " Rizzi's papers."

RIZZI was born at Poggio Rusco, near the Po, south-east of Mantua, in 1901. In about 1918 he enrolled at the Milan Polytechnic; he appears to have been based in Milan thereafter. At about the same time he became a member of the Italian Socialist Party.[6] Immediately following its split at the Livorno Congress in January 1921, Rizzi joined the Communist Party. Soon after this he gave up his studies and became a shoe salesman and political activist. Some time thereafter he began to find the Comintern orthodoxy of the Communist Party too constricting and took up positions critical of the Party leadership. Although he was never part of the opposition current around Bordiga, he wrote, he frequented their circles.[7] Eventually he quit active politics in order to give himself time to " reflect."

A—possibly partly alternative—version has him expelled or excluded from the Communist Party following his attempts to communicate to Party leaders his suspicions regarding the identity of an informer responsible for repeated arrests among the Milan federation. Rizzi's own, dramatic, account of the episode relates his being arrested and interrogated by communists posing as policemen.[8]

Police reports of 1926 show that in May of that year Rizzi applied for a passport to go to Austria and France as a commercial traveller, giving as a supplementary reason his wish to consult " specialists in cerebral illnesses." The passport was refused, he being judged an " active propagandist " for the Communist Party. However, a follow-up report in June 1926 qualifies this assessment; Rizzi " professes communist theories, but leads a life apart and refrains from open propaganda, from fear also of reprisals, being personally known to fascist elements."[9] There is then a gap in the police reports until 1939. However, in 1929 Rizzi was, apparently, admitted to a clinic for psychological disorders; police reports during 1939–43 several times characterize him as " mentally unbalanced." In 1934 he was granted a passport and was able to

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The Archivo Centrale dello Stato, Rome, contains a file of 30 short documents concerning Rizzi from 1926, 1939–40 and 1943, mainly police and Ministry of the Interior–Public Security memoranda (Casellario Politico Centrale, reference no. 33507); this is cited below as " Rizzi's police file." The documents relate to the following events: Rizzi's unsuccessful application for a passport in 1926; a report to the police on his abortive attempt to have Part III of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* translated in 1939 and his subsequent departure from Milan to France; mail intercepts, police enquiries and an alert notice to frontier stations concerning Rizzi in 1940; and correspondence of May–June 1943 on his application to the Italian Consulate in Paris to renew his expired passport. There is also a list of 15 dated and serial numbered documents from the years 1926, 1939–40 and 1943; these are not on the file, though some of them (and other numbered documents not listed) are referred to in memoranda which *are* on the file.

There were clearly other episodes when Rizzi was the object of police attention, but which are not directly covered on the file. These include: his successful application for a passport in 1934, and its renewal in 1937 and March 1939; a police report on communists in Milan in 1935; his application to the Milan Prefettura in 1937 to publish his *Dove va l'URSS?* (see below, p. 42); and a police interview with Rizzi's mother in Milan in January 1940. Release of Casellario Politico Centrale material of this period is, apparently, still subject to the approval of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.

[6] Obituary article by Giorgio Galli, " Bruno Rizzi e la Nuova Classe," in *Mondo Operaio* (1977), no. 2.

[7] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. p. 174.

[8] Ibid. pp. 13–14 (essay by A. Rossi Raccagni), and pp. 226–27.

[9] Reports by the Milan Prefettura dated 11 May 1926 and 16 June 1926 (Rizzi's police file).

travel abroad selling shoes—which he often did, both to other parts of Europe, especially the south of France, and as far afield as the Sudan.[10]

Long afterwards Rizzi recalled being " decisively of the opposition from 1929, when I obtained a German version of Trotsky's *The Real Situation in Russia* "[11] (that is, the volume containing the suppressed " platform " of the 1927 joint opposition for the Fifteenth Soviet Party Congress; it was first published in German in 1928). Rizzi's recollection must be doubted. In fact the first written fruits of his " reflection " to have survived suggest he was a rather loyal supporter of the Soviet regime well after Stalin's complete triumph. This is a letter he prepared to the Soviet authorities in 1935, responding politely to Soviet official comment on the first five-year plan (1928/9–1933) and offering some observations, based on his own " experience of fifteen years in bourgeois trade," and intended as constructive criticism on the usefulness of the distributive and retail trades within the Sovet economy.[12] Far from being " parasites " or bourgeois survivals, as many Bolsheviks imagine, Rizzi argues that those employed in distribution have a crucial contribution to make, particularly in the " technical criticism " of products, and in adjusting production to the scale of consumer demand; it behoves Soviet planners to take the views of workers in distribution fully into account as the best barometer of consumers' needs and wishes. Some of these preoccupations, if not the propositions, anticipate those of his later, and especially post-war, writings—particularly the idea of the information conveyed by free consumer markets as essential.

However, by the early months of 1937, at the latest, Rizzi had read Trotsky's lengthy assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union, *The Revolution Betrayed*. His first work for publication, *Dove va L'URSS?* (Where is the USSR going?), written in March and printed (at his own expense) in Milan in June of that year is largely a paraphrase—in parts a direct translation—of *The Revolution Betrayed*;[13] it is likely that Rizzi drew on the French edition, which became available in late 1936. Rizzi preceded his use of Trotsky, however, with two chapters of his own in which he blamed Stalin for the assassination of Kirov and denounced the Moscow trials then taking place. According to Rizzi, the book's vigorous anti-Stalinism allowed it to gain the temporary approval of the Italian censorship authorities, although the censor changed his mind and impounded it a fortnight later.[14]

IT was probably in 1937 or 1938 that Rizzi began his association with Trotskyists and other Left communists outside Italy. He has, indeed,

[10] Interview with M Pierre Naville, Paris, 9 June 1983 (cited below as Naville interview).

[11] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. p. 218.

[12] Corrected draft letter from Rizzi to the Soviet government (or embassy?) dated 6 Jan. 1935 from Milan (Rizzi's papers).

[13] Bruno Rizzi, *Dove va L'URSS?* (La Prora, Milan, 1937); a copy is among Rizzi's papers.

[14] *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* (1939 edition), p. 104. According to a report of 30 June 1939 on Rizzi's police file, he submitted it to the Press Office of the Milan Prefettura for approval in August 1937, but the Ministry of Popular Culture, in early September, ordered it impounded.

sometimes been represented—at least in the period before *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*—simply as a Trotskyist.[15] Rizzi himself has contributed to this belief: in the preface to the third part of the 1939 edition of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* he explained that another—unpublished—work of the same period was written " to combat opportunism and lead the workers towards the Fourth International."[16] And the biographical note to the 1977 Italian edition, prepared with Rizzi's collaboration, describes him simply as having joined the Communist Party, and later the Fourth International, leaving the latter after a polemic with Trotsky.

Rizzi's political alignments were, however, somewhat more complex.[17] Pierre Naville, at that time a leading member of the main French Trotskyist organization, the " Parti Ouvrier Internationaliste," recalls that he first encountered him in the winter of 1938, when Rizzi arrived in their small offices in Paris and introduced himself, referring to his *Dove va L'URSS?* (of which, however, he had not brought a copy). He had obtained, apparently in Nice, copies of various Trotskyist publications (which he took back to Italy " under some shoes "),[18] some of which included exchanges between Naville and Yvan Craipeau on the nature of the Soviet state, and Trotsky's 1937 article " Not a Workers' and not a Bourgeois State? "[19] Rizzi was developing his own views on this question, which he vigorously expounded to the Paris Trotskyists during that winter; Naville advised him to set down his ideas in writing. During 1938 and 1939 Rizzi was to be found around Left communist circles, not only in Paris, but among exiled Italian Bordigists in Brussels and Trotskyists in London. It does not appear, however, that he was either a member of or in close political agreement with any of these groupings. His rather distinctive views and his independent and argumentative disposition would have made it difficult for him to be so.

He was, also, the object of at least a certain degree of suspicion, probably because of the ease with which he was able to leave and return to fascist Italy. Naville recalls that his acquaintances among the Italian Bordigists expressed reservations along such lines.[20] And Angelo Tasca,

[15] See, for example, Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (OUP, Oxford, 1981), Vol. 3, p. 215, and Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929—1940* (OUP, Oxford, 1979), p. 463. Silverio Corvisieri's account of Italian Trotskyism repudiates the possibility on the grounds that Rizzi was both sympathetic to Mussolini and anti-semitic (*Trotskij e il Communismo Italiano*, Samona e Savelli, Roma, 1969, pp. 180–81).

As is shown below, the reality was more complex, and Rizzi's political attachments very varied. The reports on Rizzi's police file do not refer to his Trotskyism, describing him, interchangeably, as a " communist " and " maximalist socialist."

[16] p. 108. This is the manuscript " Est-ce le Crépuscule de la Civilisation? (Anti-Labriola)," discussed below.

[17] French Trotskyism in this period was itself not uncomplicated. For a schematic view see the much-bifurcated diagram in Jacques Roussel, *Les Enfants du Prophète: Histoire du Mouvement Trotskiste en France* (Cahiers Mensuels Spartacus, Paris, Jan.–Feb. 1972), pp. 16–17. The events and atmosphere have been recalled by participants in the memoirs of Pierre Naville, Yvan Craipeau and Fred Zeller.

[18] Naville interview, and letter in *Le Contrat Social*, 6 Jan. 1959.

[19] *Quatrième Internationale*, June (numéro spécial) and November 1938.

[20] Naville interview.

the Italian communist expelled for his opposition to the Party leadership in 1929, refers to the author of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* as " the provocateur Bruno R. [icci] who speaks of a ' bureaucratic collectivism.' "[21]

On Rizzi's own account he was on civil, if disputatious, terms with Italian Bordigists, and French and British Trotskyists, but was " repulsed " by the few Italian Trotskyists in exile in Paris, who regarded him as a spy.[22] The sensitivity of the anti-Stalinist Left at this time is understandable; they were, after all, the targets of a number of attempted and successful assassinations on the part of the Soviet intelligence services, including the killing of Trotsky in August 1940, and Mussolini's agents, also, attacked his opponents in exile. Rizzi's own habit of addressing personal letters to the most powerful figures of the times—including Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini—bespeaks traits of character which would have been unlikely to reassure the left-wingers he associated with.

Although it is clear that Rizzi had close and spirited relations with circles of the Left opposition to official communism in the 1930s, I have been able to find no evidence to support the statement, in Baruch Knei-Paz's authoritative intellectual biography of Trotsky, that Rizzi and Trotsky met.[23] This is, in any case, improbable. Trotsky was sent out of France in June 1935, following the Stalin–Laval pact the previous month, and sailed from Norway for Mexico in December 1936. Moreover the internal evidence of Rizzi's relevant writings, including six letters from him to Trotsky in 1938–39, strongly suggests no direct acquaintance between the two men.[24]

A curious image thus emerges of Bruno Rizzi in the late 1930s: a largely self-educated, solitary, peripatetic, somewhat sensitive and arrogant man (he was also something of a gallant[25]) intermittently meeting and colliding with circles of the Marxist Left. Within these circles, bereft of power and violently execrated from various points of the political compass, Rizzi sought to gain a hearing for the ideas he was developing on fascism, Stalinism and the character of modern society; meeting a by and large unenthusiastic reception, he denounced his audience as hide-bound and " orthodox." *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* thus took shape, so to speak, on the uneasy fringe of fringe movements. And it did so in uneven bursts of composition, both because the impulsiveness of Rizzi's character caused him to take up his pen immediately when an idea seized him,

[21] Angelo Tasca, " Mie osservazioni sull'articolo di Trotsky, *L'URSS en Guerre*," (in French), in *Scritti critici e storici inediti*, Annali Istituto Feltrinelli, Milan, 1969, p. 710.

[22] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. pp. 218–20. The materials on Rizzi's police file testify to his eccentricity, but I could discern no evidence in them that he acted for the fascist authorities; however, the incompleteness of the file makes it impossible to be wholly definite.

[23] Baruch Knei-Paz, *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky* (OUP, Oxford, 1979), p. 419.

[24] Published, with introductory notes by Pierre Naville and Attilio Chitarin, and an autobiographical letter from Rizzi to Naville dated 20 Feb. 1959, in *Belfagor*, Anno XXXVIII, IV, 30 Nov. 1983.

[25] See, for example, the account and photographs in the television programme prepared with the assistance of Gian Paolo Prandstraller: " Il Profeta Ignorato: vita e opere di Bruno Rizzi," transmitted in the series *Micromega* on the Italian channel RAI/TV2, 27 March 1983.

and because composition had to be squeezed in between the necessities of earning his living as a travelling salesman.

WHAT of the intellectual trajectory which brought Rizzi to *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*? We may trace an important part of its genesis in an earlier, unpublished, manuscript of 1936–7, *Anti-Labriola*.[26] This takes Arturo Labriola's *Le Crépuscule de la Civilisation*, published in Paris in 1936,[27] as a peg on which to hang a variety of polemics and observations. Rizzi undertakes both an account and a criticism of Labriola's general view of the development of civilizations as analogous to that of natural organisms. Contrary to Labriola, Rizzi argues, civilizations do not, in general, suffer individual death, at least not from internal causes, but reproduce or renew themselves internally through " renaissances." It is, moreover, false of Labriola to infer, from the fact that there is now one single, universal civilization, capitalism, and that it is in decline, that the future cannot be one of historical progress (or, more generally, that the idea of progress is an ideological illusion peculiar to the capitalist period) and that the development of competing " caesarisms " will lead to their mutual massacre.[28] " Caesarism "—by which Rizzi means primarily fascism—is, in reality, the form of internal renewal of a decaying capitalist civilization; its principal characteristics are the substitution of private property and the market by state ownership and intervention—key ideas of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. " The most striking thing about the totalitarian state is its progressive and continual invasion into the economy "; the bourgeoisie, who sought to employ fascism for their own purposes, are deluded; " they will be driven from their throne," their "historical role is finished."[29]

Does this mean that, unlike all previous states, the fascist state does not represent the interests of a class? True, it seeks to rise above classes, but bureaucracy forms a growing " mass of the population which lives attached to the body of the state and sucks its sap."[30] It is possible that fascism may be " suffocated by the bureaucratic hypertrophy," but equally " the bureaucratic danger may lead to its further distancing from

[26] Typescript in French of 188 pages among Rizzi's papers. An undated note in Rizzi's handwriting with the manuscript explains that it was written between the end of 1936 and 1937, being taken up again after he had written *Dove va L'URSS?* " in the middle of 1937." It was written to " combat opportunism, to defend Marxism, to oppose theoretical demoralisation and to understand fascism better." The Preface to the third part of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* gives the book the title " Est-ce le Crépuscule de la Civilisation (Anti-Labriola) " and describes it as written after *Dove va L'URSS?* (p. 105).

[27] Arturo Labriola (1873–1959), long-lived Neapolitan socialist writer and politician, left Italy in 1927 and supported *émigré* anti-fascist causes, but later espoused Mussolini's Ethiopian war in 1935 and returned to Italy the following year. *Le Crépuscule de la Civilisation: l'Occident et les Peuples de Couleur* (G. Mignolet et Storz, Paris, n.d.) was based on a series of lectures given in Brussels, and was published in 1936. After the war, at the age of 72, Labriola re-entered politics and succeeded in being elected to the constituent assembly; he finished his career as a councillor on the Communist Party list in Naples.

[28] See Labriola, *Le Crépuscule de la Civilisation*, especially the Introduction and chapters 1–3, 6, 7, 12, 13.

[29] *Anti-Labriola*, pp. 147–48.

[30] Ibid. p. 149.

the bourgeoisie and, at the same time, its rapprochement with the proletariat, to become the state of this class."[31]

In a somewhat casual, uneven way, therefore, Rizzi begins to formulate his view of the totalitarian-bureaucratic state around the example of Italian fascism; it is in process of formation, however, everywhere. And Soviet Russia, which at this point Rizzi still considers a " proletarian state," is vulnerable to the same danger, as is clearly shown by the " Stalinist degeneration."[32] The achievement of capitalism, Rizzi insists, has been to establish one world civilization, with a common ethos and culture. Patterns of work, of life, of dress, even of music " standardize themselves," from Fifth Avenue to Unter den Linden; national characteristics are reduced to " local colour " for the rising volume of tourists, who are themselves an indicator of homogenization.[33]

But the existence of a single, dominant world civilization, without any more dynamic external enemies which could supplant it, does not mean—contrary to what Labriola thinks—that possibilities for renewal are extinct.[34] Within this general civilization, based on its universal productive relations, a common germ is being incubated, first of all in the fascist states. It " wishes to be the vaccine which would combat the microbes which have infected [capitalist] society but, oh! surprise, it increasingly takes on [these microbes'] economic characteristics, that is to say the fundamental ones." Private property has not been removed at one go as in the Russian revolution but " it is continually being eaten into." It is being placed in the service of the state, and controlled by economic plans; thus " the latent forces which are in play in the depths of society prevail over men's will and impose their reality."[35] A new world, Rizzi concludes, is in process of being born. Its basic " economic physiognomy " emerges in " the Russian experience as well as the fascist and Nazi experiences "; the two hostile political movements, disputing capitalism's legacy, have adopted the same economic forms, " one according to its established programme, the other form the experience of power."[36] Here Rizzi accepts in part one of Labriola's principal conclusions—that " in its communist (Stalinist), fascist (Musolinian) or national-socialist (Hitlerite) form, the state replaces control by private capitalism with its own control, through its functionaries." (Labriola adds the further question whether, in the Soviet Union, a " new ruling class is being formed from the leading elements of the Communist Party and the state bureaucracy.")[37]

The arguments of *Anti-Labriola* are more universal in scope than those of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, which is—at one level—the working out of its contemporary political implications. The earlier work carries

[31] Ibid. p. 150.
[32] Ibid p. 149.
[33] Ibid. p. 52.
[34] Ibid. p. 184.
[35] Ibid. p. 185.
[36] Ibid. pp. 187–88.
[37] Labriola, *Le Crépuscule de la Civilisation*, op. cit. p. 332.

traits very distinctive of Rizzi. Based more on experience and common sense than on scholarly immersion in theoretical or historical literature, it has no fear of speculative leaps. Formally Marxist and " economist," Rizzi nevertheless seeks to follow Labriola in comprehending societies in the round, taking their cultural and psychological aspects as essential. The work is a polemic, yet still prisoner of its target: though Rizzi gives it a bold, particular, twist, its historical sequence—and its examples—derive directly from Labriola.

But despite his belief in " progress," Rizzi is a pessimistic observer of Western decadence and decline (he prefers Spengler to Labriola)[38] and his theory seeks exit from this in an eclectic political voluntarism. Labriola—along with Bernstein—he denounces for his " Buddhist " and contemplative subservience to bourgeois interests. Unconcerned with philosophical conundrums, Rizzi leaves unresolved and almost unexplored numerous contradictions between economic necessity and political will.

The attitudes and ideas of *Anti-Labriola*, referring primarily to Italian fascism, are those which Rizzi brought into confrontation, in 1938, with the debates among French (and, at one remove, American) Trotskyists, on how to define the Soviet state. *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* was the result. It was, as Rizzi wrote at the time[39] (and after the war repeatedly insisted) an unfinished and contradictory work, published in haste, a " film of his thought " in the writing of which his views changed appreciably. They were, doubtless, shifted not only by his own " meditations " but by the political events then under way in Europe. He began it in late 1938, shortly after the Munich conference and the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, and finished the main text in May 1939, the month in which Hitler and Mussolini affirmed their " Pact of Steel," and in which Molotov replaced the Jew Litvinov as Soviet Foreign Minister—a gesture which was to prove prefatory to the pact with Hitler in August. Finally, in July 1939, Rizzi wrote a Preface to the whole book, amending the view set out in the latter part of it that " bureaucratic collectivism " was historically progressive.

SINCE the war a certain number of confusions have arisen about the character, and indeed the text, of the 1939 edition. Sometimes the first part of that edition (" L'URSS: Collectivisme Bureaucratique ") has been taken to be the whole of it.[40] It may therefore be useful to give a

[38] Two studies by Gian Paolo Prandstraller attribute considerable importance to Rizzi as a contemporary prophet of the decline of the West, through the strangulation of the market at the hands of bureaucracy: " Bruno Rizzi e la crisi dell'Occidente," in *Tempo Presente*, nos. 4–5, August–October 1980; and *Riflessione sulla decadenza dell'Occidente*, Salerno Editrice, Rome, 1981. These do not, however, consider *Anti-Labriola*.

[39] 1939 edition, p. 104.

[40] In 1967 Rizzi published an Italian, slightly truncated version of the first part (with other, post-war materials) as " *La Burocratisation du Monde* " (sic): *Il Collettivismo Burocratico* (Galeati, Imola, 1967). In 1976 he republished the same part, with additional later materials and amended footnotes, as *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, II^A Edizione (Editrice Razionalista, Bussolengo [Verona], 1976—this was in fact Rizzi's private publishing imprint). A pirate edition of the first part only of the original French text

short account of the materials Rizzi wrote, and those he subsequently published, for and as *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*.

In the 1939 edition Rizzi recorded that the first part was "conceived" in London towards the end of 1938, but only given final written form in Milan during March 1939. This part, which deals principally with the Soviet Union, but contains the basic general ideas of the whole, opens with a direct response to the debate among Trotskyists on the class character of the Soviet state. It rejects the idea that the Soviet Union may be considered any form of either capitalism or socialism, and sets out, with many empirical fragments and asides, Rizzi's neo-Marxist theoretical account of it as " bureaucratic collectivism," presided over by a new ruling class, owning collective property through the state.

A second part, on the totalitarian state and Italian fascism, was written in January 1939. Rizzi's papers contain a number of typewritten chapters and materials in Italian, together with translations into French, which were evidently for this part, together with a typewritten preface in French for publishing them separately, dated 6 October 1939. These chapters were omitted from the 1939 edition and never published in that form. Part II is slighter than Parts I or III; it recapitulates ideas in *Anti-Labriola*, but with a greater stress on the weight of state bureaucracy, and with lengthy quotation of materials intended to show that the Italian fascist leaders were (if " unconsciously ") aware of the necessity of state control over the economy.

The third part, " Quo Vadis, America?," on the New Deal in the United States, and the appendices, were written in the first half of May 1939, in Milan. Part III is a lengthy discussion of the New Deal; with frequent quotation from Henry Wallace, Rizzi argues that those who carry out the economic support policies of the Roosevelt administration are, despite their intentions, preparing the ground for the state to engulf society. Though their actions are intended to be temporary, they have a tendency to become permanent; their hymns to state intervention are a subconscious tribute to the totalitarianism they abhor, and, when the capitalists are removed, their place will be taken by a new class of bureaucrats. The appendix chapters form a mixed group, in which Rizzi abruptly launches, and then alters, his political viewpoints; they are discussed a little further below. Their predominant conclusion is stated in a typescript preface in English which Rizzi prepared for Part III (which

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was issued by Champs Libre, Paris, in 1976 with a brief cover note and titled (accurately) *L'URSS: Collectivisme Bureaucratique: La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, 1e partie. In June 1977 (Rizzi died in January 1977) a commercial edition was produced by SugarCo Edizioni, Milan (a publishing house associated with the Italian Socialist Party), which consisted of the text of Part I (but without Rizzi's 1939 Preface) with yet partly different later materials, and with a laudatory Preface by Bettino Craxi and an Introduction by Luciano Pellicani. A note to this edition said: " *Il Collettivismo Burocratico* came out in France on the eve of the Second World War with the title *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*." This edition served as the basis for a Spanish translation: *La Burocraticatión del Mundo* (Ediciones Peninsula, Barcelona, 1980) accompanied by essays by Salvador Giner and Juan-Ramon Capella. A Dutch edition is in preparation: *De Sovjetunie: Bureaucratisch Collectivisme* (Wereldvenster, Weesp, 1985, forthcoming).

broadly reproduces the corresponding Preface to Part III in the 1939 French edition): the proletariat still has a " very important task to accomplish; to acknowledge Herr Hitler and Mr Mussolini as the gravediggers of international Capitalism . . . and to help them in their task." Finally, the Preface which precedes Part I of the French edition revises that opinion; it is dated Paris, 15 July 1939.

The 1939 printed edition thus consists of this Preface, followed by Part I (" L'URSS: Collectivisme Bureaucratique "—nine chapters). Part II is absent. There follows Part III (" Quo Vadis, America? "—Preface, plus 19 chapters), and after this the appendices, " Appendice: Où va le monde?," consisting of 10 chapters.[41]

Rizzi made various, mostly unsuccessful, attempts to have his book published. A report of the Milan Prefettura of 30 June 1939 indicates that in May he gave a typescript of the third part (" Quo Vadis, America? ") to a " German Jew," to translate into German. Before this was done Rizzi explained to the translator that he intended to send copies to Hitler, Stalin, Trotsky and the Duce; at this the translator took fright and handed the typescript to the Milan police. Rizzi sought its return, then appealed in a letter to Mussolini, explaining that he intended to send it to the four prominent figures indicated, but also to publish the first edition in Italy, to be sold abroad. In July, however, Rizzi abruptly returned to France, giving up his job as a commercial traveller.[42]

From there he pursued the efforts he had already begun to have the larger work published in French. Naville recalls that in the early months of 1939 he received a long manuscript, posted from Genoa, of what he was later to recognize as the basic text of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, with a letter from Rizzi asking Naville or his associates to have it translated and published. This was followed by a number of postcards repeating the request. Naville explained they had no resources to do this, and knew nothing further of the book until, in December 1939, he noticed a copy displayed in a bookshop in Paris, which he bought.[43] In the meantime Rizzi had unsuccessfully approached a number of French publishers[44]; he also sent an English translation to Victor Gollancz in London (it was refused).[45] Finally, in August 1939, he resolved to publish it himself. He had the version which appeared as the 1939 edition printed at his own expense and arranged terms for its distribution through Messageries Hachette. This was interrupted in September by official obstacles connected with the outbreak of war and there was perhaps never a very full distribution; evidently, however, some copies did go on display.[46]

[41] See the 1939 edition, particularly the Preface to Part III, on its composition.

[42] Letter from Rizzi to Mussolini, 26 May 1926 and report by Milan Prefettura, 30 June 1926 (Rizzi's police file).

[43] Naville interview, and letter in *Le Contrat Social*, 6 Jan. 1959, op. cit. Rizzi apparently posted material from Genoa in an attempt to avoid police attention.

[44] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. pp. 68–69.

[45] Letters from Gollancz to Rizzi, 21 Aug. 1939 and 22 Sept. 1939, in Rizzi's papers.

[46] Letters, Hachette to Rizzi 22, 24 and 29 Aug. 1939, 21 Sept. 1939 and 6 Oct. 1939; and Rizzi to Hachette 30 Aug. 1939 (Rizzi's papers). Hachette required Rizzi to submit the book to censorship in

Naville remarked to himself, when he read the copy he had bought, that Rizzi, although " megalomaniac " in some matters, had nonetheless been prudent enough to omit the part dealing with fascism and Italy.[47] In fact, however, Rizzi made efforts during October 1939 to have this part translated and published separately by a commercial publisher under the title " L'Etat Totalitaire et la Société Nouvelle."[48] The incomplete nature of the 1939 edition seems to have been due more to his haste to have it published immediately, in order to warn the world of the basis of the union between fascism and Stalinism, than to political reticences.[49]

As well as omissions, and some internal inconsistencies, the 1939 edition contains, in the appendix chapters, a certain number of surprising—and extremely odious—opinions. Chapter IV, " The Jewish Question," sets out his view that Jews epitomize capitalism. " Jews and capitalists, generally, form a single entity "; they represent " an unfortunate, corrupted historical formation," part of the " scum " which has risen in capitalism's last phase. Jews have sacrificed all morality, pride and dignity to gathering gold. Rizzi rejects the biological arguments of Nazi racialism in favour of his own view that races are historically formed, and that the dispersal of the Jews has led them into " speculation, finance, banking, etc." Hitler's " pogrom " against Jews, though conducted " in a theoretically erroneous manner, is practically just." " Hitler is right and we were wrong. We must correct ourselves and become anti-Jewish because we are anti-capitalist."[50]

Rizzi's alignment with Hitler is not only on the Jewish question but a general one, founded on Marxist argumentation of a rigid orthodoxy, and embellished with Hegelian terminology: the interaction " thesis–antithesis " produces something new, a " synthesis," and consequently the opposition of proletariat (no matter how heroic its struggle) to bourgeoisie, produces " the new social synthesis," bureaucracy. The laws of historical progress dictate that workers should cooperate with the new rulers—fascist or Stalinist—" for long years "; in due course the new society will lead directly to socialism because of the very high levels of production reached.[51] Later in the " film of his thought " in the composition of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* Rizzi dropped his support for Nazism. This phase, he suggested, was an abberation in the " sinuous and very long voyage of our thinking."[52]

But his attitude to Jews was a deep-rooted one, which surfaced well after Hitler's genocide had become clear—even if its political implications

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early September, but by early October were giving him a report on distribution. One of those who apparently read a copy soon after it was published was Isaac Deutscher (letter from Deutscher to Rizzi, 2 April 1964, in Rizzi's papers).

[47] Naville interview.

[48] Letter from Rizzi to Editions Alcan, 8 Oct. 1939, in Rizzi's papers.

[49] Rizzi's papers contain a number of telegrams during August, and letters of 25 and 31 Aug. 1939, from the printer to Rizzi, testifying to the latter's extreme impatience.

[50] 1939 edition, p. 293 et seq.

[51] Chapter II, " La Tragédie du Proletariat," esp. pp. 282–83.

[52] See pp. 317–18, 337–38.

wavered. In 1959, for example, Rizzi replied to suggestions of his anti-semitism in *Le Contrat Social* by asserting that Marx (along with Engels) belonged to the " Jewish secret society " and employed it to set up the First International.[53]

BEFORE discussing *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*'s reception and subsequent reputation something should be said about Rizzi's life from 1939. His departure from Milan in July may well have been in the nature of a flight from the imbroglio stirred up by his attempts to disseminate " Quo Vadis, America? "; in early 1940 the police were making enquiries of his family and acquaintances in Milan, and shortly thereafter Italian frontier posts were alerted to report his presence. Some time in the latter part of 1939, it seems, he sought (unsuccessfully) French citizenship.[54] He remained in Paris until August 1943; much of this period, he later told Naville, was spent in semi-clandestinity. He lived in a room over the restaurant *La Coupole*, where he knew a fellow Italian employed as a waiter who gave him food; he visited the Bibliothèque Nationale frequently and it was in this period he prepared his writings on feudal society, which he published after the war.[55] He remained a fervent admirer of Trotsky, and was devastated by news of his death in August 1940.[56]

However, there were also, at the least, additional aspects to Rizzi's life in Paris from the autumn of 1939. At the beginning of 1940 the French authorities brought a prosecution against him for racial defamation on the basis of passages from Chapter IV, " The Jewish Question," of the appendices of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*[57]; he was convicted, given a suspended sentence, fined, and stocks of the book were ordered to be impounded. This is why the 1939 edition is such a rarity.[58]

Rizzi's papers also contain a number of typed drafts from the autumn of 1939. Most are short, journalistic pieces or appeals on the theme of the Nazi–Soviet pact as the unity of the " fascist " (or, sometimes, " feudal ")

[53] *Le Contrat Social*, III, 3 (May 1959).

[54] See report from Milan Prefettura, 21 Jan. 1940, and intercepted letter to Rizzi in Paris from his mother in Milan, 23 Jan. 1940 (Rizzi's police file).

[55] Naville interview; *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. p. 227; and intercepted letter, 20 April 1940, to Gioachino Ersoch in Rome (Rizzi's police file).

[56] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. p. 289.

[57] Anti-semitism was an acute issue in Paris in the 1930s. The city then had (after Warsaw and New York) the world's third largest Jewish population. Their response to racialist pressures is described in David H. Weinberg, *A Community on Trial: the Jews of Paris in the 1930s* (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1980).

[58] Notice of conviction and sentence by Le Tribunal Correctionel, 4e Chambre (Paris), 1940, No. 60566, dated 17 Jan. 1940, in Rizzi's papers. That the book *was* impounded may be considered definite. In his 1940 pamphlet " *Ecoute, Citoyen!* . . . " (discussed below) he refers to *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* as " seized and then condemned for racial defamation." He seldom referred to this episode after the war; however, in his lengthy article (" Il Plagio ") accusing James Burnham of plagiarizing *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* to write *The Managerial Revolution* (first published in 1941) he avers that Burnham " already knew that the edition had been confiscated " (*Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. p. 282). Naville refers to *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* going on sale in Paris in August 1939, but being " immediately banned, seized and pulped " (*Le Nouveau Lèviathan*, Part 3, Anthropos, Paris, 1970, p. 262n.).

social orders against Anglo-French capitalism; they do not appear to have been published.[59] One longer piece, however, was: *Écoute, citoyen!* . . . is a 16-page pamphlet published in or after June 1940 which suggests that Rizzi made certain literary and political adaptations to the Nazi conquest of France in that month.[60] The Foreword, dated 19 June 1940 (i.e. five days after the fall of Paris) renounces all hope that the Anglo-French leaders of " rotten plutocracy " could defend either freedom, or their property, against the dictators. " A judeo-masonic dictatorship, as genteel and base as one may imagine, that's their democracy. Hitler and Mussolini at least, are not hypocrites." The working people could only find salvation, Rizzi urged, if the country were cleansed of " the judeo-masonic vermin," " the parliamentary profession, the press and trades unions."[61]

This pamphlet was censored before being printed, the number of lines of each excised passage being shown within the printed text. Since Rizzi's papers include a draft of the whole text of the main section (entitled " Pensez Citoyen, " and dated 10 October 1939) comparison of the two allows an interesting view of the political criteria at work in the censorship in the first days of military occupation. Some, but not all, critical references to Nazism and fascism are deleted, such as those describing Hitler as an " enslaver " etc.; but what *are* consistently removed are passages in which Rizzi sets out his general theoretical view that Stalinism and fascism are a common social form ruled by a new class of exploiters. Intriguingly, a number of the most derogatory references to the Soviet Union and the French Communist Party alone—i.e. not in any association with fascism—are also deleted. The political thrust of Nazi censorship at this time[62] accords with the political feelers that were being surreptitiously extended in the summer of 1940, beneath the general umbrella of the Nazi–Soviet pact, between the French Communist Party and the German occupying authorities; Rizzi, had he had any inkling of them, would doubtless have considered them confirmation of his " convergence " thesis. (The pact was the occasion of similar reflections among

[59] The entire pieces are: " Deux Géants Aveugles," 3pp. dated 2 Sept. 1939; " L'Offensive de la Paix," 3pp. dated 1939; and " La Cannonade de Valmy," 2pp. dated 1939.

[60] A copy is among Rizzi's papers: Bruno R., *Ecoute Citoyen!* . . . no publisher or date; printed at the Imprimerie Centrale du Croissant, Rue de Croissant. (It was here that Victor Serge, cold-shouldered by the socialist press during the Popular Front, worked during 1937. His *Memoirs* recall it as a cheerful place, printing an eclectic variety of socialist and radical literature.) That *Ecoute Citoyen!* . . . was, in some sense, published is also suggested by the fact that Rizzi lists it with other previously published works on some volumes of his *Socialismo dalla Religione alla Scienza* (1946–48); however, he did not list it in subsequent publications.

[61] *Ecoute citoyen!* . . ., p. 1. Forms of freemasonry were common among French left-wing socialists in the 1930s; during 1939 Marceau Pivert's Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Paysan was the scene of a sharp conflict between Trotskyists and freemasons (Jean-Paul Joubert, *Révolutionnaires de la SFIO*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1977, pp. 198 et seq.). A Trotskyist leader in the Socialist youth movement, Fred Zeller, later became a leader of French masonry.

[62] The list of works prohibited by the German authorities is contained in *Biblio 1939* (Hachette, Paris, 1940); in addition to directly anti-fascist works it includes a number by authors critical of the Soviet Union (Yvon, Ciliga) as well as Trotsky, Freud, etc., but not Stalin or Lenin (apart from the latter's *Notebooks on Hegel's Dialectics*).

politicians. In the informal negotiations preceding it the German side stressed that what the ideologies of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union had in common was opposition to the capitalist democracies,[63] while in October 1939 Mussolini—reviving one of his recurrent parallels—was tempted to explain to the Italian people that Bolshevism in Russia was dead and had been replaced by a kind of " Slavic fascism.")[64]

As we have seen, *Ecoute, Citoyen! . . .* was not an instantaneous political turn on Rizzi's part; he had previously solicited the political attention of fascist as well as communist leaders. And a letter explaining his political ideas to the Paris Prefect of Police (dated April 1940 and printed as part of the pamphlet) declares his willingness to work with " the bourgeois right (Laval, Caillaux, etc. . . .) and some men of large spirit such as M. Deat " (i.e. Marcel Deat, the French " National Socialist " and former Marxist).

Rizzi evidently remained in Paris from 1940 to 1943, though it is doubtful how far his life was clandestine. Memoranda of May–June 1943 on his police file show him applying to the Italian Consulate in Paris for renewal of his expired passport; in due course approval was given for him to return to Italy, but not to re-exit.[65] From then until the end of the war we have only Rizzi's account of his movements. According to this, in August 1943, after Mussolini's fall, he returned to his native Gargano, on the west shore of Lake Garda and only a little distance from the Villa Feltrinelli where, in October, Mussolini took up residence under German guard as titular head of his neo-fascist " Salo Republic." Rizzi tried to write to Mussolini, with a view to setting up a newspaper to explain the danger of communism to Italian workers, but his letters were intercepted by the Duce's SS guards, who nonetheless understood " the honesty of my intentions." At the liberation of northern Italy, in April 1945, he felt himself in some danger from communist-led partisans, but he survived.[66]

AFTER the war Rizzi resumed his work in the shoe trade. His prowess as a salesman won a wide, and eventually international, market for the shoemakers of Bussolengo, near Verona, and helped their artisan trade to develop into factory production.[67] He himself went into the manufacturing side and became in due course the proprietor of a substantial shoe factory at Bussolengo.

From 1946 he began to publish writings in book form through his own " publisher," Editrice Razionalista; this he continued to do until his death. He wrote about Roman and feudal society, touching on questions such as oriental despotism and Asiatic society, dissected the history of socialism and returned to the history of the Russian revolution and the USSR, set out the basis of a modern " scientific " socialism centred on the

[63] *Nazi–Soviet Relations* (Department of State, Washington DC, 1948), p. 33.
[64] *Ciano's Diaries, 1939–1943* (Heinemann, London, 1948), p. 167.
[65] Memoranda and reports dated 1 May–15 June 1943 (Rizzi's police file).
[66] *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit. pp. 52, 229.
[67] See the television programme on Rizzi, " Il Profeta Ignorato," op. cit.

firm, and ranged over a number of other topics, in both his books and various periodical articles. Always jealous of his reputation, he frequently insisted on the originality of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* (of which, however, he only republished Part I) and came to feel that his ideas had been both plagiarized by others and deliberately ignored by established political and intellectual figures. Especially towards the end of his life, however, his reputation grew among a number of scholars, and the first commercial edition of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* with a preface by Bettino Craxi, marked his informal adoption by academic circles associated with the Italian Socialist Party; Rizzi died in January 1977, shortly before it appeared.

Such, in brief, then, is the chequered—and doubtless in parts approximate—career of the author of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. It remains to say something about the book's reception and the development of its reputation.

THE most important initial source of its reputation is the attention paid to Rizzi by Trotsky in his writings of 1939–40. Trotsky received six letters from Rizzi, one sent in December 1938 and five in rapid succession in June–July 1939, full of hero-worship, sending drafts, explaining (and correcting) his views, summoning Trotsky to more or less grandiose political schemes—a " new Zimmerwald," or alternatively to seek an understanding with Stalin—and at the same time complaining of the indifference shown him by Trotsky's followers in Europe.[68]

Trotsky never replied directly to Rizzi. He did, however, receive a copy of the printed version of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* and commented upon it several times during his bitter arguments with leading figures of the US Trotskyist movement in 1939–40, arguments which coloured the views of a significant cohort of American intellectuals. In the United States, unlike Europe, Trotskyism rivalled official communism as a pole of attraction for left-inclined intellectuals in the 1930s.[69] America's more democratic temper, combined with the Stalinists' crude vilification and violence against the Trotskyists, enabled them to tap rather wide sympathy, especially through their " entrism " into the Socialist Party.

Among its members, sympathizers or empathizers, American Trotskyism could count not only Burnham but Philip Rahv and William Phillips, the editors of *Partisan Review*, and their friend from Yale, Dwight Macdonald; James T. Farrell and, more fleetingly, Saul Bellow; Hal Draper and his young admirer Irving Howe; the subsequent " neoconservative " Irving Kristol, the black historian C. L. R. James, and a

[68] These were lodged in the previously closed section of Trotsky's archive, in Harvard University Library. They have recently been published in *Belfagor*, Anno XXXVIII, IV, 30 Nov. 1983, op. cit.

[69] Constance A. Myers has written a history: *The Prophet's Army: Trotskyists in America, 1928–41* (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1977). The atmosphere of student and intellectual Trotskyism in New York is captured in a number of memoirs, most benignly in Irving Howe's *A Margin of Hope: an Intellectual Biography* (Secker and Warburg, London, 1982), chapters 2 and 3, and Irving Kristol's " Memoirs of a Trotskyist " (1977) in *Reflections of a Neoconservative* (Basic Books, New York, 1983).

large number of others. Trotskyism in New York was, in B. J. Widdick's recollection, " a first-rate think-tank "[70]—and one in which ideas like " bureaucratic collectivism " could grow rapidly. Among these circles the policy to be adopted towards the Soviet Union, and the connected theoretical questions of the character of the Soviet state and society, were sensitive matters. The view at which Trotsky had arrived by the mid-1930s, and which had thus become " orthodox " for the Trotskyists, was that Stalin's regime was an unstable " degenerated workers' state," its tyrannical political superstructure in conflict with its potentially socialist economic relations, which might either be transformed by political revolution, to become a " healthy " workers' state again, or might relapse into capitalism; the Soviet Union should, because potentially socialist, be unconditionally defended against capitalist states.

This stance stimulated some differences as early as 1936.[71] In 1937 James Burnham and Joseph Carter put forward amendments questioning the nature of the Soviet state to the congress at which the American Trotskyists reorganized themselves, following their expulsion from the Socialist Party. Others in France, for example Yvan Craipeau, were expressing differences and doubts along similar lines. In reply Trotsky reaffirmed his view.[72] These were the exchanges which, in part, Rizzi picked up from the French Trotskyist press in 1938 and which triggered *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. *Its* particular contribution was to link together the negative objections—within the framework of a rather orthodox Marxist sociology—to the conception of Stalin's Russia as any sort of " workers' state," with the ideas on fascism as containing a new social form, based on state command of the economy, which were contained in his *Anti-Labriola*.

The German–Soviet pact of 22 August 1939 and the outbreak of the European war abruptly rekindled matters within the US Trotskyist movement. James Burnham, now in alliance with Max Shachtman within the leadership of the Socialist Workers' Party, urged that its definition of the Soviet Union as a " workers' state " (and, by implication, the policy of defending it in war) be revised. In the bitter polemic (and subsequent split) which ensued, Trotsky, from Mexico, found himself acting as the chief literary combatant for the other faction of the US Trotskyist leadership, under James Cannon. In effect, Trotsky's theoretical

[70] Myers, op. cit. p. 204. For Irving Howe its denizens were " enchanted captives heading straight into the hermetic box of a left-wing sect " (Howe, op. cit. p. 35).

[71] James Burnham, " Socialists and the Coming War," in *American Socialist Monthly*, 5 (August 1936), quoted in Myers, op. cit. pp. 143–44.

[72] Burnham and Carter's amendment is in *Socialist Workers Party Bulletin*, No. 2, 1937; Craipeau's " report," " La Quatrième Internationale et la Contre-Révolution Russe," is in *Quatrième Internationale*, June 1983. Trotsky responded to Craipeau in " Once Again: the USSR and its Defence " and to Burnham and Carter in " Not a Workers' and Not a Bourgeois State?," both written in November 1937 and published in French in *Quatrième Internationale*, June 1938, op. cit; English versions are in *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937–38* (Pathfinder Press, New York, 1976).

responses to events following August 1939 were produced *via* his arguments with Burnham and Shachtman.[73]

Early in September 1939 Trotsky received a printed copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. He immediately seized on its characterization of the Soviet Union—and returned to it during the polemic—as encapsulating what, in his view, necessarily flowed from denying that the Soviet Union was a form of " workers' state." Rizzi had the " merit of seeking to transfer the question from the charmed circle of terminological copybook exercises to the plane of major historical generalisation."[74] Trotsky posed the overarching question as two alternative scenarios of historical development: " have we entered the epoch of social revolution and socialist society, or on the contrary the epoch of the declining society of totalitarian bureaucracy? "; and the answer to this, in turn, hinged on whether or not—as Rizzi averred—the state bureaucracy was capable of becoming, in the Marxist sense, a ruling class presiding over a qualitatively distinct social form. The war would put this to the test; if the Soviet bureaucracy survived the war intact this would evidence the potential of such state bureaucracies to graduate as ruling classes.[75]

But such a conclusion was, Trotsky maintained, at present unfounded, and moreover betrayed " pessimism." Rizzi, Trotsky added, had evidently " lost his balance " among the " fantastic contradictions " in the last part of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. He was concerned principally with Rizzi's arguments that the Soviet bureaucracy was a ruling class.[76]

Trotsky's opponents, lacking a copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, were unable to assess it. And Rizzi himself, at the time, remained oblivious to the controversy. However, since it involved a number of able and energetic political intellectuals, its " fission products " took on lives of their own. A large minority of the Socialist Workers' Party, led by Shachtman, separated from it in April 1940 as the Workers' Party; they adopted a " third camp " stance in world politics and in their many writings characterized the Soviet Union as " bureaucratic collectivist."[77] Intrigued by Trotsky's references to Rizzi, one of their number after the war gained access to a copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* and in 1948 published one of the early, and reasonably objective, accounts of the work's content.[78]

[73] Accounts of the polemic are in the works cited by Deutscher, Knei-Paz and Myers, and in James T. Burnett's PhD thesis, " American Trotskyism and the Russian Question " (University of California, Berkeley, 1968). Trotsky's writings in the course of the debate are collected in *In Defence of Marxism* (Pathfinder Press, New York, 1976).

[74] " The USSR in War " (25 Sept. 1939), in *In Defence of Marxism*, op. cit. p. 10.

[75] Ibid. p. 9.

[76] Ibid. pp. 13–14.

[77] A selection of Shachtman's numerous writings about Soviet " bureaucratic collectivism " was published in book form as *The Bureaucratic Revolution* (The Donald Press, New York, 1962). He recalled Trotsky's use of " Bruno Ricci " (sic) in " 1939: Whither Russia? Trotsky and his critics," *Survey*, no. 41, April 1962.

[78] James M. Fenwick, " The Mysterious Bruno R.," in *New International*, September 1948.

MORE generally, the arguments on the nature of Soviet society continued to resonate among broader groups of American—and other—writers and academics during and after the war, and Rizzi's name (though generally without any first-hand acquaintance with *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*) was from time to time invoked as that of a pioneer of ideas of " bureaucratic collectivism."

Burnham's polemic with Trotsky in 1939–40 also produced a work with similarities to Rizzi's which became, if not a classic, certainly a best-seller: *The Managerial Revolution*.[79] Burnham initially joined Shachtman's Workers' Party when it split with Trotsky, but almost immediately left it, and *The Managerial Revolution* was written during 1940, while he was in full recoil from the Marxism he had espoused for the previous seven or eight years. It was published in the spring of 1941, before Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Its central ideas—that managerial power was supplanting private property as the basis of rule in a new form of society, and that the world was headed towards division between a few rival managerial superpowers (centred, in Burnham's view, on the United States, Western Europe and Japan)—together with its lively style and wealth of examples, gained it, during and after the war, a very wide readership and its title became a catch-phrase of sociological journalism.

Burnham was quite early on accused—and the charge has been repeated many times up to the present—of having plagiarized *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* to write *The Managerial Revolution*, and this is a matter on which this article can scarcely avoid commenting. The first to commit this accusation to print, so far as I am aware, was Joseph Hansen, one of Trotsky's secretary-bodyguards and a leading " orthodox " Trotskyist after the rupture with Burnham, in a rather abusive review of *The Managerial Revolution* in June 1941.[80]

For the reasons I have indicated above it is unlikely that Burnham, in New York, had access to a copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* before writing *The Managerial Revolution*; on the other hand Hansen's opinion, close to the scene of events in Mexico and New York, must be taken seriously. However, it is quite possible that, in the highly acrimonious atmosphere engendered by Burnham's departure from the Trotskyist movement, Hansen simply drew on Trotsky's comparisons of Burnham's earlier ideas with Rizzi's—which give Rizzi credit for the greater boldness and generality, but do not suggest plagiarism—and converted them into an accusation of unacknowledged borrowing. None of those, within or around Trotskyist circles in New York at the time, whom I have been able to consult—who generally remember the Trotsky–Burnham polemic vividly—recall a copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* being in circulation at that time. For Hansen's accusation to be true, therefore, we must suppose that Burnham obtained a copy, but made no public

[79] It sold around 10,000 copies in the first six months or so, according to Dwight Macdonald's review in *Partisan Review*, January–February 1942.

[80] " Burnham's ' Managerial Revolution '," in *Fourth International*, June 1941.

reference to it, and simply used it as the basis of *The Managerial Revolution*. This seems implausible.[81]

Subsequent, independent, accusations of plagiarism have arisen from the similar arguments of the two books. Naville, when he first read *The Managerial Revolution* in 1945, concluded that its ideas were copied from *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*.[82] Rizzi himself, when *The Managerial Revolution* was drawn to his attention in 1951, conducted a brief correspondence with Burnham, and concluded that he had been plagiarized, a charge he repeated, vehemently and bitterly, up to his death.[83] And the accusation has been repeated by the recent commercial editions of (parts of) *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, and by a number of academics and others, but never with any supporting evidence.[84] My own view is that the accusation is unproven, and unlikely to be true. The similarities, some of them rather striking, can be explained by the fact that the authors wrote at about the same time, from backgrounds which had much in common, and by the ideas that were already " in the air."

Even if there was a degree of derivation (and Burnham, of course, knew Trotsky's summary of Rizzi, which would naturally have struck a chord in his own thinking), Burnham adds much that is his own, or from different sources—in many of his historical analogies or current illustrations, for example, and in the distinctive modification he makes to Marxist historical scenarios or social-economic models. His arguments that ownership of the means of production cannot realistically be divorced from control over them, and that corporate control by managers leads to " corporate exploitation " through the state, parallel, but are quite distinct from, Rizzi's insistence that exploitation under " bureaucratic collectivism " necessarily implies a new form of collective class property.

Since in general Burnham indicates and draws upon his sources rather freely it would be the more surprising if he had used *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* without acknowledgment. And, even if this were so, accusations of plagiarism would be quite misplaced, because one of Rizzi's points of departure in the first part of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* is

[81] Giorgio Galli's obituary of Rizzi repeats Rizzi's conclusion that Trotsky sent his own copy of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* to " the most intelligent of his followers, the young James Burnham, " but without any supporting evidence (" Bruno Rizzi e la Nuova Classe," *Mondo Operaio*, 1977, No. 2). Rizzi elsewhere asserts that in 1940 Hachette sent a copy to New York, and implies this was to Burnham (*Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, 1976, ed. p. 273).

[82] He first expressed this view in his editorial in *La Revue Internationale*, Tome III, No. 16, June 1947.

[83] See the article " Il Plagio," in *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, op. cit.

[84] The accusation or suggestion has also been made, among others, by Yvan Craipeau (*Les révolutionnaires pendant la seconde guerre mondiale: Pt. 1 Contre vents et mârées, 1938–1945*, Savelli, Paris, 1977, p. 72); François Fejtö (" L'Ere des Bureaucrates," *L'Histoire*, No. 4, September 1978); Max Shachtman (" 1939: Whither Russia? . . ." op. cit.); Walter Kendall (" Bruno Rizzi: Socialism and the Bureaucratic Society," in *The Socialist Leader*, 3 Nov. 1962); and (perhaps over-patriotically) by a number of Italians: A. Rossi Raccagni and Giorgio Galli in introductory essays to Rizzi's post-war editions of *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, Luciano Pellicani in his Introduction to the 1977 Italian edition, Bruno Bongiovanni (" The Dissolution of Trotskyism," *Telos*, No. 52, Summer 1982), Antonio Carlo and Umberto Melotti (" In Memory of Bruno Rizzi," *Telos*, No. 33, Fall 1977), Gian Paolo Prandstraller (" Bruno Rizzi e la crisi dell' Occidente," op. cit.), and Leonardo Rapone (*Trotskij e il fascismo*, Laterza, Bari, 1978, pp. 183–85). See also the television programme about Rizzi, op. cit.

the argument—as disputed by Trotsky—of two of his followers, " B " and " C," in 1937, that the Soviet Union was not a workers' state but some other, novel, form of society. Unknown to Rizzi " B " was, of course, James Burnham (" C " was Joseph Carter).[85] So any influence would have been reciprocal.

It is worth adding that it is not only from Rizzi that *The Managerial Revolution* has been held to be derivative. Max Nomad reproached Burnham (" a professor of ethics ") with filching the ideas from Machajski's *The Intellectual Worker*,[86] while George Orwell, in a perceptive 1946 review, detected anticipations of the " managerial revolution " in sources ranging from Belloc's *The Servile State*, through Zamyatin's *We*, to Huxley's *Brave New World*[87]—and Orwell, for his pains, was to be accused by Isaac Deutscher of having lifted the essential elements for *1984* from Zamyatin.[88] There can be few things more disputed than an idea whose time has come.

HOW original *was* Rizzi's *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, and how far are the larger claims made for (and by) him as a theorist on the basis of it justified? After the war, *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* was cited as a pioneering work in several different contexts.

The first is among macrosociologists, concerned with the effects on social structure of bureaucracy, of the state, and of the increasing importance of technical or intellectual acquirements, relative to physical means of production or private property—especially where the writer has an interest in the history of sociological ideas. An excellent example is Daniel Bell, who credits Rizzi with both the concept and the phrase of bureaucratic collectivism, and weaves this among the strands of thought he sees as contributing to the notion of " post-industrial society." From this perspective Rizzi's contribution lies in discerning trends common to all industrially developed societies, and their consequent " convergence."[89]

The second, distinct but scarcely separate, source of interest in *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* is among Marxists and socialists, concerned, in the light of twentieth-century developments, with the running repair of Marxism as a theoretical edifice and/or of socialism as a political doctrine. Starting with Trotsky, this forms a more varied and larger group, holding Rizzi to be more original, and among whom what is drawn from him is

[85] Burnham and Carter's amendment to the Socialist Workers' Party resolution on the Soviet Union (SWP Bulletin, No. 2, 1937) was the subject of Trotsky's reply in " Not a Workers' and Not a Bourgeois State?" In their rejoinders Burnham and Carter develop more boldly the idea of a distinctive state form ruled by the " new middle class ": Carter, " The Class Nature of the Stalinist State," and Burnham, " From Formula to Reality " (both in SWP Bulletin, No. 5, 1938).

[86] *Aspects of Revolt* (Bookman Associates, New York, 1959), p. 15.

[87] " James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution," in Orwell, *Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters*, Vol. IV (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978), p. 195.

[88] In his 1954 essay " ' 1984 '—The Mysticism of Cruelty," reprinted in Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades* (Cape, London, 1969).

[89] See " The Strange Tale of Bruno R.," in *The New Leader*, 28 Sept. 1959; and *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (Heinemann, London, 1974), pp. 94–97.

more shaped by political inclinations. There is, first of all, the characterization of communist states as neither state capitalist nor any form of socialist, but " bureaucratic collectivist," even if it is the notion, rather than the phrase, that is adopted. Bureaucratic collectivism is a distinct social form, with its own laws of motion, and ruled by a new dominant class rooted in the state bureaucracy. These writers then find it necessary to situate bureaucratic collectivism within an overall pattern of historical development towards socialism, and at this point they mostly depart from Rizzi's simple insertion of it as an extra, if unexpected, social form to be added in to Marx's scenario between capitalism and socialism. There are good reasons for this, since Marx's analysis in *Capital* was aimed at showing how the organic development of capitalism produces the basis of socialism. If what in fact emerges, in the first instance, is " bureaucratic collectivism," there is no particular reason to suppose that socialism will then follow it. Thus, while adopting much of Rizzi's descriptive characterization of bureaucratic collectivism, later Marxists generally seek to limit the category's scope; this is, perhaps, what Martin Krygier is pointing to when he speaks of bureaucratic collectivism as a concept which arises essentially as a heresy within the Marxist tradition.[90]

Thus Antonio Carlo, for example, explains it as a form of society progressive relative to capitalism, but whose emergence is specific to underdeveloped countries.[91] It is thus a by-product of capitalism's uneven economic development on a world scale. Carlo's " bureaucratic collectivism " is further modified by Umberto Melotti, who treats it as a descendant of Marx's " Asiatic mode of production," issuing only from Asiatic or semi-Asiatic societies[92]; it is thus the industrializing phase of these distinct social structures, occupying a formally similar place within the historical flow chart (only seen as progressive rather than regressive) to the communist " industrial despotism " which Karl Wittfogel sees as emerging in *Oriental Despotism*. Other Marxists have been inclined to limit the category even more narrowly. Shachtman, for example, initially sought to define it as the specific product of a communist revolution in decay. But later, as the Soviet system spread to eastern Europe, he gave it a broader place within a general schema fissured by a choice: capitalist decay raised two alternatives, socialism or barbarism, and bureaucratic collectivism was the latter.[93]

While adopting the phrase, each author draws only selectively on the analytic ingredients of Rizzi's concept of bureaucratic collectivism. For example, Carlo, one of those most heavily indebted to Rizzi, borrows the

[90] Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier (eds.), *Bureaucracy: the career of a concept* (Edward Arnold, London, 1979), Chapter 4. The heresy can be expressed in terms of historical sequences, or of the interactions of classes. Thus when Rizzi deduces that the struggle of proletariat (thesis) with bourgeoisie (antithesis) will not lead to the victory of the former, but to the rule of a " new social synthesis " or middle class, his conclusion matches that of Alvin Gouldner's (also neo-Hegelian) *The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (Macmillan, London, 1979): " The lowliest class never came to power. Nor does it seem likely to now " (p. 93).

[91] " The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," *Telos*, No. 22, Fall 1974.

[92] *Marx and the Third World* (Macmillan, London, 1977).

[93] *The Bureaucratic Revolution*, op. cit.

emphasis on collective *property*, but rejects the notion (which Rizzi developed further after the war) of bureaucratic collectivism as a recrudescence of feudalism, or the idea that it is immanent also in fascism, or in state intervention in general.

Pierre Naville's large work of renewal of socialist theory, *Le Nouveau Lèviathan*, takes Rizzi's " bureaucratic collectivism " as a bold and original proposal, but also as demonstrating the schematism to which treating the Soviet bureaucracy as a universal phenomenon leads.[94] Other Marxist writers on Soviet-type societies have justified their own model, and terminology, in explicit opposition to Rizzi's bureaucratic collectivism—for example Tony Cliff, in formulating his theory of " state capitalism " in 1948,[95] and more recently Paul Bellis, in offering a history, up-dating and defence of Trotsky's theory of the Soviet state.[96] One of Trotsky's central arguments was also revived by the former French communist Jean Ellenstein, who rejected Rizzi's view that a ruling class exists in the Soviet Union on the grounds that there is no inheritance of bureaucratic office.[97]

Rizzi has also been the subject of straightforward political appropriation. His recent quasi-official adoption by Bettino Craxi for the Italian Socialist Party stresses bureaucratic collectivism as a tendency and danger within all Western economies—the limiting result of which is to be seen in Soviet-type societies.[98] But rather than locate the finished social form within any determinate historical scenario Craxi employs it to underline the importance of liberal and democratic values and the centrality of the market—rather than economic collectivism—in the transition to " socialist pluralism." The pioneering claims of the first edition of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* are invoked to reinforce the position of Western European socialists vis-à-vis their rivals (and possible allies) among the communists. Rizzi's harsh words for the social democratic " traitors," preserved in post-war editions, lend this some irony—which is not diminished by his 1939 appendix (omitted from post-war editions) explaining that Jews epitomize the capitalist market, and that Hitler's attitude to them is to be applauded.

Earlier Georgio Galli, in somewhat more rounded appreciations of Rizzi, also depicted him as a prophet of a possible socialist " third route " between the capitalist " free world " and the totalitarian socialist state.[99] The kernel of an authentically socialist order lay in the specific microsociological form which Rizzi came to advocate after the war, socialist enterprises (*aziende*) connected by free markets. As we saw

[94] *Le Nouveau Lèviathan*, 6 parts (M. Rivière and Anthropos, Paris, 1957–); see, in particular, Part III, pp. 262–80, and Part V, pp. 202–11.

[95] " The Theory of Bureaucratic Collectivism—a Critique," in *The Fourth International, Stalinism and the Origins of the International Socialists: Some Documents* (Pluto Press, London, 1971).

[96] *Marxism and the USSR* (Macmillan, London, 1979).

[97] *The Stalin Phenomenon* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1976).

[98] Preface to *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*, 1977 edition (SugarCo, Milan).

[99] Introductory essay in Rizzi's editions of *Il Collettivismo Burocratico*; " Bruno Rizzi e la Nuova Classe," op. cit.

above, Rizzi's evaluation of markets as essential to socialism pre-dates *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*. His belated adoption by liberal socialists is thus congruent—as Luciano Pellicani registers—with their attention to the arguments of neo-liberals on the internal contradictions of centralized economic planning and its consequences for political democracy.[100]

Gian Paolo Prandstraller pursues a theme partly related to this, crediting Rizzi with originality within a broad tradition of writing (stemming in the twentieth century from Oswald Spengler) on the decline or decadence of Western civilization.[101] Rizzi's contribution was to provide a social-structural analysis explaining cultural and psychological phenomena of decay—one applicable not only to the twentieth century, but also, for example, to the decline of Roman imperialism. The key lay in the degeneration and " saturation " of the market, bringing the state and its growing bureaucracies to intervene in wider and wider areas of social life, leading to the ossification and decay of society's spontaneous functioning.

ENOUGH has been said to show that Rizzi's influence, and the significances imputed to *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*, have been rather varied. The variation can only in part be attributed to the relative inaccessibility of the 1939 edition and consequent reliance on indirect accounts; a number of authors have also drawn on Rizzi's post-war writings. No doubt, some writers might have expressed themselves differently had they been in possession of a fuller picture, and in particular, if they had been familiar with the pro-fascist and anti-semitic components of his thinking. But the variety of Rizzi's influences is, nonetheless, an index of the several perceptions and suggestions in him which have proved original, at least in the sense of stimulating a number of vigorous (if not equally fruitful) lines of thought.

A more direct assessment of the originality of *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* must distinguish its different elements. " Pre-proletarian " socialism—of the Saint-Simonians for example—was much inclined to link its blueprints for the future to the dominion of experts and administrators. And the idea that the socialist movement (or at least state socialism), ostensibly based on the industrial working class, could or would issue in the rule of a new " managerial " class has a long history, as has often been pointed out. It was advanced by Bakunin in his polemics with Marx in the 1870s, and before the First World War had become almost a commonplace of anarchist criticisms of state socialism.[102] Machajski turned the idea specifically against the Russian social democratic intelligentsia, accusing them of wishing to ride the working class to power in order to drive out the owners of physical capital and gain—through their tenancy of state offices—a monopoly of exploitation for their own " human capital " (a

[100] Introduction to *Il Collettivismo Burocratico* , 1977 edition, op. cit.

[101] " Bruno Rizzi e la crisi dell' Occidente," and *Riflessione sulla decadenza dell' Occidente*, op. cit.

[102] These are reviewed by Nico Berti in " Anticipazioni anarchiche sui nuovi padroni," *Interrogations*, No. 6, March 1976.

concept which is not prominent in Rizzi, who has a poor opinion of bureaucrats' intellectual accomplishments).

And from rather early in the life of the Soviet regime, the combination of dictatorship and economic privilege prompted accusations that a new type of bourgeoisie was becoming entrenched, an idea voiced—in many variants—by some Left communists, by anarchists and Mensheviks, by Kautsky and by many others (including Hitler). From stressing the novelty of the Soviet bourgeoisie it was a small semantic step—if one pregnant with theoretical implications—to speaking of a new class and social order. In 1929–30, Christian Rakovsky, in internal Soviet exile, pointed to a new " class of rulers " whose basis was " a type—also new—of private property; the possession of the state power."[103] In France, during the 1930s, the Austrian disciple of Bukharin, Otto Machl (Lucien Laurat) modified Marx's analysis in *Capital* to explain the Soviet bureaucracy's economic exploitation.[104] From 1936 a French communist who had spent over a decade in the Soviet Union, M. Yvon, began to publish accounts of it. Although primarily empirical rather than theoretical, they drew the conclusion that what had become entrenched in the Soviet Union was a new class, composed of functionaries and the political officialdom, and benefiting from a novel type of exploitation.[105] (Rakovsky and Yvon are summarized in the report by Craipeau which Rizzi obtained in 1938.)[106] Such views were often implicit, and sometimes surfaced, in the polemical and journalistic responses of opposition Marxists as they struggled to explain the significance of the Moscow trials.[107] Ante Ciliga's *Au Pays du Grand Mensonge*, published in 1938, reached similar conclusions. (Later editions contained his reports of Marxists in Stalin's " isolators " who earlier maintained that the Soviet Union was a new social formation, equivalent to " Kemalist Turkey, fascist Italy, Germany on the march to Hitlerism, and the America of Hoover–Roosevelt "—and were " expelled " by their fellow political prisoners for their opinions.)[108] Rizzi's identification of a new class ruling the Soviet state was thus not—as he was to claim—wholly new, but in the expression " bureaucratic collectivism " he came upon what proved to be contagious terminology for it.

WAS he perhaps more original in the other component—his perception of tendencies common to all industrialized societies and the prediction that these would congeal into a novel social form? Such ideas were also current, as was natural, in the 1930s. Bukharin's delphic last writings before his arrest—in which one can hear echoes of his thinking on

[103] " Déclaration de l'opposition . . .," in *Lutte de Classes* (Paris), September–December 1930.
[104] Lucien Laurat, *Marxism and Democracy* (Gollancz, London, 1940).
[105] *L'URSS telle qu'elle est* (Gallimard, Paris, 1938).
[106] " La Quatrième Internationale et la Contre-Révolution Russe," *Quatrième Internationale*, June 1938, op. cit.
[107] See, for example, the interesting survey of correspondence by Peter Deli, " The *Manchester Guardian* and the Soviet Purges 1936–38," in Survey, Vol. 28, no. 1 (120), Spring 1984.
[108] *The Russian Enigma* (Ink Links, London, 1979), pp. 280–81.

the " pirate state " during the First World War—seem to warn of a growing together of fascist and Stalinist states as examples of a common species.[109] And from the Mensheviks' and Austro-Marxists' arguments over the Soviet Union, Rudolph Hilferding (from whom Bukharin and Lenin had drawn in the First World War) concluded in 1940 that in modern times the state is capable of quite unprecedented independence, causing political power to rule over economic relationships. " The controversy as to whether the economic system of the Soviet Union is ' capitalist ' or ' socialist ' seems to me rather pointless. It is neither. It represents a *totalitarian state economy*, i.e. a system to which the economies of Germany and Italy are drawing closer and closer."[110] (A little earlier, in March 1939, Peter Struve, in despair over Munich, wrote warning the British government of the dangers of appeasement. " Lenin–Stalin . . . and the Bolshevik regime, as well as Hitler and Mussolini, despite their different tactics and even overt political aims, represent not only related phenomena, but phenomena which are identical from the viewpoint of their basic significance."[111] Since its addressee was Samuel Hoare, Struve's letter fell on deaf ears.)

Where Rizzi may claim originality is in giving these early suggestions of " convergence "—in the distinctive pre-war sense of the coming together of Stalinist and fascist regimes—definite shape and terminology as a distinctive social form or stage within the Marxist scenario of historical succession. Rizzi did this with a bolder schematism, less inhibited by its implications for the overall structure of Marxist theory, than could a Bukharin or a Hilferding; it was this readiness to revise the entire body of Marxism from within that Trotsky seized upon, both to belabour his opponents with its implications, and to contemplate as a possible obituary upon socialism.

Rizzi certainly considered himself original, but was less so, in his contribution to the sociology of bureaucracy. *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* (and some of his later writings) contain, it is true, a quantity of empirical details and observations on bureaucracy and bureaucrats, but the category remains undefined, underdeveloped and almost undifferentiated, one component among the several which form his " new class." He makes no use, for example, of Weber's reflections on bureaucracy—and Weber, it should be recalled, also envisioned an all-embracing bureaucracy if private property's role in counterbalancing the state power should be removed.[112]

Rizzi and *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* are frequently mentioned in

[109] Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (Vintage Books, New York, 1975), Chapter X.

[110] " State capitalism or totalitarian state economy?," in J. Steinberg (ed.), *The Verdict of Three Decades* (Duell Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1950).

[111] Quoted in Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 433.

[112] See, for example, *Economy and Society* (Bedminster Press, New York, 1968), III, p. 1401 et seq.

the context of socialist or radical thought, and as part of that tradition.[113] This accords with Rizzi's view of himself, both as a friend—if an unheeded one—of the workers and a creative Marxist theoretician. In the light of a fuller picture it is tempting either to dismiss this, or—as he himself and a number of commentators have done—to discard those elements which do not tally with this image as abberations, adaptations to political circumstances, or even derangements.

My own feeling is that such explanations may be superficial. Both Rizzi's social arguments and his political stances are shaped by a powerful, necessitarian sense of " progress," deriving directly from his background in Marxism. This sits, uneasily, with an erratic political voluntarism. Having deduced from their shared ingredients that communism and fascism form a single category, more viable than capitalism, he concludes in 1938–39 that this is the actual, inevitable, and—thus—desirable next phase of historical evolution. When, later, he recoils from this conclusion, his amended view is still drawn within the geometry of " progress "—bureaucratic collectivism is now "regressive." But this remains a merely moral reassessment, a judgment that what economic necessities lead to is, after all, politically intolerable. Since the logic of " progress " is ill-adapted for return travel, Rizzi's political shifts collide with, and produce sharp inconsistencies within, the geometry of his thinking. And it is this geometry that rules his sociological writing; his portrayals of communist (and fascist) societies, even in their grimmest passages, read also as celebrations of the greater unity and determination with which they drive the labouring population. Like Burnham (and unlike the best eye-witness reports of the 1930s) he has little sense of their " fine grain, " of the waste and inefficiency engendered by their routine brutality. Rizzi's sociology is extrinsic, aiming not primarily at the analysis of social phenomena themselves, but at fitting them into prior historical schemata.

TO raise the nature of modern historicism would take us beyond our subject. But one of the things it displays is an extraordinary capacity for unexpected political changes of course and amalgamations—and for accounting for these within a larger doctrine of progress. In Rizzi—at least the Rizzi of 1938–39—this is carried to an extreme point. He takes a mixture of ingredients: the assortment of his own sociological, economic and national perceptions, a commercial traveller's common sense, pillars

[113] In addition to works cited above, we may mention Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (Pall Mall Press, London, 1970), Richard Gombin, *The Radical Tradition* (Methuen, London, 1978), Svetozar Stojanovic, *Between Ideals and Reality* (OUP, New York, 1973), Pierre Souryi, *Le Marxisme après Marx* (Flamarion, Paris, 1970), Marian Sawer " Theories of the New Class from Bakunin to Kuron and Modzelewski: the Morphology of Permanent Protest," in Sawer (ed.), *Socialism and the New Class* (ASPA Monograph 19, Flinders University, Bedford Park, S. Australia, 1978), Siep Stuurman " State Property and the Nature of the Soviet Ruling Class," in *Monthly Review*, April 1980, and Donald C. Hodges, *The Bureaucratisation of Socialism* (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1981). David Lane's *The End of Social Inequality?* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982) inexplicably has Rizzi as holding a " state capitalist " view of the Soviet Union, contrasting this with the " bureaucratic collectivism " of Umberto Melotti.

of an obstinately " economist " Marxism, and an assortment of wider reading, a sense of being surrounded by decadence, vulgar " anti-capitalist " anti-semitism, a fascination with " leaders " and dictators, a stereotyped and melodramatic image of the working population, and—last but not least—a sense that his own importance is undervalued and that he has been selected as a vehicle of historical predestination—and pummels these, in bursts of composition of his vigorous, colourful, sometimes purple—prose into the contradictory and often repetitive series of passages that forms *La Bureaucratisation du Monde*.

It can rightly claim to have predicted the 1939 pact, and to have come to this from a general account of the social roots of communism's kinship with fascism (and of the still wider spread of state intervention); indeed Rizzi, with his " bureaucratic collectivism," could with some justice have staked a claim as the unacknowledged theorist of Leninism's " third period." That his 1939 book, more frequently cited than read, should have passed so widely but so partially into post-war sociological and socialist literature owes as much to accident as to the text. Its popularity bespeaks, perhaps, the appetite for folklore that—happily for the sociological imagination—still characterizes the academic community.

Nationalism, Politics and the European Experience

George Schöpflin

NATIONALISM in Europe—and for that matter elsewhere in the world, for nationalism has been Europe's primary export commodity in this realm—has been intimately bound up with the question of political power. The generation of power, its distribution and its legitimation have all been influenced and mediated by nationalism for the best part of two centuries. Yet for the most part, analyses have tended to concentrate on nationalism, and its exact relationship to power has often been an unanalysed assumption. It will be argued in this article that both nationalism and the nature of political power are better understood together. In particular, by looking at the nature of political power in modern Europe, limits to the efficient functioning of nationalism can be established and, equally, answers can be offered to the integrative and disintegrative aspects of nationalism.

It is generally accepted that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and it is further argued that expressions of what may have looked like nationalism in the pre-modern (i.e. pre-nineteenth century) period were in fact the expressions of something else. The distinction to be made in this connection is between nationalism as a political doctrine, which clearly has its origins in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and the various forms of ethnopolitical identities and loyalties which held pre-modern polities together. Thus although it would be misleading to regard the pre-modern expressions of loyalty to particular polities or dynasties as nationalist in the modern sense, they had well-established political consequences and functions. The difference is in the universalistic claims of the nationalist doctrine—that the world is divided into nations and only into nations and that each individual is the member of one and only one nation. This concentration of loyalties is evidently a modern phenomenon and it arose for reasons which will be discussed later. However, pre-modern identities—the shared sense of community, a concept of " we " as being different from " them "—could be created and sustained over long periods of time and in a variety of ways. Armstrong argues that these included social, religious and economic patterns like sedentarism against nomadism, Christianity against Islam, urban against rural, transcendental myths of empire and the significance of the creation of centralized languages (elaborated codes) as tools of administrative convenience.[1]

[1] John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982); Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1975); Orest Ranum (ed.), *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975).

In the paradigmatic cases of nationhood, in the core countries of England, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, there was a slow process of fusing the political and administrative machines with a single cultural community. Indeed, this fusion enhanced the cohesiveness of the cultural community over time and strengthened its internal bonds. It included a shared sense of history, similar patterns of taxation, policing, justice and the like and the standardization of language through a single standard of literate communication. In these polities, discordant minorities were either eliminated (e.g. French Protestants) or they were attached to the core community by such strong bonds as to make their assimilation an accomplished fact. In effect, state power and culture were more or less coextensive. The consequence of this was that in the nineteenth century, when pressure for the redistribution of political power began to make itself felt, through demands for wider access to politics, these demands were in no way challenges to the integrity of the state as such. The redistribution of power did not become an issue of loyalty but could be settled within the confines of the polity. There were no culturally distinct groups who might endanger the integrity of the state if they were accorded greater power. This did not, of course, mean that the redistribution of power was a smooth process; but it did not affect the state as such, only the powers of the components of the state. Consequently, in these states the central proposition of nationalism—that there is causal nexus between cultural similarity and political organization—had no far-reaching repercussions, on the contrary there was a fairly straightforward transformation of pre-modern loyalties into loyalties to the nation.[2]

The real problem of nationalism arose in the rest of Europe, where for whatever reasons of history there was not this comparatively direct relationship between culturally homogeneous communities and their political organization. In Southern, Central and Eastern Europe the situation was one of discontinuity between culture and political power and it was in these areas—particularly in the politically fragmented German cultural area—that the problem of response to the successful core area states arose with particular acuteness during and after the Napoleonic wars. Defeat by France constituted a major trauma for the rest of Europe and, at the same time, shook the old-established monarchical political institutions by questioning their permanence and their legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects. If these polities were unable to defend themselves against the foreign invader, then their *raison d'être* was called into question. New forms of political loyalty, above all forms modelled on the successful core countries' experience, would have to replace the now questionable *ancien régime*.

The Enlightenment had already witnessed the emergence of new currents of ideas, which were destructive of a political order based

[2] A. W. Orridge, "Varieties of Nationalism," in Leonard Tivey (ed.), *The Nation State: the Formation of Modern Politics* (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981), pp. 39–58.

primarily on status and privilege. These new ideas, notably associated with Rousseau and Herder, proposed different bases for political organization: the people equal within a single community and united in a single culture. At the same time, there was a growing intellectual interest in language, ethnography, folklore, etc., which provided ammunition for the subsequent arguments of nationalists who were concerned to define their own cultures in as clear a way as they could. This clarity of definition was essential if political organization and political power were to rest on cultural similarity. Thus early philologists and poets like Dobrovský or Kollár or Prešeren may not have been initially concerned with political issues, but their work was automatically politicized once the ideas of nationalism gained ground. There was one further factor in this complex which demands attention—the proposition that " the nation " was a fixed quantity, that it had existed since time immemorial and that it was something immanent in history. These concepts, which have become central to nationalists, were associated particularly with Hegel and Fichte, but they were taken over by nationalists elsewhere, predictably, for the nationalist objective of linking cultural community with political power could only gain in legitimacy if it could be shown that nations were historically immanent and that the existing political order was a historical aberration or injustice.[3] The claim that nations were a fixed quantity, furthermore, made a good deal of sense at first sight. In the core states, this was clearly the existing order of politics, so that it was logical to argue that once the limits of the nation were established, a corresponding political order could be (should be) created. Otherwise there would be uncertainty and a lack of clarity as to where the writ of the state ended, where different cultural–political communities began and the limits of the political arena would remain confused. The difficulty was a practical one—where cultural community and polity did not coincide, there still existed vested political interests, with firmly held ideas of their own about the distribution of power. Their competitors likewise had ideas of their own about how far and to whom political power should be redistributed. Hence each and every competitor for power looked for the definition of cultural community most favourable to itself, in an attempt to maximize power. An equal difficulty was that the nationalists ignored the unifying experience of the core states in their slow growth into single communities and could not or would not see that in the core states, culture had shaped politics and politics had shaped culture. They argued that this experience could be easily replicated and that the nations or nations-to-be on the periphery of Europe could rapidly catch up with the core.

Nationalism and Political Change

The problem with most of the propositions outlined in the foregoing is that they have not conformed to political realities. On the contrary,

[3] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Hutchinson, London, 1960, 1966); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: a Conceptual Framework* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1982).

nationalists (not unlike the adherents of other modern ideologies) found again and again that their preconceptions and political realities were miles apart; the nationalists' reponse was to seek to make the political realities conform to their own ideologically inspired objectives. Thus, in the first place, the proposition that the nation is a historically immanent, unchanging category, whose lineaments have merely to be established for them to be fixed in all time coming, is simply mistaken. The nation is in common with other political categories subject to continuous flux. This does not mean that the nation cannot be called into existence by the various techniques of mobilization deployed by nationalists, but it does imply that the definition of nationhood is far less certain than they would like. The various criteria of nationhood which have been put forward by nationalists in different places and at different times—shared language, history, culture, residence, religion and so on—can all be changed by individuals for whatever reasons of interest of a temporary or long-term nature. Individuals and even groups define and redefine their political interests continuously and will seek to maximize their political power and advantage as they see fit. Idealistic categories (as determined by nationalists) may or may not coincide with these. Where they do not, the so-called " transcendental imperatives of nationhood " will be ignored. Not that this should be taken to mean that there are no certainties in the area of nationhood at all. These do exist, in as much as there are long-term fixities in culture and in the political organization based on it. But even in this connection, cultures change and the political expression of those cultures changes correspondingly. It is self-evident that the totality of French culture in the 1880s was something quite different in a whole variety of ways from French culture today; there is a continuity, but there are major variations between the two.[4]

This has far-reaching repercussions for the definition of nations. First, it means that nationhood and its membership are subject to change, so that the way in which a nation is constituted, who is a member and who is not and, perhaps most sensitively, what are the codes of behaviour pertaining to membership, are all part of the flux and are subject to change. This then creates uncertainty as to the definition of the nation—where its limits lie, who is a member, what the internal distribution of power within the nation is—and the uncertainty tends to spill over into insecurity concerning all these areas. This insecurity can and does become fear for the very existence of the nation itself. The response to the insecurity is to call for intensification of the cohesiveness of the nation and because political challenges are regarded as potentially destructive of that cohesiveness, nationalists in these circumstances can easily subordinate the non-national to the national. The nationalist response is to try and delegitimate such challenges by declaring them anti-national, which of course inherently constitutes a severe restriction

[4] On France, see Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1979).

on the ambit of politics. The codes of political behaviour are tailored to the needs of nationalism, rather than to the demands of political activity. In this way, the normal issues of politics, the contests over values and resources, become infused with questions of global political identity. At the same time, the use of nationalism in this fashion aims at undermining conflictual politics by promoting myths of social harmony and vaguely defined organic concepts of society.

Second, the proposition that nationhood is not fixed but is subject to continuous change affects the criteria of nationhood, the external and internal badges of identity. When the nationalists outside the core countries began to define their cultural communities in order to build political structures on this basis, they assumed that the outer limits of culture were self-evident. The criterion was deceptively straightforward—each culture is defined by its language and each language is the bearer of one culture. All that had to be done was to bring the speakers of one language together within the framework of one political organization and, hey presto! a nation-state, the guarantor of freedom and universal plenty, would emerge. The actual reality of nineteenth-century Europe was very different. Culture, as already suggested, is far from having the fixed quality attributed to it by nationalists; even the continuous mutual strengthening of cultural community and political community experienced in the core states did not prevent individuals from opting out and seeking to improve their interests by adopting a new culture. Outside the core area, the imperatives of culture were fluid and the organization of politics was equally vague. The idea of making the two coincide—the kernel of the nationalist principle—raised enormous practical difficulties for the definition of both culture and politics. Thus nationalists tended to go for the simplest, most " self-evident " criteria, above all language, and to argue that the speakers of a particular language constituted a cultural community, that this was " the nation " and consequently the nation should be recognized as an independent unit of politics, viz. as a state.

The problem with this equation is that its different parts are far from self-evident. Although the majority of the population would tend to speak the same language, at the edges it was frequently difficult to say where a " language " ended and another began. While at the centre of a language area this might be clear, dialects shaded off into each other and the distinction between, say, dialects of German and Dutch or of Polish and Ukrainian was more notional than real. On purely linguistic criteria it could be argued with some force that Italy was potentially the cradle of dozens of languages. Equally, in many areas individuals might well be bilingual and use different languages for different purposes, so that when language became the criterion of political advantage, they could switch readily from one to another. When asked how many Poles there were in Teschen, a prominent Czech politician replied:[5]

[5] Quoted by Walter Kolarz, *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe* (Lindsay Drummond, London, 1946), p. 30.

> Perhaps 40,000, perhaps 100,000 . . . the figures change. The people of certain villages are changing their nationality every week, according to their economic interests and sometimes the economic interests of the mayor of the village.

The use of other criteria like territory and religion were equally fraught with difficulty, in as much as they too could be made the subject of individual change. The net result of this confusion concerning the precise outer limits of a particular cultural community was that the attempt to base political organization on it inevitably brought the protagonists of different nations into conflict with each other and gave rise to the multitude of vexed questions and disputes that continue to bedevil international and nationality relations in Europe and elsewhere.

The third consequence of the fluctuation of nationhood and politics is that the contours of both are to some extent determined by the other; codes of political behaviour depend on the sense of security. If the function of nationalism in a particular cultural community is to establish a political organization on that cultural base and if that political demand is being resisted, then the nationalists concerned will be inclined to emphasize unification and homogeneity in order to maximize their claim to political power.

The relationship between nationalism and politics is further complicated by the vagueness of the former. Given the antecedents of nationalism in culture and the elevation of loyalty to culture as the primary referent of identity, it is perhaps predictable that nationalism is unable to provide answers to a whole range of questions encountered in political life. Nationhood gives very clear answers to the question " where do I belong? Who are my fellows in my community? Who are not?", but it says next to nothing about the codes of political behaviour within a polity. If anything, because of the tendency to emphasize social harmony the answers given by nationalism are likely to be misleading if not actually mischievous, in as much as challenges can be delegitimated by reference to the needs of the nation. This can promote étatism and authoritarianism and a propensity to suppress complexity in politics. It can be very easy to dismiss the claims of a social minority by reference to national disloyalty, that, say, the demands of a section of the working class are " unpatriotic." In this way, nationalism has become a powerful instrument in the hands of those who have been able to define nationhood and to lay down its criteria. Almost without exception, despite high ideals, these definitions have favoured the interests of those who control the agenda of nationhood. The political elites, which have monopolized this process, can therefore use nationalism to fight off non-national challenges.

Political Elites and the Agenda of Nationalism

This raises the question of the nature of political elites in Europe outside the core area. At the time of the reception of nationalism, Europe was far from having been a political *tabula rasa*. On the contrary, there existed

a number of centres of political power deriving this power from tradition, feudal privilege and economic advantage based on that privilege. These applied equally to the ossified merchant guilds of the German cities or Venice or Ragusa (Dubrovnik) or to the feudal landlords who based their power on latifundia worked at low levels of technology by serf labour or to the impoverished gentry clinging to their rights as members of the Hungarian nobility. The rest of the population was outside the ambit of politics completely. These political elites and sub-elites had their own traditions and aspirations and these were for the most part largely at variance with those of the political elites which were emerging in France and England. Whereas in the latter countries, the pressure was for the destruction of feudal privilege which acted as a barrier to trade and was for access to equality of political power, outside the core countries the political elites were in an entirely different situation. For them, the feudal privileges constituted the basis of their power and that power was coming under mounting pressure from two sources—the attempts by the ruling empires (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to streamline their administrations and build up their military power and, at the same time, from the economic impact of cheap goods from the West which were fast undermining the viability of the local economies based on outdated, inefficient technology.[6]

The key to the understanding of the political attitudes of these sub-elites was that they had retained their distinctiveness from the ruling empires and that they regarded themselves also as distinct from the bulk of the (peasant) population. When the new doctrines of nationalism began to enter the periphery, these sub-elites automatically sought to appropriate them and to use them to strengthen and legitimate their own political claims vis-à-vis the ruling empires. Whilst in the West, the concept of nation was intimately linked with demands for popular sovereignty, that the entire population constituted the nation and each member of it should have equal access to political power, in the East these political freedoms tended to be regarded as the preserve of the politically conscious elites. Indeed, the concepts of nationalism were used to legitimate this. It was repeatedly argued that the interests of the nation, of its integrity and unity were paramount and took priority over all other considerations. The values of the political sub-elites became the cultural basis for the definition of nationhood in the East and, given the exclusivist nature of these values, the nationalism that emerged from it was likewise exclusivist. Nationalism in Eastern Europe never fully outgrew its origins. It has tended to remain monopolistic and to be étatistic; the terms of nationhood are fixed from above rather than from below. This proposition applies as much to the intelligentsia as it does to the political elites who came later to control the machinery of the state. Not only was the bulk of the intelligentsia integrated into state adminstration—hardly surprising in the light of the absence of competing social institutions

[6] On elites, see Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (New Left Books, London, 1974) and Olwen Hufton, *Europe: Privilege and Protest 1730–1789* (Fontana, London, 1980).

which could provide secure employment for the specialized knowledge of the intelligentsia—but they retained their particular political positions as guardians of the "conscience of the nation." This special position enjoyed by the intelligentsia in defining the terms of nationhood remains a standard feature of East European politics.[7] Yet the question remains, as it does in connection with all attempts to lay down strict guidelines from above regardless of the ideology concerned, who is to determine the agenda of nationhood? Who has the right to define the nationalist project? With the particularities of East European history sketched above, it becomes easier to understand why nationalism in this area should tend towards the homogeneity, the intolerance towards minority opinion and the exclusivist étatism that has been so characteristic of it.

Nationalism and Power

There is a final factor to be noted in this connection and this concerns the generation and legitimation of power by nationalism. It has been argued above that nationalism has tended to be appropriated by generally narrow sections of the political elite, who have sought to define the agenda of nationhood at least partially to their own advantage. This picture requires a measure of refinement at this point. The political cultures on which these elites created the political aspirations of nationalism may have been exclusivist, but the national aspect of these cultures did have to have something of a genuine popular base. The core countries of the West, as argued, built their political systems on an existing cultural community. These cultural communities also existed in the periphery, albeit they were weaker and their consciousness of community tended to be less developed. But there was no question of their existence—Czech or Polish or Hungarian cultures did exist. The local elites saw as their task the construction of cultures strong enough to compete politically with those of the developed West and with the political power of the ruling empires.

This demanded a process of mobilization, of bringing the potential members of the cultural community to awareness of their membership and to politicize them thereby. It is this duality of function that has marked the politics of nationalism in Europe outside the core. Culture and participation in cultural activity were promoted into an act of political loyalty (or disloyalty). But because the terms of nationhood were defined and redefined from above, the mass of the population had little or no control over those terms. Mass mobilization consequently tended to be a surrogate for political organization from below and, at the same time, to concentrate on relatively vague, ill-defined concepts like "unity" or "integrity" in which interests and conflicts of interests were not spelt out. A similar role was played by the use of symbols, flags, anniversaries and other rituals to integrate the political responses of a relatively untutored population as far as political sophistication was concerned.

[7] The intelligentsia is dealt with by Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), especially Chap. 6.

From the standpoint of the nationalist mobilizers, the essential task was to awaken the largely peasant masses rapidly, in order that the nation gain the political muscle to achieve its independence. The difficulty with this mobilization from above is that the habits of direction and guidance they give rise to have a tendency to take root. As nationalist mobilization proceeded and as the mobilizers drew political advantages from their monopoly or hegemony of the national and political agenda, they became most reluctant to share power and to widen the possibilities of participation, except under strong pressure from below. A consequence of this process was to intensify the trend towards the concentration of power in the hands of the state, to promote étatism and to weaken the intermediate institutions between state and society. This then obstructed the growth of political structures appropriate to the increasing social and economic complexity of these societies. At worst, the rulers could attempt—and often succeeded—to maintain serious maldistributions of power and to legitimate this state of affairs by reference to the overriding need for national unity, external threats to the nation and so on. The national principle, which began life in the core countries as an ideology legitimating the extension of political participation, was turned on its head in the periphery and was used to justify authoritarian rule.

It follows from the foregoing that the situation of cultural minorities in the periphery is a particularly difficult and disadvantageous one. Political organization is erected on the foundation of cultural community and non-members of that community are automatically disqualified from membership of both political and cultural units. When political rights are derived from culture, as they logically are in the construction of nation-states, and when the codes of political behaviour are determined by reference to national homogeneity, cultural (ethnic) minorities begin from a very poor position. If they seek to challenge the majority in its political dimension by claiming political rights for themselves, they are by definition tackling the national majority at its most sensitive point—the national imperative. In the absence of a strong political tradition where reciprocity of rights and access to political participation are at least partly autonomous of nationality, ethnic minorities find themselves denied their rights. Indeed, the national majority will see the challenge from the minority in the most extreme terms, because the minority by its very existence constitutes a kind of political exception with which the political codes of the majority cannot easily come to terms.

From the point of view of the majority in the nineteenth century, the claims of ethnic minorities were a serious danger. They could be and were used to deny the majority its claims to political power. Furthermore, given the extraordinary complexity of the ethnographic map of the periphery of Europe, the situation on the ground provided ample opportunity for all the contestants for power to manipulate ethnopolitical claims. A minority in one region was, if the frontier was aligned differently, part of a greater majority elsewhere and the first nation in question was thereby itself reduced to minority status. It was and remains

extremely difficult to justify existing frontiers and therefore to justify the majority or minority status of various groups.

A Case Study: the Czechs

The entire complex of problems concerning majorities and minorities is well illustrated by the case of the Czechs. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Czech lands of Bohemia-Moravia and the rump of Silesia that remained to Austria after the Seven Years' War were characterized by the existence of a Czech cultural community, a German cultural community and a non-national aristocracy. Unlike much of the European periphery, the Czech lands were relatively better off economically. The grain yield ratio was 4 or 5 to 1; early industrialization was beginning to attract labour off the land; the serfs had been made personally independent of their feudal lords in 1782; the aristocracy, probably because its native roots were weak, was outward looking and economically innovative; and generally the scene was not unfavourable to the emergence, albeit late, of an entrepreneurial class, a process not unlike what had happened further West. In the early stages, the primary beneficiaries of this growing prosperity and the political expectations that accompanied it were the Germans. But the Czechs benefited too and by the early nineteenth century there was a growing Czech middle class, which in turn generated a new intelligentsia. From the Czech point of view, the task was twofold. They had to establish themselves in the face of political and economic competition from the Germans and the Empire and, at the same time, define what being Czech meant in political and national terms.

The existence of a Czech cultural community was self-evident *prima facie*, but in the light of the ambiguous historical and legal studies of the Czech lands—its intimate connection with the Holy Roman Empire and with Austria—there was an immediate Czech anxiety that their position was endangered by the threat of being engulfed by the creation of a German political organization based on German culture. In 1848 the Germans meeting in the *Vorparlament* in Frankfurt automatically assumed that the Bohemian lands would form part of the newly created or more properly to be created German state. Invitations to attend were sent to Prague and one of those invited was František Palacký who emphatically rejected any suggestion that the Czechs should be part of a German state. Palacký sought to define the Czech national agenda by linking the development of the Czech nation with Austria, which he saw as better fitted to protect the interests of the small Slav nations of Central Europe and prophetically he argued that Austria was needed as protection not just against the Germans but also against Russia.

But the conflict between Czechs and Germans was writ large for all to see. The Czechs saw their political future as permanently under threat from being engulfed by the German cultural community and its political organization. The threat was both internal, from the German population of the Czech lands, and external. The rest of the Habsburg period was, in

fact, expended on precisely this struggle. It was one in which the Czechs did well, but in the process they came repeatedly to define their political demands in national terms—political power to withstand Germanization—and their national demands in political terms—the subordination of conflicts among the Czechs to national unity. The upshot of it all was that when the Czechs had their opportunity to create their own national–political organization, Czechoslovakia, it was imbued with these fears and these concepts.

The political system established in post-1918 Czechoslovakia was in many respects an open and liberal system; it went a long way towards the recognition of the rule of law; it provided for the election of the legislature by universal suffrage; and it accepted considerable freedom for initiatives from below. Yet as far as the national question was concerned, its constitution was flawed from the outset. From the Czech standpoint, their overriding objective was the creation of a Czech national state, established according to what were regarded as Czech codes of political behaviour. These were to be anchored in the entire state. But at this point, the frontiers of the state complicated matters—the Czechs were not prepared to settle for anything less than the historic frontiers of Bohemia–Moravia, for reasons of historic rights, economic advantage and military security. This demand had the unfortunate drawback that it left the Czechs in a solid, but by no means overwhelming majority over the Germans—roughly in a two-to-one proportion. It was clear that this was not a sufficient majority to achieve the desired aim of a Czech national state; a state created on these lines would be a bi-national state or else it would be fatally weakened. Hence the Czech objective could only be reached by augmenting the Czech population so substantially as to gain an overwhelming majority over the Germans. This was where the device of Czechoslovakism came in useful.

There had, of course, been historical contacts between Czechs and Slovaks, and Slovak Protestants in particular had looked to Prague for cultural and religious models. But this did not mean then or later that the Slovaks for their part were willing to submerge their identity in the Czech nation; they had their own national agenda. Indeed, in the 1840s the emergent Czech intelligentsia, including the liberal luminary Havlíček, was dismissive, to say the least, of Slovak attempts to define their own agenda, including the language. In 1918, as much the stronger partner, the Czechs sought to impose their own concepts of both nationhood and politics on the Slovaks because they needed the Slovak population to act as a counterweight to the Germans—there were actually more Germans in Czechoslovakia than there were Slovaks. The device worked as far as the Germans were concerned, at any rate in the short term. But it had the fatal legacy of restricting the Slovaks' right to determine their national agenda. In the event, in 1938 Czechoslovakia disintegrated not merely because of the threat of force from Nazi Germany, but also because the Czech political elite discovered that it stood alone as far as the non-Czechs were concerned. It had failed to make provision for

the national demands of the non-Czechs, who promptly deserted the Czechoslovak state when the opportunity for this arose. In this way, the merging of the national principle with Czech political goals fundamentally functioned to the disadvantage of the Czechs.

With the post-war period, the equation changed with the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia and with the concomitant acceptance of the Slovaks on the basis of parity in national terms. But this acceptance did not mean that the Czechs were willing to give the Slovaks the same rights to shape the post-war order as they wanted for themselves and with the imposition of the communist system, much of this became irrelevant, at any rate until the loosening up of the 1960s. At that point, the Czechs found that Slovak demands could be used as one instrument in helping to bring about the decentralization of Czech politics, in the campaign against Novotný in 1967–68. The fact that Slovak objectives were quite different from Czech ones during the Prague Spring was regarded by Prague as something of a distraction. But here again the existence of two divergent national political agendas in one state came back to haunt Czechoslovakia in the 1970s, when the Slovaks were satisfied by normalization and came to act as one of the bases of the stabilization which still endures. This combination of national fears and objectives (Czech, German, Slovak) has, therefore, served to sow fatal confusion in the Czech agenda and has arguably worked to the disadvantage of the Czechs. Indeed, it may be asked why the Czechs remain committed to the maintenance of a single state in tandem with the Slovaks at all.

However, the repercussions of the way in which the Czechs defined their national–political agenda do not end there. In the drawing of the frontier in 1918–1920, the Czechs unhesitatingly chose the most advantageous criteria in terms of territory: the historic though not ethnic frontier in the Czech lands, extended by a strategic frontier against Hungary in Slovakia. The agreement of the Western Entente to the Danube frontier and the granting of the multi-national city of Bratislava (Pressburg, Pozsony) to Czechoslovakia—both Austria and Hungary had equally good claims to it on ethnic and historic grounds—left the new state with a large Hungarian minority in Slovakia. For the Slovaks, the new frontier was non-negotiable, despite the clear breach of the cultural community principle by which they legitimated their own secession from Hungary. The Hungarian minority, on the other hand, became a classic minority problem, that of a deviant ethnocultural body which the majority could not accept or assimilate (Hungarians constitute about 12 per cent of the population of Slovakia and live in more or less solid ethnic blocs). Hence from the Slovak standpoint, the existence of this minority has been a perpetual threat to the integrity of their frontiers and raises the threat of a frontier revision, thereby replicating the fears of the Czechs vis-à-vis the Germans before 1938. In exactly the same way as the Slovaks felt themselves threatened by Prague centralism in the years after 1948 (when, as argued, their role in the Czech national agenda had become *passé*), so they responded to potential and actual Hungarian claims with

fear, thereby ensuring that even the minimal liberalization of political practice permissible in a Soviet-type polity should be difficult to introduce. By this contorted mechanism the national agenda developed by the Czech political elite came to impinge on the agendas of the Slovaks, the Germans of Czechoslovakia and of the Hungarians (to say nothing of the Poles of Teschen and the Ruthenes of Subcarpathia).

From the Czech point of view, the creation of Czechoslovakia within its post-1918 frontiers (Subcarpathia excepted) was the axiomatic minimum within which a Czech political system could be made to function. Their success of 1918, because it was based on the historically contingent conditions of a simultaneously defeated Germany and Russia and because the Czech national agenda contained political imperatives going beyond the real power of the Czech nation, contained the seeds of the national–political setbacks which the Czechs have had to endure since 1938.[8] In parentheses, it should be noted here that the Czechs constituted only one particular illustration of the propositions put forward in this argument, that the confusion of the national agenda with the political agenda had lasting and generally unfavourable consequences for both. Very similar analyses could be put forward for other East European nations, and indeed for others outside Europe.

The Ethnic Revival and its Absence

The contrast which has emerged from the foregoing is the one between the concentration of power and narrow definitions of nationhood on the one hand and the distribution of power and the broader definitions of nationhood on the other. The consequences that flow from this distinction continue to affect politics in both Western and Eastern Europe. In particular, Western Europe has been the scene of a renewed upsurge of ethnopolitical pressure, whilst in Eastern Europe there is continuing tension between the existing political system and the national aspirations of the people. So at first sight, there would appear to be a rough and ready similarity between the two parts of Europe as far as the area of nationhood is concerned. The argument to be put forward here is that this similarity is largely superficial and that, in fact, there are major political

[8] This account of Czechoslovakia has drawn on the following works: C. A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire* (Weidenfeld, London, 1966); Stanley Z. Pech, *The Czech Revolution of 1848*, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1969); Endre Arató, *Kelet Európa története a 19. század első felében* (Akadémiai, Budapest, 1971); J. W. Brügel, *Tschechen und Deutsche 1939–1946* (Nymphenburger Verlagsanstalt, Munich, 1974); J. W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973); Wenzel Jaksch, *Europas Weg nach Potsdam* (Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1958) and Gregory F. Campbell, *Confrontation in Central Europe* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975). See further, on Slovakia, J. M. Kirschbaum, *Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe* (Speller, New York, 1960); on Czechoslovakism, the speeches of Milan Hodža, *Középeurópa országutján*, 2 Vols., (Prager, Bratislava, 1938) and Ivan Dérer, *Nemzet és Szellem* (Prager, Bratislava, 1938). On the Hungarians of Slovakia, see Endre Arató, *Tanulmányok a szlovákiai magyarok történetéből 1918–1975* (Magvetö, Budapest, 1975) and Kálmán Janics, *Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority 1945–1948* (Columbia University Press for Brooklyn College Studies, New York, 1982). Also useful is Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague 1861–1914* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1981).

differences between the two, with far-reaching consequences for both nationhood and politics.

The settlement of Western Europe after the Second World War saw what seemed to be the decline of nationalism and the corresponding rise of internationalism. European integration, with Franco-German reconciliation as its kernel, appeared to be forging a new pattern of European politics, which some optimists hoped would lead eventually to a United States of Europe. The ideas of nationhood, nationalism and ethnicity were for a long time excluded from the political and intellectual vocabulary (and concerns of Europe) or where these phenomena could not be ignored (e.g. the South Tyrol), they were shrugged off as a relic of the past or as a temporary aberration. " Rational " liberal considerations, welfare consensus and economic growth were the dominant principles for about two decades.[9]

Then with a suddenness that was startling, ethnopolitics returned to the European political arena. A variety of ethnic movements began to make political demands on the existing states, which (as argued) had regarded the national issue as closed and the process of nation-building as complete. The reasons for this ethnic revival need not detain us but the response of the existing national states is of central relevance. Without exception these nations, and this includes the classical core nations of Europe, responded by seeking to delegitimize the new ethnopolitical challenges. They were either dubbed old-fashioned or reactionary or particularistic or, interestingly, their ethnic content was denied by being termed " protest " movements. If one takes the Scottish nationalist resurgence of the 1960s and 1970s as paradigmatic, then a number of propositions emerge from this experience. First, these ethnopolitical movements deserved the name inasmuch as they were both ethnic and political, that is to say that they sought to base their political demands—access to power—on ethnicity and to legitimate those demands by reference to an ethnocultural base. The Scottish National Party argued that Scotland was a qualitatively different region of the United Kingdom, that Scottishness was a cultural quality which gave Scottish demands an entirely different dimension to, say, Yorkshire and that the United Kingdom political order should be rearranged in such a way as to recognize these claims. In other words, the spokesmen of the Scottish national movement were engaged in a classic exercise of defining a national agenda in order to legitimate political claims and thereby to effect significant changes in the allocation of values and resources in the global political system. The fact that the Scottish National Party formally demanded independence is in fact misleading in this context: the SNP did not command majority support on this issue and was not wholly united on it itself. The thrust of the Scottish ethnopolitical agenda was within the UK framework. The Catalan, Breton, Occitan and other movements were on a par with Scotland.

[9] Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," in *Against the Current* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981), pp. 335–355.

What is noteworthy about the ethnic resurgence in Western Europe, however, was not just that it actually occurred at a time when nationalism had been generally declared dead and buried, but that it was taking place in a democratic, politically open framework. The significance of this was that however painful it may have been for the existing nations to be challenged as to their integrity, the political system proved flexible enough to respond and to deal with the newly articulated demands without resort to coercion. In other words, the rise of ethnopolitics in Western Europe was an attempt to redefine the national agenda and thereby to redefine the political agenda as well. The possibility of debate allowed these agendas to be determined on the basis of pressures from below, as well as new concepts of futurity from above.

The result of this openness of the political framework was partially to defuse the strength of ethnopolitical pressure. If the newly emergent ethnopolitical movements could satisfy their goals within the framework by redefining it, then the integrity of the state as such was secure. Hence ethnopolitics has been by and large, though not without some exceptions (viz. Corsica, Northern Ireland), absorbed into the broader political arena and ethnopolitical identities are generally to be regarded as one of many political identities which criss-cross modern polities. Ethnopolitical groups are in this sense analogous to pressure groups which claim a measure of autonomy on the basis of social cleavage (class), gender, race, religion, economic interests and the like. The likelihood is, however, that ethnopolitical challenges will remain on the political agendas of Western states and, indeed, that new ethnocultural identities, submerged at the moment, will surface to complicate Western politics yet further.

In all, then, open systems have been generally capable of meeting the challenge of ethnopolitics by redefining the existing limits of what constitutes legitimate political action and have evidently strengthened their own cohesion as a result. Where such pressures are denied the political space for articulation, they are likely to envenom the situation and to generate demands for far more radical change. This appears to be the lesson of Northern Ireland, one of the most intractable of ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious issues to trouble any Western democracy.

The Ethnopolitical Revival that has Failed to Revive

By contrast, the situation in Eastern Europe is entirely different. There too one might point to superficial parallels, notably that the process of nation-building is complete, that all the nations that can be created in the area have been. The post-war scene in Eastern Europe, far from having spawned yet new ethnopolitical movements to challenge the national status quo, has in fact been one of quiescence in this one respect. There appears to be an absence of sub-state nationalism in Eastern Europe. This would imply an extraordinarily high degree of ethnonational homogeneity in the region, something that does not actually stand up to closer scrutiny. In reality, Eastern Europe is as divided by potential or

actual ethnocultural cleavages as the West. Yet these have failed to manifest themselves on the political scene.

The explanation for this must be sought in the nature of Soviet-type systems and the response to the imposition of Soviet-type systems on Eastern Europe by the nationalist intelligentsias which have retained, as far as possible, their special role in defining the agendas of nationhood. Furthermore, in the light of the historical experience of modernization in Eastern Europe, with its heavy reliance on nationalism to sustain political loyalties in systems where intermediate institutions were weak, the chances of ethnopolitical challenges emerging were clearly smaller. In the pre-communist period, the ruling political elites derived much of their power and legitimation of that power from the control of the national agenda and understandably defined the nationalist project in as exclusive a manner as they could. The relatively closed quality of the political system perpetuated this state of affairs.

The alien communist revolution changed surprisingly little in all this. Indeed, the communists used their extensive control of the levers of power to freeze the situation as it existed (the few exceptions, mostly in Yugoslavia, will be discussed below). From the standpoint of the logic of Soviet-type systems, with their insistence on the maximum concentration of power, the elimination of competing centres of power and the destruction of autonomous sources of legitimacy, this was predictable. The fewer nationalist agendas to cope with, the better it was from the communist standpoint. This attitude has, equally, prevailed in the entire post-war era in Eastern Europe, and however liberal or relaxed certain periods of communist rule may have been, the proposition that ethnopolitical initiatives may be accepted in the political arena has received an even dustier answer than the one given to other types of interest articulation. The communist standpoint is further explained in this connection by the fundamental incompatibility between a transcendental ideology based in theory on class (communism) and one based, again in theory, on culture (nationalism).

What is less widely perceived, however, is that ethnopolitics has been regarded with equal disfavour by nationalists in Eastern Europe. In this context, the relationship between the alien communist political ideology and system on the one hand and the national response to them on the other is crucial. The nationalist intelligentsias have seen themselves under continuous threat from communism and have reacted by trying to maintain the highest level of national unity possible in the circumstances. It is almost as if the nationalists have become a mirror image of the communists in the restrictiveness with which they define the political agenda. Thus the emergence of potential ethnonational challenges was as much of a threat to nationalism as it was to communism, so that ironically nationalists and communists have found, at any rate tacitly, common ground.

Yet a close look at the situation in Eastern Europe will show that it is as fertile in potential ethnopolitical challengers as Western Europe. Despite

the best part of two centuries of homogenization, there remains a wide variety of not fully integrated regional and religious groups, with a separate, but partial (with respect to the nation of which they are members) consciousness. Sometimes, this can give rise to two tiers of consciousness and the political loyalties associated with it. Potentially these proto-ethnopolitical groups could readily become the bases for bids for autonomy and interest articulation, along with the kinds of interest groups that are familiar elsewhere, i.e. economic, gender, etc.

A Case Study continued: the Czechs

The foregoing propositions can be illustrated by the case of the Moravians. Up to now, it has been assumed that there is and has been only one way in which the Czech national agenda can be defined, not least because it was invariably defined in competition with the Germans. This picture demands modification, something which has arisen at least in part because of the ending of the direct competition between Czechs and Germans within Czechoslovakia. In 1968 during the Prague Spring, at a time when a whole variety of interest groups came forward with their different claims to political recognition, a group calling itself the Society for Moravia and Silesia demanded the reorganization of the Czechoslovak republic, which was in the throes of negotiating federation between the Czech lands and Slovakia, on a tripartite basis. The Society claimed a membership of 240,000 and enjoyed the sympathetic neutrality of the Party committee in Brno. The Society called for a plebiscite on the issue and sought to legitimate its claim on the grounds that the " community " of Moravia–Silesia constituted " a social, geographical, ethnic, historical, economic and political fact." There were references to the separate status of Moravia in history, including the Great Moravian Empire (something which the Slovaks had claimed as their antecedent state) and Margravate of Moravia in the Middle Ages, which had a status separate from Bohemia. Equally, in both the Habsburg empire and the First Republic, Moravia had enjoyed a semi-autonomous administrative status, and it was argued that the Moravians, while obviously members of the Czech nation, had a cultural distinctiveness of their own. Further, only administrative autonomy, which in the conditions of the Prague Spring implied a measure of political autonomy, would protect the special economic interests of the region. All this is the classic ground of ethnopolitics. The response to the demands of the Moravians was likewise fairly familiar. Both Czechs in Bohemia and Slovaks were opposed to the Moravian bid, albeit on different grounds. The Bohemians rejected it on grounds of administrative complexity and inconvenience, adding that the Moravian claim was particularistic; for the Slovaks the recognition of an equal status for the Moravians would have represented a devaluation of their own status as a nation coequal with the Czechs. Yet the Moravian campaign had deeper implications, centering on the question of whether there was only one way in which the Czech national

agenda was to be defined or was it, in fact, possible to approach this problem at more than one level.[10]

If the Moravian case raised questions of devolution of power on the basis of an ethnoregional claim and was swiftly delegitimated by the holders of power, the case of the Lachians illustrates a similar though more extreme set of the pressures, albeit with virtually no power implications. As a matter of fact, it is somewhat misleading to refer to Lachians in the plural, for one is dealing in effect with the efforts of one man, Óndra Ľysohorsky, to establish his right to use a language which is virtually his own invention. Lachia is the region of Ostrava and Teschen (Těsín, Cieszyn) and the local dialect represents an intermediate stage between standard Czech and Polish, notably a fixed stress on the penultimate syllable (as opposed to the initial stress of Czech). Ľysohorsky first published in this dialect, which he insisted was a language, in 1934 and he expressly sought to establish the right of Lachians to be regarded as a nation of its own. This was the beginning of a long and unsuccessful Odyssey. But the attempt received added piquancy from the fact that Ľysohorsky was a communist and argued his case for Lachian self-determination by reference to Soviet nationalities policy (this was in 1934!). He further justified his position by arguing that in using Lachian, he was doing no more than writing in the language of the people, notably the miners and metalworkers of the area.

Despite this seemingly excellent proletarian pedigree, Ľysohorsky's expectations of the establishment of a communist system in Czechoslovakia were disappointed. Even during the war (which he spent in the Soviet Union) it was made clear to him by Czech communists that his efforts were not regarded favourably, above all because his broaching of a separate Lachian language could be used by the Poles to legitimate their claim to the area, which was actually briefly annexed by Poland after Munich. After the war, Ľysohorsky found himself silenced; he was unable to have a single line of his Lachian poetry published, although by a telling irony his work was brought out in translation in German, Hungarian (in Slovakia), French and English. In effect, it can be argued, the Czech intelligentsia and political elite remained hostile to a potential division of Czech culture and the possibility of the creation of a Lachian cultural community with its own language, values and ultimate political demands.[11]

If the Lachian case seems murine in its significance, it is far from being the only one in Eastern Europe. A brief list will indicate the range of potential ethnopolitical challenges to East European nations and states. In Hungary, one of the most homogeneous states ethnically, there is a large Gypsy minority which is not even recognized in ethnic terms—it is treated

[10] Moravia is discussed by H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1976), pp. 470–474 and Vladimir V. Kusin, *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Macmillan, London, 1972), pp. 159–160.

[11] On Ľysohorsky and the Lachians, see Igor Hájek, "Poet of a New Nation," in *Cross-Currents*, 1983, pp. 316–332.

as a social category—yet it clearly has ethnopolitical implications. The Croats have resolutely refused to recognize the Dalmations' claim to be a separate cultural group, despite historical and other arguments. The Kashubs in Poland, currently relegated to a status of folkloric interest, could likewise constitute the basis of an ethnopolitical challenge. Most significantly, there is the highly sensitive question of the Romanians of Transylvania, who are obviously members of the Romanian nation, but some of whom argue that there exists a separate Transylvanian consciousness which does not diminish their Romanianness, but does signify a certain readiness to approach politics differently. Indeed, it might reasonably be asked whether there is not a Romanian minority in Romania, given that since incorporation the Transylvanians have experienced a continuous transfer of their resources to the Regat. It may be that Transylvanian Romanians are satisfied with this state of affairs as the price they have to pay for protection against Hungarian irredentism, but it is a matter on which they have never had the opportunity to express an opinion.

A Yugoslav Exception?

Yugoslavia constitutes a special case in the matrix of ethnopolitics in Europe, in that the Yugoslav elite of the post-war era has sought to resolve some of its ethnopolitical conflicts by moving in the opposite direction to the one sketched above—the Yugoslav communists have actually encouraged the formation of new nations. They have done this with the objective of enhancing the integrity of the country's territory and of reducing the chances of conflict between already defined nations—the Serbs and Croats in the first place. The particularly successful example of the former has been the fostering of a Macedonian nation and national–political community. Having been denied any right of cultural self-expression before the war, the Slavophone Christians of the Vardar valley were attached to the Yugoslav polity by being expressly recognized as a nation and being accorded the political power that other nations in Yugoslavia enjoy, i.e. republican status. Within the federal framework this strategy has evidently worked and the Macedonians' loyalty to Yugoslavia has been secured; this strategy has, however, been assisted by the contrary policy of the Bulgarians, the potential competitors for the Macedonians, who have absolutely refused to recognize a separate Macedonian nationhood. It should be noted that this mechanism does follow the standard pattern of nation-building in Eastern Europe, namely that the definition of the Macedonian national agenda was determined from above with the aim of achieving not just the satisfaction of Macedonian national aspirations, but also of reaching another political objective—the creation of a pattern of loyalties which would secure the Macedonian-inhabited areas for Yugoslavia. The parallel (though later) encouragement of a Moslem nation, again decreed from above, likewise had a political objective distinct from the wishes of the Moslems. If

Moslems, who are Serbo-Croat speaking, could be claimed by neither Serbs nor Croats as they had been in the past, then this source of serious discord would be removed and the problem of Bosnia would be solved. Ironically this device has, if anything, been too successful and in Bosnia there is now some evidence of Moslem power being exercised to the detriment of Serbs and Croats in the republic. What is oddly contradictory in this exercise is the fundamental idea of a communist elite seeking to create a nation on the basis of religious loyalties, something which has brought an upsurge of Islam to Bosnia, a development distinctly unwelcome to Belgrade. In this sense, the Yugoslav political elite has used national agendas as an instrument of the manipulation to secure political ends only tenuously connected with the nationhood of those involved.

THE broad answer to the problem of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe is that as long as these states remain ruled by Soviet-type systems, no deconcentration of power sufficient to provide for the redefinition of the national and political agendas can be envisaged. And what can be applied to ethnic minorities, applies with even greater force to national minorities, i.e. those which are fully conscious culturally of being members of another nation, but are living in states dominated by a nation foreign to them. In these cases—the Hungarians of Slovakia provide an illustration—there may be some attempt to separate cultural community from political organization and to adapt to local conditions, but in general the imperative of merging the two is so intense as to make this distinction extremely hard to operationalize.

Overall, when viewed from this perspective—and this is, of course, true of other areas of politics as well—Soviet-type systems have proved less flexible and less responsive to ethnopolitical challenges than the more open Western democracies. The assimilation of ethnopolitics into the political practice of the latter is far from complete, but the indication is that the established nations and their political elites accept ethnopolitics, even if they do so with reluctance. The implications of this are far-reaching. It suggests that ethnopolitics need not lead to the disintegration of the state; that ethnic demands need not become nationalist in the sense of demanding secession; that the definition of the political agenda remains a matter of political debate and conflict. At the same time, in Soviet-type systems the reverse is true and whenever political problems appear on the agenda, as they do in periods of weak Party control, ethnopolitical demands appear along with the others. The elites in these states are at as much of a loss as to how to deal with ethnopolitical challenges as they are with respect to all forms of interest group pressure. Conflictual politics generally remains outside the framework of Soviet-type systems and in this respect, paradoxically, there is a confluence of interests between communists and nationalists.

Religious Ferment in Eastern Europe*

Pedro Ramet

EASTERN Europe is witnessing a wave of religious ferment without precedent in the post-war period, and although the roots of this ferment must be traced back at least 20 years, it is clear that the Polish Pope and the Polish example have much to do with the recent intensification both of religious fervour and of religious persecution on the part of the regimes throughout the region. Concentrated in Catholic areas (Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, Lithuania and the western Ukraine), the religious revival has also penetrated into non-Catholic and religiously mixed regions (chiefly East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Soviet Georgia, but also the Russian heartland) and presents the communist authorities with a challenge as trying and as complex as the multi-faceted economic woes currently afflicting the region, and perhaps as dangerous in the long run as the crisis of legitimacy brought into focus by the appearance of the independent trade union Solidarity between 1980 and 1981.

The current religious revival in European communist lands has sundry sources. First of all, the unevenness of religious policy from country to country (with Gomulka easing up on the Polish Catholic Church, for example, at the same time as Khrushchev was unleashing his anti-religious campaign of 1959–1964) encouraged clergy and congregations in the various countries to contemplate the possibility of change, whether for the better or for the worse, and in that way encouraged them to undertake organized action to affect their fate.

Second, the unevenness of religious policy over time has stimulated hope and self-confidence where policy has eased (Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and, to a limited degree, Romania), while the use of anti-religious campaigns (as in Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Yugoslavia and elsewhere), in so far as it may be of intermittent intensity, has actually reinforced religious devotion.

Third, the mushrooming of religious *samizdat* since 1970 has provided the religious population, mostly the Catholic population, with an authentic forum and, in the process, encouraged religious practice. Chief among the religious *samizdat* periodicals one might mention: *The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, Ausra* and *Dievas ir tevyne* in Lithuania, *Teologicke texty, Informace o cirkvi, Nabozenstvo a Sucasnost, Vzkrseni* and an apparently new publication, *Una Sancta Cattolica-Advent*, in Czechoslovakia, *Beszelo* in Hungary, *Spotkania* and

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The Cross of Nowa Huta in Poland, and *Vestnik Istiny* and *Maloyaroslavets* among Soviet evangelicals.

Fourth, the editors of several *legal* religious publications in the East have shown an increased confidence in their ability to stake out independent, if circumscribed, paths. The examples of *Glas koncila, Druzina, Crkva u svijetu* and *Pravoslavlje* in Yugoslavia, and *Slowo Powszechne, Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Wiez* in Poland illustrate that this process has made headway in at least two countries.

Fifth, instead of backing the churches against the wall, repressive policies have had the effect of stimulating the development of " catacomb churches " and grass-roots religious movements, thereby involving lay people more actively than they might otherwise have been involved. These phenomena have developed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia and the Ukraine.

Sixth, reports of an apparition of the Virgin Mary on 22 December 1954 on a mountain in a rural district of the Ukraine catalysed the emergence of an intensely religious and intensely nationalist and anti-Soviet, neo-Uniate movement, known as the " Pokutnyky," in the Ukraine.[1] Claiming that the second coming had already occurred— in the Ukraine—the " Pokutnyky " became a source of profound disquiet to the regime, spreading their influence throughout the western Ukraine and beyond, opposing conscription into the Soviet army and allegedly even portraying the Ukrainian nation as a new " chosen people."

Seventh, there is the availability of religiosity as an obvious form of protest against an oppressive system. The communists appear to view it in this light themselves and recent anti-religious press articles in Russia, Estonia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have portrayed the fascination of even atheist youth with religious paraphernalia as a symptom of rebellion and even of dissent.

Finally, religious currents in Eastern Europe have been reinforced by the " Polish syndrome," long symbolized by the late Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, powerfully invigorated by the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Cracow to the papacy in October 1978 under the name John Paul II, and exacerbated by the triumphal visit of the " Polish Pope " to his homeland in June 1979, which has provided much of the catalyst for recent change. The fact that the emergence of an independent trade union, Solidarity, and of independent farmers' and student unions in Poland invite emulation elsewhere in Eastern Europe (emulation which was specifically invited by participants in Solidarity's first National Congress in September 1981) itself encourages the emulation of other aspects of Polish society including, and especially, the privileged position of the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, some of the East European elites (specifically the Czechs, the Romanians and the Yugoslavs) have responded to this challenge by setting in motion vocal

[1] Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, " Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine," in George W. Simmonds (ed.), *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (University of Detroit Press, Detroit, 1977), p. 86.

anti-religious campaigns. Others (the Hungarians) have nervously underlined and reiterated the " understanding and cooperation " prevailing between church and state within their jurisdiction.

The Polish Example

The partition of Poland among Austria, Russia and Prussia, accomplished between 1772 and 1795, is perhaps the most important historical root of the Polish Church's present strength. From 1795 to 1918, the Church was the Poles' sole bastion against Germanization at the hands of Prussia and Russification in the East. The Catholic Church played an important role in sustaining Polish national heritage and became important as a symbol of Polish identity, in opposition to Prussian Protestantism and Russian Orthodoxy. The clergy was not identified with an oppressive regime, as elsewhere, but with *resistance* to oppressive regimes, and took part in the Polish uprising of 1863. The Soviet occupation of Poland after the Second World War repeated this pattern. Once again, the Church figured as the most important institutional obstacle to cultural assimilation, and thus when, in 1976, the Party endeavoured to incorporate into the Polish constitution explicit reference to Poland's " friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union," which was widely viewed as making a mockery of Polish sovereignty, opposition by Church and intelligentsia defeated the move.[2] In the post-war period as in the nineteenth century, a Church policy of resistance and opposition led to a strengthening of the Church, so that by mid-1981, the Polish regime found itself consulting with the Church as with a partner. The symbiosis of Catholicism and Polish nationalism has resulted in the fact that 99 per cent of Poles regard themselves as Catholics, even though only 93 per cent are baptized.[3]

Since the imposition of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, the Warsaw regime has launched, in increments, a campaign of harassment, blackmail, slander and false arrest against the Church. Code-named " Operation Crow," the campaign has resulted in the jailing of priests in Gdansk for leading violent street demonstrations, of a priest in Otwock for " membership in a terrorist group," of a priest in Koszalin for delivering an " anti-Polish sermon," and of others; in a raid of St Martin's Franciscan Convent in Warsaw in May 1983 by men armed with police clubs, who beat several lay volunteers; and in the investigation of Rev. Henryk Jankowski, an adviser to Lech Walesa, and Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko in the autumn of 1983 on charges of abusing religious freedom and making anti-government remarks.[4] Polish police also

[2] Karl Hartmann, " Stagnation in den Beziehungen zwischen Kirche und Staat in Polen," in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1978), pp. 883–885.

[3] Witold Zdaniewicz, *Kosciol Katolicki w Polsce 1945–1978* (Pallotinium, Poznan, 1979), p. 21, cited in Jan Nowak, " The Church in Poland," in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January–February 1982), p. 3.

[4] *Los Angeles Times* (12 May 1983); *Christian Science Monitor* (16 May and 17 Oct. 1983); AKSA (20 May 1983); and *Keston News Service* (12 March 1982).

ransacked the homes of Father Popieluszko and Father Stanislaw Maikowski, gave Cardinal Glemp a list of 69 " extremist priests " to be reined in, and, according to Keston College, were suspiciously implicated in the accident-related death of a Dominican priest whose car had been tampered with.[5] The Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party justified itself in October 1983, by accusing the Church of " undermining the state's authority and taking control of the youth," and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, in March of this year, charged that the Church was harbouring political opposition.[6] British sources said the campaign was designed to undermine the Church's authority, to foment divisions within the ranks of the clergy, and to demoralize the clergy.[7] It may have also contributed to Glemp's evident decision to distance himself from underground Solidarity,[8] thus safeguarding Church interests, to make certain concessions to the regime in personnel policy (specifically in agreeing to transfer the pro-Solidarity priest, Father Mieczyslaw Nowak, from working-class Ursus to a rural parish),[9] and to work to revive Church–State dialogue. This campaign came to a climax in November 1984, when the body of Father Popieluszko, known for his pro-Solidarity views, was found in the Wloclawek reservoir. A huge crowd of 250,000 mourners attended his funeral in one of the largest public gatherings since the Second World War.[10] His grave became a place of pilgrimage.[11] The trial of his murderers[12] from the security police was an event made necessary to assuage Polish public opinion. It was manipulated in such a way as to avoid further political repercussions and the murderers escaped the death sentence (to prevent further damage to the morale of the security apparatus). The attacks on the Church made during the trial (and broadcast on the radio) were a new campaign and led to new pressures being brought to bear on it. Other vocal pro-Solidarity priests, such as Father Malkowski and Father Zalewski, were subjected to renewed chicaneries, and Father Zielinski even to physical violence. The Episcopate protested and began to show increased concern about its relations with the state.

The " Polish syndrome " has entailed at least six factors: (1) Church championing of human rights generally (a stance which churches have adopted also in Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Yugoslavia), support of what the regime calls " partial interests " (e.g. the interests of farmers or of workers), and the use of the pulpit to present the Church's version of events; (2) Church engagement in political debate, in particular

[5] *Keston News Service* (20 Oct., 17 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1983; 12 Jan. and 8 March 1984).
[6] *New York Times* (16 Oct. 1983); and *Corriere della Sera* (17 March 1984).
[7] *Foreign Report* (17 Feb. 1983), p. 3. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (6 April 1984).
[8] *Corriere della Sera* (4 March 1984); and *Der Spiegel* (6 Feb. 1984), p. 121.
[9] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (24 Jan. 1984); *The Times* (London, 22 Feb. 1984); and *Washington Post* (22 Feb. and 23 Feb. 1984).
[10] *Vjesnik* (Zagreb, 27 Dec. 1983); *The Times* (5 Jan. 1984); *Die Zeit* (27 Jan. 1984); *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (14 April 1984); *Christian Science Monitor* (1 Nov. 1984); and *New York Times* (5 Nov. 1984).
[11] Cf. Grazyna Sikorska, *A Martyr For The Truth, Jerzy Popieluszko*, Collins, London, 1985.
[12] Cf. Leopold Labedz, " A Polish Murder Trial," in *Encounter*, May 1985.

in the debate over constitutional revision, in its sundry aspects, 1975–1976 (while the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia had similarly articulated its positions during the Yugoslav constitutional debate, 1971–1973)[13]; (3) the demonstrated ability of the Church to win concessions from the government, especially with respect to media access (an ability which the Church in Yugoslavia, Hungary and the GDR have also demonstrated); (4) the Church's direct contact with the democratic opposition[14] (a tactic also followed by the Church in Lithuania and Czechoslovakia); (5) the involvement of the Polish Church in support of fellow Catholics abroad, specifically in Czechoslovakia[15]; and (6) the ability of the primate to present himself as a national leader—a role which might be emulated, elsewhere in Eastern Europe, only by Croatian Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, and there only within Croatia and parts of Bosnia.[16] It was precisely the fear that the " Polish syndrome " might spread that prompted communist authorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Yugoslavia—the most vulnerable areas—to launch anti-Church campaigns over the past four years; as in Poland, the Church in East European countries has come under intensified pressure.

The Polish Pope and the Polish Crisis

From the moment Cracow's Karol Wojtyla was elected Pope in October 1978, it was apparent that there was going to be some sort of impact on Eastern Europe. Just five weeks before his election to the papacy, Wojtyla had denounced communist censorship as " the weapon of a totalitarian system which places blinkers on the eyes of the Polish people," and had underlined the right of Christian citizens " to express their views publicly."[17] Now as Pope, he quickly accepted an invitation from the Polish episcopate to visit his homeland and pressed to have the proposed visit coincide with the 900th anniversary of the martyrdom of St Stanislaus, the Archbishop of Cracow put to death by King Boleslaw Chrobry in 1079, and the patron saint of Poland. He launched a Polish edition of *L'Osservatore Romano*, the Vatican newspaper, stepped up Vatican broadcasts to Eastern Europe (with Croatian broadcasts twice daily since 1 May 1983, for example), and brought in Franjo Seper, former Archbishop of Ljubljana, and Monsignor Andryss Backis of Lithuania to assist him in Rome. In November 1981, the Vatican opened the Cyril and Methodius Institute of Slavic Studies in Rome, and in October 1983, a Bulgarian Catholic Centre, to serve as a historical and contemporary archive and study centre for

[13] See Pedro Ramet, "Catholicism and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1982).

[14] See, in particular, H. H. Hiking and M. T. Svijecki, "Katolicka crkva i demokratska opozicija," in *Gledista* (Belgrade), Vol. 22, Nos. 5–6 (May–June 1981).

[15] See " 317 polnische katholiken ermutigen Kardinal Tomasek zum Einsatz für ' Charta 77 '," in *Glaube in der 2. Welt*, Vol. 7, No. 10 (October 1979), p. 11.

[16] See " Nadbiskup Kuharic—kardinal," in *Nova Hrvatska* (16 Jan. 1983), p. 5; and " Kardinal Kuharic—' Primas Croatiae '?," in *Nova Hrvatska* (13 Feb. 1983), p. 4.

[17] Quoted in *Los Angeles Times* (21 Oct. 1978).

Bulgarian affairs. During the latter month, the Vatican also canonized Father Leopold Bogdan Mandic (1866–1942), a Croatian Capuchin father.[18]

As the new Pope returned to Poland in June 1979, the triumphal visit took on the character and dimensions of a national celebration. In the nine days of the papal visit, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Polish and East European Catholics crowded to see him at the various stops along the way. 200,000 people turned out at Jasna Gora to see the pontiff; 100,000 or more along the streets of Cracow; and more than half a million at Gniezno, the first seat of Roman Catholicism in Poland a millennium ago.

Earlier, in his first Christmas message to his home diocese of Cracow since becoming Pope, the pontiff had been encouraging his audiences to stand up to the state pressures. " St Stanislaus," he had told members of the diocese, " defended the contemporary society against the evil that threatened that society, and he did not hesitate to stand face to face with the ruler when the defense of the moral order required it."[19] Now, in the course of his return visit in 1979, he talked, in Warsaw, about the Soviet Union's refusal to come to the Poles' aid during the ill-fated Warsaw uprising of August–October 1944, when the Red Army halted across the river from Warsaw and watched the Nazis suppress the rebellious Poles. In Czestochowa, the Pope even appeared to call into question the legitimacy of the Communist Party's power monopoly, demanding at the same time that the Church enjoy complete freedom as a social actor. Nervous Polish authorities instructed Polish TV to avoid any panning shots that would show the size of the crowds attending the Pope's talks; and according to certain West German sources, Polish television broadcasts of the visit were notably ". . . poor and scanty in the eastern and northern parts of Poland, where broadcasts can be picked up in Western Belorussia and Western Lithuania; and the Bialystock station was temporarily ' out of order ' allegedly as a result of Soviet pressure."[20]

Some 3,500 Czechs and Slovaks tried for two days to cross the border into Poland. Others from elsewhere in Eastern Europe got through and joined in the catalytic celebration. Elsewhere there were reports of large encampments of Lithuanians and Belorussians along the border with Poland.[21] Cardinal Koenig of Vienna predicted that the visit would trigger a " psychological earthquake " in Poland,[22] and an anxious Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, would openly fret that the pontiff's visit would have " the same effect on the [Polish] masses as the Ayatollah Khomeini had in Iran."[23] Western analysts would in fact

[18] *Glas koncila* (Zagreb, 23 Oct. and 20 Nov. 1983).
[19] Quoted in *New York Times* (25 Dec. 1978).
[20] Paul Lendvai, *The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Manage the News* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981), p. 99.
[21] Margaret Budy, " Nine Days that Shook E. Europe," in *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 8, No. 13 (28 June 1979), p. 7.
[22] *Frankfurter Rundschau* (1 June 1979).
[23] Quoted in Budy, " Nine Days," p. 7.

subsequently credit the papal visit with having given the Poles a sense of their clout and power, and with having thus provided the spark for the workers' strikes that would erupt in Poland the following summer. The papal visit provided a poignant answer to Stalin's old question, " how many divisions has the Pope? "

The transformation of the Polish political landscape after August 1980 conferred a new role on the Polish Church. With the appearance of Solidarity, which inherited the role of rallying point for opposition and dissent, the Church came to see itself in terms of a mediator between Party and Solidarity, state and society. This new role, as Wyszynski's successor Jozef Glemp observed, seemed if anything to increase the prestige and influence of the Church after the *coup* of General Jaruzelski.

Slovakia's " Secret Church "

During the 1970s, Church–State relations elsewhere in Eastern Europe had fallen roughly into three patterns: siege (Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and the Ukraine), *modus vivendi* (Hungary, the GDR and Yugoslavia), and cooptation (Romania, Bulgaria and Russia). John Paul II's new *Ostpolitik*, launched with considerable fanfare, excited considerable attention in East European capitals. Even the Yugoslavs privately fretted lest the Pope plan a visit to nationalistically-prone Croatia, and publicly observed that " the offensive of the Polish Church has [had] its effects."[24]

Czechoslovakia was, perhaps in part for reasons of proximity, the first East European country to feel the repercussions of the Polish religious syndrome. And although Prague launched a wide-ranging anti-religious campaign in early 1970, as part of its programme of reversal of the policy effects of 1968,[25] the regime undertook a more specific suppression of the Catholic Church very soon after Wojtyla became Pope.[26] This anti-Catholic campaign gathered momentum as the Polish crisis developed, and Catholic clergy have been decimated by a wave of arrests.

Western sources confirm that an underground network of Catholic priests and nuns, concentrated in Slovakia but with adherents also in the Czech lands, formed in the early 1970s, in response to the intensified wave of repression, and that it numbers 10,000–25,000 priests and believers.[27] This " secret church " finds itself in opposition not only to a regime bent on its liquidation but also to those sectors of the Church hierarchy which have been subverted by the regime (though the catacomb church enjoys the blessing of both the Vatican and of Prague's Cardinal Tomasek).[28] This, of course, represents a significant difference from the Polish case, where the Church was never driven underground. In

[24] *Vjesnik* (10 Jan. 1980).

[25] Peter A. Toma and Milan J. Reban, " Church-State Schism in Czechoslovakia," in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong (eds.), *Religion and Atheism in the USSR And Eastern Europe* (Macmillan, London, 1975), pp. 286–287.

[26] *Christian Science Monitor* (24 Aug. 1981).

[27] KNA (3 Nov. 1981); and *Daily Telegraph* (London, 6 March 1981).

[28] *Rheinischer Merkur* (2 Nov. 1979); and Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (6 April 1984).

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, masses are regularly being said in private homes, and nuns pursue their calling clandestinely.

Despite recurrent warnings from the regime that " religion warps the character of a person " and produces schizoid and anti-social behaviour,[29] religiosity has shown tenacity in Czechoslovakia and in recent years has shown especial strength among the youth.[30] A number of Franciscans, including Jan Barta (who was released in 1968 after 17 years in prison and who died in December 1982), attracted a widening circle of young people eager to discuss God and religion. Moreover, among the various denominations, it is Catholicism, to which 60 per cent of the country's population adhere, which has been the most dogged in the resistance to regime pressures. Western journalistic distortion notwithstanding, it is not the dissident movement Charter 77 (now suppressed) which has been the most vexing to the Prague regime, but rather the Catholic Church, and it was the waxing tacit alliance between Chartists and the Catholic opposition at the end of the 1970s which seemed to threaten the regime's confidence.[31] The regime noted with dismay a concurrent rise of anti-communist Slovak nationalism in areas where the catacomb church (also known as the Oasis Movement) is most active and took umbrage at a pastoral letter distributed in Slovakia in which Polish clergy expressed a sense of " responsibility " for fellow Catholics in neighbouring Slavic countries. The Bratislava daily, *Pravda*, signalled Party displeasure by denouncing movement adherents in Slovakia as a motley group of " clerofascists," " neoseparatists," and " politically disoriented individuals . . . under the spell of mystic romanticism . . . who are incapable of recognizing what is at stake." The " secret church," *Pravda* went on, represents a direct threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia.[32] Worse yet, from the regime's standpoint, the catacomb church showed signs of feeling *encouraged* by events in Poland; and in mid-December 1980, *Pravda* published an unusually long article accusing the Polish Catholic Church of having been behind the organization of Solidarity and of actively assisting the Czechoslovak " secret church."[33]

The Czechoslovak Communist Party responded decisively, stepping up repression and targeting the Oasis Movement for liquidation. Underground priests have been rounded up by the dozen, tried on charges of anti-state activity and jailed. The movement itself has been infiltrated by regime agents. Those returning from trips to Poland have been interrogated and placed under surveillance. The Slovak secret police were even

[29] See, for instance, the article by Bohus Kuchar in *Pravda* (Bratislava, 3 Feb. 1972), translated in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. 11, Nos. 7–9 (July–September 1972), pp. 100–102.

[30] *Muenchner Merkur* (13 Aug. 1981); *Stuttgarter Zeitung* (28 Aug. 1982); *Frankfurter Rundschau* (13 April 1983); and Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (11 May 1984). See also *Czechoslovak Newsletter* (May 1984), which claims that " the neo-Stalinist regime of Gustav Husak [through] its anti-religious stance is producing a backlash, a revival of religious feeling among the population."

[31] For more on these points, see *Rheinischer Merkur* (2 Nov. 1979).

[32] *Pravda* (Bratislava, 29 Dec. 1980), translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 5 Jan. 1981.

[33] *Keston News Service* (16 Jan. 1981).

augmented by the temporary assignment of some 300 agents from the Czech part of the country. Tactics have run the gamut from harassment to the " disappearance " of certain priests. With one of the toughest drunk-driver laws on the books (with no minimum alcohol level spelled out), the authorities have adopted a practice of stopping priests in their cars after mass, having them take breathalyser tests for drunkenness after taking communion wine. Some priests have accordingly lost their drivers' licences. Others have been disqualified from exemption from military service and drafted into the army, while still others have been forced to retire, allegedly because of poor eyesight or health defects. In Moravec, in Bohemia, witnesses reported having seen some 150 armed police, with dogs, searching a priest's home, confiscating religious literature, while 40 security officials were said to have forced their way into a Dominican abbey elsewhere in Bohemia in October 1981. There were at least two unexplained deaths of active Catholics during 1981, and two Catholic lay volunteers were arrested in August 1982 and subsequently imprisoned for the illegal distribution of religious literature.[34]

More recently, several Catholic priests have been stripped of their state licences to practise,[35] and a number of Franciscan fathers have been put in jail.[36] In a surprising development, Father Stefan Podolinsky, originally arrested on charges of " obstructing state supervision of the Church," was cleared of all charges at his trial in Banska Bystrica in August 1983 and released. Despite that, pressure on young people suspected of belonging to clandestine religious orders has continued, and the Catholic seminary in Bratislava has been instructed to include a course in atheist philosophy as part of its curriculum.[37]

A commentary which appeared in the Slovak daily, *Pravda*, in July 1982 pinpoints the nature of the regime's concern in its excoriation of the linkage of religion and nationalism in Poland.[38] In so saying, the article also conceded that the regime is far more concerned about religiosity among the largely Catholic Slovaks (whose church attendance has recently been estimated to be as high as 80 per cent), than about religious currents in Bohemia and Moravia, where church loyalty is far less strong.[39] It is for this reason that the current anti-religious campaign in Czechoslovakia has been concentrated in the eastern, Slovak territories.

Pope John Paul II responded to this pressure by ordering Czechoslovakia's Catholic priests to withdraw from the regime's Trojan horse, " Pacem in Terris," and by forbidding priests to join associations with political orientations. Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, seconding the Pope's

[34] For more on the Czechoslovak situation, see Pedro Ramet, " The Czechoslovak Church under pressure," in *The World Today*, Vol. 38, No. 9 (September 1982).

[35] *Keston News Service* (23 Feb. and 7 June 1984); and Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (11 May 1984), p. 10.

[36] *Die Presse* (27 April 1983); and *Keston News Service* (28 July 1983).

[37] *Keston News Service* (3 Nov. 1983; 9 Feb. and 5 April 1984).

[38] Reported in DPA (Hamburg, 10 July 1982).

[39] See Alexander Tomsky, " *Modus Moriendi* of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1982).

demand, withdrew authorization from the regime-subverted newspaper, *Katolicke noviny*, to advertise itself as an organ of the Church.[40] Responding to Church criticisms of " Pacem in Terris," which produced an immediate plunge in that organization's membership, the Prague daily, *Rude pravo*, charged that " this step cannot be characterized otherwise than as an attempt at gross interference in the affairs of citizens of this country. We cannot permit Catholic priests committed to ' Pacem in Terris ' to be persecuted for their peace-oriented and patriotic activities."[41] The Pope followed this up by naming two new bishops—Dominik Hrusovsky and Jaroslav Skarvada, neither of whom is trusted by the regime, which soon began to imply that Hrusovsky intended to press for the canonization of Monsignor Josef Tiso, the wartime president of Slovakia.[42] Before 1982 was out, there had been violent clashes between police and people in the Slovak town of Velki Krtis, where authorities have endeavoured to prevent any religious instruction from taking place.[43]

Under these circumstances, the talks between Archbishop Poggi of the Vatican and Czechoslovak state authorities in April quickly ran aground—as was signalled by *Tribuna*'s denunciation of the Pope, shortly after the meeting, as one of the century's most " reactionary " popes.[44]

The 1,100th anniversary of the St Cyril and St Methodius mission to Moravia was celebrated by a Papal mass on 14 February 1985, inaugurating the year-long celebrations in honour of the saints. In an attempt to counter the possible enhancement of the Church's position in Czechoslovakia as a result of the celebrations, the regime launched a propaganda campaign against " the misuse " of the anniversary " by the most reactionary forces of imperialism." The press argued that " the greatness of Methodius does not consist in his religious activities, nor in his adherence to the Church, but in his active participation in forming the state of Greater Moravia " (*Vecerni Praha*, 19 Feb. 1985). The attack in the Party weekly *Tribuna* (No. 1, 1985) against the ecclesiastical interpretation of the saints' mission as " bearers of the faith " prompted Cardinal Tomasek to protest in a letter to the editor (dated 18 March 1985), in which he condemned the " brutal attack " against the Pope and the attempts to misinterpret the mission of " the two brothers from Salonika " as political and not evangelical. In a further letter of protest, addressed to President Husak, he disclosed the existence of a " document " in which the authorities prepared a " set of measures " designed to undermine the impact of the anniversary through a vehement anti-religious campaign and the weakening of Church influence. The refusal of the authorities to countenance Cardinal Tomasek's invitation

[40] *Stuttgarter Zeitung* (28 Aug. 1982); and Radio Vatican (3 Dec. 1982), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 6 Dec. 1982.
[41] *Rude Pravo* (17 Dec. 1982).
[42] *Pravda* (Bratislava, 21 Jan. 1983).
[43] *Kurier* (Vienna, 12 Nov. 1982).
[44] AKSA (4 April 1984). See also *The Times* (26 April, 1984).

to the Pope to visit Czechoslovakia in order to participate in the anniversary celebrations is obviously not going to be reversed now.

The Miracle at Citluk

In Yugoslavia the echo has been perhaps even more striking, with a sharp reversal of the policy of accommodation abruptly set in motion in January 1981. Ironically, as late as December 1979, when Cvijetin Mijatovic, then ceremonial head of state, visited the Vatican, Church-State relations were painted in roseate hues, and it was generally thought that Church-State relations in Yugoslavia had found a stable *modus vivendi*. Instead, a sharp attack on the deceased Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac by Croatian President Jakov Blazevic in late January inaugurated a polemical campaign against "clerico-fascists," "separatists," Croatian "nationalists," and "neo-Ustashas" in the Church, with Stepinac serving as the regime's chief foil in the campaign's early stages.[45]

Evidence suggests that the campaign was prompted by fears that the Catholic Church in Croatia would attempt to emulate the Polish Church. Indeed, there were some ominous stirrings in Church circles in the wake of Wojtyla's election and later at the time of his visit to Poland.[46] Indeed, by the beginning of 1981, the Church seemed quite clearly to have adopted an oppositionist posture vis-à-vis the state. There were four things that most clearly suggested this: first, a petition submitted by 43 leading Catholic clergy and intellectuals in Croatia demanding amnesty for political prisoners (submitted at the end of 1980); second, the Christmas sermon delivered by Zagreb Archbishop Franjo Kuharic in which he demanded greater respect for human rights, political equality for Christians, and greater church access to Catholics in prisons, in hospitals and in the military; third, a sermon delivered by Kuharic on 10 February 1981, ridiculing the regime's long-standing insistence that Stepinac was a fascist and demanding a reconsideration of the evidence; and fourth, the Croatian Church's active promotion of Stepinac as a candidate for canonization.[47] None of these elements, taken separately, represented either disloyalty or the launching of an oppositionist offensive, but taken together, they seemed to threaten the weak collective leadership that succeeded Tito in May 1980 and which was uncertain of itself.

The anti-Stepinac campaign became overtly an anti-Church campaign on 5 March 1981, when Branko Puharic, a leading member of the Croatian Socialist Alliance of Working People, delivered a major indictment of the Catholic clergy. In particular, Puharic denounced what he described as an ideology of political opposition. "The political

[45] See Pedro Ramet, "Opening old wounds in Yugoslavia," in *Commonweal* (19 June 1981), pp. 368–369.

[46] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (21 June 1979).

[47] Radio Vatican (30 Dec. 1980), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 31 Dec. 1980; *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (27 Jan. 1981); *Kroatische Berichte* (January–April 1981), pp. 9–13; and interviews conducted by the author in Zagreb, July 1982.

consequences of this ideology," said Puharic, " places the Church in the position of the political fighter for the rights of the believers, while trying to politicize the believers themselves in the direction of opposition activity and struggle for political change of the existing system."[48] And political opposition, Puharic amplified, could only be founded on hostility to the socialist system.[49]

By July, Yugoslav Party leaders openly admitted their anxiety lest the Croatian Catholic Church follow in the footsteps of the Polish Church. Milutin Baltic, secretary of the Central Committee Presidium of the Croatian Party, warned the Croatian clerics not to aspire to imitate the Polish Church in its involvement in politics, explaining that the Polish context was entirely different and implying that the Croatian Church was infiltrated with traitors. Baltic further accused Archbishop Kuharic of counter-revolutionary activity.[50] Franc Setinc, Baltic's counterpart in the Slovenian Party, added that the " Polish recipe " was irrelevant to Church-State relations in Yugoslavia, because Poland is not Yugoslavia. The clergy remained unrepentant, however, and on 30 April 1981, the Yugoslav bishops issued a statement demanding complete freedom of religion in Yugoslavia. The statement was quickly denounced by the authorities.[51]

This situation took a strange turn on 24 June 1981, when the Madonna allegedly appeared to six girls from the Bosnian village of Medjugorje, near Citluk. The children subsequently claimed that the Madonna had appeared to them repeatedly over a period of several days and that she had divulged five " secrets " to them. The alleged miraculous appearance in Citluk of the Mother of God stimulated a massive stream of enthusiastic Catholic pilgrims and provoked intense nervousness both among the Orthodox Serbs and Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and on the part of the regime itself. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Catholics have streamed into Citluk, despite efforts by the authorities to discourage them, and jammed the town on the first anniversary of the appearance in June 1982; there were reports that Croatian separatists gathered at the new shrine, as well, to sing old Ustasha songs from the Second World War.[52] As if that were not bad enough, shortly after the alleged apparition, Medjugorje parish priest Father Jozo Zovko told parishioners in a sermon (as reported by *Svijet*, in its 17 August issue):

[48] Tanjug (5 March 1981), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 10 March 1981.

[49] Ibid. See also *Politika* (Belgrade, 12 March 1981).

[50] A high-ranking Party official (in Belgrade) admitted to me in July 1982 that Baltic's charge was unfounded and absurd. See also *Oslobodjenje* (28 July 1981); *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (29 July 1981); and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (29 July 1981).

[51] Tanjug (6 Aug 1981), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 17 Aug. 1981; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (9 July 1981).

[52] Interviews, Zagreb, July 1982. After numerous people who had approached the Crnica hill where the apparition was supposed to have taken place claimed to have been miraculously cured of sundry ailments, the authorities placed a cordon around the hill, with armed guards, to prevent people from approaching it. See Christopher Cviic, " A Fatima in a Communist Land?," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 5–6. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (2 Sept. 1981); *Die Presse* (15 Sept. 1981); *Vecernje novosti* (12 Oct. 1981); and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (12 Nov. 1981).

> Jesus said: the Lord has sent me to deliver from the prisons the captives, the prisoners, the convicts, to set them free . . . So did he not come to liberate me, since I am a captive? and you, who are a prisoner, since you have been enslaved for 40 years—so that this evening or tomorrow you can kneel down before him and say: remove the chains, untie the knots, loose the links which confine my life, since I have been fettered by evil sin.

The authorities promptly put Zovko behind bars, on a three and a half year sentence (later reduced to one and a half years), surmising that the 40 years referred to the period of communist rule.[53] Communist Party authorities immediately began to blame Kuharic and the Church hierarchy for having " concocted " the miracle—an accusation that contrasts sharply with the Archbishop's relatively cautious reaction to the reports from Citluk.[54]

In the meantime, another front was opened with the alleged creation of an underground pietist movement by certain pro-monarchist Serbian Orthodox priests. This movement, dubbed the " Orthodox Christian community " and said to be a Chetnik front organization, was openly modelled on an earlier pietist movement created during the war by Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic, a Chetnik. But the authorities saw political ambitions in the mystic pietist professions of the movement and in late summer 1981, rounded up its leading figures, including Orthodox priests Petar Lukic and Cviko Mojic. As evidence of their pro-Chetnik sympathies, the authorities cited a recorded message from Velimirovic, which the priests were said to have played for their adherents.[55] *Oslobodjenje*, the news organ of the Bosnian Communist Party, launched into a seven-part series devoted to Velimirovic, the new Orthodox Christian Community, and their shared alleged nationalist intolerance, while Zivomir Stankovic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly's Commission for Relations with other Countries, warned that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been infiltrated by Chetnik and anti-socialist enemy *émigrés*.[56] By mid-1983, moreover, there were reports of religious revival and ecclesiastical " politicization " along the entire Dalmatian coast, in both the Catholic and Orthodox churches.[57]

Pacifism and Opposition in East Germany

The Polish crisis has also had an impact on Church–State relations in East Germany, where the Polish crisis gets at least some of the blame for the termination, by the regime, of the Church–State *détente* negotiated by

[53] *Glas koncila* (30 Aug. 1981); *Vjesnik* (24 Oct. 1981); and AKSA (17 Sept. 1982).

[54] *Glas koncila*, reflecting the official stance of the Vatican and of the Zagreb archbishopric, has cautiously declined to endorse either the alleged appearances of the Madonna in Medjugorje or the attendant miracle cures being reported. See *Glas koncila* (1 May 1983).

[55] *Politika* (4 Sept. 1981); and *Oslobodjenje* (19 Sept. 1981).

[56] *Oslobodjenje* (18–24 Sept. 1981); and Tanjug (20 Oct. 1981), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 21 Oct. 1981.

[57] *Slobodna Dalmacija* (16 July 1983), summarized in AKSA (22 July 1983).

Evangelical Bishop D. Albrecht Schoenherr over the course of the 1970s.[58] Even prior to the election of the Polish Pope, there had been a revival of interest in the Church among East German youth,[59] dating from the early 1970s, which both compensated for an absolute decline in overall church membership and encouraged the churches to maintain a more independent stance vis-à-vis the regime. This policy was re-affirmed in January 1981 when Bishop Schoenherr, then chairman of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, told members of the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing:

> Two things must be ruled out, namely the danger of total adaptation and the danger of total refusal. The danger of adaptation is great because it is precisely a church that has become powerless which could be enticed through power to sacrifice the freedom and the richness of its preachings for the pottage of having a chance to survive. The danger of refusal consists in the wrong conviction that a basically atheist and totalitarian regime always and everywhere produces only wrong things.[60]

But the Evangelical Church was scarcely satisfied with its status, and in an April 1976 report, Bishop Schoenherr would complain that " freedom of conscience and faith is no longer unequivocally guaranteed for those citizens who cannot embrace the Marxist-Leninist world-view."[61] The Evangelical Church drew courage from the Helsinki Conference (1975), in which the communist states of Europe had pledged to respect human rights, and convoked an ecumenical congress, a few months later, to review the results of Helsinki. The Berlin regime decided to appease the Church at that juncture, and promised at its Ninth Party Congress (1976) to respect the equality of all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation. Encouraged, thus, by the Helsinki Conference, envigorated by its resilience among the youth, and strengthened by a Church–State *détente* negotiated in early 1978, the East German Evangelical Church began to show signs of increased stridency.

Already early in 1980, the Evangelical Church spoke out against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and criticized the belligerence of reports by the East German media of summer manoeuvres by the Warsaw Pact.[62] East German Professor Eberhard Poppe shot back with the accusation that the Evangelical Church was supporting NATO's line:

> the imperialist forces keep trying to affect citizens with religious ties and religious communities in the GDR through anti-communist agi-

[58] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (13 Dec. 1980, and 3 Jan. 1981). See also George A. Glass, " Church-State Relations in East Germany: Expanding Dimensions of an Unresolved Problem," in *East Central Europe*, Vol. 6, Pt. 2 (1979), pp. 243–246.

[59] Glass, " Church-State Relations in East Germany," p. 248.

[60] Quoted in *Die Welt* (29 Jan. 1981), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 30 Jan. 1981. See also Robert F. Goeckel, " Zehn Jahre Kirchenpolitik unter Honecker," in *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 14, No. 9 (September 1981), p. 942.

[61] Quoted in Gisela Helwig, " Zwischen Opposition und Opportunismus: zur Lage der Kirche in der DDR," in *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 9, No. 6 (June 1976), p. 577.

[62] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (13 Dec. 1980).

> tation in " Christian " garb and ideological diversion so as to push them into opposition to the socialist state and to socialist development.[63]

Despite this and similar warnings, the Evangelical Church raised new demands—for increased contacts with West German evangelicals and abrogation of the new foreign exchange requirements for Western visitors—protested compulsory military service, suggesting the institution of a social service substitute, criticized state policies in education and other areas, and lent its support to the budding pacifist movement in the GDR. The authorities confiscated one offending edition of the Evangelical News Service, banned a regional church newspaper containing other critical remarks, and put the Church on notice that it would not tolerate a political Church on the Polish model. Finally, as the Polish crisis unfurled and GDR authorities grew nervous, the regime stiffened censorship of Church publications.[64] Numerous sources confirm that East German authorities were worried that the Evangelical Church might serve as a rallying centre for opposition in the GDR and conceivably stimulate a movement similar to the opposition movement in Poland,[65] while a Keston College correspondent even suggested that the Soviets may have specifically advised the East Germans to muzzle their churches or face Soviet retaliatory measures.[66]

Unintimidated by the pressure, the Evangelical Church found itself inexorably drawn into the Polish crisis. A high point of this process may have been reached in April 1981 when a synod of the Evangelical Church in the eastern region at Berlin-Brandenburg proclaimed its solidarity with neighbouring Poland and set itself squarely in opposition to the regime's encouragement of traditional anti-Polish prejudices, adding, for good measure, that reciprocal visits between people of the GDR and Poland should be allowed to resume.[67]

The East German Catholic Church was slower to adopt a clear oppositionist stance, chiefly because, as a smaller church organization, it felt more vulnerable.[68] Pressure from two distinct sources combined to change this situation, however. First, there was growing ferment among the congregation itself, leading to the formation, already in 1969, of a lay activist organization known as the Halle Action Circle and composed of both clergy and laity. This organization, finding itself drawn into the peace movement initially succoured by the regime itself but increasingly out of its control, protested the Church's silence on the issue of war and

[63] Eberhard Poppe, " Basic Rights of Citizens in Socialist Society," quoted in *Neue Zeit* (East Berlin, 3 Jan. 1981).

[64] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (11 Oct. 1980); and Reuter (10 Nov. 1980).

[65] *Der Spiegel* (4 May 1981), p. 62; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (21 Aug. 1981).

[66] *Keston News Service* (16 Jan. 1981).

[67] DPA (28 April 1981), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 29 April 1981. For further discussion of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in East Germany, see Pedro Ramet, " Church and Peace in the GDR," in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (July–August 1984).

[68] Klemens Richter, " Zu einer Standortbestimmung der katholischen Kirche in der DDR," in *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 15, No. 8 (August 1982), p. 800.

peace. In an open letter of 5 March 1982, the Circle charged that "... many Christians can no longer overlook the troubling silence of the Catholic Church in the German Democratic Republic with respect to the contemporary peace movement. Is this church," the Circle asked, "still ' in the village '? "[69] Second, Pope John Paul II himself explicitly urged the Church in East Germany to become more involved in social issues; and Bishop Gerhard Schaffran of Dresden-Meisen, chairman of the Bishops' Conference of East Germany, divulged in May 1982 that he felt bound by the Pope's exhortations.

Actually, the East German Catholic Bishops' Conference had issued a statement as early as 1978, condemning the militarization of East German society and specifically criticizing an educational system which aimed at implanting a disposition to view the world in terms of friend-and-foe, militance, struggle and inter-group hate.[70] This statement was submitted to the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and circulated in the West; it was not, however, disseminated in East Germany itself. In early 1983, however, the Church, pressured thus from above and from below, overcame its diffidence and assailed the regime's militarism in a pastoral letter read to congregations in all East German Catholic churches. The letter repudiated the communist notion that arms build-up in the East is justifiable and charged that weapons of mass destruction are ". . . in every case immoral in themselves." The letter called for controlled disarmament, endorsed conscientious objection to military service in East Germany, and chastised the East German authorities for an increase in militaristic indoctrination in the schools.[71] That this new stridency in the East German Catholic Church is linked both to popular religious ferment and to the vigilant attitude of the Polish Pope seems to be beyond question.

The East German bishops were undoubtedly encouraged in their attitude during their visit to the Vatican in October 1982, and this evoked an angry editorial in *Neues Deutschland* (7 Jan. 1983) in which " certain dignitaries steered by Rome " were reminded that they " were citizens of the GDR." The official visit of Erich Honecker to the Vatican on 23–24 April 1985 was conceived not just to enhance the GDR leader's standing, but also to discuss some of the thorny issues between Rome and Pankow in a private meeting with the Pope.

New Worries in Bucharest and Budapest

The link to the Polish Pope is more difficult to establish in the case of Romania, though the fact of a religious revival there is unmistakable. There has been an upsurge in attendance at church services among

[69] Quoted in Klemens Richter, " Katholische Kirche in der DDR und Friedensbewegung," in *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. 15, No. 7 (July 1982), p. 685. See also *Die Welt* (24 Aug. 1982); and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (9 Sept. 1982).

[70] Richter, " Katholische Kirche," p. 687.

[71] DPA (3 Jan. 1983), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 5 Jan. 1983; and *Los Angeles Times* (5 Jan. 1983).

Orthodox, Catholics and Baptists, and Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu openly conceded in 1979 that religious feeling is once again on the rise in Romania.[72] At the same time, the long suppressed Romanian Uniates have recently re-emerged and have renewed their campaign for recognition.[73] Bucharest's concern at these developments is clearly reflected in the renewed assaults on the non-Orthodox churches, with the regime forcibly closing down a number of churches and arresting " recalcitrant " clergymen. The threat that the example of the Polish Church poses to Romania is the same as that posed to East Germany, namely that it offers a possible model for emulation and may thus encourage the religious establishment to become both more vocal in the defence of human rights (including workers' rights) and more critical of specific regime policies.

What Romania has tried to achieve, like the USSR, Bulgaria and in a certain sense Hungary, is a relationship in which the largest Christian Church is subservient to the state. Recently, however, perhaps encouraged by clerical defiance in other communist countries, five Romanian Orthodox priests drew up a " Testimony of Faith " addressed to the Romanian patriarch, demanding:

> the implementation of the right to give children a religious education and the organization of a young Christian movement; individual ecumenical freedom without any constraints; the right to have access to the information media, radio and television; the release of Father Calciu from prison; the reintroduction of the " Lord's Army " movement [a moral renewal movement which operated legally from 1923 to 1947 and which may still have as many as 400,000 members underground]; and the recognition of the Uniate Church as the sister and supporter of Orthodox spiritual life.[74]

Shortly thereafter, two of the five priests were beaten up by the local militia, a third was taken into custody, threatened with torture, forced to sign a confession and stripped of his licence to do priestly work (and thus of his salary as well). A fourth signatory was also dismissed from his job. Clearly, in Romania, the clergy does not even have the right to *request* change in their status quo. Over the course of 1983, Bucharest stiffened its anti-religious stance. Ceausescu called for more effective atheist instruction in schools, and educational institutions from the primary level up to university level have been ordered to comply.[75]

Yet, despite these rumblings from the ranks, the Romanian Orthodox hierarchy has by and large accommodated itself to the regime. The result has been that alienated Christians have left the Orthodox Church and

[72] *Preporod* (Sarajevo, 15–31 Oct. 1979).

[73] Romanian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (23 Sept. 1981), pp. 10–11.

[74] *Buletin de Informatie Pentru Romani in Exil* (Paris, 1 Dec. 1981), p. 10, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report* (Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs)—henceforth, JPRS/EE—(15 Jan. 1982). See also " The ' Lord's Army ' Movement in the Romanian Orthodox Church," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 314–317.

[75] *Christian Science Monitor* (13 Oct. 1983).

joined new Protestant organizations, especially Baptists and Pentecostals, in the past few years. Today there are some 300,000 new Protestants in Romania, two thirds of whom are Baptists—which is more than in all other East European countries combined. As Vladimir Socor recently noted,

> owing to the sense of mission they have brought to the service of their faith and the determination they have displayed in resisting regime pressures, the Baptists' visibility and their impact on the Romanian religious scene has been far greater than their number might suggest. They have been especially active in proselytizing, in disseminating throughout the country Bibles received from abroad, and have engaged in a constant tug of war with the authorities for permission to acquire or build prayer houses and churches.[76]

FINALLY, change in the religious atmosphere has penetrated even Hungary. In some ways, this is the most surprising development of all, since Cardinal Laszlo Lekai had shown himself to be completely willing to cooperate with the authorities. But it was precisely this cooperation which gave impetus to a grass-roots movement of " basic communities " which arose in the course of the 1970s, and which may number as many as 4,000 cells.[77] Concentrated in Hungary's larger cities, the basic communities have drawn youth and intellectuals into a movement outside the ordinary parish framework and have inevitably clashed with the Hungarian Catholic Church authorities. The young priests who have organized the basic communities have not only worked hard for religious renewal but have been inspired by an anti-hierarchical orientation which has led them to repudiate the notion of absolute obedience to the Cardinal and to champion conscientious objection to military service.[78] The basic communities complain, in particular (according to the Hungarian *samizdat* periodical, *Beszelo*), that " the Church has made concessions that it should not have made " and that " the concessions made by the state are mere formalities that did not make any substantial change in the situation of the Church."[79] The hierarchy responded by assailing the more radically independent priests and, in a move reminiscent of communist " salami tactics," by attempting to distinguish between " good " and " bad " basic communities, neutralizing the " good " in the process.[80] Two of the more independent-minded priests—Laszlo Kovacs and Andras Gromon—were noisily suspended from priestly duties in October 1981 in a warning to the movement to curb itself.

Instead, however, the movement dug in its heels, prompting the

[76] " Eastern Europe: toward a ' Religious Revival '?," *Radio Free Europe Research* (23 May 1984), p. 36.

[77] Trevor Beeson, *Discretion and Valour*, Revd. edn. (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1982), p. 285.

[78] Diethild Treffert, " Ungarn: Einigkeit—das Schlüsselproblem der Kirche," in *Herder Korrespondenz*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March 1981), p. 154; Emmerich Andras, " Offene Konflikte in Ungarns Kirche," in *Herder Korrespondenz*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (April 1982), p. 170; and AKSA (2 April 1982).

[79] Steven Polgar, " The Third Issue of ' Beszelo ' Appears in Hungary," *Radio Free Europe Research* (16 Nov. 1982), p. 8.

[80] *Kirche im Osten*, Vol. 25 (1982), p. 142.

Hungarian authorities to put pressure on the Cardinal to take action against 70-year-old Father Gyorgy Bulanyi, the acknowledged " leader " of the basic communities movement. Finally, in June 1982, the Hungarian bishops' conference released Bulanyi of his duties, criticizing him for views " contrary to the fundamental teaching of the Catholic Church."[81] In so doing, the bishops invited criticism from the Holy See, in so far as the bishops were motivated in part by pressure from state authorities. On at least two occasions, the Pope told the Hungarian bishops to adopt a more resolute stand in defence of Church rights, especially with respect to religious instruction. Eventually, in March 1983, Bishop Jozsef Cserhati, secretary of the Hungarian Catholic bishops' conference, called for greater freedom for the Church.[82]

It is known that the election of Karol Wojtyla to the papacy in 1978 caused " considerable agitation " both among Hungarian Party officials concerned with religious affairs and among Hungarian Church leaders. Both groups feared that the Slavic Pope might exert an influence which would undermine the Hungarian *modus vivendi* from below.[83] At the same time, there has been a strong revival of interest in the Bible among Hungarians, both Catholics and non-Catholics, and some 50,000 Catholics took part in a recent pilgrimage. The conclusion that religious ferment has spread to Hungary too, is inescapable.

Religious Opposition in Lithuania

Partly as a backlash evoked by Khrushchev's coercive anti-religious campaign in the early 1960s, and partly as a concomitant of related processes of dissent, religious sentiment has gained ground in the last two decades in the Baltic republics, Belorussia, Central Asia, Siberia, Transcaucasia, more especially in the Ukraine, and even within the Great Russian heartland.[84] This religious renaissance has affected the Russian Orthodox, Buddhists, Baptists, Moslems, Jews, Pentecostals, Roman Catholics and, especially during the 1968 " Prague Spring " and during the brief period of liberalization in Poland (August 1980–December 1981), also the adherents of the underground Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in the Ukraine.[85] Among the symptoms of this revival have been a jump in the number of youth converting, the widespread fashion, especially among young people, of wearing crosses and religious necklaces, and the " tenacity " of church rituals, such as infant baptism.[86]

[81] Quoted in Christopher Cviic, " Hungarian balance sheet," in *The Tablet* (31 July 1982), p. 760.
[82] *Foreign Report* (24 March 1983), p. 5.
[83] *HIS Press Service* (Vienna), No. 18 (November 1980), pp. 8–9.
[84] Dennis J. Dunn, " Religious Renaissance in the USSR," in *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1977), pp. 23–24, 31; see also " Religious Revival Among Soviet Youth," in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. 12, Nos. 10–12 (October–December 1973), p. 180.
[85] David Kowalewski, " Protest for Religious Rights in the USSR: Characteristics and Consequences," in *Russian Review*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (October 1980), pp. 427, 429; and Vasyl Markus, " Religion and Nationality: the Uniates of the Ukraine," in Bociurkiw and Strong (eds.), *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*, p. 113.
[86] *Izvestiya* (9 Oct. 1981).

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, conceded in late 1980, that enrollment in the country's theological seminaries had increased, specifically mentioning the three seminaries run by the Russian Orthodox Church and two operated by the Roman Catholic Church in the Baltic region.[87]

Since the Russian Orthodox Church has essentially reconciled itself to functioning at the authorities' pleasure and even to operating as an administrative arm of the regime, it is the religious sects (Baptists, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses) and those religious organizations associated with non-Russian national groups (Catholicism, Islam and so forth) where the religious revival takes on a threatening dimension, as far as the Kremlin is concerned, although even within the Russian Orthodox Church a new grass-roots splinter has developed over the past two decades in protest over the Church hierarchy's subordination to the Kremlin. Among non-Russian groups, Estonian priests, for instance, have been deeply involved in resistance to the Russification of Estonia, where political opposition has been bolder and more violent since the Gdansk strikes of July-August 1980. Estonia erupted with student and workers' demonstrations in Tallinn and other cities in September 1980, and the republic has remained unruly. In summer 1981, Father Vello Salum, a Protestant pastor in Estonia, was locked up by the KGB after publicly declaring that it was the duty of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Estonia to function as an opposition political party, and to defend the language, territory and welfare of Estonians.[88] In Latvia, too, the Church has grown more active, and Latvian Party chief A. Voss recently complained of the Church's " negative influence " and of its support for Latvian " bourgeois nationalism."[89] Similarly, in the Soviet republic of Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church has displayed a marked restiveness and boldness over the past few years and has taken it upon itself to defend Georgian interests against Russian encroachment.[90] Belorussia, too, may be affected by the trenchant Catholic protest movement. The religious revival in Belorussia has been characterized by the organization of clandestine religious instruction in Belorussian towns and villages with groups of children numbering about 50 on average: in mid-September 1982, the Soviet daily, *Sovetskaya Byelorossiya*, sharply attacked four Catholic priests (Fathers C. Kuchinsky, R. Tokovich, K. Shanyavsky and P. Bartoshevich) and two women (J. Subko and E. Sitko) for organizing such instruction.[91] Earlier, in what was certainly a token of apprehensiveness on the Soviets' part, the Belorussian journal, *Polymya*, published a long and derogatory attack on the Pope, by Ales' Bazhko, in its March 1981 issue. Describing the Pope as schizoid, Bazhko accused

[87] " Notes on Church-State Affairs," in *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1981), p. 172.
[88] DPA (9 July 1981); and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (18 July 1981).
[89] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (3 Aug. 1981).
[90] Ibid. (25 Aug. 1981); and *Die Presse* (28 Aug. 1981).
[91] *Keston News Service* (7 Oct. 1982).

Wojtyla of passive support for the Nazi occupation authorities in Poland during the Second World War.[92]

BUT it is Lithuania and the Ukraine which remain the flashpoints of the Soviet religious renaissance and the areas more directly affected by the example of the worker–Church alliance in Poland and of the steadfastness of the Polish Church. The symbiosis of Catholicism and nationalism in Lithuania has rendered that republic indigestible to its Russian masters and has reinforced religious devotion there. Since 1972, moreover, the solidarity and self-assurance of Lithuanian Catholics have been strengthened by the regular appearance of the underground periodical, *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*. Lithuanians have also made full use of their right, as enunciated in the Soviet constitution, to submit petitions and protests to the various Soviet authorities. Scores of petitions have been submitted over the past decade, with more than 1,000 signatures each, while in late 1979, some 148,149 Lithuanians (an unprecedented number) signed a petition addressed to Brezhnev, demanding the return of a church confiscated by the authorities.[93] In Lithuania, understandably, the election of Wojtyla had an effect almost as electric as in Poland. Rumours quickly spread through the republic that the new Pope was part Lithuanian—an unfounded fabrication which was nonetheless lent some credence by Wojtyla's declaration, on one occasion, that half his heart was in Lithuania. Within a matter of weeks of Wojtyla's election and, by their own admission, encouraged by John Paul II's public avowal that the Vatican would speak out on behalf of Catholics under communist rule, five Lithuanian priests formed a Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights. Three of the committee's founders subsequently held a press conference to list their grievances: the closure of churches and monasteries, restrictions on the number of students allowed to enter Lithuania's only seminary, the lack of catechisms and other religious publications, and the persecution of believers. Soviet authorities subsequently arrested and jailed two of the commitee's founders, and by summer 1984, an " underground group " was formed to carry on the committee's work.[94]

Lithuania's youth has been increasingly drawn to Catholicism and the annual pilgrimage to Schiluva has, in recent years, drawn ever larger crowds—with several thousand youth taking part in September 1980. The Lithuanian Church itself appeared more confident, and continued to assail the authorities in its underground *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*. Already in mid-1978, the *Chronicle* published a memorandum proposing the revision of those articles of the new Soviet

[92] *Polymya* (1981), no. 3, pp. 138–167, as summarized in Oxana Antic, " How the Pope is Faring in the Soviet Media," *Radio Liberty Research* (19 Oct. 1981), p. 4.

[93] Alex Alexiev, *Dissent and Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, September 1983), p. 26.

[94] *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 7, No. 24 (7 Dec. 1978), p. 5; *Kirche im Osten*, Vol. 25 (1982), p. 134; *Los Angeles Times* (3 March 1979); and *Keston News Service* (16 Aug. 1984).

Constitution which dealt with religion and the rights of believers, and demanding the creation of a separate organ to oversee the execution and interpretation of the Constitution, since, it was argued, the body currently so authorized, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, is unfit for that task. More recently, there have been reports of an underground seminary which trains priests whom the authorities keep out of the " official " seminary at Kaunas.[95]

The Lithuanian edition of *Kommunist* signalled a hardening of the already tough regime policy vis-à-vis the Church, in its September 1980 issue, printing an overt attack on the Church by the prominent atheist writer, J. Anicas. The principal thrust of the article was that the Lithuanian Catholic Church was refusing to limit itself to " satisfying the religious needs of believers," by which Anicas meant conducting religious services, and that it was aiming to convert itself into a political force and was exploiting Lithuanian " bourgeois nationalism " for that purpose.[96] The Commissioner of the Council for Religious Affairs in the Lithuanian SSR, Petras Anilionis, and his deputies, organized a series of meetings with Catholic representatives during the early part of 1981 in an attempt to bridle the rebellious religionists.[97] These meetings often turned out to be little more than occasions for mud-slinging and name-calling. At a meeting held in Radviliskis on 10 March 1981, for instance, communist officials abused the priests, calling them " well-fed bloodsuckers " and " exploiters." The Polish peril was specifically raised at an " educational " meeting held at the Silupe *kolkhoz* in December 1980, when the speaker lashed out at allegedly " fanatical " agents of the Pope who were engaging in disruptive activity in Poland and complained of the opposition activities of " extremist " clergy in Lithuania, singling out Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas Tamevicius, both members of the Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Believers, as the " most rabid " of the lot. The authorities followed this up by arresting Father Svarinskas in the spring of 1983, sentencing him to seven years in prison for " anti-constitutional and anti-state activity."

The authorities terminated the free flow of Polish newspapers and magazines into Lithuania, drastically curtailed the traffic between the two areas, obstructed the 1981 pilgrimage to Schiluva, and even tightened the monitoring of correspondence between Poland and Lithuania. In late 1982, a new branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism was established in Vilnius, under the direction of Serapinas Kraujelis, to coordinate and promote research on questions of religion and atheism in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Belorussia. The KGB also allegedly stepped up its

[95] *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 7, No. 24 (7 Dec. 1978), p. 5; *Los Angeles Times* (22 Aug. 1981); and KNA (3 Nov. 1981). For a thorough discussion of Lithuania's Catholic opposition in the 1970s, see V. Stanley Vardys, " Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised," in *Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 1980).

[96] *Keston News Service* (12 Dec. 1980). This complaint is scarcely new. See, for instance, I. A. Matsyavicius, " Katolitsizm i sovremennaya ideologicheskaya bor'ba," in *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 8 (August 1976), pp. 158, 162.

[97] See *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, no. 47 (19 March 1981).

surveillance of church sermons, wary of signs of political agitation.[98] Nonetheless, the Lithuanians continue to receive Radio Vatican, which beams 15 minutes of Lithuanian-language broadcasting into the republic every night, and in the western part of the republic, they have also been able to receive Polish television and radio. With more than half of the Lithuanians counted as practising Catholics,[99] Moscow grew apprehensive lest the " Polish virus " compound the oppositionist infection with which Lithuania has, since its annexation, been " stricken."

Religious Ferment in the Ukraine

The kernel of Moscow's religious dilemma in the Ukraine has been the existence of a well-organized underground Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church claiming some four million faithful, 350–500 priests, three or four clandestine bishops, and several clandestine convents.[100] Soviet authorities tried to suppress the Uniate Church in the western Ukraine when they annexed the region at the end of the Second World War. In the autumn and winter of 1944–1945, Uniate priests and bishops were forced to attend " re-education " meetings; poor " learners " were given extra " tutoring " by the NKVD in all-night sessions. Eventually, all the Uniate bishops were imprisoned, the priests were compelled to recognize the authority of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, and finally, in a pseudo-Synod of the Greek Catholic Church, organized by the authorities in March 1946, the Church's link with Rome was severed and the Church was " reunited " with the Russian Orthodox Church.[101] Since then, the Ukrainian Uniates have been one of the most persecuted religious bodies in the USSR, unable to practise openly and victimized by the periodical jailing of their ministers. Despite repeated attempts to obtain the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church, the regime has remained convinced of the nationalist character of the Church and has viewed the prospect of its open re-establishment as anathema. When, in 1968, under the impact of the " Prague Spring," the Greek Catholic Church re-emerged into the open in the western Ukraine, the regime launched a systematic campaign of new reprisals against the recalcitrant Ukrainians. Typical of the official policy towards the Greek Catholics was the sentencing of Bishop Basil Velychkovsky to a three-year term in March 1970 for having performed religious functions in defiance of the ban on the Greek Catholic Church.[102]

[98] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (3 Aug. 1981); *Keston News Service* (21 Oct. 1982); and *Los Angeles Times* (22 Aug. 1981).

[99] Otto Luchterhandt, " Kirche und Gesellschaft in der Sowjetunion," in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1980), p. 46.

[100] Figures are given in *Catholic Herald* (28 March 1980); and Iwan Hvat, " Die ukrainische katholische Kirche des byzantinischen Ritus," in *Kirche in Not*, Vol. 23 (1975), p. 113. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (22 Dec. 1980).

[101] For more elaborate discussions of the suppression of the Uniate Church in the Ukraine, see Markus, " Religion and Nationality: the Uniates of the Ukraine," pp. 104–107; Walter Dushnyck, " Religious Situation in Ukraine," in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. 16, Nos. 4–6 (1977), pp. 75–76; and Denis Dirscherl, " The Soviet Destruction of the Greek Catholic Church," in *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Autumn 1970), pp. 421–439.

[102] *Washington Post* (25 March 1970).

Central to the understanding of Ukrainian Greek Catholicism is the fact that it is concentrated in the western regions, where it is the dominant religion. These western regions have traditionally figured as a vanguard of Ukranian nationalist thinking and could catalyse a nationalist revival in the Ukraine. Because of this and because it is identified with separatism, its importance is probably greater than a mere numerical tally would suggest. Its adherents, moreover, are devoutly loyal. Legalization of the Ukrainian Uniate Church thus remains out of the question, and after Ukrainian dissident Iosif Terelya and four others formed a committee to press for that Church's legalization, Soviet police arrested Terelya (in December 1982).[103]

Under the papacy of Paul VI, relations between the Vatican and the Ukrainian Uniates had steadily deteriorated. Paul VI was pursuing an *Ostpolitik* of *détente* and the impression was conveyed that the Vatican no longer even recognized the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.[104] In particular, the Vatican continued to deny Ukrainian Cardinal Josyf Slipyj the status of patriarch. This denial produced a minor incident in October 1977 when Slipyj walked out of a papal mass in the Sistine Chapel because he was denied the place of honour traditionally reserved for patriarchs.[105]

But with the election of John Paul II, this began to change. The Polish Pope convoked the first official synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 51 years, with 15 of the 18 Uniate bishops in attendance. The synod, held at the Vatican, began on 24 March 1980, and signalled Vatican recognition of the Uniates. The Pope also named Archbishop Miroslav I. Lubachivsky, the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of Philadelphia, to become coadjutor with Slipyj and to succeed the latter, upon his death, as Archbishop of Lviv, in the western Ukraine.[106] Before the year was out, Slipyj had, with the Pope's approval, convoked a second synod of Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops in Rome, principally to deal with ecclesiastical appointments but also to express support for the continuing struggle by Catholics in the Ukraine, and to underline the importance of the Ukrainian-language programmes transmitted to the Ukraine by Radio Vatican.[107]

The Pope also gave direct encouragement to the Ukrainian Catholics themselves. In October 1979, while on a visit to the United States, the new pontiff told a congregation at the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Philadelphia:

> For many years, I have highly esteemed the Ukrainian people. I have known of the many sufferings and injustices you have endured. These have been and continue to be matters of great concern to me. I

[103] Reuter (13 Feb. 1983).

[104] *Washington Post* (6 Oct. 1977). See also Dennis J. Dunn, *Detente and Papal-Communist Relations, 1962–1978* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979).

[105] *News World* (5 Oct. 1977).

[106] Documentation, *Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1980), pp. 195, 220.

[107] Ibid. Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter 1980), p. 443; see also ibid. Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1980), p. 314.

> am also mindful of the struggles of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, throughout its history, to remain faithful to the Gospel and to be in union with the successor of Saint Peter.[108]

The Pope had, in other ways, shown a readiness to defend the Ukrainian Uniates even at the expense of *Ostpolitik*. Thus in February 1980, Pope John Paul II suggested to Slipyj that the long vacant Ukrainian Bishopric in Przemysl in Poland be filled and the diocese restored to active status, and in July 1980, he received four prominent lay Ukrainian *émigrés*, who presented him with a letter concerning problems currently facing the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Ukraine.[109] Finally, the Vatican underwrote the establishment of a Ukrainian Catholic University as well as of several Greek Catholic seminaries.

Ukrainian Cardinal Slipyj (who died in September 1984) had actively urged the Vatican to step up its radio broadcasts to the Ukraine—a demand which has not escaped the notice of Soviet polemicists. Apprehensively, the Ukrainian communist press fretted that the Polish Pope was proving " more gracious than his predecessor in his response to the groundless claims of the Uniate nationalist extremists,"[110] and spoke of " a new anti-Communist ' crusade ' . . . to whitewash the Uniate Church and to ' revive ' it in the Ukraine."[111] In a lengthy article for the Ukrainian daily, *Radyans'ka Ukrayina*, Klym Dymtruk sharply assailed the " . . . Ukrainian-language broadcasts from the Vatican, broadcasts prepared by dyed-in-the-wool anti-Soviets and Nazi remnants garbed in soutanes, of the ilk of I. Hryn'yokh and R. Holovats'kyy." Dymtruk continued:

> Alongside religious subject matter which, incidentally, has recently been occupying an increasingly smaller place in Ukrainian-language radio broadcasts [from the Vatican], anti-communism and anti-Soviet propaganda are openly disseminated . . . In addition, these radio saboteurs praise bourgeois-nationalist ideology, and preach a sinister alliance between the cross and the trident . . .[112]

In a revealing passage, Dymtruk linked Soviet worries regarding the religious situation in the Ukraine with the Polish crisis, suggesting that the authorities take the dangers of the Polish example most seriously.

Indeed, there has been a tangible Ukrainian response to papal gestures. Ukrainian Catholics have taken heart, and many have sent appeals to the Pope for help. In September 1982, a group of Ukrainian Catholics, including several priests, established an Initiative Group for the Defence of the Rights of the Church, emulating a parallel move in

[108] Ibid. Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1979), p. 413.
[109] Ibid. Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1980), p. 330.
[110] *Kommunist Ukrainy*, no. 5 (May 1981). On the other hand, the Pope firmly turned down Slipyj's requests that a " Ukrainian Patriarchate " be formed and that the Vatican re-examine the premises of its dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church. See Hansjakob Stehle, " The *Ostpolitik* of the Vatican and the Polish Pope," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1980), p. 18.
[111] *Radyans'ka Ukrayina* (28 June 1981).
[112] Ibid. (26 March 1981), translated in JPRS/Soviet (19 Aug. 1981).

Lithuania, and sent a petition to the Kremlin, asking that Uniate churches and monasteries be allowed to reopen.[113] One interesting *samvydav* (Ukrainian for *samizdat*) document written in the wake of Wojtyla's election and trip to Poland was a tract by Mykola Ihnatenko, a 45-year-old worker in Kaniv. Ihnatenko's tract accused the Soviet government of employing Orthodoxy in the Ukraine as an instrument of Russification and closed with demands for the reopening of Catholic monasteries and convents in the Ukraine, the abrogation of church taxation, and the grant of freedom of religion in the Ukraine.[114] The Kremlin, already disconcerted by the attraction that Solidarity had demonstrated for Ukrainian workers,[115] was taken aback by this aggravation of the Uniate problem and the synod of Ukrainian Uniate bishops convoked by the Pope in March 1980 was attacked in two separate articles in the Ukrainian Party news organ, *Radyans'ka Ukrayina*.[116]

In April 1981, *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, the heavily censored organ of the Russian Orthodox Church, joined the fray with the publication of an exchange of letters between Patriarch Pimen and Pope John Paul II, in which the latter was alleged to have distanced himself from documents released after the March 1980 synod, which had declared the abolition of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1946 invalid.[117] Clearly the Soviets have been worried about the impact that the Slavic Pope is having in their western territories.

The Plot to Kill the Pope

By the time Pope John Paul II made his triumphal visit to Poland in 1979, if not before, the Soviets had concluded that he constituted, both in his policy and in his nationality, a potent threat to the stability of the Soviet empire. His strong support for Lithuanian Catholics and for the suppressed Greek Catholics of the Ukraine soon stimulated Soviet apprehension, and a leading Lithuanian atheist writer would complain, in spring 1980, that Wojtyla had " . . . been elected simply because 'most of the cardinals were dissatisfied with the Eastern policy of Pope John Paul VI.' "[118] A Ukrainian writer charged the Pope (in March 1981) with advocacy of the " aggressive penetration of clerical ideology into the socialist countries,"[119] while an article appearing in the Vilnius edition of *Kommunist* in August 1982 noted:

[113] Ivan Hvat, " The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1983), pp. 275–277; and Alex Alexiev, " The Kremlin and the Vatican," in *Orbis*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1983), p. 559.

[114] Documentation, *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1981), p. 109.

[115] See Andrew Fedynsky, " Stirrings in the Soviet Ukraine," in *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), pp. 121–122.

[116] *Radyans'ka Ukrayina* (28 and 24 March 1981), as cited in Antic, " How the Pope is Faring," p. 4.

[117] These letters are reprinted, in translation, in *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1981), pp. 303–306.

[118] Article by J. Anicas, in *Nauka i religiya* (June 1980), translated in JPRS/Soviet (20 Aug. 1980).

[119] *Radyans'ka Ukrayina* (26 March 1981), translated in JPRS/Soviet (19 Aug. 1981).

> it is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that the Vatican's activities are not limited to church or religious confines. The Vatican continues to be a major international anti-communist centre that still has at its disposal large amounts of means for exerting an ideological and policy effect upon the broad masses of the faithful.[120]

It was bad enough, the article went on, that Wojtyla had no faith in dialogue with Marxists and that he had made clear his conviction that, of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union is by far the greater threat to peace and security in the world; far worse were Wojtyla's aspirations to expand the role of the Church in Eastern Europe. The Holy See was said to have designated the Polish Church to serve a kind of vanguard role in the "re-Christianization" of Eastern Europe, and even Vatican contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church, let alone with Prague's Cardinal Tomasek or the Lithuanian Church hierarchy, came to be considered suspect.[121]

The Kremlin became obsessed with the idea that Wojtyla's election had somehow been "engineered by President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to destabilize Poland and dislodge it from the Soviet bloc."[122] At some point between 1979 and 1980—most likely shortly after the papal visit to Poland—the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the Polish Pope had to be eliminated. Such a decision could only have been taken at the very highest level, and thus we may surmise that Brezhnev, Andropov, Suslov, and perhaps also Ponomarev, the Central Committee Secretary charged with relations with Eastern Europe, were involved in the decision. The decision, for that matter, may even have been taken at a Politburo session, with all Politburo members present. The assassination would be " sanitized " by hiring a Turkish leftist (camouflaged as a right-wing terrorist) to do the job and by entrusting supervision of the plot to the Bulgarians. If successful, the Soviets hoped the Pope's murder would terminate the Vatican's new policy of activism in Eastern Europe—epitomized by the creation of the Vatican's Cyril and Methodius Institute of Slavic Studies in Rome in November 1981—and plunge the Poles into a melancholy which would either have resulted in a loss of spirit, which would have facilitated the re-establishment of " normalcy " in Poland, or have stimulated national chaos of sufficient magnitude that a Soviet military invasion might have been viewed as " justifiable " in the interests of restoring order. The murder of the Pope would also have removed an important symbol of

[120] Vladas Nyunka, " The Vatican's Eastern Policy," in *Kommunist* (August 1982), translated in JPRS/Soviet (9 Nov. 1982).

[121] V. Mahin, " Religiya v ideynom arsenale antikommunizma," in *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 12 (December 1982), p. 117.

[122] Claire Sterling, *A Time of the Assassins* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1983), p. 116.

hope and encouragement to millions of believers throughout Eastern Europe.[123]

HOW significant are these phenomena? In social terms, it is evident that we are witnessing in Eastern Europe a burgeoning of collective solidarity based on religion, which underpins the workers' revolt in Poland and probably has more hold on people than class loyalty, in Lithuania, the western Ukraine, Slovakia, Croatia and perhaps also Bulgaria and Romania. It is also evident that the communist policy of religious persecution has, if anything, backfired, fuelling tangible religious ferment. In political terms, it is evident that the Party's organizational monopoly naturally encourages the sole independent institution, namely the Church, to become involved in political and quasi-political questions and that religious revival therefore strengthens this form of opposition to communist rule. Moreover, the symbiosis of religion and nationalism in many of these regions elevates religious questions into ethno-national concerns and creates the possibility that religious revival might catalyse or reinforce a substantial change in consciousness—to Moscow's detriment—which could prove permanent. To a significant extent, such a change of consciousness has already taken place as a result of the religious ferment of the last decade.

The religious ferment which began to affect the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the early 1970s has manifestly been intensified by the new Pope's activist orientation towards the Slavic nations, and by the example of efficacious resilience set by the Polish Church in particular. The Polish Pope and the " Polish syndrome " have directly or indirectly affected almost all of the countries of Eastern Europe. They directly incited recent religious ferment in Slovakia, Croatia and the Ukraine, and provided both reinforcement and a model to the Lithuanian Catholic Church and to the Evangelical and Catholic churches in East Germany. They also offer a potential model in Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Hungary and Romania, and perhaps even Belorussia, and thus directly threaten the ruling elites in Moscow, Budapest and Bucharest as well. The Pope himself has urged Catholic prelates in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere to stand up to the communist elites and to avoid retreats or agreements which would compromise the interests of the Church.

FROM the very beginning of Solidarity, the Catholic Church in Poland gave strong support to the independent trade union. It maintained constant contact with Solidarity leaders, and unequivocally endorsed the

[123] The Kremlin's involvement in the plot to kill the pontiff has been exhaustively documented by Paul Henze and Claire Sterling, and need not be recapitulated here. See Paul B. Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1983); Paul B. Henze, " Misinformation and Disinformation: the Plot to Kill the Pope," in *Survey*, Vol. 27, Nos. 118–119 (Autumn–Winter 1983); and Claire Sterling, *A Time of the Assassins*. See also *Corriere della Sera* (30 Sept. 1983; 3 May and 4 May 1984); and *New York Times* (10 June 1984).

Farmers' Free Trade Union's struggle to obtain official recognition.[124] With the imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of Solidarity, the Polish Catholic Church has resumed its posture of opposition vis-à-vis the Party and in his New Year's message at St Peter's Square (in 1982), Pope John Paul II gave strong support to Solidarity in its underground struggle against the military government.[125] The Warsaw Episcopate has repeatedly demanded the restoration of Solidarity and Rural Solidarity and an end to military rule, and Pope John Paul II echoed these demands in October 1982, before a Polish state delegation in Rome.[126]

In mid-February 1982, the Warsaw daily *Trybuna Ludu* published an abrasive article in what proved to be the inception of a press campaign against the Catholic Church. At the same time, " reliable Polish sources " revealed that the Polish security service had drawn up lists of priests viewed as dangerous and was planning its strategy.[127] Among the numerous arrests which followed were those, in late 1982, of Janusz Krupski and Jan Stepek, two editors of *Spotkania*, a clandestine Catholic journal.[128] In mid-1984, *BIS*, a Polish *samizdat* bulletin, carried a story about a sharp increase in the number of fires in Polish churches, started by vandals. The implication was that the regime was behind it.[129]

The Warsaw regime's refusal to allow the Pope to make a second visit in August 1982, as orginally planned, betrayed the evident insecurity of martial law's administrators. Evidently, some members of the Polish regime hoped to block a papal revisit indefinitely. Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, well-known for his hard-line views, is among those who opposed Jaruzelski's decision to allow the Pope back a second time. Olszowski is reported to have tendered his resignation in protest at that decision.[130] The Kremlin also viewed the prospect of a second papal visit with dismay, as did several of the other Warsaw Pact parties, most especially the Czechoslovak Party, which vehemently assailed the visit when it finally came about.[131]

Upon returning to Poland in mid-June 1983, the Pope boldly upbraided the Warsaw regime for martial law and the detention of political prisoners, requested an amnesty for the latter, and challenged the regime to live up to its 1980 reform agreements. The thousands upon thousands who turned out to greet him included a number who carried " Solidarity " banners, and even some whose banners specifically linked the Pope with the banned trade union.[132] A dismayed Gromyko, speaking

[124] " News in Brief," in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 9, Nos. 3–4 (Autumn 1981), p. 157.
[125] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (5 Jan. 1982).
[126] *Los Angeles Times* (18 Sept. 1982); Radio Warsaw (10 Oct. 1982), translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 12 Oct. 1982.
[127] *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (17 Feb. and 18 Feb. 1982).
[128] *Keston News Service* (18 Nov. 1982).
[129] Ibid. (5 July 1984).
[130] *Los Angeles Times* (17 June 1983).
[131] *Christian Science Monitor* (20 June 1983).
[132] Karl Hartmann, " Politische Bilanz des zweiten Papstbesuches in Polen," in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 33, Nos. 11–12 (November–December 1983), pp. 894, 896.

before the Supreme Soviet while the Pope was in Poland, reiterated the Kremlin position that it has " legitimate interests " in Poland, that Poland " remains an inalienable part of the socialist community," and that the Kremlin reserves the right to " ensure the reliability " of Poland.[133]

After the Popieluszko murder trial, relations between the Church and the communist regime deteriorated sharply. The government stepped up its campaign against the Church and for the first time the Pope became the personal target of press criticisms.[134] This was followed by a number of statements from officials which, in the words of the Episcopate, were " openly hostile to the Church and its representatives." But its protests were only countered by the call of the Minister in charge of Religious Affairs, Adam Lopatka, for the Church to mend its ways by " adjusting to the conditions of the socialist system," and by the warning issued by the government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, that the authorities were " losing patience " with the turbulent clerics.

On balance, it seems clear: first, that the religious revival in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has grass-roots strength and is too far developed to be capable of being diminished by repressive action in Poland; second, that in Poland itself, the authorities need the cooperation of the Church if they are to restore political order and to revive the economy; third, that in the Slavic world as elsewhere, religious repression has only served to deepen religious conviction and heighten clerical tenacity; and fourth, that the religious ferment, although associated with other socio-economic and political currents, has autonomous roots and ramifications. Because this religious ferment has been associated with ever bolder demands for human rights and, in the case of the captive nationalities of the USSR, national rights, and because waxing religious consciousness derives from an independent centre of authority thus constituting a challenge to the legitimacy of the communist organizational and political monopoly, the religious revival presents the communist authorities with a challenge as trying and as complex, and possibly as politically potent, as the multi-faceted economic mire into which the Soviet bloc is gradually sinking.

[133] Quoted in *Los Angeles Times* (17 June 1983).

[134] In particular one can mention the comprehensive indictment by the pseudonymous Jerzy Jarzeniec in the semi-official *Polityka* (30 March 1985).

Environmental Deterioration in Eastern Europe

Christine Zvosec

> *The four horsemen of the apocalypse accompanying society along the path of development are war, famine, conquest, and the destruction of the natural environment. Only if we succeed in conquering these threats can we think meaningfully about the distant future.*[1]

THESE are strong words. They were written by a Hungarian contributor to a collection of essays on environmental deterioration in Eastern Europe. The nations of Eastern Europe are becoming all too familiar with the menace posed by the fourth horseman. All are suffering harmful consequences from environmental pollution, including public health hazards, the degradation of natural resources, and the endangerment of plant and animal species. The limited, generally unsuccessful efforts of these countries to monitor and control pollution result from a variety of ideological, economic and political factors.

Comprehensive information as to the exact nature of environmental pollution in Eastern Europe is difficult to obtain. Most of these nations do not systematically monitor pollution sources, nor do they openly publish details on the effects of pollution on public health and the environment. Such information is becoming increasingly available, however, as environmental problems multiply and public officials become more outspoken about them.

THE case of environmental deterioration in Czechoslovakia is probably the most publicized in Eastern Europe, especially with reference to air pollution. The nation's bad air quality is due to the economy's concentration on heavy manufacturing that uses low-quality, domestic coal as its principal fuel source. Industrial demands have necessitated an increase in power generation from 4,100 million kilowatt-hours (kwh) in 1937 to 73,500 million kwh in 1981. About 64,000 million kwh of this energy is produced by power plants burning low-quality, high-sulphur coal. As a result, Czechoslovakia's sulphur dioxide (SO_2) emissions are among the world's highest. In fact, they are roughly equal to those of the economically superior and much larger Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).[2]

[1] Gyorgy Enyedi, "Planning for Purposeful Use of the Environment: A Hungarian Viewpoint," in *Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and East Europe* by Ivan Volgyes (ed.), (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974), p. 124.

[2] *Radio Free Europe* (RFE) *Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 5.

Czechoslovak industries do not even attempt the separation of sulphur dioxide emissions, allegedly owing to the unavailability and costliness of the necessary equipment. Although the technology for separating solid emissions is relatively simple and inexpensive, over half of all separators in Czechoslovakia were over 15 years old in 1975. Only one-third of the demand for modernizing this equipment was being met.[3]

The area around the North Bohemia town of Most is the most polluted in the country, for it is the centre of Czechoslovakia's open-cast mining.[4] Health problems arising from the intense air pollution date back 20 years. During the period 1960–63, the Teplice district of North Bohemia had the highest death rate in the country, mainly due to emissions of SO_2 and arsenic.[5] Although data on the area's current ecological problems are a state secret, their severity is indicated by the percentage of abortions, mongoloid children, and so on. The smog apparently becomes so concentrated that breathing is nearly impossible. The authorities' recommendations in such instances are to stay indoors and wait for stronger winds.[6] Another source reports that area inhabitants are taken once a week to fresh-air locations for several hours of breathing under medical supervision. Despite the severity of their situation, people working and living in North Bohemia are prohibited from leaving the district to seek employment elsewhere.[7]

Czechoslovakia's problems in coping with air pollution are matched only by its severe water problems. In June 1982, Slovakia official radio reported that 1,800 miles of the republic's 3,750 miles of rivers were polluted by 1,500 industries and 2,400 agricultural enterprises.[8] Nationwide, about 4,340 miles of a total 15,500 miles of major river length have been classified in the worst pollution categories—either incapable of sustaining fish or containing inedible fish. Czechoslovakia's effluent measures do not include heavy metals, some organic compounds, detergents and other potentially dangerous substances; thus, the pollution of its surface waters is probably worse than reported.[9] The pollution of rivers and underground waters by fertilizers, pesticides, and animal wastes is expected to double by the end of the century.[10]

Data on the pollution of public water mains is only available for Slovakia, where 21 per cent of the samples in western Slovakia were contaminated in 1981. The 1981 figures for central and eastern Slovakia were 15 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively. Well-water pollution in western Slovakia was measured at 78·6 per cent in 1981. In central and eastern Slovakia, the figures were 71·5 per cent and 81·4 per cent. The

[3] Ibid.
[4] "Pollution Grows in Eastern Europe," in *The New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1982, p. 9.
[5] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 13.
[6] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 14 (Czechoslovakia), 9 Aug. 1983, p. 4.
[7] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), 27–28 Feb. 1983, translated in *Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)*, No. 83385, 3 May 1983, p. 11.
[8] *The New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1982, p. 9.
[9] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 10 Dec. 1982, p. 6.
[10] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 22 (Czechoslovakia), 10 Dec. 1982, p. 14.

consumption of polluted water has led to considerable health problems, including epidemics of dysentery, jaundice and virus-based hepatitis.[11] Some Bratislava residents take no chances and brush their teeth with mineral water.[12] The situation in the Czech lands is probably better, since the Czechs depend more on mains than wells for their drinking water.

Much of the water pollution in Czechoslovakia stems from the "accidental" mishandling of contaminants, especially oil derivatives. In 1981, 70 cases of oil spills were reported.[13] The negligence and even recklessness of state authorities in tolerating prolonged contamination of waters is evidenced by the case of the Slovnaft Chemical Works in Bratislava. This enterprise leaked considerable wastes into the Danube and Little Danube rivers on a daily basis, and then in 1974 it was responsible for a major accident which endangered the entire underground reservoir. Water was pumped away, dangerously lowering water levels, until 1977 when the government finally endorsed building a water purification station for Slovnaft. The station was not expected to be completed until the seventh five-year plan (1981–85).[14]

The water shortages resulting from contaminated supplies are worsened by Czechoslovakia's water mains, which leak significant amounts of water. In 1982, 23·1 per cent of total water supplies in the Czech republic leaked and were wasted. The nation also suffers from a shortage of spare parts for household water taps.[15] Authorities berate excess consumption as the root of the problem. A Slovak official reported that drinking-water consumption increased from 153 gallons per capita in 1960 to 214 gallons per capita in 1980. He compared this to 1979 consumption figures of 54 gallons per capita in Belgium and 73 gallons per capita in Norway.[16] In early 1984 the coal mining area of Ostravia reportedly suffered critical water shortages.[17] South Bohemia experienced similar problems, especially due to a lack of precipitation in 1983. In the Ceske Budejovice district, 25 per cent of all agricultural enterprises were short on water.[18]

Czechoslovakia's air pollution has had a tremendous effect on the country's forests. One-third of all forested areas in the Czech lands have already perished or reached the first stages of irreversible damage. The problem is worse there than in Slovakia, because the Czech republic burns more brown coal. Additionally, over half of Czech forests are coniferous and subject to damage from sulphur dioxide emissions, whereas less than 30 per cent of Slovakia's forests are coniferous. The worst problem is in North Bohemia, where one-third of the nation's

[11] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 6.
[12] *JPRS*, No. 83385, 3 May 1983, p. 11.
[13] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 22 (Czechoslovakia), 10 Dec. 1982, p. 14.
[14] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 7.
[15] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 22 (Czechoslovakia), 10 Dec. 1982, p. 13.
[16] *Pravda* (Bratislava), 12 Jan. 1983, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), 17 Jan. 1983, pp. D1–3.
[17] *Le Monde* (Paris), 7 Jan. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 12 Jan. 1984, p. D7.
[18] *Rude Pravo*, 30 Jan. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 7 Feb. 1984, p. D5.

thermal power plants are centred around the brown coal production. The trees are weakened to pests after the pollution and require great amounts of insecticide spraying.[19] Concern is especially intense about the forests in Krkonose, the only national park in the Czech republic. The park receives about nine million visitors a year, and 80 per cent of its surface is covered by forests. More than half of the park's evergreens have already been damaged by "toxic fallout."[20] Given current conditions, it is estimated that between 45 and 60 per cent of Czechoslovakia's forests will have deteriorated by the year 2000.[21] Forest deterioration is a trans-national problem for Czechoslovakia. In June 1982, the Bavarian government of the FRG gave the Czechoslovak government a report stating that 22·4 per cent of the pine forests on the Bavarian side of the border were damaged by Czechoslovak pollution.[22]

Air pollution combined with indiscriminate use of fertilizers has had adverse effects on agriculture in Czechoslovakia, decreasing plant yields by 15 to 20 per cent and lowering crop quality.[23] *Agricultural News* reported sluggish barley yields in the last harvest, explaining, "Acidic and slightly acid soil has increased, and barley has not become well enough adapted to the contemporary soil conditions."[24] Czechoslovakia has done no testing to determine the long-term consequences of pesticide accumulation in soil and food. However, it has been noted that over 60 per cent of animals slaughtered have been affected by "various kinds of poisoning and dietary problems" due to contamination of the food chain by heavy metals.[25]

MUCH like Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has responded to higher oil prices by substituting domestic brown coal for oil and even hard coal. The GDR plans to increase brown coal production from 258 million tons in 1980 to 300 million tons in 1990. Almost no desulphurization plants have been installed in GDR factories. The increase in SO_2 emissions is a serious one, for even in the 1970s, the GDR had the highest rate of SO_2 emissions per square kilometre in Europe. This emission rate peaked at 37 tons, as compared with 14·5 tons for the FRG. Sulphur dioxide emissions are about 25 per cent higher now than at their previous peak and are expected to continue rising. This trend is accompanied by a worsening in the regional discharge structure; almost half of the SO_2 emissions are concentrated in the Halle/Leipzig area.[26] *Der Spiegel* has reported that the village of Moelbis, located in the brown-coal district south of Leipzig, is "past saving." The article continues:

[19] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, pp.9–10.
[20] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), 12 March 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83298, 20 April 1983, pp. 31–3.
[21] *Le Monde* (Paris), 7 Jan. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 12 Jan. 1984, p. D8.
[22] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 19 (Czechoslovakia), 15 Oct. 1982, p. 17.
[23] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 11.
[24] *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), 6 July 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84198, 25 Aug. 1983, p. 42.
[25] *Le Monde*, *FBIS*, 12 Jan. 1984, p. D8.
[26] *Diw-Wochenbericht* (West Berlin), 27 Jan. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83270, 15 April 1983, pp. 22, 24, 31.

> Deacon Siegfried Rueffert reports that parsely (*sic*) no longer grows in the gardens, other greens are wasting away with curled-up leaves, and birches and poplars have died out. Moelbis lives in a cloud of dust: Whenever someone removes a sheet of paper from his desk, he sees a black border. In the vernacular: "It has gotton filthy here."[27]

As a result of such intense air pollution, the GDR is experiencing vast forest deterioration along its border with the FRG and Czechoslovakia. Approximately half of the damage is in the Erzgebirge mountains, where about 432,250 acres of forest have died in the past 15 years. Reforestation attempts have failed, for experts are finding that the area's ecological structure has already changed. The forest is being replaced by the flora typical of a nutrient-poor, acidified tundra. A Bonn journal described this change as a "1,000-year ecological reversion" and a "macabre attestation of ecological policy helplessness: man destroys the land on which he lives."[28]

ROMANIA is quickly catching up with its more advanced European neighbours, in terms of both industry and pollution. According to the Swedish Academy of Sciences, Romania has Europe's fourth highest per capita output of SO_2 emissions. It is also thirteenth on the list of dumpers— countries discharging SO_2 outside national borders. It heads the list in increased emissions since 1972, with the horrifying figure of 235 per cent (Greece is a distant second, down at 70 per cent).[29] The lead in the air is 15 to 40 times the acceptable limit around non-ferrous metallurgical plants, and Romania has similar problems with noxious fumes around phosphate fertilizer, ferrous metallurgical, cellulose and paper plants. In 1983 the Romanian weekly *Flacara* interviewed an engineer from the mining area of Zlatra, which is also the centre of the chemical and metallurgy industries. The interview read in part:

> He has seen with his own eyes private gardens and forests burnt by sulfuric acid produced by the combination of sulfur dioxide and the humidity in the atmosphere; he has also seen women's stockings burnt by the same acid; he knows there are many cases of lead poisoning; that people suffer from headaches because of the gases emitted by the production process; and he also knows that because of the presence of cadmium in the atmosphere people's bones are becoming spongy and fragile.[30]

Almost every industrial area in Romania is experiencing negative health effects from pollution. The lead and sulphurous anhydride pollution in Zlatra and Copsa Mica have led to lead poisoning, pulmonary problems, anaemia, malignant tumours, rickets and chronic bronchitis. In most industrial units, air purification equipment is inadequate or completely

[27] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Vol. 37 No. 30, 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84155, 19 Aug. 1983, p. 22.
[28] *Iwe Tagesdienst* (Bonn), 7 Oct. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. EEI-84-004, 11 Jan. 1984, pp. 100–1.
[29] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 19 (Romania), 21 Nov. 1983, p. 18.
[30] Ibid. p. 19.

lacking. Equipment to eliminate waste gases was to have been built as early as 1972. However, it will only be completed in the current five-year plan.[31]

Chemical analysis of industrial wastes flowing into Romania's rivers and streams has shown large amounts of pollutants, including chlorides, organic substances, phosphates, ammonia salts and cyanide. In early 1982, 27·3 per cent of the 3,801 water purification plants were operating below standards and 68 plants were not functioning at all.[32] As a result, less than 20 per cent of Romania's main waterways provide drinkable water.[33] The 1,364 miles of polluted rivers in turn contaminate underground water resources, especially in the areas of Ploesti, Borzesti and Pitesti, where the water has large amounts of petroleum products.[34] Romania is experiencing trans-national pollution problems with relation to water as well as air pollution. In 1983 it received a Yugoslav delegation to discuss environmental problems, particularly concerning the two border rivers, the Bega and the Danube.[35]

Pollution has harmed about 284,050 acres of forests in Romania. Erosion, excess humidity, acidity, salinity, and alkalization are making considerable areas of land unsuitable for agriculture. Soil erosion is worsened by the increased level of underground water due to irrational irrigation projects which resulted from Ceausescu's "new agrarian revolution."[36]

Ecological harm due to grandiose irrigation projects is only one of the threats facing the Danube Delta, an ecologically unique area primarily contained within Romania. The Danube Delta area is experiencing significant pollution from riverside industries dumping copper, mercury, lead detergents and oil products. Fish species are dying and rare; protected birds who eat the fish are also perishing. The area's mammal population is being threatened by development that is destroying its natural habitat. The ecological balance will be further affected by plans to drain areas of the fertile land for use in agriculture and by the almost-finished Danube–Black Sea Canal. The government has also announced plans to link Bucharest with the Danube via another canal.[37]

Romania's amateur status with regard to coping with development and environmental stresses is further evidenced by the situation surrounding Lake Techirghiol. Lake Techirghiol is located near Romania's Black Sea coast and is a world-famous source of mineral water and therapeutic mud, as well as a rich agricultural area. Indiscriminate use of fertilizers and pesticides has led to contaminated run-off flowing into the lake from

[31] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Romania), 29 Jan. 1983, p. 25.
[32] Ibid. p. 26.
[33] John M. Kramer, "The Environmental Crisis in Eastern Europe: The Price for Progress," in *Slavic Review*, Summer 1983, p. 204.
[34] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Romania), 29 Jan. 1983, p. 26.
[35] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 19 (Romania), 21 Nov. 1983, p. 21.
[36] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Romania), 29 Jan. 1983, pp. 22, 26.
[37] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 20 (Romania), 24 Nov. 1982, pp. 13–14; *RFE Situation Report*, No. 19 (Romania), 21 Nov. 1983, p. 21.

irrigated areas. Studies have shown that these contaminants are inimical to mud formation in the lake; they have also decreased the mineral and biological contents of the water. The irrigation of the surrounding area and the resulting flow of water into the lake is also causing flooding dangers. If the lake's water volume continues to rise, the lake will unite with the Black Sea, with unpredictable consequences for the area's ecology and future development.[38]

Factors Contributing to Environmental Deterioration in Eastern Europe

An editorial in a Bulgarian journal described the Marxist–Leninist theory of interaction between society and nature as a two-state process of, first, exploitation and, secondly, preservation and restoration of the environment.[39] Judging from the environmental state of most of Eastern Europe, these nations have paid more attention to the first than the second part of this formula.

Indeed, there are tenets of the communist ideology that encourage all-out exploitation of the environment. The ideology's emphasis on man's social and material evolution tends to obscure environmental factors that are not directly related to the class structure or to economic processes. Nature is viewed as subject to domination by man, as something to be conquered.[40] According to Marx, "the earth is not the product of labour and therefore has no value." Consequently, socialist theory has viewed ground rent as a form of surplus value, a form of exploitation. This has led to the price theory that all natural resources are to be made available without charge to the nationalized industries.[41]

Lenin and his successors contributed to this disregard for the environment with the role of a disciplined elite to promote the revolution for a politically inert proletariat. This concept of conscious voluntarism increases the tendency to regard nature as an object to be manipulated and dominated by man, with the conquest of nature seen as another "battle" against formidable odds.[42]

In its efforts to outshine capitalism as an economic and social system, communism has heightened the urgency with which the Eastern European nations view industrialization, leading them to concentrate on the high-polluting heavy industries over light manufacturing and services. Moreover, their traditional autarky has made them exploit low-quality domestic resources rather than import fuel and primary raw materials.[43] In Poland, for example, coal provides 77 per cent of the nation's energy, especially for the industrial sector.[44]

[38] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 22 (Romania), 27 Dec. 1982, pp. 18–20.
[39] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), 3 May 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83752, 23 June 1983, p. 16.
[40] Donald R. Kelley, Kenneth R. Stunkel, Richard R. Wescott, *The Economic Superpowers and the Environment* (W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1976), p. 23.
[41] Cf. Josef Fullenbach, *European Environmental Policy: East and West* (Butterworth's, Boston, 1981), p. 85.
[42] Cf. Kelley, p. 25.
[43] Leslie Dienes, "Environmental Disruption in East Europe," in Volgyes, p. 149.
[44] *RFE Background Report*, No. 158 (Poland), 5 Aug. 1982, p. 2.

Perhaps the worst effect of ideological considerations is that they make these systems less open to change, less responsive to new concerns such as the environment. Although limited reforms can be justified, fundamental changes that challenge ideological foundations cannot even be considered. Boris Komarov, author of a recent exposé of Soviet environmental difficulties, stated, "The more thoroughly economic policy is kneaded with the yeasts of ideology, the less room remains for flexible economic decisions, for the exchange of valuable experience accumulated throughout the world."[45]

ALTHOUGH ideology makes communist decision-makers predisposed to overlook environmental concerns, economic factors have contributed more directly to Eastern Europe's environmental difficulties. Environmental disruption may be due to failures in formulating economic plans and failures in implementing these plans.[46] Because socialist economic planning leaves no room for spare capacity, the political decision must be made to invest in the environment over other priorities.[47] However, investment in environmental projects is constrained by the limited resources of the East European nations and the higher priority placed on the industrial and military sectors of the economy. For example, according to Stefan Kozlowski, a geologist and member of the Polish State Council for Environmental Protection, saving Poland's environment would require expenditures of at least three times what has been allocated in the 1981–85 economic plan.[48]

Regulation of existing standards with existing means rather than new investment has been the primary planning method in Eastern economies. However, the economic hierarchy in these nations is not set up to regulate environmental pollution. Ministries are usually organized around specific industries or groups of industries, and these bodies are also responsible for environmental regulation. The industries of one ministry usually tend to originate the pollution felt by the constituency of another ministry, be it industrial or non-industrial. Another problem is that the regional jurisdiction of an organization may not be the same as the area polluted by the enterprises under its control. For example, a republic-level ministry may not effectively control water pollution from a chemical factory dumping wastes into a major river whose waters run beyond republic boundaries. Nor could this republic do anything about pollution it receives from an industry far upstream.[49]

This fragmentation of authority for environmental control among a variety of functional and territorial agencies leads to confusion, differing

[45] Boris Komarov, *Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union*. (M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1980), p. 138.

[46] Leonore Shever Taga, "Externalities in a Command Society," in Fred Singleton (ed.), *Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970), p. 76.

[47] Fullenbach, p. 99.

[48] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 25 Nov. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 21.

[49] Taga, pp. 82–4.

priorities, and ambiguity about who is responsible for what. An engineer and professor at the University of Warsaw bewailed Poland's water and environmental management system, stating that it "cannot be described as anything other than chaotic." Seven federal bodies have jurisdiction over Poland's water management: the Central Geological Authority and the Ministries for Agriculture; Administration; Communal Economy and Environmental Protection; Transportation; Mining and Power-Hydropower and the Lower Vistula Development; and Construction and Construction Materials. In terms of territorial jurisdiction, 49 provinces have water management authority.[50] Somewhat the opposite situation has occurred in Hungary, which has problems with rubbish control because no government agency has been assigned to deal directly with waste products.[51]

The bureaucratic politics involved in addressing issues of such cross-cutting jurisdiction can be intense. Conflicts are usually settled according to the relative political weight and interests of the contenders, rather than the merits of a case. As a result, the large heavy-industry ministries can overshadow the less influential state agencies or councils concerned with environmental protection. Attempts to reorder this "ministerial pecking order" in favour of the environment would only provoke opposition from the bureaucrats and Party leaders with power centres in the larger ministries.[52]

In addition to insufficient environmental investment and improper regulatory structures, East European economies make a third planning failure in pricing. Pricing failures include both an absence of prices and prices that do not reflect the social value of the factor in question. Because socialized resources—land, water and raw materials—are freely available to producers or available at administratively set charges, they are not utilized with opportunity costs in mind. As a result, these resources are often wastefully or over-utilized; new mines are opened before old ones are worked out.[53]

Socialist economies also tend to set the prices of capital-intensive products too low, and a positive correlation has been noted between capital intensity in some industrial branches and environmental pollution.[54] In general, socialist enterprises have no incentive to account for the choking air and the undrinkable water they create. Nor do they have an incentive to include environmental factors in siting decisions, since this could mean incurring higher production costs. They also tend to overstate the costs of pollution abatement and to call them unfair burdens which hurt production.[55]

[50] *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), 12 Dec. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 14.
[51] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 15 (Hungary), 8 Oct. 1981, p. 12.
[52] Kelley, p. 163.
[53] Charles E. Ziegler, "Centrally Planned Economies and Environmental Information: A Rejoinder," in *Soviet Studies* Vol. 34 No. 2, April 1982, p. 298; Fullenbach, p. 85.
[54] Fullenbach, p. 83.
[55] Ziegler, p. 297.

Beyond failure in the formulation of economic plans, the implementation of these plans has led to disregard of the environment in Eastern Europe. The predominant emphasis on fulfilment and overfulfilment of production targets leads to the neglect of secondary targets such as environmental protection, even if these other targets are also mandated. Some analysts see a fundamental contradiction in this: "If we accept the premise that a centrally planned economy has as its primary goal the quantitative expansion of production, environmental protection goals necessarily conflict with, and cannot complement, the main organizational rationale."[56]

Because of this emphasis on production, environmental investment funds are frequently diverted for other purposes. The Bulgarian press reported a lag in the building of municipal purification stations; only 63 per cent of planned investment for the first two years of the plan was spent. The main offender, it claimed, was the Hudrostroy State Economic Trust, which transferred construction brigades to other projects.[57] The Czechoslovak press cited a similar occurrence, reporting that during the fifth five-year plan the people's committees diverted several million dollars for water resources investment to other purposes.[58] An official with the Czechoslovak Ministry of Forestry and Water Economy complained that there were too many applicants for exemption from the water pollution law who did not even try to comply, and that applications were poorly or falsely written and justified. He cited a number of calamities which "extraordinary sums and efforts" were required to resolve, claiming that these were the result of "gross carelessness, indifference and nonobservance of basic duties, but also deliberately committed calamities are increasing in numbers."[59]

There are two crucial reasons why enterprises divert investment resources from pollution control. First, in almost every instance, the fines levied for violating environmental regulations are lower than the expense of installing pollution control equipment. Second, none of the East European systems rewards industries for fulfilling environmental protection plans; there is no bonus system similar to that used in fulfilling production plans. Also as a result of these factors, existing environmental plants are not fully exploited and are frequently inactive due to inadequate servicing.[60] Boris Komarov's comment on the failure of Soviet industries to implement waste-free technologies is equally relevant to the situation in Eastern Europe. He stated, "As long as enterprises have no real economic interest in ecologically clean technologies, forcing them to adopt such processes is more or less like forcing a cat to eat cucumbers by giving it a lecture on the benefits of vegetarianism."[61]

[56] Ibid.
[57] *JPRS*, No. 83752, 23 June 1983, p. 16.
[58] *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 8, 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84697, 7 Nov. 1983, p. 48.
[59] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), 11 May 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 16 May 1983, p. D9.
[60] Fullenbach, p. 101.
[61] Komarev, p. 95.

Industry's reluctance to implement environmental control measures is matched by the reluctance of state officials to see that they do so. The fragmentation of environmental control authority within Eastern European systems makes it difficult to ensure accountability. In addition, the state ownership of resources and production facilities creates a collusive relationship between industry and state officials. The careers and salaries of administrative officials are often dependent upon the productivity of the industries they regulate. As with industry, there are no incentives to fulfil environmental plan goals which can counter the pressure for meeting quantitative goals. A diplomat based in the GDR commented on this collusive relationship by saying, "Local party bosses share the view of managers that overfulfilled plans make more impression on Berlin than clean air and rivers."[62] A Polish engineer compaired this type of situation to "the story of a hare who was entrusted with taking care of a head of cabbage—and this, from all accounts, did not work!"[63]

The above factors suggest that even the most admirable environmental plans that the authorities might devise probably could not be fulfilled due to limitations within industry. In early 1984, a member of the Czech Planning Commission bewailed the fact that investment measures were not keeping up with increases in water and air pollution and waste creation. New water purification plants could not be built fast enough; there was a shortage of facilities to produce and maintain separation equipment, a shortage of spare parts, an insufficient increase in the number of managed waste dumps, and no increase at all in the building of municipal incinerators.[64]

Some of the Czech republic's problems could have been overcome if the necessary investment resources had been directed to environmental protection. Others, however, stemmed from technological limitations. Almost all nations have difficulty encouraging and then implementing technological innovation. According to press reports and official statements, the East European nations are highly aware of deficiencies in their scientific-technological establishment. In 1983 Czechoslovak Presidium member Milos Jakes stated that one of the nation's main problems was that scientific and technical advance had not become "the axis of planning and management."[65]

Many of these systems do not have a regulatory structure that properly encourages and rewards technological innovation. In an article entitled "Does Fashion Tower Above Progress?" a Slovak writer contrasts the preferential pricing of fashionable goods with the mark-up of technologically advanced products. According to him, enterprises withhold technically advanced products because the current system

[62] *The New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1982, p. 9.
[63] *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 16.
[64] *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 10 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. EEI-84-008, 17 Jan. 1984, pp. 3–11.
[65] *CPCZ Central Committee Presidium Report on the More Rapid Application of the Results of Science and Technology*, 15 June 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83897, 15 July 1983, p. 10.

forces them to develop a new product within two years of marketing the first one. If they do not, the preferential pricing and limited production allowances for the product expire and the enterprise has problems meeting its production plans for the item. He continued:

> Every such producer inevitably asks himself the following question: "Is it worth the 2 per cent wage fund incentive to risk moving on a rickety plane?" Enterprises that have learned their lesson, enterprises that have experienced a fall from their place in the sun, are cautious. They leave themselves a back door open for cases of exigency. This, too, is one of the reasons for the declining number of technologically advanced products.[66]

All of these planning and implementation failures that East European systems have experienced with regard to pollution control have worsened due to their current financial difficulties. Concerns such as environmental protection are among the first to be sacrificed in hard financial times. Investment is not available for building new plants or commercializing new technologies. Hard currency to import pollution control technology is virtually non-existent. Constraints on importing foreign oil mean that most of Eastern Europe is relying more heavily on burning coal for energy and industrial production, which only worsens their environmental problems.

In Hungary, everyone is agreed on the need to clean up Lake Balaton, the largest lake in central Europe and a popular resort area. However, the money is just not available. In order to eliminate further pollution and purify the lake, the government would have to spend a figure that is equal to one month's wages for each Hungarian.[67] Poland has similar problems in controlling air pollution. Because of increased urbanization and brown-coal mining, the cost of controlling gaseous emission has become prohibitive. As a result, the draft economic plan for the 1986–90 period envisages the adoption of "the highest preference for protecting air against gaseous pollutants" only "after 1990."[68]

THE problems posed by trans-national pollution are especially knotty ones to solve. The Danube river is a classical case of trans-national pollution, for it initially receives heavy amounts of contaminants in Austria and the FRG and acquires additional pollutants in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania before it empties into the Black Sea. Trans-national air pollution is also a problem, since the prevailing winds in Europe blow from west to east. As a result, power plants in the GDR cause extensive pollution in the Turzow region of Poland, and air pollution from both the GDR and Poland has damaged forests in Czechoslovakia.[69] West Berlin has consistently blamed the East

[66] *Pravda* (Bratislava), 7 Dec. 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 16 Dec. 1983, pp. D6–7.
[67] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 15 (Hungary), 8 Oct. 1981, p. 11.
[68] *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 21.
[69] Kramer, p. 216.

for its frequent "smog alarms," when asthmatics and children are told to stay inside. It also complains that indiscriminate dumping of wastes into the Spree river is affecting both parts of the city.[70]

The problems in dealing with trans-national pollution stem initially from the fact that inaccurate monitoring systems do not allow the determination of exactly who is being polluted from where, and by how much. Even if responsibility could be determined, many of the nations of Eastern Europe are unwilling to accept such blame, mainly because they are reluctant to expend scarce resources to clean up pollution beyond their borders.

Politics inevitably affects the settling of trans-national disputes. The head of the Yugoslav Council on Environmental Protection and Improvement blamed foreign investors for the nation's pollution, stating, "It becomes clear that it is more suitable for them to construct industrial projects which may pollute the environment on our shores and in our regions which are far from their own."[71] Hans Reichelt, the GDR's Minister for Environmental Protection and Water Management, openly linked environmental and political issues when he visited Bavaria in late 1983. At that time he stated, "It is very difficult to think of successful negotiations in the protection of forests and water with the newly deployed American Pershing II missiles and the cruise missile in the territory of the FRG, not far from our state border."[72]

A FINAL reason why the nations of Eastern Europe are experiencing such environmental difficulties, yet dealing insufficiently with them, is found in the social context within which the leadership operates. A random interviewing of citizens in Ljub, the largest city in the republic of Slovenia, revealed that few of the city's inhabitants knew anything about environmental pollution beyond their own personal experiences with it. Thus, most did not know the health costs related to pollution and had never even thought of their home heating as a pollution source.[73] Although this public ignorance may be due to the limited information on pollution, it may also stem from a lack of concern about environmental issues, a belief that pollution is the price one pays for modernization. The increase in consumer-goods production that some of these regimes have planned will only add to this attitude, creating a consumer oriented middle class intent on improving its living standard.[74]

Certainly there are people in Eastern Europe who are truly concerned about environmental protection. Such individuals or groups have little power to influence public policy, however. In most of these systems, the spokesmen for environmental agencies and semi-official conservation

[70] *The New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1982, p. 9.
[71] *Privredni Pregled* (Belgrade), 23–5 July 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84219, 30 Aug. 1983, p. 132.
[72] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 12 October 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 21 Oct. 1983, p. E1.
[73] David E. Kromm, "Perception of the Air Pollution Hazard in Ljubjana, Yugoslavia," in Volgyes, p. 130.
[74] Kelley, p. 294.

groups are closed out of high-level negotiations by Party officials and industrial interests. In addition, much environmental policy is made within the government agencies responsible for the use and exploitation of natural resources.[75]

Recent Government Actions in Environmental Protection

Keeping in mind the factors constraining environmental protection in Eastern Europe, one finds that these systems have a mixed record of recent actions in the environmental sphere.

From all indications in the East European press, environmental issues are receiving increased attention in government forums; reports are being heard, studies ordered and decrees issued. What remains unsaid in many such accounts, however, is what kind of concrete action is taken, if any. In late 1982 the Bulgarian press reported on a joint meeting of the National Assembly Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection and the Council on the Protection of the Environment attached to the Bulgarian State Council. Papers were read on a variety of environmental and agricultural issues, including environmental protection activities in the Black Sea territorial complex, the Devnya chemical plant area, and the Danube territorial complex.[76] No mention was made of reactions or follow up to the papers. In 1983 the Polish Central Committee Presidium approved the establishment of a Walery Goetel memorial fund for supporting work in environmental protection. Goetel was termed one of the "Polish precursors" in environmental protection and planning.[77] The amount of funding approved for the memorium was not given. The sixth five-year plan is Czechoslovakia's first with a chapter on environmental planning with certain quantified targets. According to the analyst who reported this, however, the government has no basic methodological concepts for determining environmental losses, costs and damages.[78]

The newest environmental buzzwords in Eastern Europe are "low-waste" and "waste-free technologies." Virtually every nation in Eastern Europe has declared its intention to develop such technologies. Bulgaria—one of the less technologically sophisticated nations—was among the first to announce such plans in 1981.[79] With one exception, however, none of these nations has reported any concrete results. The exception was Poland, which in late 1982 announced its development of a new waste treatment technology that prevented the formation of liquid wastes.[80]

[75] Ibid. p. 166.
[76] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), 29 Oct. 1982, translated in *FBIS*, 3 Nov. 1982, p. C2.
[77] Warsaw Domestic Service (Warsaw), 5 Jan. 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 6 Jan. 1983, p. G1.
[78] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 4.
[79] BTA (Sofia), 4 March 1981, translated in *FBIS*, 10 March 1981, p. AA1.
[80] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 5 Nov. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 27.

WHAT one can find are indications that the East European nations are attempting to control environmental pollution through measures of a non-investment nature, such as better utilizing existing plant capacity, increasing enforcement efforts, and so on. In January 1984, a member of the Czech Planning Commission reviewed the doubtful success of recent environmental investments as well as the republic's financial constraints and stated:

> Measures of a non investment nature will, however, assume ever greater importance; these include adhering to technological discipline, maximizing the utilization of existing equipment for this entrapment and elimination of polluting substances, the adherence to valid regulations and standards as well as discipline and a sense of individual responsibility to oneself and society.[81]

In the GDR the emphasis is on "enterprise rationalization measures" to increase the capacity and production of existing plants through the use of "modern managerial models" and automation.[82]

Given the fiscal constraints of these nations and the variety of competing demands for investment funds, authorities are becoming more limited in setting environmental targets. In its seventh five-year plan, the Slovak republic speaks of the gradual elimination of only the greatest pollution sources. Rather than aiming to improve the environment, it hopes merely to prevent pollution from worsening in areas that already exceed established norms.[83]

Many of these systems are hoping for beneficial results in the stricter application of existing regulations and standards. In early 1983, a Warsaw journal reported that the state pollution authority had stepped up inspections and had cited an appalling number of violators. Oddly enough, the article ended on an up beat:

> The activities so far of the State Inspectorate for Environmental Protection warrant inferring rather optimistic conclusions. If further inspections will be conducted just as consistently and a list of violators published just as consistently, too, it may be that the growing destruction of the environment could finally be halted.[84]

What the article fails to mention is that neither Poland nor any of the other countries in Eastern Europe has raised the fines for violating pollution standards so that they truly discourage non-compliance.

In efforts to control the depletion of natural resources, most of these governments are strongly urging conservation by industry and the populace. In fact, a Slovak republic official stressed conservation over all other measures in addressing water pollution and supply problems.[85] All

[81] *JPRS*, No. EE1-84-008, p. 14.
[82] *Wasserwirtschaft-Wassertechnik* (East Berlin), No. 11, Nov. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84975, 19 Dec. 1983, p. 30.
[83] *Hospodarske Noviny* (Prague), 21 Oct. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84965, 16 Dec. 1983, p. 33.
[84] *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 19 Nov. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 24.
[85] *Pravda* (Bratislava), 12 Jan. 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 17 Jan. 1983, pp. D1–3.

of these countries are also embarking on ambitious recycling programmes. The programme adopted by the GDR is a fairly representative one. Its economic plan for 1981–85 called for 12 per cent of raw material requirements to be met with secondary raw materials. It also called for developing ways to recycle industrial wastes such as oil and plastic, in addition to such traditional recyclables as paper and jars. Material incentives have been introduced, so that enterprises pay lower prices for the recycled materials.[86]

Romania's recycling programme may be the area's most ambitious, for it calls for recycling everything from steel, pig iron, copper and bronze to tyres and plastics. In 1984 Romania aimed at re-using 52 per cent of its steel, 71 per cent of its pig iron, and 86 per cent of its lead.[87] The programme envisaged nationwide mobilization for that purpose; even schoolchildren and communist youth organizations were directed to collect material for recycling. But in 1980, such actions resulted in the collection of only about 1 per cent of national steel production, which was far below official expectations. The programme had better success in recent years, but at the expense of other areas of the economy. Modest fees were established for the collection of recyclables, and this led people to steal materials from construction sites, take shortcuts in manufacturing processes, and so on. There were even reports of silver being stolen from mining areas.[88]

These recycling programmes may or may not prove economically beneficial, but in any case it will be at the expense of the environment. Poland's "Emergency Programme for Saving Fuel, Energy and Materials and for Using Scrap Materials" has the environmentally sound provisions of reducing coal use by the state railway and economizing water use, especially through prompt leak repair. However, its ghastly alternative to burning coal at cement works is to burn old tyres. It also encourages the use of "local fuels" such as timber, peat and brown coal, which could increase noxious emissions.[89]

Some of the nations in Eastern Europe have undertaken administrative reorganizations in so-called environmental protection efforts. But they were not very effective. In 1981 Poland's Nature Preservation League strongly opposed a proposal that would have given greater say on environmental issues to the Forestry and Timber Ministry than to the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Protection of the Environment. The Forestry Ministry would not have been required to implement any active conservation policy.[90] In 1983 the Romanian government removed forestry from the jurisdiction of the Council on Agriculture, the Food Industry, Forestry and Water Management and established a Council on Forestry. The powers vested in the new council

[86] Domestic Television Service (East Berlin), 12 July 1982, translated in *FBIS*, 14 July 1982, p. E1.
[87] Agerpres (Bucharest), 9 Jan. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 13 Jan. 1984, p. H1.
[88] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 9 (Romania), 12 May 1981, pp. 16–7.
[89] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 28 March 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 31 March 1983, pp. G1–5.
[90] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Poland), 30 Jan. 1981, p. 34.

indicated that the move was designed to ensure adequate fodder for livestock, rather than to address Romania's forestry problems.[91]

The pre-eminence of economic over environmental concerns is also evident in proposals by East European governments for the future development of key natural resources. The most publicized case is that of development plans for the Danube Delta, which are under discussion by the Romanian government. The Danube Delta is one of Europe's few remaining wetlands and is home to over 300 species of marsh animals. Plans for the delta include draining these marshes to plant conifers and establish fig plantations and wheat and maize fields. Fishing and fish breeding are also to be expanded. This would not, however, save the area's pelicans, for fishermen consistently shoot the birds because they are in competition for the fish. It is suggested that, under current conditions, all pelicans within the delta will soon be killed.[92]

Poland is having similar experiences in planning the development of its national park and forest areas. A comprehensive development project for Poland's Tatra Park was inexplicably shelved by the local authorities. In addition, a large area of the forest was destroyed to build luxury rest-homes for government officials. The last surviving bear on the Polish side of the Tatra Mountains was reportedly shot by a park official. A ministerial decree on the area's tourist and recreational development ignored the park's Scientific Council's recommendations and concentrated on increased sports and tourism, with only small expenditures for necessary sewage and purification measures. The Kampinos Park, north-east of Warsaw, is all that remains of the vast Kampinos Forest, a peat bog and home of the Polish elk. According to Polish ecology experts, the Ministry of Forestry's reforestation policy may hurt the area's biological balance. The resettlement of several villages within park boundaries is also being questioned. The park desperately needs to provide suitable recreational facilities for Warsaw residents as well as safeguard the area's natural resources. However, a comprehensive development plan had been bogged down for several years at the time that this was reported, and local administrators' ad hoc measures were only worsening the situation.[93]

Czechoslovakia and the GDR are considering equally short-sighted measures for their dying forests. Rather than attempting to reduce the air pollution that is killing the forests, these governments are only considering such measures as converting more land to forest, increasing insecticide spraying, and planting more pollution-resistant tree species. "Darwinizing" the forests by planting deciduous trees could have extremely adverse consequences. Deciduous trees do not resist flooding as well as conifers, and erosion would probably increase in such replanted areas.[94]

[91] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 6 (Romania), 30 March 1981, pp. 17–9.
[92] Gabriel Ronay, "Danube Delta Pelicans Face Extinction," *The Times* (London), 19 Feb. 1983, p. 7.
[93] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Poland), 30 Jan. 1981, pp. 31–4.
[94] *RFE Background Report*, No. 62 (GDR), 24 March 1983, pp. 2–3; *RFE Situation Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 10.

MANY of the nations in Eastern Europe are pursuing nuclear power programmes in order to decrease their dependence on imported fuel. Here, at last, the associated safety and environmental considerations seem to be receiving careful attention. In 1981 the Yugoslav government delayed putting its Krsko nuclear plant into trial operation because radioactive waste storage, fire prevention, and several other concerns had not been resolved.[95] The GDR introduced regulations on radioactive waste storage at about the same time, requiring plants to collect, process and eventually transport radioactive wastes to a final storage depot at one of the nuclear power stations. The regulations provide a potentially large loophole, however, in granting exceptions for "compelling technical or economic grounds."[96] Czechoslovakia is still writing its legislation and regulations on nuclear power. In early 1984, the Committee for Industry and Building Trade of the Czech National Council discussed a bill on state supervision of nuclear power plant equipment which addressed safety and environmental considerations in the construction and production of nuclear power plants.[97]

Several additional environmental protection achievements merit brief mention. One is the hazardous waste regulations that Hungary promulgated in 1982. Much like the United States' comprehensive Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Hungarian legislation requires companies to keep daily and yearly registers on their production and disposal of hazardous wastes and to process these wastes within one year. The measure is hoped to decrease hazardous waste production by 20 per cent and to see that the smallest possible quantity contaminates the soil, water, and air.[98] Also, in 1983, the GDR enacted what appears to be a comprehensive attempt to regulate the country's water and waterways. The bill sets water quality standards, enumerates the responsibilities of industry and government, and specifies penalties for violating the standards.[99]

GENERALLY, efforts to expand technological applications in Eastern Europe have not been accompanied by measures directed towards improving environmental monitoring and control techniques. However, strengthening the overall scientific and technical expertise within a nation means that, should environmental concerns receive higher priority in the future, some means will exist for addressing them. In this vein, Bulgaria adopted a variety of measures in 1982 to increase coordination between its Academy of Sciences and industry, to improve

[95] *Tanjug* (Belgrade), 24 April 1981, translated in *FBIS*, 29 April 1981, p. 13.
[96] DPA (Berlin), 18 June 1981, translated in *FBIS*, 23 June 1981, p. E10.
[97] Prague Domestic Service (Prague), 9 Feb. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 10 Feb. 1984, p. D2.
[98] MTI (Budapest), 25 Nov. 1981, translated in *FBIS*, 4 Dec. 1981, p. F4.
[99] *Neue Justiz* (East Berlin), Vol. 36 No. 11, Nov. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82663, 17 Jan. 1983, p. 16.

the Academy's information services, and to use more efficiently the existing material and technical base.[100]

East European governments are also involved in international environmental activities. They signed a number of bilateral and multilateral environmental agreements. How much progress comes from these agreements is uncertain. For example, the CMEA's Council for Environmental Protection periodically meets to promote environmental cooperation. In March 1983, it met to discuss desulphurization, low-waste technologies and water management.[101] At about this time, the GDR and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement on specific projects to decrease SO_2 emissions and increase scientific and technological cooperation.[102]

Progress has been apparent in environmental cooperation between the two Germanies, especially with regard to controlling brown-coal emissions and water pollution. The FRG has contributed funds to GDR pollution-control projects, and in May 1983 the two nations were completing negotiations on the purification and desalinization of the Werra, Weser and Roeden rivers.[103]

EASTERN Europe in the 1980s is beginning to experience the increased environmental concern that manifested itself in the United States and Western Europe in the early 1970s. Official and even some non-official environmental organizations are now pressing their governments for action in this important sphere.

Almost all of these nations have officially sponsored environmental groups. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Union of the Protectors of Nature and the Land has 10,000 individual and 250 institutional members, whereas the Czech Union of the Protectors of Nature now boasts about 20,000 individual and 100 institutional members.[104] The Socialist Youth Union and the Czech and Slovak Huntsman's Federation also engage in some environmental protection activities. The Hungarian Ornithological Society has a 3,000-member volunteer force that has recently been involved in efforts to save the bustard, an endangered bird species.[105] In Bulgaria, the journalists' union and the National Committee for the Protection of Nature recently signed an agreement to collaborate on environmental measures.[106]

As with other officially sponsored organizations, it is difficult to determine how much these groups represent public concerns. They undoubtedly perform an important co-optive role in mobilizing people to

[100] Domestic Service (Sofia), 25 Jan. 1982, translated in *FBIS*, 2 Feb. 1982, p. C7.
[101] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 31 March 1983, translated in *FBIS*, 5 April 1983, p. AA1.
[102] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 5–6 Feb. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83089, 17 March 1983, p. 23.
[103] *RFE Background Report*, No. 62, (GDR), 24 March 1983, p. 5.
[104] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 7 (Czechoslovakia), 1983, p.8.
[105] Don Hinrichsen and Erika Laszlo, "Uncle Geza vs. The Bustard," in *International Wildlife* Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1982, p. 15.
[106] *JPRS*, No. 83752, 23 June 1983, p. 16.

support official policy and frequently organize recycling drives, tree plantings and municipal clean-ups.

Non-official environmental activism in Eastern Europe began in Poland with the establishment of the Polish Ecology Club in September 1980. The club was begun by some of Cracow's scientific and cultural personnel, trade unionists and environmentalists with an open letter to the Polish *Sejm* on the need to enact environmental protection and education measures.

Cracow was a natural place for such a movement to begin. The mediaeval city has a long tradition as a centre for naturalists and preservationists. It experiences intense pollution because of its location; the building of the gigantic steelworks in nearby Nowa Huta added immensely to the problem. The prevailing westerly winds blow emissions from these nearby factories over the city that are then trapped by temperature inversions. The area's high humidity turns this pollution into a sulphurous smog.[107]

In September 1980, the Polish Ecology Club sent a letter to the mayor of Cracow asking that the old royal capital be declared "threatened by an ecological catastrophe" and granted privileged status. In addition, it asked that the nearby Skawina Aluminium Smelter, which was operating without any anti-pollution devices, be closed until its toxic fluorine emissions were eliminated. Other requests included the modernization of the Lenin Steelworks and area chemical plants; the introduction of "better quality" gas and electricity to decrease Cracow's dependence on coal; and the creation of parks and water reserves.[108] The Skawina Aluminium Smelter was the club's main concern. In November 1980, residents of Skawina, supported by Solidarity and the Ecology Club, filed a suit against the smelter, demanding compensation for health damages. The mayor of Cracow supported their action and recommended that the plant be shut down to half its capacity. In early 1981, after much wrangling, Warsaw ordered the plant to be closed. The preliminary findings of a special government commission were that every worker with over 20 years' seniority suffered one form of sickness or another. It appeared that most of the plant's 2,400 workers would retire on pensions because they were too sick to work elsewhere.[109]

In July 1981, the Polish Ecology Club had grown to 14 branches and about 20,000 members.[110] Solidarity also continued to press for environmental protection. In May 1981, its Interfactory Workers' Committee passed a resolution asking that work be stopped at an oil extraction area in the Szczecin province until the environmental damage could be addressed. The trade union also demanded that experts

[107] David Brand, "Polish Ecology Club Risks Government Ire by Battling Pollution," in *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 1981, pp. 1, 7.
[108] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 2 (Poland), 30 Jan. 1981, p. 26.
[109] *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 1981, pp. 1, 7.
[110] Ibid.

determine the extent of pollution in the area, for the air at some points had been tested as having 29 times the acceptable level of hydrogen sulphide. In addition, the region's health service had noticed negative health effects such as heart malfunctions in newborn babies.[111] The Polish Ecology Club was hit hard with the imposition of martial law and the crushing of Solidarity. It apparently continues to work underground to some extent, however, and similar non-official movements have appeared in other nations.

Czechoslovakia's human rights group, Charter 77, has included environmental issues in its platform.[112] In July 1983, Charter 77 drew up a letter to alert the authorities to large-scale environmental and social deterioration in North Bohemia. Although the government ostensibly has a comprehensive plan to limit the environmental damage in North Bohemia, this document backed up foreign and Czechoslovak press reports that the plan has not worked. The severe pollution problems have apparently led to social problems, especially with the younger generation, such as random destructiveness and drug abuse.[113] Charter 77 made international headlines in early 1984, when it obtained and circulated an Academy of Sciences report on Czechoslovakia's environmental situation. Although the government had ordered that the report be written, its publication was later suppressed because of its alarming contents.[114]

Environmental activism in the GDR has been spearheaded by the Protestant Church, which back in the 1970s urged its congregation to gather in small groups to talk about the nation's environmental problems and what they as citizens could do. In 1979 the regional synod at Mecklenburgian Schwerin had the nation's first public discussion on the risks of nuclear power. Active environmental groups were formed in some parishes and they conducted such activities as tree plantings and bicycle riding with the motto "Be mobile without automobiles." Such actions are now standing programmes in many parishes.[115] On 5 June 1983, the international day of the environment, 200 residents of Halle, East Germany, tried to protest against the Buna Chemical Works. The fire department broke up the demonstration by spraying foam at the protestors, who were then arrested and fined. A similar demonstration took place in Schwerin about the construction of a motorway to Wismar. At the Church of the Holy Cross in Dresden, more than 1,000 people gathered under an enormous green cross of lettuce heads to listen to an ecological group from the Dresden church district.[116] As in Czechoslovakia, the ecology and peace groups in the GDR are coalescing. A banner at the Church of the Holy Cross read: "First Law of Environmental Protection: Disarmament." Volker Nollau, an instructor

[111] Warsaw Domestic Service (Warsaw), 3 May 1981, translated in *FBIS*, 4 May 1981, p. G10.
[112] *JPRS*, No. 83752, 23 June 1983, p. 16.
[113] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 14 (Czechoslovakia), 9 Aug. 1983, p. 11.
[114] *Le Monde* (Paris), 7 Jan. 1984, translated in *FBIS*, 12 Jan. 1984, p. D7.
[115] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Vol. 37 No. 30, 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84155, 19 Aug. 1983, p. 23.
[116] Ibid. p. 24.

at the Dresden Technical University and a synod member from Saxony, said to a group of church members that environmental protection makes sense only "when the concept of nuclear deterrence through possible mutual destruction is abandoned. . ."[117]

A collection of essays written by East Germans has recently been published in the FRG. The essays portray some of the non-official thinking within the GDR on ethical problems of science and technology under socialism and environmental activism, among other subjects. The book indicates that the number of concerned, active people in the GDR is small but growing, and these people are impressed with the need to educate others on environmental problems. The common element among the essays was "the questioning, and at times rejection, of the primacy of economic growth as *the* all-encompassing societal goal under socialism."[118] Many of the articles in this collection were sponsored by the East German Evangelical Church. The Evangelical Church frequently discusses environmental issues in its press, which has an impressive daily circulation of 500,000. The Church also operates an environmental research facility in Thuringia and sponsors public awareness initiatives such as group bicycle rides.[119]

EASTERN Europe's scientific, technological and professional circles are becoming increasingly concerned about environmental protection. As experts who have studied the growth and effects of pollution, these individuals are speaking out on the extent of environmental problems. In August 1983, the Warsaw Domestic Service did a stark editorial report on pollution entitled "When Birds Die." A doctor who was interviewed said: "Silesia is not a place to live for children, pregnant women, old people, or people with first signs of cancer, who should undergo intensive cure in an unpolluted environment."[120] Some state officials have couched their appeals to the leadership in economic terms. In April 1982, the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences organized a meeting on "economic problems and the environment." Debate at the meeting dealt with attempts "to make theoretical conclusions of economic researchers attainable by decision-makers."[121]

In addition to publicizing the seriousness of the problem, Eastern Europe's scientific and professional elite has used its expertise to propose solutions. The Polish Academy of Sciences praised the draft economic plan for 1986–90 for its general emphasis on the environment, but noticed that this was not reflected in the proposed investment. It recommended that it should be increased by 6 per cent for "full satisfaction of our

[117] Ibid. p. 25.
[118] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 146 (GDR), 12 July 1982, pp. 2–4.
[119] Ibid. p. 5.
[120] *Gazeta Olsztynska* (Olsztyn), No. 4, 11 April 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84219, 30 Aug. 1983, p. 86.
[121] *RFE Situation Report*, No. 7 (Czechoslovakia), 19 April 1983, p. 8.

environmental needs."[122] Scientists and technologists are also advocating necessary administrative reorganization. A Czech engineer and forestry expert proposed the establishment of a central control system to implement measures "relevant to utilization of timber from contaminated regions on the one hand, and the requisite decontamination and recultivation of the countryside, on the other hand."[123]

Professionals who have spoken out on environmental problems have been virtually unanimous in their appeals for more research and better use of scientific and technical information in decision-making. Nojdan Pasic, a Yugoslav sociologist, emphasized the need to support citizen participation in decision-making. According to Pasic, "This need for political modernization in keeping with the demands of profoundly altered socio-economic realities is much greater in socialist countries where it is a question of vital importance for political life as a whole."[124] A member of the Polish State Council for Environmental Protection and dean at the Warsaw Polytechnic also stated that the public should be able to influence the choices about environmental protection in the 1986–90 economic plan.[125]

IN many instances, the appeals of East European environmental groups and concerned elites are being heard because of the media's increased attention to environmental issues. This is due not to any liberalization in reporting policy, but to the inability of ignoring pollution problems. A West German journal reported that the GDR media has reversed its previous practice now to give attention to environmental issues. Even the Party paper, *Freie Presse*, reported the passage of a resolution to reduce pollution and forest damage in Erzgebirge.[126] The Polish official press agency characterized Poland's environmental situation as "an approaching ecological disaster."[127] In Czechoslovakia, *Prace* foresees an "ecological catastrophe."[128]

Scholarly journals are giving environmental questions relatively serious and comprehensive appraisal. In May 1983, a Warsaw journal ran two lengthy articles detailing Poland's pollution problems and outlining the administrative and investment measures needed to address these problems. A third article was a case study of pollution problems and control measures in the city of Police, the location of a large and dirty chemical plant.[129]

[122] *Nauka Polska* (Warsaw), No. 4, April 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 83920, 18 July 1983, p. 21.
[123] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), 12 July 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84256, 2 Sept. 1983, p. 44.
[124] Jan F. Triska, "Citizen Participation in Community Decisions in Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary and Poland," in Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, *Political Development in East Europe*, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1977), p. 150.
[125] *Zycie Warsawy* (Warsaw), 24 Nov. 1982, translated in *JPRS*, No. 82733, 26 Jan. 1983, p. 19.
[126] *Iwe Wirtschaftsdienst* (Bonn), No. 39, 17 Nov. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. EE12-84-006, 12 Jan. 1984, p. 37.
[127] *The New York Times*, 12 Sept. 1982, p. 9
[128] *RFE Background Report*, No. 95 (Czechoslovakia), 6 May 1983, p. 15.
[129] *Rada Narodowa Gospodarka Administracja* (Warsaw), 3 May 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84066, 8 Aug. 1983, pp. 32–53.

Some representatives of the press are remonstrating with government officials for not providing timely, accurate information on environmental problems and mishaps. The Zagreb Domestic Service sharply criticized the authorities of the Krsko nuclear power station for not giving the public the details of a relatively minor mishap. This had only exaggerated rumours, as well as suspicion and distrust of the authorities.[130]

THE response of East European governments to environmental activism has been mixed. On the one hand, the number of officially sponsored ecology groups is an indication that these governments have recognized pollution as a problem and are trying both to co-opt the public to support whatever official environmental policy may exist, and to channel concern into constructive activities, such as municipal clean-ups.

On the other hand, the East European governments continue to look askance at non-official expressions of concern, especially where environmental lists have aligned with the more dangerous human rights and peace groups. This, for instance, is the case in the GDR. One week following the protest at the Buna Chemical Works in Halle, youth deacon Lothar Rochau was arrested. Rochau was also the leader of a peace group of more than 30 individuals. He was charged with anti-government agitation and unlawful communication with the West. When *Der Spiegel* reported Rochau's arrest, it contended that the authorities were attempting to destroy the Halle peace movement, just as they had recently done in the city of Jena.[131]

The GDR has also been discouraging the dissemination of environmental data and information. In late 1983, a letter to the editor of a GDR paper called for a public discussion on the environment. The inquiry was referred to a member of the Karl-Marx-Stadt council on environmental protection, who merely cited previously published interviews on the subject.[132] In another instance, two prominent scientists at the Central Institute for Philosophy at the East Berlin Academy of Sciences accepted an invitation to a discussion with some Christian ecologists in Dresden. Both were absent from the meeting without excuse. According to *Der Spiegel*, "The SED leadership had brought them back into line."[133]

One potentially positive response to public environmental concern is in Yugoslavia, where the government has drafted legislation requiring that the siting of nuclear power stations be decided with the consent of the local population. The draft law also banned the siting of nuclear plants in areas particularly susceptible to earthquakes, landslides and floods,

[130] Zagreb Domestic Service (Zagreb), 27 Aug. 1982, translated in *FBIS*. 30 Aug. 1983, pp. 12–3.
[131] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Vol. 37, No. 39, 26 Sept. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. 84677, 3 Nov. 1983, pp. 22–4.
[132] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 28 Nov. 1983, translated in *JPRS*, No. EE1-84-004, 11 Jan. 1984, p. 99.
[133] *JPRS*, No. 84677, 3 Nov. 1983, p. 25.

stating that no nuclear power plant should "pose a threat to human environment."[134]

THE nations of Eastern Europe are experiencing severe and mounting environmental problems. Their measures to address these problems have thus far been constrained by ideological values, economic priorities, and technical and fiscal limitations.

Theoretically, a command economy is better equipped to implement environmental policy than a market economy, for it has direct control over natural resources as well as those who are polluting these resources. Whether the economies of Eastern Europe could successfully implement environmental policy on a large scale depends on a commitment by state and industry officials alike to direct resources and fashion administrative and technological changes necessary to deal with environmental problems.

Whether this is a sufficient condition for the solution of these problems is a moot point, but one may ask when will the East European nations take on a serious commitment to protect and restore their environmental problems until the latter create even more significant economic ones. Marshall Goldman, an analyst of Soviet environmental problems, has stated this belief most succinctly. He said, "Until the point is reached when environmental disruption causes other state interests, especially manufacturing and agriculture, to lose as much as those in favor of greater exploitation of the environment stand to gain, environmental quality in the USSR is in a very fragile condition."[135]

This economic perspective does not consider the extent of public concern and activism which environmental deterioration has stimulated in Eastern Europe. For the general population, the consequences of environmental destruction are immediately tangible; they can drastically affect its daily life and, in many cases, already do so. Even the most apathetic individual would be concerned and fearful upon learning that his city's water supply was in imminent threat of contamination by toxic chemicals leaking from an abandoned waste dump.

Concern for the environment has mobilized broad sectors of society in Eastern Europe, from trade unions to scientists to media representatives. Thus far, the governments of these nations have channelled most public concern into conservation activities that have not threatened the status quo. As their limited and ad hoc measures fail to reverse worsening pollution, however, these systems may find that the environmentally concerned are becoming a significant portion of their politically restive element. Moreover, the far-ranging effects of environmental pollution will give this issue a greater legitimacy and expand its constituency.

[134] "Proposed Yugoslav Law Calls for Public Vote on New Atomic Plants," *Wall Street Journal*, 21 May 1982, p. 34.

[135] Robert J. Smith, "Privatizing the Environment," *Policy Review*, Vol. 20, Spring 1982, p. 21.

Rumours in Socialist Romania

Steven Sampson

DURING several periods of anthropological fieldwork between 1974 and 1984, I have been constantly impressed by the never-ending and imaginative stream of rumours emanating from peasants, workers, intellectuals and Party officials.* There are rumours of the Soviets sabotaging factories, of restaurants selling human meat, of religious fanatics stealing children, and of members of Romania's ruling family (the Ceausescus) running down pedestrians or losing thousands of dollars at the gaming tables of Monte Carlo. Rumours in Romania combine petty gossip, informal news, and narrative of a fantastic character. In this combination of information, distortion and sheer fantasy, rumour has become a kind of modern-day folklore in Romania.

The study of rumours—their origin, transmission, content and function—can provide insights into the nature of the so-called " informal sector " which operates in all socialist countries. Rumours exist in structural opposition to the official communication system in the same way as improvisation exists in relation to the Plan, corruption to bureaucracy and second economy to official economy in Romania.[1] Like other branches of this informal sector, rumours are only partially controlled by the state. Hence, they help create social ties which hold out the possibility of change in these societies, of a possible realignment between state and society. This article examines rumour as a means of folk expression, as a mirror for understanding how socialist societies work, and as a possible instrument for social change in Romania and Eastern Europe.

I will argue that rumours in Romania are comparatively more significant than rumours would be in the West. This is because they combine " news " with expressions of societal anxiety and conflict.

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[1] See the following by Steven Sampson: " Bureaucracy and Corruption as Anthropological Problems: a Case Study from Romania, " in *Folk* (Copenhagen), 1983, Vol. 25, pp. 63–96; " The Culture of the Planners: Anthropological Notes on the Study of the Planning Process, " Papers, Tenth Nordic Ethnographer's Meetings. Institut for Etnologi og Antropologi (Univ. of Copenhagen), 1983; " Rich Families and Poor Collectives: an Anthropological Study of Romania's ' Second Economy, ' " in *Bidrag til Öststatsforskning* (Uppsala), Vol. 11(1), 1983, pp. 44–77; " Is Romania the Next Poland? " in *Critique*, No. 16, 1983, pp. 139–44; *National Integration through Socialist Planning: an Anthropological Study of a Romanian New Town*, East European Monographs, Boulder, dist. by Columbia University Press, 1984; " Elites and Mobilization in Romanian Villages, " *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 24, No. 1. pp. 30–51.

Rumour is not a quaint survival of irrationality or social pathology (as some official researchers have suggested), but a *resurgent* form of folk expression. Rumours are diffused by urban intellectuals as much as by the peasants. In sum, this article will argue that rumours are the " folklore of socialism."

The Nature of Rumour

A rumour is any kind of information which is neither substantiated nor refuted.[2] Rumours may often be stigmatized (" just a rumour "), but they do not have to be false. For example, rumours that Yuri Andropov was gravely ill turned out to be true. Rumours are usually transmitted by word of mouth, but they may also be propagated by the printed media, together with " news." Rumours contrast with other forms of popular oral expression such as narratives, legends, folk-tales or myths. The latter normally lack the topicality of rumour, and they do not have the pretence of transmitting valuable information.

Rumour and gossip are sometimes used synonymously. Gossip is any discussion of people and their activities. Unlike rumour, which is always unsubstantiated, gossip can be verified as true or false. In addition, gossip tends to be more restricted than rumour, in that it deals only with individual behaviour and is relevant to a delimited social group.[3] Gossip tends to be transmitted among people who have intense, long-term social relations. Rumours, in contrast, encompass more than gossip, and may be passed among total strangers, in public places. The line between gossip and rumour is determined by the social context. Gossip about the Ceausescu family and high officials circulates among Bucharest's elite. As it leaves these circles and diffuses among the masses and into the countryside, what may be a simple fact becomes distorted, embellished and remains unsubstantiated. It has become a rumour.

Theorists of rumour divide into two camps. Sociologists, such as Shibutani,[4] Fine and Roznow[5] focus on rumour as a collective act. Shibutani sees rumour as a form of " collective problem solving " in which " people make sense out of ambiguous situations." Rumours are a form of " improvised news," and the way this news is formed and reworked is what is significant. In contrast, the psychological approach taken by Allport and Postman,[6] Jung,[7] Festinger[8] and the anthropologist Lienhardt, sees rumours as expressions of individual and societal anxieties. Rumours reflect psychological states of mind rather than efforts to make sense of the environment. Hence they can be analysed as

[2] Ralph Roznow and Gary Fine, *Rumour and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay*, 1976, p. 11.
[3] M. Gluckman, "Gossip and Scandal," in *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 4, June 1963, pp. 307–16.
[4] T. Shibutani, *Improvized News: A Sociological Study of Rumour*, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1966.
[5] Ralph Roznow and Gary Fine, op. cit. p. 11.
[6] G. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumour*, Holt, New York, 1947.
[7] C. Jung, " A Visionary Rumour, " in *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, Vol. 4, 1959, pp. 5–19.
[8] L. Festinger, " A Study of a Rumour: its Origin and Spread, " in *Human Relations*, Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 464–86.

texts, just like dreams or other forms of symbolic expression. Lienhardt[9] and Firth,[10] the only two anthropologists to deal explicitly with rumours, seem to fall into this school.

The major studies of rumour tend to be eclectic in their data base. This becomes problematic when one seeks to use rumour to understand a particular society like Romania. If rumours are everywhere a reaction to constant ambiguity and anxiety, why are they generally so comparatively rare (as Lienhardt asked)? Why do we need *rumours* to reflect our state of mind? The concentration on sociological or psychological functions robs rumour of its multi-functionality.

Here I would like to approach rumours as a cultural phenomenon. The " culture " in question has two elements: (1) the culture of *really existing socialism* as it exists in Eastern Europe, and (2) the specific social, political and historical characteristics of socialist *Romania*. In this framework, what may be viewed as Romanian rumours—to the extent they are found in other East European societies—may be more fruitfully seen as " system rumours."

Rumours and Socialist Societies

Socialism brings with it the gradual politicization of social life. No sphere of human relations is immune to the penetration of state plans and programmes (even if this penetration is not as complete as planners would prefer). There are efforts to build a new economy, a new political order, new cultural values, to create a new socialist man and to transform human relations from " friendship to comradeship."[11] The separation between public and private spheres is not simply a dichotomy but a genuine conflict. The public sphere continually imposes itself on the private, while the intimate social relations of family and friendship close ranks and resist. This is done by intensifying interpersonal exchanges of information. By means of " idle chatter," informal oral communication becomes a means to combat state control over information, to find out " secrets," to go around the censors, to neutralize the bureaucratic forces of society, and to locate or procure scarce resources (material or social). Rumour and gossip are politicized, as the state tries alternately to censor, stigmatize or criminalize all channels of information which it cannot control—from letter-writing to telephone conversations to social clubs to any informal oral channels.

The sphere of official literate culture and its censorship closely parallels the *vertical* social hierarchy in socialist societies. Those at the higher levels are granted access to more reliable and more extensive informa-

[9] P. Lienhardt, " The Interpretation of Rumour, " in *Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in Memory of E. E. Evans-Pritchard*, by P. Lienhardt and J. Beattie (eds.), (OUP, Oxford, 1975), pp. 97–130.

[10] R. Firth, " Rumour in a Primitive Society, " in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 53, 1956, pp. 122–32. Reprinted in *Tikopia Ritual and Belief* (1967).

[11] E. Vogel, " From Friendship to Comradeship: the Change in Personal Relations in Communist China, " in *China Quarterly*, Vol. 21, 1966, pp. 46–60

tion, which in turn provides access to other resources. Via censorship the information is then allocated to various strata in this vertical hierarchy—to the Party apparatus, to specialists, to province officials and to the masses. In this way, the 100-page report on a miners' strike prepared for the Central Committee becomes five pages when it reaches the local Party organization, while the masses may learn of it only obliquely, in a newspaper article entitled " Improving Worker Discipline in the Coal Mining Sector." Hence, information is *dispensed* down the vertical hierarchy.

Yet information does not only flow vertically. In all East European societies there also exist horizontal " circles," i.e. social or occupational ghettoes of intellectuals, officials, technicians and Party functionaries. Shipler,[12] who coined this term with reference to the USSR, notes that such people often tend to work at the same places, live in the same buildings, eat at the same clubs, go to the same resorts, marry their children into the same families and have similar cultural interests. Like small communities everywhere, horizontal segments tend to thrive on exchange of information. Everyone may have secrets, and they may find it in their interest to be on guard, duplicitous or to practise the kind of posturing which Milosz termed " Ketman."[13] But horizontal segments are characterized by the constant desire to seek and *exchange* new information. Hence, where vertical relations carefully dispense information, horizontal relations guarantee that it diffuses widely. With the state's efforts to control information and society's constant demand for it, rumour takes on a new significance. It evolves from a *supplemental* system of communication (as we know it in the West) to a *parallel* communication network competing directly with the official media.

Rumour will be that much more important when the population views official media as irrelevant or ineffective. This is clearly the case in modern Romania.

Rumour in Romania

Romania represents an extreme case of the features cited above. It remains one of the poorest countries in the Eastern bloc. In recent years the living standard has stagnated and in some cases declined, leading to economic hardship, political tensions, and social alienation. All aspects of the polity, economy and culture are centralized and the population is given very little data with which to judge the validity of state decisions. There is a heavily censored press and an almost total lack of unofficial or dissident publications which could take up certain issues that are rumoured. (The only exception is the *samizdat* publication of the Transylvanian Magyars, *Counterpoints*, which is published in Hungarian and limits itself to aspects of the ethnic and cultural problems of this group). In its lack of informal written channels, Romania thus differs

[12] D. Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams* (Times Books, New York, 1984) pp. 208–23.
[13] C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, Vintage Books, New York, 1981. First publd. 1951.

from countries like Hungary, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, whose alternative press provides in principle a middle ground between formal written and informal oral communication.

As a result of lack of information and state mobilization, Romanians are confronted with a myriad of new laws, decrees, cutbacks and other measures which often come as a shock to the population. In what amounts to a wartime economy, where food and energy are severely rationed, a great deal of anxiety and competitiveness has arisen among people trying to procure life's necessities and secure a better future for their children. Nevertheless, the state has instilled a high degree of expectation and a hunger for information among the population. The anxiety, competitiveness, secrecy, capriciousness and unfulfilled expectations in a relatively literate population generate fertile ground for rumours.

The precise content of these rumours reflects some specific features of the Romanian political situation. Most notable is the overbearing presence and glorification of President Nicolae Ceausescu and his family. As the sole political actor on the Romanian stage, the only leading thinker in politics, economics, culture and philosophy, with his wife and son holding high Party positions while another daughter and son are active in the scientific arena, it is natural for the Ceausescus to become the focus of " royal-family " type rumours.

A second aspect providing a basis for rumours revolves around the fear of external enemies, particularly the Soviet Union and Hungary. Anxiety about Romanian national integrity is cultivated in several foreign policy moves by President Ceausescu, for it is defence of Romania's national autonomy that forms the basis for Party legitimacy and for Ceausescu's own prestige among the population (a prestige in rapid decline, however).

Third, there is the regime's general fear of foreign elements and the kinds of " ideological pollution " they may cause. Xenophobia and jingoism appear periodically in Romanian political and cultural life and reflect the political insecurity of the leadership. This has led to strict laws limiting contact between Romanians and foreign citizens and suspicion of any Romanian who establishes such contact. It has also produced veiled anti-semitic attacks in Romanian literary journals, campaigns against certain religious sects, and the dismissal of some officials and academics because of their interest in Transcendental Meditation, which was seen as a plot to take Romania out of the Warsaw Pact.[14]

Fourth, Romanians' continuing economic hardships have obvious influence on rumour content, generating cynicism and discontent about the ability of the state to provide the population with bread, meat, milk and vegetables, not to mention quality goods and services.

[14] See M. Shafir, " The Men of the Archangel Revisited: anti-Semitic Formations Among Communist Romania's Intellectuals, " in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 16, 1983, pp. 220–39; and " From Transcendental Meditation to the Repression of Intellectuals," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Romanian Situation Report, No. 9, 21 May 1982, pp. 2–5.

Given these kinds of factors, it is not altogether surprising that rumours appear which deal with the escapades of Nicu, Ceausescu's son, the Soviet sabotage of factories, the religious sects who kidnap children, celebrities who come into conflict with the regime, restaurants selling human meat, and Party secretaries who miraculously appear in factories, clinics and meat queues to identify wrongdoing and bring justice. All such rumours reflect the kinds of daily problems facing Romanians. However, we are still left with a problem of credibility. How is it that even the most discerning intellectuals can believe the most fantastic and unverifiable of rumours? Here we must bring in the value system as it accords with informal oral communication. The historical conflict between state and society in Romania, a conflict which in many ways has continued in the socialist period, has failed to produce intermediate institutions which can win the allegiance of the population. The official media are instruments of these institutions, and suspicion of the media is such that even were they directly to deny a rumour, it might only serve to confirm it.

The informal, family and kin networks are the ties that bind in Romania. Like Poland, Romania could be considered " a federation of families."[15] The expression of these informal relations lies in oral, interpersonal exchange at the face to face level. The normative value of these exchanges means that anything spoken about receives a higher degree of credibility simply because it is orally transmitted. Not only is anything in the newspapers suspect, but what is NOT in them MUST be true. Oral channels give rumour a kind of authority that transforms it into " news." Rumours are credible because they reflect the authenticity of the private sphere relations.

Rumour Diffusion

Not everyone is equally adept or interested in gathering or spreading rumours. Those most likely to play a key role are people who link the vertical classes or who connect horizontal segments. One category of rumour agents are those who travel from one location to another. Bauer and Gleicher[16] report the importance of truck drivers in the USSR's rural zones for spreading news in that country. Visiting officials are also important since they are in a position both to propagate and clear up rumours about reported accidents, food shortages, new decrees, etc.

Another rumour agent consists of people whose work takes them into a higher social class or different segment of society, e.g. maids, repairmen, waiters, chauffeurs for high officials, etc. These people may make contact with those whose information is more reliable. Their presence is not a threat to their superiors, so they may become privy to much information. This may be embellished and distorted as it is passed down the line and across horizontal segments.

[15] M. Vale (ed.), *Poland: The State of the Republic: Two Reports by the Experience and the Future Discussion Group (DiP)*, Pluto Press, London, 1981, p. 15.

[16] R. Bauer and D. Gleicher, " Word-of-mouth Communication in the Soviet Union," in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1953, pp. 297–310.

Finally, there are individuals whose occupation functions as an intersection for varying social categories—taxi-drivers, hairdressers, the doctor who treats both high officials as well as cousins and friends from the village. Subsequently, the information collected by these individuals can be transmitted by kin, friends or colleagues as they meet socially or stand in queues. In village Romania particularly, doctors and local officials who have contacts in the county seat and also make home visits are important links in rumour transmission.

In the cities, rumours easily filter down and across social segments. For example, a Bucharest intellectual first heard about the restaurant selling human meat from a writer, who himself had heard about it from a waitress in the Writers' Union canteen, " a woman without culture." The waitress had heard about it from a friend "in the branch"; the friend had attended some sort of meeting regarding the maintenance of health services in the food sector. I myself heard the story from an engineer in a Romanian provincial town and from the son of a Bucharest doctor. The doctor's son had friends who knew the pathologist called in to verify that it was a human liver which had poisoned a boy at the restaurant. Workplace and neighbourhood ties were also forums for transmitting big city rumours; e.g. the various stories of grizzly murders in Bucharest which circulate from time to time (in one such story a woman's body was found chopped up in 19 different pieces, strewn all over Bucharest).

The way in which rumours can cross large social gaps has itself created its own folklore. One story concerns a peasant who was hitch-hiking and was picked up by Nicu Ceausescu, son of Romania's President, in his red Jaguar. The peasant did not know who Nicu was, and proceeded to relate a story of a Hungarian minority demonstration in Harghita County, at Lake Saint Anna, in which Hungarian flags were flown and 6,000 Hungarians sang patriotic songs. Nicu took this information and told his father, who then disciplined those members of the Harghita County Security apparatus who had failed to inform their chief. This story reflects typical Romanian anxiety over a suspect minority group (the events of the demonstration are apparently true and led to several expulsions from among Cluj's polytechnic students). Yet it also reflects the limitations of information flow. Only by going outside the system—in a chance encounter between the son of the ruler and a simple peasant—is the ruler informed of what is going on.

A fourth channel of rumour transmission is the Western mass media itself, especially Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts daily to Romania, is not jammed, and is heard by many segments of the population. Radio Free Europe's material frequently consists of translating Western correspondents' news stories as published in the British, French, German or American press. Typically the correspondent has spent a few days in Romania and gathered some rumours from an embassy contact or a Bucharest intellectual. These will then be broadcast as rumours by Radio Free Europe, a curious situation whereby peasants in a remote mountain village may hear about miners throwing stones at Mr Ceausescu's

helicopter or mull over rumours about an aborted palace *coup* which occurred in Bucharest.

An additional factor in rumour transmission involves the motives of those who transmit them. For some people, rumours may be perceived as wholly untrue and may simply be an entertaining diversion. Yet sheer repetition and further embellishment may transform an entertaining story into " news." This may be the case with stories of Madame Ceausescu's plastic surgery and her presumed " stand-in," or tales about Ceausescu's negotiations with Indira Gandhi about repatriating Romania's Gypsies back to India.

Yet the career of a rumour is not solely dependent on its means of transmission. Just as important is the relation of rumour to other communication systems in Romania.

Rumours and the Official Literate Culture

The Romanian press is characterized by much formalized and ritualized content. It reprints effusive tributes to President Ceausescu, toasts by foreign dignitaries, diplomatic communiqués, and telegrams of well-wishing to and from world leaders and from the people to their President. Like most East European papers, the hard news is usually found in short notices of personnel changes, decrees of amnesties or wage increases, or notes at the bottom of the foreign news page. Given the cryptic nature of the Romanian press, people are forced to " read between the lines," assuming that minor changes in wording can have key significance. Other readers make more convoluted interpretations of what they read, especially as regards cultural and socio-political problems. As one Romanian explained, " if a film gets a bad review in *Scinteia* [the Party daily], then I will definitely go to see it."

The official literate culture in Romania is circumscribed by the dictates of censorship, both prescriptive and proscriptive. Authors and journalists censor themselves before they write. Editors, publication houses and Party watchdogs make further changes. Censorship offices were officially abolished in Romania in 1978. In fact, this only transferred more responsibility to editors and led to the placing of former censors and Party watchdogs directly on editorial boards.

In the oral sphere, censorship is not possible. The State's only sanction consists of intimidation and laws against rumour-mongering. In the late 1940s, those who voiced too much criticism of the regime (written or oral), who told too many political jokes or who listened to Western radio stations risked imprisonment. Romania's current shortage of political jokes—attributed to low morale among the population—has also been explained in terms of a renewed campaign against unauthorized oral expression.

Rumours in Romania are politically stigmatized. They represent a potential threat to the regime's control over communication. Those who spread or preoccupy themselves with rumour—even if only to prove them

false—are taking risks. A journalist who asked her editor for further information on a series of Bucharest murders was told to " stop hanging around with the type of people who spread these kinds of slanders." The journalist observed that, " it's safer to discuss rumours with a salesgirl than with colleagues. Who knows what they will think? "

Those who control Romania's mass media generally choose to ignore rumours rather than confirm or deny them. In exceptional cases, and for explicit reasons, they will try to counteract a report on Radio Free Europe: typically, an individual who RFE says is on a hunger strike for religious freedom is presented by the Romanian journalist as a parasite, criminal or religious fanatic. Sometimes rumours may be denied in a very indirect way. For example, in 1981, rumours circulated that Stefan Voitec, a long-time member of the Political-Executive Committee, had had a public argument with Ceausescu at a ceremony and was now in jail or psychiatric hospital. For two months Voitec had been absent from public view, which in Romania means being present at ceremonies and meetings in which Ceausescu officiates, or having his name mentioned as one of those who sent off or welcomed him at Bucharest's airport. Radio Free Europe began to carry commentary about Voitec, intimating that his career was finished. The same day, during a Ceausescu speech to Party cultural activists, Voitec was again seen sitting in his usual position behind the podium, next to Madame Ceausescu. During the President's speech, the camera focused on Voitec an inordinate number of times. The man had become somewhat thinner, but he was politically alive, nevertheless. The television's oblique presentation managed to convince most of those who had been affected by the rumour. A small minority insisted that Voitec was drugged or forced to appear on the podium or was replaced by a double. Meanwhile, those who had never heard the rumour remained ignorant of the controversy altogether.

Romania's prohibitions on any unauthorized publications and its cautious approach to rumours cause them to diffuse more widely. The rumour's " career " cannot be hindered as occurs in the West, where official spokesmen or enterprising journalists will seek to confirm or deny a controversial story. In Romania, the rumour only reinforces uncertainty and anxiety, giving rise to more anxiety, further embellishment of the rumour, and the diffusion of the most implausible tales. Romanians' faith in oral channels gives them a credibility which is often wholly undeserved. These improvisations are illustrated in the stories about Nadia Comaneci's wedding. She is alternatively viewed as a Hungarian, Gypsy, or Russian. According to these rumours, there was a fistfight between the friends of the groom (a soccer player) and the bodyguards of Nicu Ceausescu (rumoured to be a former suitor). These rumours have circulated for months. Yet Nadia recently told an American television interviewer in Los Angeles during the Olympics that she is not even married!

The relationship between rumours and the official media varies

according to social categories. Bauer and Gleicher[17] compared the way rumours function among Soviet peasants and urban intellectuals (their study was part of the Harvard project which interviewed hundreds of Soviet *émigrés* after the Second World War). Bauer and Gleicher found that for Russian peasants, rumour functioned as a *substitute* for other media. Peasants relied on word of mouth even for news which was readily available in the newspapers or radio. State campaigns in the village were also conducted via oral agitation, in accordance with the peasants' faith in the use of oral channels and to create more personal bonds between Party activists and the masses. Since the peasants were far from the centres of news and in a low position to verify it, they could become subject to the most implausible of rumours.

For the urban intellectuals, rumour served not so much as a substitute for the official media but as a *supplement and corrective*. By talking with people, the intellectuals could interpret what they had read in the papers. Ninety-five per cent of the intellectuals interviewed by Bauer and Gleicher found rumours to be more reliable than the press. This group included not just the anti-regime or marginal elements, whose confidence in unofficial channels would be expected, but also those who had held high career positions in the political, economic and cultural apparatus. These individuals sought to supplement the official, censored information channels by using informal word-of-mouth channels. In fact, they could not carry out their jobs without this supplementary source. In contrast to peasants, intellectuals were closer to the centre of news, more able to verify it, and were presumably less susceptible to implausible rumours.

The fact that those in high-level positions also had a faith in the utility of informal channels has implications for the way state organs influence society. It means that those in high positions will not hesitate to disseminate rumours, believing that they will diffuse more widely and have more credibility than any written document or official campaign. This is clearly the case in Romania, where rumour campaigns are launched concerning a Soviet threat, the activities of a Magyar-minority Fifth Column, or concerning dangerous religious sects like Adventists or Jehovah's Witnesses.

So far I have discussed rumours in terms of information content. Yet many rumours have a quite fantastic character which seems to overwhelm the otherwise critical faculties of Romania's urban intellectuals. Bauer and Gleicher assert that spreading such fantastic rumours constitutes a form of intellectual entertainment. Yet this explanation fails to link the nature of rumour with its actual content and the social processes involved. I believe that we can see rumours as expressions of societal anxieties and contradictions, which, given the nature of Romanian society, cannot be articulated in other forms. Even the most fantastic of rumours can also

[17] Op. cit.

serve (like jokes) to unite social categories which would otherwise remain separated. Rumours unite social classes and cross-cut horizontal segments. The suspicion, secrecy, competition and anxiety which characterize East European societies provides a stimulus for rumour transmission across wide social divides; hence, the journalist who finds it more comfortable to discuss rumours with a salesgirl than with colleagues. It is rumours which can unite the Party official with his chauffeur, the writer with the waitress, the journalist with the salesgirl. It is here that we can explain the wide appeal of rumours to all classes and categories of Romanian society, including the discerning intellectuals. Of course, some rumours will have more appeal and quite different functions than others. Hence, the remainder of this article discusses the varying types of rumours in Romania.

A Typology of Rumours

Fine and Roznow,[18] noting a study by Knapp[19] divide rumours into three distinct types:

1. *pipe-dreams*—rumours connected with wish-fulfilment;
2. *bogies*—rumours reflecting fear of the future, social anxiety, etc.;
3. *wedge-drivers*—rumours which seek to divide a community or find a common scapegoat.

In the Romanian context, pipe-dream rumours would include those dealing with the demise of an unpopular ruling family or revenge on an irresponsible ruler. They would also include " Robin Hood " type rumours describing peasant or worker uprisings, and " Good King " rumours in which Ceausescu or a high official surprises a wrongdoer and brings back justice in economic or social life. Bogey rumours would highlight the chaos and uncertainty of society—adulterated food, disappearing officials or celebrities, impending disasters, price-rises, cutbacks, invasions, *coups*, etc. Rumours about the exploits of Romania's organs of state security in acquiring knowledge about and treating Romanian citizens would also be treated in this category, as would stories about corrupt officials. Finally, wedge-driving rumours would be directed at minority groups (Jews, Gypsies, Magyars), at dissidents, religious sects and at the Soviets.

Fine and Roznow compare two studies which categorized rumours according to this typology: Knapp's 1942 study of 1,000 wartime rumours showed two-thirds to be wedge-drivers (anti-Black, anti-semitic); a sample of rumours collected in Biafra during the 1970 civil war, however, showed an overwhelming percentage of pipe-dream rumours. My sample of rumours, described in the present article, seems more difficult to categorize. Depending on one's political convictions, for example, a rumour that the Soviets are about to enter Romania and

[18] Ralph Roznow and Gary Fine, op. cit.
[19] R. Knapp, " A Psychology of Rumor, " in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 8, 1944, pp. 23–37.

replace Ceausescu could reflect wish-fulfilment, social anxiety or drive a wedge between supporters and opponents of the regime.

The nature of state-society relations in Eastern Europe and the place of rumour in the total communication system demands that two other indices be added to describe rumour content: *plausibility* and *point of origin*. On the " plausibility " index we could distinguish rumours which are " possible " from those which appear " fantastic." Firth[20] and Lienhardt[21] refer to these as " minor " and " major " rumours. There seems to be a fundamental difference between a rumour of a disaster or worker protest and a rumour stating that ex-King Michael has landed in Tirgu Mures in a helicopter. As for " point of origin " criteria, it would be useful to distinguish between rumours which appear to emanate from the population versus those which could arise with the help of the state (e.g. rumours of invasion or that a certain dissident is a Soviet agent).

It is my own impression that the number of fantastic rumours is increasing. This seems to accord with the increasing level of anxiety among the population, their uncertainty about the future, discontent with the Ceausescu regime, and state efforts to inhibit popular expression or even discussion of Romania's problems. Second, it should be noted that state-supported rumours can be just as fantastic as those which emerge spontaneously from the population. Rumours of Soviet invasions or Hungarian conspiracies to annex Transylvania, and of local Party secretaries who appear in several factories simultaneously and restore order, of religious fanatics who kidnap and even eat young children, all are as implausible as peasant tales of witches, evil spirits or restaurants selling human meat.

Pipe-dream Rumours—Ridiculing the " Royal Family "

A common East European rumour genre centres on the high political figures and their families. We might call these " royal-family rumours " as they resemble those we hear in the West. However, rumours about Romania's Ceausescus also reflect specific features of Romanian socialist society. First, they are *rumours*—not gossip—in that they are never mentioned, confirmed or denied in the Romanian media. Second, they generally tend to be negative, even vicious, reflecting the " pipe-dream " of seeing a royal family humiliated, brought down to earth or eliminated altogether. Third, they seem to concentrate much more on the immediate family of Nicolae Ceausescu than on Ceausescu himself. One could surmise that his legitimacy—while on the decline—is much more acceptable than that of his wife or son, who have no independent political experience. The fact that rumours about Romania's first family are never mentioned in the media only serves to prolong their existence. Given the strained relationship between the state media and society, official denial of a vicious rumour would likely have the reverse effect.

[20] R. Firth, op. cit.
[21] P. Lienhardt, op. cit.

Even within an East European context, Romania's royal-family rumours stand out as exceptional. This is due first to the total dominance and high visibility in the media of President Ceausescu, who makes public appearances or delivers major speeches continually. In this context, the appearance of any other celebrity—political or cultural—constitutes a destabilizing factor. In addition, Romania's royal-family rumours stand out because of the high public visibility of Ceausescu's wife Elena, who is First Deputy-Prime Minister, and son Nicu, who is head of the Party Youth Organization and mentioned as possible successor to his father. The cult of the Ceausescus is pervasive. A single issue of *Scinteia* may contain references to all three persons, plus occasionally reference to daughter Zoia (a mathematician) and son Valentin (an atomic physicist who represents Romania in certain international scientific and atomic energy forums). Despite their high visibility and their obvious power, no further information about them is available to the public.

The viciousness of the rumours and jokes about the Ceausescus clearly reflects the acute disappointment of Romanians in a leadership which has failed to " deliver the promised goods," which has continually pressed the population towards more and more sacrifice, which has appropriated the good life for its members (villas, cars, travel abroad) and which has unabashedly elevated its members far above their peasant roots. Jokes exist about their inability to speak correct Romanian or converse intelligently with foreign visitors. Jokes about Madame Ceausescu may emphasize her physical unattractiveness or insatiable or peculiar sexual appetite. Rumours frequently cite her hidden power over her husband. In Romanian folk motifs, this combination of ugliness, sex and power resembles the kind of talk one might hear about a *witch*. (One might look for parallel rumours concerning Magda Lupescu, the mistress of Romania's King Carol during the 1930s.) Other tales emphasize Madame Ceausescu's callousness and the way she suffers for it. One example (in many variants) tells how she (or her chauffeur) ran down a pedestrian (or collided with an ambulance) on the way to a meeting. Madame Ceausescu herself was said to be severely injured and taken to Paris (or Vienna) for plastic surgery. Still another variant describes brain surgery performed in Bucharest by Romania's famed neurosurgeon Dr Arsenie (said to be both crazy and a millionaire). Dr Arsenie is said to have insulted her on the operating table, or refused to come when she called him late at night.

The theme of insult, of competent people confronting and earning momentary victories over illegitimate authority, is also typical of many stories regarding Nicu Ceausescu, widely regarded as the playboy of the family. As a youth, Nicu was said to have been pulled off the street by an over-zealous policeman because of his long hair. He is thought to have had some influence in allowing for more Western and Romanian pop music. He (or at times brother Valentin) is said to have fallen in love with a daughter of Romania's ex-king Michael, whom he met while studying at Oxford; *Paris-Match* or *l'Humanité* is said to have taken a photograph of

the couple, which Romanian officials prevented from being published.

With his rise to power, however, Nicu's image lost its innocence. He is said to have his share of rumoured car accidents and smashed up restaurants. (In one alleged accident, he ran over a pedestrian on Calea Victoria while drunk-driving. 1979.) Several stories tell of violent altercations with well-known and well-respected Romanian celebrities. In the lobby of Bucharest's Intercontinental Hotel, for example, Nicu confronts actor Florin Persic and demands to go home with his girlfriend. Persic refuses; there follows an exchange of insults and a fight in which Persic succeeds in hitting Nicu before himself being pummelled by Nicu's bodyguards. In another he has an argument with the son of CC member Janos Fazekas over a woman, Donka Mizil. He beats up women and gets Fazekas' driver's licence taken from him. Rumours like this are difficult to verify. Sources have indicated to me that the two are friends and often go out together and that this could not have happened. Others say the opposite. It is interesting that Persic himself, during a performance in Cluj, actually made an ad lib remark about the incident. The audience howled, yet one could not tell whether he was making fun of the incident or playing on the rumours about it.

The theme of insult continues in other stories about Nicu. In another tale he confronts Ion Voicu, son of the director of the Bucharest philharmonic, and a Gypsy. Nicu demands that Voicu leave the restaurant, saying, " Son of a Gypsy, get out." Voicu is said to have responded, " Son of a cobbler, go home." Nicolae Ceausescu was originally a shoemaker's apprentice. In yet a third tale, Nicu has an altercation with Romania's cosmonaut, Dumitru Prunariu. Prunariu knocks Nicu to the ground and runs from the *Doinea* restaurant to the Soviet embassy, which is indeed nearby. Taking refuge in the embassy, he eventually leaves after receiving some kind of guarantee that he will not be harmed. Some weeks later, however, the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest has a heart attack and dies. The rumour behind his death is that the ambulance was purposely late responding to the Russians' call and had arranged an accident on the way to the hospital. This was Romania's retaliation for the Prunariu incident. Other versions have it that the ambassador died from a steam bath or simple heart attack.

The two most recent tales about Nicu refer to his irresponsibility. In one, Nicu is said to have lost 700,000 dollars at gambling tables in Las Vegas, Monte Carlo or Miami(?). In one variant he pays his debt with seven Lippezaner stallions from Romania's national stables. In another, his mother is forced to cover his debt from her private Swiss bank account. She is identified by a press photographer or journalist. Some say it is Richard Nixon who paid. In April 1984 a fresh rumour concerned Nicu's friendship with a Romanian foreign trade official stationed in the US, who supplied Nicu with cash ($400 per day) during his visit to the States. The official came under Romanian scrutiny but was protected by Nicu. He eventually embezzled money from the state and defected. Madame Ceausescu was so furious that she scolded her son for being a

good-for-nothing and a fool. Nicu got so angry that he assaulted her, forcing her to remain indoors for two weeks because of her bruises.

Rumours about Nicu's sister Zoia, a mathematician and head of her institute (the story of which is itself a subject of vicious tales), are more benign. The rumours concern her failed love affairs. She had an affair with a doctor from Cluj, and was found in a motel room in Suceava. He eventually left her. Zoia is now said to be living despondently in Paris, home of one of her ex-lovers. A house in central Bucharest, across from the Bucharest Hotel, has been prepared for her return, but this house is coveted by brother Nicu. She drives a Mercedes 280SE.

Royal-family rumours are easily the most embellished. They are beyond verification and are inherently interesting to all Romanians for both personal and political reasons. The " pipe-dream " aspect is that they depict a desire to see a family so filled with conflict that it will fall from power. Moreover, these rumours are not peasant rumours but originate with intellectuals from Bucharest and then spread to the provinces via human channels or Western radio broadcasts beamed back into Romania. When a peasant from the countryside can recite a conversation between Nicu Ceausescu and Florin Persic in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel, we have gone beyond the realm of rumour. We are talking of a folk narrative or legend. We are witnessing how folklore can become resurgent, with the help of modern-day media.

Royal-family rumours (of the wish-fulfilment type) are not the only kind of pipe-dream. Others concern what could be called " Robin Hood " tales, in which common people outwit the authorities, take from the rich and give to the poor, or assert their identities in the face of power holders. There are stories of peasants who stop Romanian trucks filled with meat destined for export and distribute the meat among the villagers. Perhaps these stories derive from truck accidents where meat is salvaged or pilfered. A Gypsy tale makes fun of border authorities: a Gypsy wanting to go abroad was so impatient that he left Romania at the border with Yugoslavia, visited 13 European countries, and returned home without a passport; when the security organs eventually decided to give him permission to leave, he told them it was unnecessary, since he had gone and already come back. This story has attained enough credibility in some areas for Gypsies to use it to intimidate local authorities into giving them a passport.

There exist numerous tales of consumer and worker resistance in Romania, not all of which are untrue. A much-discussed rumour tells of miners in the Jiu Valley, on strike in 1977, who threw stones at President Ceausescu's helicopter as it tried to land there in 1981. This was reported even in *The Times* (London, 4 Sept. 1981) and other Western papers.

All the pipe-dream rumours cited represent desired situations on the part of the population—the demise of a decadent royal family, the disciplining of the " foolish son," the overcoming of shortages, the establishment of popular control. Sensing this kind of anxiety, the state can also generate its own kind of pipe-dream rumours (which will be

discussed later). Pipe-dream rumours exemplify the expressive character of rumour as opposed to its informative function. As a Bucharest intellectual explained to me when I questioned the credibility of the rumour that miners had thrown stones at Ceausescu's helicopter: " It doesn't matter if it's not true. It should be."

Given the actual conditions in Romania and the popular desires as expressed above, one should expect a continuing stream of pipe-dream rumours.

Bogies—Anxiety Rumours

Bogie rumours are the most acute expressions of social anxiety and the least linked to actual news events. One form of anxiety emphasizes the capriciousness of the political order under Mr Ceausescu. Political figures are constantly being rotated to new posts or may disappear from the scene altogether. Anyone with a degree of celebrity in Romania will be the topic of rumours describing his or her downfall. Cornel Burtica, a recently demoted member of the Party elite, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cultural Affairs—and a presumed in-law of President Ceausescu—is said to have committed suicide after being discharged from his posts. The poet laureate of the regime, Adrian Paunescu, argued with Ceausescu over the latter's poetry. He was thought to be a victim of Ceausescu's antipathy when he was publicly insulted at a large gathering.[22] Peasants also mentioned the possibility of Paunescu taking an ambassadorial post in Canada. Dumitru Prunariu, who has not recently appeared in public, is now said to be of Russian descent, to have married a Russian, and to have sought to emigrate to the USSR.[23]

A typical case of political caprice is the case of Virgil Trofin, former head of Brasov County and Central Committee member. In September 1981 Trofin was dismissed as Minister of the Coal Mining Industry for allegedly falsifying production statistics, after which he was sent off to head a state farm in the Baragan plain. A year after his dismissal, he was reported to have committed suicide, been killed, or as one doctor's son insisted with 100 per cent certainty, to have died when he fell under a tractor (with his wife). Yet a year later, I spoke with a woman who claimed to have been told of someone on a train displaying an invitation from Mr and Mrs Virgil Trofin to attend their son's wedding. In mid-July 1984, after circulating for over two years, the rumour was belatedly confirmed when the daily newpaper *Romania Libera* printed a short notice of Trofin's death and funeral in its " Obituaries " column (the notice was submitted by his family). Reuters and Radio Free Europe subsequently commented on Trofin's stormy career, but the official Romanian media remained silent.

[22] A Turkish *provocateur* (?) was planted at Paunescu's Flacara presentations, at which he offered a friendly greeting in Turkish. When it was published, this greeting translated into a slander, intended to put Paunescu firmly back in his place.

[23] The only hard evidence for this comes from the fact that the original transmission from the space-capsule had astronaut Prunariu speaking the first few words of Romanian with a Russian accent. After that he spoke normally, however. In any event he has not been heard of since.

A host of bogey rumours involve Romania's strained relationship with the Soviet Union. Soviets are seen as one cause of Romania's economic problems. Soviet border guards, for example, are said purposely to halt Romanian food exports to that country so that the produce spoils. In 1974, a series of fires and explosions which occurred in factories in Brasov, Pitesti, Bucharest and Tirgoviste was explained as the result of Soviet sabotage. The factories presumably specialized in exporting goods to the West; the Soviets would have preferred to obtain the Romanian goods themselves. These explanations seem implausible, despite their wide currency even in American diplomatic circles. The Soviets could have caused much more damage by striking at Romania's oil refineries. Besides, rumours in Brasov spoke of poor safety conditions and worker discontent; slogans complaining of unpaid bonuses were found on factory walls after the fire.[24]

A similar subversion theory operates to explain a fire at Bucharest's national theatre which occurred the day before the Chinese premier was supposed to see a performance there. The safety curtain in the theatre failed to operate. The utility of the " Soviet subversion " theory is that it combines genuine anti-Russian sentiment with official state policies of asserting Romanian independence and attributing Romania's difficulties to evil outside forces. Exploiting Romanians' anti-Sovietism is one way for the state to deal with unpleasant rumours. The sudden death and secretive funeral of author Marin Preda provides a case in point. Preda was known for his literary independence *and* for the anti-Soviet tone of his historical novels. The original rumours of his death mentioned alcoholism and suicide, but suspicions were also focused on the Romanian or Soviet security services. It was then rumoured that Ceausescu himself had ordered an investigation to determine whether Preda had been killed by the KGB. In keeping with the delicate nature of Romanian–Soviet relations and the conspiratorial nature of the " Soviet subversion " theory, neither the investigation nor any of the above-mentioned disasters were mentioned in the press.

The Russian bogey may also be employed with respect to any social problems in Transylvania. These may be automatically attributed to subversion from Hungary, even to Hungarian efforts to re-annex Transylvania. In Romanian eyes, Hungary operates as a Soviet surrogate.

Rumours of impending Soviet invasions arise periodically, often spread by Romanian diplomats abroad. Yet such tales also attain a popular version, as in the following: a Soviet delegation, led by Brezhnev himself, came to Bucharest to force Ceausescu to knuckle under to certain Warsaw Pact decisions. When Ceausescu refused, KGB members of the delegation pulled their guns, whereupon the Romanian *Securitate* guards appeared from behind a curtain and shot it out with the Russians. Brezhnev returned home without his concessions.

[24] In Brasov, at Steagul Rosul truck plant, workers had painted on the wall: " Thieves, when do you give us our bonus? " 1974.

A 1983 rumour, reflecting the instability of Ceausescu's rule, concerns an officers' *coup*. Most Romanians would interpret this as a Soviet-inspired plot, however patriotic the officers' motives. Having been trained in the USSR, the officer corps is seen as Soviet-manipulated. In one version, the officers politely appeal to Ceausescu to change his policies, but the President presses a button and they disappear, never to be heard of again. In another version the officers, with guns drawn, actually reach Ceausescu's ante-chamber, but are repulsed and over-powered by bodyguards. This rumour was first mentioned in the French press and then repeated on Radio Free Europe more than a month after it supposedly occurred (December 1982). No one in Bucharest could add any more to the story except for a woman who maintained that " there were many funerals of army officers that week." Most Romanians cannot even imagine, much less discuss, the possibility of a Romania without Ceausescu. He has been in power since 1965, and his period of rule is now modestly hailed as the " Ceausescu Epoch." The rumour of a failed *coup* is perhaps one way of combining pipe-dreams about his demise, anxieties about the future (a Soviet-dominated Romania) and conscious recognition of his hold on power.

The anxiety of Romanians is not solely connected with hostile foreign powers, however. The country suffers from a myriad of internal problems, including many economic hardships which have served to increase the anxiety of the citizens in recent years (more piece-work, factory closings, price-rises, lowered state subsidies for health and education, emigration appeals and rationing of food).[25] The most recent crisis is the virtual halt to all abortions, a campaign which has had tragic consequences in some cases. The anxiety situation has led to several rumours reflecting the crisis nature of Romanian life. In 1983, a rumour arose that customers in the *Budapest* restaurant in Bucharest had been poisoned by eating human organs. The restaurant is not far from the city morgue. One variant of the story told of a morgue employee who sold organs to a knowing chef at the restaurant. In another variant, the chef unwittingly bought a human liver from a peasant, bypassing the state distribution system; a child was said to have been poisoned. Following this, similar " cannibalism " rumours in Pitesti and Tirgu Jiu involved adulteration of sausage dishes. The *Budapest* case was not mentioned in the Romanian press, of course, but was quite widespread.

The cannibalism rumour has several interesting elements. First, the food served is not simply adulterated or spoiled but converted into human form. Second, the rumour concerns not a food store but a restaurant. Third, it centres on a restaurant with a particular " cuisine " (which by Western standards does not vary much from standard Bucharest fare).

[25] One rumour maintained that 200 Bucharesti taxi-drivers, protesting their lay-offs due to the energy crisis and/or lowering of their commission, decided to turn in their papers to emigrate, since strikes are illegal. Going down to present their papers, they were told that this cannot be done in groups but must be done individually. According to various drivers, 20 per cent of them eventually went to prison, others left, but most were turned down.

Adulteration and spoilage of food is a common concern of most Romanians who buy from state shops. Many Romanians do not buy any sort of processed meat, and stories have circulated of peasants passing off dog meat as lamb. The *Budapest* rumour reflects some of the anxiety and uncertainty in Romanian society. People do not know what they are eating anymore. No one can be trusted. It is every man for himself in Romanian daily life: people are devouring each other to obtain scarce resources—food, housing, education, consumer goods, train tickets, places for their children in good schools, etc.

The rumour has its share of sly characters: the morgue worker, the peasant and the chef, who is also spoken of as simply " crazy " or vicious, purposely out to insult his customers.

The tale takes place in a restaurant rather than a shop. In today's Romania, where restaurant prices are high compared to wages, those in the restaurants represent an upper social category—high officials or those making extra money on the side, exploiting the system in some way. That such people are fooled into eating human flesh may be seen as a kind of revenge on the part of those circulating the rumour.

Finally, that this is the *Budapest* and not one of the other deluxe restaurants in the Romanian capital may have, in addition to its " bogey " character, a " wedge-driving " function. According to this interpretation—which I heard from Western diplomats and from Romanians interested in the functioning of the security organs—the " cannibalism " rumour was part of a state plot to restrict clandestine meetings of Hungarian dissidents, who supposedly used the *Budapest* as a meeting place. This interpretation seems to be as fantastic as the rumour itself. The *Budapest* was not closed down, and there has been no noticeable effect on the social and political activities of Romania's Magyar minority, which lives predominantly in Transylvania and not in Bucharest.

Cannibalism rumours have occurred periodically in Romania. They indicate a society whose level of anxiety and cynicism has reached a point where people believe that anything, even this, can happen. Such a rumour—with credibility among intellectuals and workers alike—could be one indication of the spiritual crisis into which Romania has sunk. Given such anxieties, it is understandable for people, and for the state, to seek scapegoats.

Wedge-driving—Rumours and State Control

State officials know the power of rumour even as they seek to control unauthorized rumour-mongering. Rumour campaigns which blame the Russians are one way in which the state tries to relieve some of the social anxiety in Romania. A more vicious form of state-sponsored " wedge-driving " focuses on undesirable religious sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentacostalists and Seventh-Day Adventists. In 1982, a Bucharest teenager accidentally died in an apartment; a youth whose parents were Jehovah's Witnesses was involved. The Party then ordered

school teachers in this district to call parents in for special meetings. At the meetings, parents were told that it was the Jehovah's Witnesses who had been responsible for the boy's death, and that they had special means to kidnap and brainwash young children. Indeed, the Witnesses had a small following in this neighbourhood of Bucharest, but Party officials later admitted to sceptical teachers that the Witnesses had no part in the killing or kidnapping of children. Nevertheless, the conferences produced minor hysteria among parents, and rumours spread well beyond Bucharest that the Witnesses were kidnapping and even sacrificing young children (note the obvious parallels with historically-familiar rumour spreads directed against other pariah groups—Jews and Gypsies—which tend to circulate in times of social crisis and political instability and are frequently manipulated by the powers that be). Near the town of Turda, a Cluj priest was murdered in 1981. He had often spoken out against the religious sects, and it was soon rumoured that a Jehovah's Witness had murdered him.

At the same time as the informal rumour campaign was occuring, Romania's mass media were conducting an " anti-mysticism " campaign. This campaign dramatically pictured the way in which children were ruined by religiously fanatic parents: kept out of school, forced to attend all-night religious rites, compelled to fast, denied medical treatment, etc. The combination of the meetings with parents, the rumour campaign and newspaper accounts did more to stigmatize the Witnesses than any purely official information campaign could have done.

The Power of Rumour—Image-Making Among Local Party Secretaries

The faith in informal channels which prevails among state functionaries is no better illustrated than in the use of such channels by county Party secretaries. Fluctuations in the post of First Secretary of the County Party Committee (Romania has 40 counties) are continuous and capricious. Often the new First Secretary comes from another part of the country or is sent out from Bucharest. Each county is plagued with similar problems: inadequate services, poor planning, shortages, inefficiency, consumer discontent, etc. Theoretically, first secretaries have the power to enter any enterprise or service outlet to make an inspection. They can suggest changes and replace personnel. Within their counties, they can function much as Nicolae Ceausescu does in Romania at large. However, they cannot publicize themselves or build a public image in the county press. There is only one political actor in Romania and that is Ceausescu himself. When appointed to a new county, the Secretary seeks to buy time among constituents to establish an image that " now things will really get done." Lacking the ability to manipulate the local press, they and their staff can resort to informal or unofficial channels. Generally this follows a pattern whereby the First Secretary travels incognito around the county, encounters chaos and indiscipline, takes dramatic measures to restore order and brings back justice. This illustrates state-manufactured pipe-

dreams. Let us describe three cases which are typical of what I have heard in Brasov, Cluj, Tulcea and other counties.

In one case, the newly-arrived Brasov County Party Secretary disguises himself as a worker and applies for a job in the tractor factory. He is told to wait in the office. The Secretary spends the day observing the foreman and others going in and out of the factory, playing cards, doing nothing. The Secretary wanders around the premises and sees further instances of sloth and indiscipline. At the end of the day the personnel director finally decides to see the prospective employee. The First Secretary reveals his identity and demands to see the factory director. When the director is confronted with the hard facts, he calls in his subordinates and castigates them for their indiscipline and promises that things will improve. In the sphere of retail services, the Party chief stands in a meat queue, waiting for chicken. When the butcher says he is out of chicken and that everyone should leave, the Secretary demands to examine the store. Finding hidden stocks of meat (destined to be sold on the black market or to special customers) the Secretary demands that the butcher give them to those in the queue and cover the costs himself. Health services are a third example: the local Secretary puts a false bandage around his wrist, enters a clinic and asks to be treated by a nurse. The nurse ignores him until he is forced to bribe her. When she finally finishes treating him, he reveals his identity. In one case the Party chief's name is written on his left wrist; in another he hands her his business card. In both stories, however, everyone in the clinic is fired. Unlike the " tales " in industrial enterprises, treatment of the service sector is harsher—there is no second chance.

The exploits of the new Party Secretary spread easily among residents of the town and via commuters to the outlying communities. The " visits, " never mentioned in the media, are publicized solely via interpersonal transmission. Gradually the rumours become more embellished and elaborated. The Party Secretary is suddenly in three places at once, " putting things in order. " Stories arise of his incognito visits even before he took over his post. The examples, while being spread by local officials to gain breathing space, seem to touch on a general motif in European and Oriental folklore generally, and Romanian folklore specifically: that of the righteous king who goes among his people in disguise and re-establishes justice. Like in the Harun al-Rashid folktales, the justice in Romania (here meant as " the proper state of affairs ") is produced not by the system but by the physical presence of the " ruler. " It is supposed to be a *benevolent* despotism. For the first months, the local Party Secretary puts a scare into the workers. Since no one knows what he actually looks like, he can be anywhere, like a mysterious force. Depending on the spread of the rumours and the population's level of suggestibility, the rumours create breathing space for the new leader until he actually *can* take concrete organizational measures to alleviate factory inefficiency or service bottlenecks. The problem in Romania, however, is that as a rule the inefficiencies and over-centralized plans preclude this,

which means that a high level of social tension remains in the population. Rumours about the " good king " thus revert back to rumours telling of " chaos," or wish-fulfilment type rumours highlighting forms of protest or ridicule of power-wielders.

In employing oral transmission to bolster their images, Party secretaries themselves may be only continuing something started earlier. It is rumoured (!) that Mr Ceausescu himself, before assuming power (1965), used to wander anonymously around markets and enterprises in disguise. It is not inconceivable that local Party secretaries, recalling these rumours, decide either to act them out, or what is more likely, to give the impression that they are also wandering among their people in disguise. What is important is not that local Party secretaries may actually have carried out incognito excursions like those described above, but that these stories are systematically replicated in county after county, throughout Romania. Hence, rumours which appear to be idiosyncratic may be systematically reproduced by specific socio-political conditions and by the nature of the communication–information system generally. These are conditions of popular aspirations, unfulfilled promises, unpredictability in political behaviour, uncertainty about the future, local inadequacy in meeting consumer demands, popular mistrust of the official media, and a strong confidence in the credibility of orally-transmitted information, reinforced by Western radio broadcasts.

Conclusion—Rumours and the Socialist State

The socialist states, which have established a high degree of control over written channels of communication and broadcast media, have been less successful in censoring informal communications, especially in the oral sphere: rumours cannot be stamped " secret." They can be manipulated or embellished, but they cannot be censored or confiscated. Rumours create a social interaction which is partly autonomous from the state. Within the societies of " really existing socialism," rumours constitute a transient form of liberation. To quote Lienhardt, " Rumours . . . are the voice of the mob before the mob gathers."[26]

The danger for the state lies in the way rumour encapsulates a vicarious collective consciousness. Even as the state may try to manipulate rumour channels, the rumour may take on a career of its own. A new kind of folklore can spread from intellectuals to peasants, from city to countryside, being transformed and embellished as it is perhaps picked up by a foreign correspondent and transmitted back to a Carpathian mountain village by radio stations located in Washington, London or Munich. In view of the acute problems faced by socialist societies in general and Romania in particular, given the way these societies not only ignore these problems but complicate them in the process, we can expect rumours to become more and more prominent in the future. Rumours will become the *folklore of socialism*. Just as we find similar types of jokes throughout

[26] P. Lienhardt, op. cit. p. 130.

Eastern Europe—" system jokes "—" system rumours " are replicated in all communist countries. Such " system rumours " resemble each other in content, in mode of transmission, in measures of plausibility and in their function, as pipe-dreams, anxiety reducing, wedge-driving, etc. In all communist countries, rumour has been elevated from an incidental channel of communication to a parallel one. A focus on " system rumours " can help us explain how what appears on first sight to be " improvised news " or reactions to anxiety are part of a political system characterized by political manipulation, and covert conflict between state and society.

Comparative Studies in Society and History

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Socialism in One Family

René de Flers

ALTHOUGH Romania, as a communist country within the Soviet sphere of influence, suffers from problems that are intrinsic to its social, political, and economic system and not solely attributable to the Ceausescu dynasty at its helm, the peculiar features of " personal totalitarianism " continue to attract the attention of observers. This sketch depicts the careers of the family protagonists.

The Godfather

On 22 March 1965, after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu took over command of the RCP; since then he has constructed for himself an image of infallibility and omnipotence. Stalin, Mao, and Tito may have served him as models, and he may be compared to Kim Il-song of North Korea, although Ceausescu himself would no doubt find any such comparison belittling. What foundation does this image have and how did Ceausescu go about constructing it?

Soon after his accession, Ceausescu did what all politicians do to establish and cement new authority: he brought his own followers into the Secretariat, expanded the number of those loyal to him on the Executive Committee, and sent packing older Party leaders who might have challenged him. In the communist system, tight control over the Party usually generates domination over government as well. Ceausescu wanted to be more than a chairman, he wanted direct authority over state affairs. Chivu Stoica as Chairman of the State Council lay in his way. Therefore, at the National Party Conference in December 1967, Ceausescu annexed his position and right away started to expand the power of the State Council at the expense of the Council of Ministers. It became clear that Ceausescu preferred the rank of a head of state to that of a head of government.

His ambitions meant he needed more support, and he started to place family members in top Party and government positions. As more people began to owe their position to Ceausescu's favour, so signs of dissent and resistance began to die out and Ceausescu's ambition of supremacy became reality by the end of the 1960s.

Ceausescu was born on 26 January 1918 in Scornicesti, in the county of Olt, as the third son in a large, poor, peasant family. At the age of 11, he wanted to learn the trade of a shoemaker and went to Pitesti as an apprentice to one Gabor, a well-known maker of fashion shoes for high society. Ceausescu did not stay for long and probably went on to Bucharest to join his elder sister Nicolina, who worked in a shoe factory. At the age of 15, in 1933, he joined the illegal Communist Youth

Organization, and in 1936 he joined the Communist Party. He was sent as secretary of the Communist Youth to Prahova county. On account of his illegal communist activities, he was arrested several times and spent most of the next few years in various prisons.

After the *coup d'état* on 23 August 1944, Ceausescu was released from the Tirgu Jiu internment camp, together with his mentor Gheorghiu-Dej. His credentials were well suited to rapid advancement. He was named Secretary of the Communist Youth Organization and elected an alternate member of the Central Committee at the first National Conference of the Communist Party in October 1945. After the communist assumption of power at the end of 1947 and the congress held in February 1948, when the Communists absorbed the Social Democratic Party, he was elected a full member of the Central Committee of the new Romanian Workers' Party. For a short time, until March 1950, he was a Deputy Minister of Agriculture; during this period he is said to have been in charge of the collectivization drive in the Oltenia and Dobruja regions, and his direct involvement is said to have been very ruthless. He was then promoted to Major-General and appointed Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, serving under the Soviet-trained General Emil Bodnaras. Later he became chief of the Higher Political Directorate and was promoted to Lieutenant-General and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces.

Ceausescu's rise in the Party began after the purge of Ana Pauker and her associates in May 1952, when he became the CC Secretary in charge of the Organizational Department, advancing to alternate member of the Politburo on 20 April 1954 and achieving full membership of the highest Party body at the second Party congress in December 1955, at the age of 37. His next advancement came in July 1957, after the removal of Iosif Chisinevschi from the Secretariat and the ouster of Miron Constantinescu from the Politburo. It became clear that, after Gheorghiu-Dej, he was the second man in the Party. At the 1960 Party congress he was re-elected to the Central Committee, the Secretariat, and the Politburo, and he became known as an advocate of greater independence in Romania's relations with other countries. He stressed this attitude in speeches at Brasov in June 1963, during the visit of a Soviet delegation headed by Podgorny, and at the crucial Central Committee plenum in April 1964.

The Ninth Party Congress in July 1965 (originally the Third Romanian Workers' Party Congress) was dominated by Ceausescu who, after Gheorghiu-Dej's death, was elected Secretary-General. He had the Party revert to its original name, the Romanian Communist Party, and renamed the People's Republic as the Socialist Republic of Romania. He also succeeded in pushing aside Gheorghe Apostol, Chivu Stoica, and, perhaps his most dangerous enemy, Alexandru Draghici.

There followed a period in which, in order to strengthen his power, Ceausescu created new bodies, making himself their head. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops, in which Romania did not take part, the Front of Socialist Unity was formed[1] and

[1] *Scinteia*, 20 Nov. 1968.

the Defence Council the following year,[2] with Ceausescu as chairman and " the supreme commander of the Romanian Army. " In the years that followed, Ceausescu projected himself as a world statesman, notably by frequent visits abroad, including to the West. While maintaining a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, his visit to China in 1971[3] was the cause of some tension in his relations with the Soviet Union.

Ceausescu reached the culmination of his ambitions in March 1974, when he was elected President of the Republic, the first president to hold, as the official picture duly showed, a sceptre as a symbol of his authority. The role made for administrative convenience, allowing him, for example, to preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers without holding the title of Prime Minister. It was rumoured that Emperor Hirohito of Japan had been the immediate cause of the change. He had refused to receive Ceausescu and his son Nicu with all the honours due to a governing head of state, so the first official visit was then postponed.[4] After Ceausescu had been made president, however, Emperor Hirohito received him and his son with all the necessary pomp.[5]

Mater Familias

She was born on 7 January 1919 (an official date made public only a few years ago, she may be older), the daughter of an innkeeper in Petresti. She joined the Party in 1937 before which nothing is known about her revolutionary activities, except that on 1 May 1939, during popular festivities, she was elected " queen " of the parade. It was on this occasion that Ceausescu met her.[6]

In the early 1960s she was reported to be secretary of the Party committee of the Bucharest Central Institute of Chemical Researches, and, when Ceausescu took over the Party leadership in March 1965, she was listed as the institute's director.[7] In December of the same year, she was elected a member of the newly-established National Council of Scientific Research, and in September 1966 she was awarded the Order of Scientific Merit First Class.

Since 1968 she has risen rapidly to political prominence. She frequently accompanies her husband on official visits abroad, and it was during the state visit to China in June 1971,[8] where she noticed how Mao's wife had her own position of real power in the state, that Elena's remarkable rise was given a Chinese fillip. In July 1971 she was elected a member of the Central Commission on Socio-Economic Forecasting, and in July 1972 she became a full member of the RCP CC. She was elected a

[2] *Buletinul Oficial*, No. 32, 14 March 1969.
[3] *Scinteia*, 1 to 10 June 1971.
[4] Ibid. 24 May 1972.
[5] Ibid. 5 to 10 April 1972.
[6] *Actuel*, No. 27, Jan. 1982.
[7] *Informatia Bucurestiului*, 21 June 1965.
[8] *Scinteia*, 1 to 10 June 1971.

member of the Executive Committee in June 1973, after being proposed by Emil Bodnaras. In November 1974, at the 11th Party Congress, she was made a member of the (renamed) political executive committee and in January 1977 became a member of the highest Party body, the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee. In March 1980, she was made First Deputy Prime Minister.[9]

Since March 1974 Elena Ceausescu has been a member of the Romanian Academy's Section for Chemical Sciences.[10] It is rumoured that, at the time when she wanted to receive her doctorate from the Bucharest Faculty of Chemistry, she met with strong opposition from the great Romanian chemist Costin D. Nenitescu, the dean of the faculty. She was forced instead to present her thesis to Cristofor Simionescu and Ioan Ursu at the University of Iasi, where she met with complete success. After her glorification, Professor Nicolae Tipei, at present living in the USA, sent her a letter, renouncing his academic title.[11]

The personality cult surrounding Ceausescu has expanded over the last few years to include his wife Elena, too. She now shares her husband's limelight, receives heads of foreign scientific or technical delegations, taking precedence on such occasions over any high officials in Romania. She now accompanies her husband on foreign trips and on his various internal tours as well. This year, her 65th birthday was marked by special ceremonies in which her career as a scientist and politician was stressed.[12] Articles of praise were published, glorifying her " more than 45 years of revolutionary activity " and her new scientific work on the " Stereo-specific Polymerization of Isoprene."

It is generally believed that Elena Ceausescu's celebrated competence in science is less than genuine. During her time as Director of the Central Institute of Chemical Research, she took the floor at several conferences and meetings but spoke on general matters. Whenever a specific theme arose, she would defer to " Comrade Engineer " X or Y, who then had to explain what had to be done. Elena Ceausescu is tough, pitiless, hard-headed, and has the reputation of paying no attention to other people's needs.

In a way, the case of Elena Ceausescu is the most striking. Her pictures are everywhere next to her husband's. He rarely leaves the country on official visits without her. During their last official trip to Poland in June 1984, the two Ceausescus were seen in officially-released pictures talking to Jaruzelski and Jablonski, with Romanian Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu nowhere in sight. Elena Ceausescu ranks third in the government but second in the Party leadership.

[9] Ibid. 30 March 1980.
[10] Ibid. 2 March 1974.
[11] *Actuel*, No. 27, Jan. 1982.
[12] See Romanian Situation Report/3, *Radio Free Europe Research*, 14 Feb. 1984, item 2.

The Son Also Rises

Nicu Ceausescu, born in 1950, has been First Secretary of the Communist Youth Union since December 1983, an office that automatically carries a government post as Minister of Youth.[13] Although only in his 30s, he became a full member of the Central Committee of the RCP in 1982 and also holds the highest civilian medal, the Order of Labour, First Class. His frequent visits abroad, either with or without his father, do not always arise from official duties as Chairman of the UN Consultative Committee for Youth; he also travels as his father's representative. He has been sent on several diplomatic missions abroad, and there is much speculation that he is being groomed to succeed his father. He is a graduate of the Bucharest Polytechnical Institute and has been known to refer to himself as " doctor " in scientific publications. He is reputed to be a playboy but this has not precluded his rise in the political hierarchy. His career has been meteoric.

The closing plenary session of the 13th Romanian Communist Party Congress in November 1984 opened with the altogether unsurprising announcement that Nicolae Ceausescu had been re-elected Secretary General in " full unanimity " by the delegates to the congress. Ceausescu then told the assembly that the newly elected Central Committee had elected the members of the Political Executive Committee, whose names, departing from past practice, he read to the congress himself.

The Family

Despite the fact that nepotism in the communist world is not such an uncommon factor and everywhere the Party leaders have given their family members privileged positions, Ceausescu is something special. Since taking over the leadership he has never made a secret of his familial favouritism. In addition to his wife Elena and son Nicu, other relatives were swiftly promoted to key state and Party positions. His brothers are strategically placed in the army, security, planning, agriculture, and even the mass media. There may be other in-laws and distant relatives who are still not known as such. For example, who is Gheorghe Ceausescu, listed since June 1984 as chairman of the Bucharest Legal Councillors? Who is Constantin Ceausescu, formerly a deputy minister and now head of the post, radio, and television directorate in the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications?

Six full members of the CC have been established as relatives of Nicolae Ceausescu, another is at the Central Auditing Commission; two more full members are also believed to be relatives. These nine are Ceausescu's wife Elena, who is the regime's number two figure; their son Nicu; Nicu's wife Poliana Cristescu; Nicolae Ceausescu's brothers General Ilie Ceausescu (the sole newcomer to the CC in this family

[13] Ibid. No. 1, 7 Jan. 1984, item 4, and *Scinteia*, 13 Dec. 1983.

group) and Ion Ceausescu (on the Central Auditing Commission); Elena's brother Gheorghe Petrescu; the Ceausescus' brother-in-law Vasile Barbulescu; and the two presumed brothers-in-law, Manea Manescu and Miu Dobrescu. Between them they hold a multitude of Party and state offices, and four of them (in addition to Nicolae Ceausescu) are also members of the new Political Executive Committee.

On balance, however, one should not over-value the familial aspect of communist rule in Romania. An oligarchy need not be bound by blood relations. In a sense, all those who play Ceausescu's authoritarian game are related.

Other Members of the Clan

The Adopted Son, Valentin Ceausescu. His date of birth is not known. (He was probably born around the end of the Second World War.) He is believed to be the child of Moldavian peasants, who during the drought period in 1946 in their region were unable to take care of him. At the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, several members of the Party adopted Moldavian children. In 1969, Valentin was a third-year student at the Imperial College of Science and Technology in London. In April 1972 he accompanied Professor Ioan Ursu, at that time Chairman of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy, on his visit to the European Centre for Nuclear Research at Geneva, and he was listed as a researcher with the Romanian Institute for Nuclear Physics.[14] Valentin is presently employed as a Scientific Secretary with the Romanian Institute of Nuclear Physics in Bucharest.

The Daughter, Zoia Elena Ceausescu. There is little information about Ceausescu's daughter. She graduated from the Bucharest School of Mathematics and Mechanics; she has a doctorate and is now director of the Mathematics Institute and a senior research associate with the National Institute for Scientific and Technological Advancement. With her brother, Valentin, she was awarded somewhat minor awards in May 1983. Valentin received the Order of Scientific Merit, Second Class, and she the Order of Labour, Second Class. Neither of them appears to hold any political office. Nicu is evidently the favourite son in this respect. Some recent reports suggest that both Zoia and Valentin may, however, be gaining ground in the politics of science. Valentin was in Britain on a scientific visit and had talks with Malcolm Rifkind, Minister of State in the Foreign Office.[15] Zoia was recently chairman of the international conference on the Theory of Mathematics Operators in Bucharest.[16]

The Oldest Brother, Marin Ceausescu. Born in 1945, he is a trade councillor with the Romanian embassy in Vienna. In September 1972 he

[14] *Scinteia*, 28 April 1972.
[15] Radio Bucharest, 16 June 1984.
[16] *Scinteia*. 16 June 1984.

was listed for the first time as the director of the Romanian stand at the 14th Brno International Engineering Fair and was then moved to Vienna as chief of the Romanian Trade Agency in April 1974.

Ilie Ceausescu, a Brother and Military Historian. He graduated in August 1964 from the Bucharest Faculty of History and in August 1969 was listed as a Doctor of History. In July 1975 he was referred to as Major-General and Deputy Secretary of the Higher Political Council at the Ministry of National Defence in charge of the Party organization there. In March 1980 he was elected Vice Chairman of the Grand National Assembly's Defence Commission, and two years later he was promoted to Lieutenant General. In April 1983 he was appointed Deputy Minister of National Defence and Secretary of the Higher Political Council. In November 1984, he was elected a full member of the Central Committee. He is a prolific author of articles and books on Romanian history.

Another Brother, Ion Ceausescu. He has been the First Vice Chairman (with the rank of a Minister Secretary) of the State Planning Commission since 1983. In September 1967 he was identified as an agronomist and director of the Institute for Utilization and Industrialization of Vegetables, Fruits and Potatoes. By August 1969 he had already been appointed Secretary-General at the Ministry for Domestic Trade, holding the chief position in the Department for the Industrialization of Vegetable and Fruit Growing. In November 1969 he was moved to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as Secretary-General, and in May 1972 he was appointed Deputy Minister at the (renamed) Ministry of Agriculture, Food Industry, and Water Conservation. He is also in the Central Auditing Commission of the Party. It is said that before he became known as an official he had been working at a farm owned by the Central Committee on the former royal estate near Bucharest. The head of the farm was a man named Enciu, who became Ion Ceausescu's father-in-law.

A Brother with a Middle Name, Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu. He had to adopt his father's name, Andruta, in order to distinguish himself from the chief of the clan. In the early days of the family rise he is believed to have been an officer with the security forces but was mentioned in the Romanian press in April 1972 as being a consul with the Romanian General Consulate in Kiev. He has now been promoted from Major-General to Lieutenant-General in the Ministry of the Interior. *Le Monde* (1 March 1984) identified him as rector of the Academy of the Ministry of the Interior.

A Brother and Journalist, Florea Ceausescu. He has never been more than a correspondent of *Scinteia*, the Party daily.

A Sister, Elena Barbulescu. She is a school inspector in Olt County. Formerly she taught history at a high school in Scornicesti, where she was the headmistress.

Vasile Barbulescu is from Scornicesti and the husband of Ceausescu's sister Elena. He was referred to for the first time in January 1960 as chairman of the Scornicesti agricultural production complex. Later, he was listed as head of Scornicesti local Party committee. Little is known about him or his education. Nevertheless, in November 1974, at the 11th Party Congress, he came to political prominence, being elected an alternate member in the Central Committee and achieving full membership in November 1979. He is a Hero of Socialist Labour[17] and Chairman of the Scornicesti Unified Council of Agricultural Cooperatives.[18] In March 1980, he was elected Vice Chairman of the Grand National Assembly's Commission for Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Administration, and in February 1981 he was made a Vice Chairman of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives. He was re-elected to the Central Committee in November 1984.

Maria Manescu, Another Sister? Married to Manea Manescu, Maria became known in December 1973 as a Vice Chairman of the Romanian Red Cross Society and has been a member of the National Council of Women since April 1978.

There is no evidence that Maria Manescu is indeed Ceausescu's sister. Michel P. Hamelet, in his book on Nicolae Ceausescu, published in Paris in 1971, states that a sister Maria, who was a long-time worker at an electromagnetic factory in Bucharest, is married to an engineer. Therefore, both Maria and Manea Manescu's belonging to the Ceausescu clan is doubtful in spite of persistent speculations to this effect.

Manea Manescu himself was born on 9 August 1916 in Braila. His father was a Party veteran from Ploiesti, who in the early 1920s supported the transformation of the Socialist Party into the Communist Party. It is rather strange that he has now been brought back into the limelight, since he had already retired. In 1944, after the *coup d'état*, he worked together with Ceausescu in the Communist Youth Union. In 1951 he was appointed head of the Department of Economics at Bucharest University and Director General of the Central Directorate of Statistics; he became a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy in 1955 and held the office of Minister of Finance from 1955 to 1957. He came to greater prominence in the year that Ceausescu took over the Party leadership. In July 1965, at the Ninth Party Congress, he was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee and a Secretary of the Central Committee and most probably was put in charge of economic activities; in

[17] *Romania Libera*, 29 July 1978.
[18] *Scinteia*, 1 May 1982.

December 1967 he was appointed Chairman of the Economic Council. He was promoted to full membership of the Executive Committee in December 1968 and, after holding various positions in the Party and government, in March 1973 became Prime Minister until 1979, when he had to retire because of ill health. At present he is Vice Chairman of the State Council and Vice Chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development. In his capacity as a member of the State Council, he went on several trips abroad. He is presumed to be Ceausescu's brother-in-law. He was re-elected to the Central Committee in November 1984.

Gheorghe Petrescu, brother of Ceausescu's wife Elena and presently a Deputy Prime Minister, was first mentioned in the Romanian press in February 1957 as a deputy for the Dragasani-Olt constituency. Since then his career has advanced handsomely. At the Ninth Party Congress in July 1965, he was elected a member of the Central Auditing Committee. In August of the same year, he was mentioned as a section chief of the Central Committee and identified a year later as chief of the Party organization section.[19] He was made a full member of the Central Committee in April 1967. When the Oltenia region needed a new First Secretary he was given the job in September 1967.[20] In 1968 Ceausescu reorganized the administrative division of the country and Gheorghe Petrescu became head of Dolj County and chairman of the county's people's council.[21] In February 1971 Petrescu became Chairman of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, but two years later he inexplicably moved back to First Secretary of Dolj County. His next position was that of State Secretary with the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry in January 1977. A couple of years later, he was upgraded, becoming State Secretary with the Ministry of the Machine Tool Industry, Electrical Engineering, and Electronics.[22] For a short time he was Romania's standing representative with the CMEA in Moscow. In November 1984 he was re-elected to the Central Committee.

Poliana Cristescu, Chairman of the Pioneers' National Council, is a recent newcomer to the clan. People say she is the wife of " Crown Prince " Nicu Ceausescu. Her sudden rise and importance has not been overlooked. She was reported in January 1982 to be Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Union and in December of the same year she was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. She praised Nicolae Ceausescu in an article published by the weekly *Flacara* in February 1983 and a couple of months later was made Chairman of the Young Pioneers' National Council.[23] She visited

[19] Ibid. 9 Sept. 1966.
[20] Ibid. 26 Sept. 1967.
[21] Ibid. 18 Feb. 1968.
[22] Ibid. 26 Jan. 1977.
[23] Ibid. 21 May 1983.

China and North Korea in October 1983 on behalf of the pioneers. In the same capacity she subsequently visited Tunisia and Egypt.[24] No official statements about her marital status have been noted. She was re-elected a member of the Central Committee in November 1984.

Ilie Verdet is another Ceausescu man who is rumoured to be related to him, but no confirmation or even circumstantial evidence can be found. He is a CC Secretary in charge of the economy.

Cornel Burtica is said to be one of Ceausescu's nephews, but the relationship cannot be validated. He fell from favour in the autumn of 1982, after having been Minister of Foreign Trade since 1978 and having held other important positions in the Party.

Ion Ionita is also alleged to be a nephew of Ceausescu. The impressive progress of his career culminated with his appointment as Minister of the Armed Forces (later renamed Minister of National Defence) in 1966. He was, however, relieved from this position in June 1976.

Miu Dobrescu is also presumed to be a brother-in-law of Ceausescu. He was elected to the Central Committee in November 1984.

[24] Ibid. 1 and 4 Oct. 1983.

Miron Constantinescu or the Impossible Heresy

Vladimir Tismaneanu

THE history of communist elites is an exercise which involves more than a merely scholastic approach. The enduring struggle for power, the competition of rival clans, the triumph of a certain group over its irreconcilable enemies, cannot be understood unless one develops a comprehensive framework, a synthesis of psychological insights and sociological assumptions. It is all the more important to underscore this methodological imperative since institutional-official hagiography in communist countries aims precisely to obfuscate the human, subjective, individual dimension of contemporary history. The purification of memory is a part of the Orwellian universe, as is the glorification of present leaders, always presumed to have been the advocates of truth and justice. Eleven years after Miron Constantinescu's death in 1974, he seems to have become a non-person in Romanian history, and this despite his unswerving loyalty to the present General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. The once acclaimed official "social scientist" of the Party, the man whose name was ruthlessly slandered under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901–1965) and who was obviously indebted for his rehabilitation to Nicolae Ceausescu, the ambitious historian and sociologist, Constantinescu joined the gallery of prominent militants doomed to oblivion. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu and Iosif Chisinevschi, Iosif Ranghet and Alexandru Moghioros, not to mention many other names, are conspicuously absent from the current Party history.

To write about Miron Constantinescu is to ponder the destiny of Romanian Stalinism, its contradictions and tortuous evolution. Together with Lucretiu Patrascanu and Grigore Preoteasa, Miron Constantinescu was among the very few genuine intellectuals tolerated as members of the ruling nucleus of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Each of them had to pay tribute to the proletarian group dominated by Gheorghiu-Dej, and each of them was faced, sooner or later, with difficult choices and unbearable dilemmas. It was Patrascanu's tragedy to provoke, at the climax of the anti-Titoist campaign, the hostility of all members of the Romanian Politburo who experienced a painful inferiority complex towards the architect of the Party's strategy. The anti-intellectual obsessions of the once marginal militants grouped around Dej found their counterpart in Ana Pauker's mistrust for the "national proclivities" allegedly encouraged by Patrascanu.[1]

[1] Among the basic texts on the history of Romanian communism are: Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Romania, 1944–1962* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1964); Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Romania: From People's Democracy to Socalist Republic* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1967); Trond

One has to state that from the very outset Miron Constantinescu's presence in the leading team of Romanian communism engendered a long-lasting and painstaking distortion of his creative personality. Particularly under Gheorghiu-Dej, but also later on after his political "resurrection," the once promising sociologist had to thwart his intellectual temptations, and strive for survival by putting up with the language and practices of the Stalinist oligarchy. Without idealizing his intellectual stature or his moral commitment—Miron Constantinescu never adjured his Leninist credo—one feels compelled to emphasize the political torments and personal tragedies in his career as a Marxist militant whose background and willingness seemed to indicate, especially after the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, a possible alternative to the ossified Stalinists represented by Gheorghiu-Dej. His continual humiliation, first under Dej's rule, then, after 1965, during the period of his political revival, clearly expresses the hostility and apprehension of the RCP elite with regard to any intellectual personality. No expression of doubt was permitted by the Romanian hard-liners, no hesitation was forgiven, no self-critical interrogation was accepted. The RCP has never reneged on its Stalinist tradition, has never embarked on an *aggiornamento*. It would not tolerate a dialogue with those Marxist doctrinaires whom Antonio Gramsci once called "organic intellectuals of the proletariat."

BORN in 1917, Miron Constantinescu was introduced early to the literary and cultural-philosophical works of Romanian intellectuals from Transylvania. During his high-school years in Arad he began to study the works of Simion Barnutiu, Octavian Goga, Lucian Blaga and Aron Cotrus. His passion for history, and in particular his interest in Transylvanian cultural history, was enhanced during the years he spent as a student at Bucharest University, in that tumultuous time. As a student in the Faculty of Philosophy, Miron Constantinescu had the chance to become acquainted with the works of such distinguished philosophers as P. P. Negulescu, Mircea Florian and Tudor Vianu, who were his professors, but above all to discover the universe of *sociologia militans* as defined and promoted by the founder of the Bucharest Monographic School, Dimitrie Gusti. Whatever his merits in the elaboration of an original social philosophy, Gusti was primarily an extraordinary teacher, able to generate an atmosphere of enthusiasm and intellectual curiosity. The Sociology Seminar, assiduously attended by the young Miron Constantinescu, was dominated by such top-ranking individuals as H. H.

Gilberg, "The Communist Party of Romania" in Stephen Fischer-Galati (ed.), *The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979); Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development* (University of California Press, Berkeley, Ca., 1971); Robert R. King, *A History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Ca., 1980); also the contributions of François Fejtö and Georges Haupt, particularly the latter's analyses of the Romanian–Soviet conflict. With regard to Patrascanu, his basic works include: Lucretiu D. Patrascanu, *Sous trois dictatures* (J. Vitiano, Paris, 1946); *Curente si tendinte in filosofia româneasca* ("Currents and Trends in Romanian Philosophy") (Editura politica, Bucuresti, 1971).

Stahl, Traian Herseni and Mircea Vulcanescu.[2] The main topics debated by the students in sociology were dictated by the basic objectives of the Bucharest School: to set up a genuine institutional framework for social reform, to eradicate flagrant injustice and rural backwardness. What could have been more appealing to the minds and hearts of young altruistic intellectuals than this call to national regeneration, this invitation to devotion and solidarity? In an epoch imbued with irrational drives the message of the Bucharest School consisted of a generous affirmation of humanism, decency and reason. Although ideological divergences existed among the members of the Bucharest School, their controversies were couched in terms of mutual respect and professional cooperation. This was also true in the Faculty of Philosophy, where professors with incompatible political views coexisted in harmony: Nae Ionescu and Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Mircea Eliade and H. H. Stahl, Traian Herseni and Mihail Ralea, to name just a few examples.

Miron Constantinescu asserted that he joined the RCP in 1932, but he probably became a member of the illegal Union of Communist Youth only in 1933, rapidly becoming a prominent leader of its intellectual core. The Nazi take-over in Germany, the Great Depression and its consequences, not only for the working class, but also for the so-called "intellectual proletariat"—a significant social category in under-developed countries—the ominous powerlessness of "historical parties" (National-Peasant and National-Liberal) to put an end to the terror of the Iron Guard, determined the adherence of some young Russian intellectuals to the RCP. For Miron Constantinescu, as well as for Miron Radu Paraschivescu, Gellu Naum, Aurel Baranga, Tudor Bugnariu, Gheorghe Radulescu, Alexandru Birladeanu, Corneliu Manescu, Mihail Dragomierscu et al, the Left, and particularly the communist Left, was the sole repository of hope, the only alternative to what they perceived as the collapse of the "bourgeois democracies."

In 1936, accused by KIM (Communist International of Youth) of having been infiltrated by agents of the "bourgeois Sigurantsa" (the political police), the Romanian Communist Youth organization was dissolved. What followed was a mini-purge, a rehearsal for future similar exorcizing rituals: specially appointed Party commissions had to check each member's loyalty and subsequently recommended either his

[2] One should point out the extraordinary vitality and intellectual longevity of the exponents of the Bucharest School. Those who survived the Stalinist "cultural revolution" were able to benefit from the politics of "reconsideration of spiritual heritage," after 1960. Mircea Vulcanescu and Anton Golopentia succumbed to the Stalinist terror, Dimitrie Gusti died in anonymous poverty in the early 1950s, Traian Herseni was imprisoned for some years, and H. H. Stahl kept a low profile as a professor at the Bucharest School for Social Workers. Together with Mihail Ralea, Traian Herseni is co-author of: *Sociology of Success* and *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Reinstated as a professor at the University of Bucharest, H. H. Stahl published an impressive number of volumes on such topics as: the methodology of social sciences, the sociology of Romanian village communities, and studies of Oriental despotism and the Romanian Principalities. One of his latest books, a polemic with Lucian Blaga's *Kulturphilosophie* and Mircea Eliade's interpretation of Romanian popular culture and myths, engendered a revival of interest in Stahl's previous works: Henri H. Stahl, *Eseuri critice despre cultura populara românească* (Editura Minerva, Bucuresti, 1983).

automatic integration into the RCP, or his expulsion (which amounted to an indirect moral assassination). Miron Constantinescu succeeded in surviving this first Stalinist test of his career. The purge even paid off in his case, since he was upgraded and charged with the surveillance of political activities among students. Though Gheorghe Radulescu was officially the President of the crypto-communist Democratic Student Front, it was indeed Miron Constantinescu who inspired the various demonstrations, anaemic as they were, of this organization. A peripheral segment of the Romanian youth movement, the Democratic Student Front, was particularly instrumental in supporting campaigns on behalf of political prisoners and solidarity with Republican Spain. It never managed to attain a mass appeal and its propaganda was sterile, since it shared the basic Cominternist illusions of the Communist Party's ideological machine.

THE failure of RCP leaders to influence significantly the Romanian youth, due above all to their pro-Soviet stance and to a lack of national conscience, did not prevent Miron Constantinescu from gradually rising to prominence. In 1939 he was put in charge of the reorganization of the Communist Youth. This was an outstanding position within the leading group of the RCP and a stepping-stone for future promotions. But Romanian historians currently attribute to Nicolae Ceausescu pre-eminence in the group which undertook the re-establishment of the institutional structure of the Communist Youth. One cannot help remembering that famous plenum of the CC of the Romanian Workers' Party, in November-December 1961, after the second de-Stalinization campaign launched by Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Welcomed by Gheorghiu-Dej as an opportunity for the long-awaited settlement of accounts, the plenum provided the opportunity for the future General Secretary to dismiss Miron Constantinescu's doctrinaire pretensions. It was an occasion for Miron Constantinescu's vilification by his former comrades. He was pilloried for the mortal sin of having devoted a vacation before the war to reading Marx's *Das Kapital—in a convent!* It was Miron Constantinescu's error to have taken the possibility of a dialogue with his comrades seriously. It was his illusion that one can have genuine debates at the summit of the communist hierarchy. He was caught in an impossible dilemma; in Isaac Deutscher's terms, neither heretic nor renegade.[3] He should have known who his comrades were: after the first Moscow show trial in 1936, his close friend, Lucien Goldmann, the future French critical Marxist, author of *Le Dieu caché* and exponent of genetic structuralism, was expelled from the RCP, accused of Trotskyism. His guilt was that he dared to question the veracity of the charges and the trustworthiness of the "confessions." In his own way, Goldmann was a "humanist Marxist" *avant la lettre*, but he did not find an audience among

[3] See Isaac Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades* (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and New York, 1969).

the intransigent Stalinists who constituted the intellectual contingent of the RCP. When the Great Purge reached its climax in the Soviet Union, counting among its victims some of the historical leaders of Romanian communism (Marcel Pauker-Luximin, Elena Filipovici, David Fabian, Eugen Rozvany, Imre Aladar, Gelber Moscovici, Timotei Marin, et al), Miron Constantinescu preferred to avoid any criticism or expression of doubt. He was a disciplined Leninist intellectual, totally dedicated to the "revolutionary cause," and he was not ready for what he considered "destructive self-flagellations." He had read Georg Lukács's *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, that encyclopaedia of dialectical sophistry, and was convinced that "historical reason" has its own secret logic. Like so many other communists, he identified the interests of the Soviet *nomenklatura* with the "sense of history." He had at his disposal all the information necessary to form a lucid image of the degeneracy of Soviet bureaucracy and of the Comintern, but, blinded by that frantic teleology so characteristic of the Stalinist mind, Miron Constantinescu discarded all his doubts and suspicions, relishing the emotional comfort provided by the solidarity of the communist microcosm.

There was a permanent tension between Constantinescu's scholarly commitment and the political activities which he developed during the pre-war years. He then took part in the sociological investigations of the Gusti School in Banat and Transylvania and began to gather information for further theoretical elaborations. At the same time, he was publishing propagandistic texts in the communist or crypto-communist press, in the magazines *Era Noua*, *Reporter*, *Cadran* and *Cuvintul Liber*. Their partisan content notwithstanding, these essays display a vigorous intellectual concerned with empirical data and not just with Party dogma.[4]

Arrested for communist activity and imprisoned in Lugoj and Caransebes, Miron Constantinescu spent the war years in the Tirgu-Jiu camp. Throughout this period, along with Athanasie Joja and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, he was assigned the role of intellectual within the group dominated by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Educated to obey, he avoided running foul of the innumerable intrigues and plots which devoured the communist collective. Always distant and apparently cool, Miron Constantinescu became one of the closest associates of the future General Secretary of the RCP and supported Dej's efforts to undermine the authority of Stefan Foris, the Hungarian, Comintern-appointed, leader of the Party on the eve of the war. The relationship between Miron Constantinescu and Gheorghiu-Dej, always contradictory and complicated, was influenced by the proverbial vanity of the former, as well as by Dej's distrust of "dithering intellectuals." Potential discord was aggravated by Miron Constantinescu's personal attachment to Ana Pauker, whom he in all sincerity considered the archetype of "revolutionary purity." Later on, particularly after 1954, Miron

[4] See Miron Constantinescu's *Foreword* to his volume *Cercetari sociologice. 1938–1971* (Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, Bucuresti, 1971), p. viii.

Constantinescu became more and more susceptible to Iosif Chisinevschi's flattering remarks. Unlike Chisinevschi (Iosif Roitman), Mirion Constantinescu was not an innate conspirator. He had not attended the classes of the "Leninist School" in Moscow and thus was not properly trained for the internecine struggles within the communist oligarchy.[5]

ON 23 August 1944, Miron Constantinescu became the youngest member of the provisional Politburo of the RCP. Extremely dynamic, a polemical temperament *par excellence*, uninhibited by democratic scruples, he acted as one of the main propagandists of a political formation bereft of national tradition and desperately looking for a simulacrum of legitimacy. As chief editor of the communist newspaper *Scinteia*, Miron Constantinescu contributed decisively to the genesis and consolidation of a compulsory mythology whose basic purpose was to expropriate national memory and to propagate figments about the "liberatory" role of the Red Army and the "heroic" history of the RCP. Supporting the ideological strategy of the RCP with the whole weight of his intellectual prestige, Miron Constantinescu began to project himself on a national scale, seduced by his own purported grandeur. Under these circumstances, he also gradually accumulated a number of frustrations which exploded in the wake of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. He could not resign himself to a merely subordinate position, nor could he acquiesce in the everlasting glorification of Gheorgiu-Dej. He had been too involved in the internal Party struggles, in those obscure manouevres which decided Lucretiu Patrascanu's fate and precipitated Ana Pauker's downfall. Anything but naive, Miron Constantinescu was among the most knowledgeable leaders of the RCP, well initiated into the methodology of terror and deception: his career was suffused with adroit twists and turns, his survival had been guaranteed by an inordinate capacity for neutralizing his enemies. He had a talent for posturing, the ability to capture the confidence of intellectuals who were always befuddled by this strange blend of Stalinist radicalism and Hegelian-Marxist sophistication. Unlike Leonte Rautu (Leon Oigenstein), who strove to become the Romanian Zhdanov, Miron Constantinescu had only contempt for the nihilistic zeal of the neophytes. Far from being a Lukács, he also refused to be a Revai (the former philosopher whose basic "achievement" as Stalinst cultural dictator in Hungary under Rakosi had been the asphyxiation of spiritual life and the crippling of art and literature).

AT the National Conference of the RCP in October 1945, Miron Constantinescu became a full member of the new Politburo. At the

[5] There is a tendency to interpret the evolution of Romanian communism in terms of the *émigrés* vs. the "internal" Party, Ana Pauker vs. Dej, while the truth is that both factions nourished similar feelings for Stalin, and Dej's second-in-command, Iosif Chisinevschi, was far from favouring any "national" heresy whatsoever.

"reunification" Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in February 1948, he presented the Report of the Central Committee with regard to the new Party rules and was reconfirmed as a member of the supreme board of the Party. It is important to note that he became a secretary of the Central Committee only after 1952, i.e. after the denunciation of the so-called "rightest deviation" in the RCP, represented by the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu group. Nevertheless, his appearance at the Congress in February 1948 granted him a high profile in the elite of Romanian communism, since his responsibilities at that time included the Party organizational work.[6] Minister for Mines and Oil from 1948-1949, then President of the newly-formed State Planning Committee, Miron Constantinescu became one of the main architects of the economic policy of the communist regime, cooperating closely with Soviet advisors, setting up the notorious *Sovroms*, the "mixed societies" which represented the basic form of Soviet economic exploitation of the Romanian economy. His articles in *For a Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy*, the Cominform organ transferred from Belgrade to Bucharest after the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948, indicated a die-hard Stalinist, obsessed with the purity of Marxist-Leninist dogma and strictly opposed to the slightest "nationalist" deviation.

For Miron Constantinescu, Stalin represented the quintessential embodiment of Marxist historical wisdom. He sacrificed his own intelligence on the altar of Stalin's presumed infallible far-sightedness. In 1952, when the Soviet dictator supported Gheorghiu-Dej's purge of the highest ranks of the Romanian Workers' Party, Miron Constantinescu, despite solidarity with Ana Pauker, became one of the most vociferous critics of his former idol, dissociating himself from the compromised "deviators" and defending his powerful position in the Party. Ana Pauker had been the main symbol of the RCP's clandestine history, and Miron Constantinescu had been particularly involved with this propagandistic fiction. It was therefore all the more important for him to abandon this romantic mythology of his youth and to persuade Gheorghiu-Dej that he wholeheartedly joined the victorious faction. Converting necessity into virtue, he developed over the years all kinds of rationalizations and excuses for his failure to grasp Dej's plans to get rid of the Party's entire "Old Guard" and to smash whatever opposition he was confronted with. Together with Iosif Chisinevschi and Leonte Rautu, Miron Constantinescu was among the few RCP historical leaders who accompanied Dej to Moscow for those nocturnal conversations with Stalin in February 1952—the conspiratorial prelude to the elimination of

[6] *Congresul I a Partidului Muncitoresc Român* (Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1948). This volume is unavailable in Romania, for understandable reasons: the welcoming message of the Hungarian Communist Party was read by Laszlo Rajk, then a CC secretary and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The book contains positive references to the experience of Yugoslav communists and other "intolerable" traces of the early Cominform period. It was therefore blacklisted immediately after its publication and was never printed again. The report on the new Party rules at the Second Congress of the RWP was presented in December 1955 by Nicolae Ceausescu, the youngest member of the Politburo reorganized in 1954.

the Pauker-Luca faction. Indeed, he was in charge of the secret group which prepared the basic theoretical documents for the CC plenum in March 1952. The emphasis of this point serves to dissipate the misleading version of the events worked out *ex post facto* by Dej and his comrades at the CC plenum in November-December 1961: Miron Constantinescu had never been Ana Pauker's puppet, at any rate no more than had Emil Bodnaras, Iosif Chisinevschi or Alexandru Moghioros, but unlike the latter he played his own game, and only the unfortunate *dénoument* of events in Hungary in 1956 frustrated him in outwitting the General Secretary and becoming the new Romanian Number One.

Revisionism was an uncomfortable temptation for Miron Constantinescu. He had been deeply implicated in the aberrations of the Stalinist period and could not claim, like Imre Nagy in Hungary, to have been subjected to political harassment in the early 1950s. But, with the execution of Lucretiu Patrascanu in April 1954, with Ana Pauker definitively compromised for the excesses of the worst Stalinist period, Miron Constantinescu was the only member of the Politburo who could provide a legitimate alternative to Gheorghiu-Dej and his clique. He regarded the de-Stalinization process triggered off by Nikita Khrushchev as the chance of a lifetime, a providential window of opportunity for restructuring the RCP leadership and inaugurating a liberalization process in Romania. After 1954, Miron Constantinescu took care to cultivate his image as a hardened partisan of renewal, initiated persistant and meaningful contacts with distinguished intellectuals, and tried to organize a power base within the Party apparatus. One should mention, in this context, Miron Constantinescu's fundamental role in the release from prison of remarkable Romanian historians, such as C. C. Giurescu and P. P. Panaitescu, his constant support for former members of the Bucharest Sociological School, for example, H. H. Stahl, his overture to enter into dialogue with the prestigious poet and philosopher of culture, Lucian Blaga. As a first Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education (1954-57), Miron Constantinescu gathered increasing influence as the Party expert on cultural matters, the promoter of a more moderate line than that of forced Russianization represented by the Chisinevschi-Rautu tandem. In the snake-pit of the Romanian Politburo, his position was singularly ambiguous and his initiatives could not but arouse indignant suspicion. Contact with Lucian Blaga in 1956, mentioned by Miron Constantinescu during a National Symposium on Blaga in 1970, indicated clearly the tactics he used to gain the support of the national intelligentsia in his attempt to temper the harshness of the regime. No less significant is his confession in 1973 concerning his meeting in Moscow, in February 1956, with the Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, whose unorthodox opinions on Stalinism became known worldwide after the publication of his interviews in *Nuovi Argomenti*.[7]

[7] Miron Constantinescu wrote the introduction to Palmiro Togliatti's works published by the Political

IT was a hectic time for all "People's Democracies": Stalin's myth had been demolished by Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the 20th Party Congress, Tito had been partially rehabilitated, in Hungary and Poland the humanist-democratic intellectuals were in ferment, looking for the support of the intelligentsia and the working class. In Romania, long considered a stronghold of unreconstructed Stalinism, it was possible to perceive an intellectual opposition *in statu nascendi*. On 22 May 1956, a meeting of the Party *Aktiv* in the Stalin district of Bucharest witnessed a harsh confrontation between the Stalinist *apparatchiki* and intellectual dissenters. Permitting the development of criticism could have been disastrous for the self-satisfied bureaucrats, convinced more than ever that any attempt to revise the Party dogmas was an attack against the very foundations of the regime.[8] For Gheorghiu-Dej and Leonte Rautu, the writers' exposure of the intrinsic hypocrisy of the cultural policy of the Party was tantamount to an assault on the ideological basis of the communist system. Miron Constantinescu—who at that time was in Cluj representing the Politburo at a Party conference in a city particularly affected by the winds of liberalization blowing from Budapest—was urgently summoned to return to Bucharest to attend the second part of the meeting in the Stalin district. Years later, he described this precipitate invitation as a deliberate provocation on the part of Dej and Rautu, a stratagem to involve him in their anti-intellectual stance. He was made aware of his isolation, of the impossibility of standing up to the terrible force of the Party apparatus. This was probably the main reason for his alliance with Iosif Chisinevschi, the supreme propaganda master of the Stalinist era, reputed to have been Beria's agent in Romania and to have excellent connections in the Kremlin. Miron Constantinescu despised Chisinevschi, but he had no other choice at the time, having decided to take his chances and to defy Dej's supremacy in the Party. During the Politburo sessions of March-April 1956, partially supported by the old-timer Constantin Pirvulescu, Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisinevschi unleashed a direct attack on Gheorghiu-Dej's politics, accusing him of the main crimes perpetrated during the Stalinist epoch. Later on, after the crushing of the Hungarian insurrection and the hardening of the Kremlin line, Miron Constantinescu understood that, in Romanian circumstances, opposition to the Party General Secretary meant heresy, and he was not prepared to assume responsibility for the unpredictable consequences of a real democratization movement in that

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Publishing House in Bucharest, in 1973. Some symptomatic facts should be emphasized: the chief of the Romanian Workers' Party delegation to Togliatti's funeral in Rome in 1964 had been Nicolae Ceausescu, Dej's heir-apparent and an active partisan of the independent line adopted after the famous plenum of the CC of the RWP in April 1964. The director of the Political Publishing House, actually the Party publishing house, from 1955 until his death in November 1983, was Valter Roman, whose "Eurocommunist" connections, particularly in the Italian and Spanish communist parties, are an interesting chapter in his biography. In his prologue to Togliatti's writings, Miron Constantinescu invoked his 1956 conversations on Stalin and Stalinism with the Italian leader suggesting his deep dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's "simplistic" explanation of the "cult of personality".

[8] Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Romania*, op. cit. p. 262.

country. He was above all a Marxist intellectual, and his confidant, the late historian Georges Haupt, testified to his qualms of conscience at that moment. But, for him, there was no salvation without the Party. Like other true believers, his morality, his sense of life, his ultimate *raison d'être*, were defined and warranted by his loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist organization. It was his Party, right or wrong, and as a good Hegelian-Marxist, he accepted the morbid farce imposed on him by Dej during the Central Committee plenum in June 1957. "Diocletian Sava," as the Romanian exiled writer Petru Dumitriu immortalized him in *Rendez-Vous au Jugement Dernier*, was forced to indulge in the abject procedure of self-criticism, to implore pardon from the Party and to dismiss all his doubts as hysterical hallucinations. In June 1958, another Central Committee plenum addressed itself to the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu affair. This time, encouraged by Soviet maltreatment of the Nagy group and by the freezing of Soviet-Yugoslav relations after the publication of the *Programme of the Communist League of Yugoslavia* (1958), Gheorghiu-Dej was finally able to suppress all germs of opposition within his Party. Miron Constantinescu was exposed as the symbol of an "anarcho-liberal" deviation in the Party and was relegated to the periphery of Romanian cultural and political life. In 1959 he was expelled from the Central Committee and became an associate professor of history at the Institute for Postgraduate Pedagogical Studies in Bucharest. Later on, due to a show of mercy on the part of Dej, he was appointed a research associate at the Institute of History of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, whose director at that time was the respected historian Andrei Otetea.

Finally, in the 1965 confrontation with Gheorghiu-Dej during the internal Party struggle, Nicolae Ceausescu decided to take advantage of Miron Constantinescu's readily available services. Constantinescu had been a first-rank victim of Dej's pathological hostility towards any spark of intellectual dissent and he could demonstrate the new autocrat's magnanimity. He re-emerged after 1965 first as Deputy Minister of Education, then as Minister, and as a member of the Central Committee. In April 1968, his speech at the Central Committee plenum of the RCP suggesting the rehabilitation of the Romanian victims of Stalin's Great Purge and of the Patrascanu group, provided an argument for Ceausescu's faction in the operation against the remaining senior members of Dej's Politburo (Emil Bodnaras, Chivu Stoica, Petre Borila, Gheorghe Apostol) and in particular against the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Ceausescu's main contender for Dej's succession, Alexandru Draghici.

In May 1968, while he was undergoing medical treatment in Karlovy-Vary, Czechoslovakia, his wife, Sulamita Bloch-Constantinescu, herself an old-time member of the RCP, died in tragic circumstances: her daughter committed matricide in a moment of dementia. Fate dealt Miron Constantinescu another tragic blow: a few years after his mother's death, Horia Constantinescu, the most promising son, was killed in an

accident—frozen to death whilst on a holiday in the Bucegi Mountains. There was certainly something Shakespearian in the fate of this Romanian Marxist intellectual—as if the odds were always against him and an unknown God, to use Nietzsche's famous metaphor, was playing a macabre game with him.

THERE is no doubt that Miron Constantinescu was increasingly disgusted with the falsification of Party history both under Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu. He was contemptuous of the apologetics and the adulation of the Party leader produced by sycophants. His confessions to Georges Haupt, his confidential talks with Party "old-timers" and distinguished intellectuals, bore out an unrestrained disaffection with a hagiographic reading of past events and personalities. He tried to introduce a new spirit into the leadership of the RCP, to do away with the Byzantine style so characteristic of Romanian communist political culture. His loneliness indicated perfectly the limits of a liberalization process within that Party. His downgrading under Dej was meant to undermine any efforts to combine the de-Sovietization operation with de-Stalinization.

Appointed President of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences in 1970, a candidate member of the Executive Committee of the RCP, Miron Constantinescu tried to capitalize on the frivolous "reformist" declarations of the regime. He was the driving force behind the resurgence of Romanian sociology, head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Bucharest and author of studies on the urbanization and industrialization process in Romania. He edited volumes of sociological and historical studies and again became one of the prominent ideologues of the regime. Now a rector of the Party "Stefan Gheorghiu Academy," he played an active role during the CC plenum in November 1971, the main ideological conclave of the Party since the early '50s.[9]

In 1972, Miron Constantinescu reached the zenith of his career under Nicolae Ceausescu. He was elected secretary of the Central Committee, President of the Workers' Council of Control of Social and Economic Activities, and Vice President of the State Council of the Romanian Socialist Republic. During Ceausescu's 1973 visit to Latin America, Constantinescu was put in charge of the Party Secretariat in Bucharest, which practically amounted to total control of the Party. This was perhaps the moment when Miron Constantinescu fully realized the ultimate inanity of any attempt to go against the bureaucratic apparatus—the fundamental obstacle to any genuine reform. A few months later, he was "promoted" to the ornamental position of President of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian "Parliament."

[9] *Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din 3–5 noiembrie 1971* (Editura Politica, Bucuresti, 1971). Unlike other ideological chieftains, such as Leonte Rautu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Ion Iliescu and Ilie Radulescu, Miron Constantinescu was not asked for self-criticism at the plenum particularly concerned with the "eradication" of "liberal," "petty-bourgeois" tendencies in cultural life.

He continued to publish feverishly, particularly in the field of sociology and social history.[10] In 1973, the Sociological Laboratory founded by Miron Constantinescu, an institution affiliated to the University of Bucharest Sociological School presented a paper on the so-called *tributary social formation*, in reality an attempt to develop some of Marx's theses on Oriental despotism and to apply them to Romanian mediaeval social history. In March 1974, a book which Constantinescu published on the same heretical topic was attacked by the Party ideological watchdogs and its distribution rights were withdrawn. This was a peculiar situation for a member of the Party Secretariat, but obviously one has to take into account Miron Constantinescu's charisma and his residual status as a former contender for the supreme title in the Party. But the real power-brokers, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, who greatly benefited from Constantinescu's political resurgence, did not trust this arrogant scholar, with his irritating moralistic stances. Moreover, according to reliable sources in Bucharest, not long before his death Miron Constantinescu was stigmatized by Elena Ceausescu for allegedly intending to seize control of the Party. Power was indeed his daimonion, his sole and unchangeable guiding value in the shabby world of communist conspiracies, murders and cabals. In the wake of Gheorghiu-Dej's death, he was cajoled by Ceausescu to embark, despite old rancours, on the new strategy of the Party, but he soon discovered that he was once again a loser, that he had been outsmarted by those for whom power represented both the means and the end. Brought up a Stalinist, but disappointed by the ethical collapse of the Soviet system, he began to re-examine the metaphysical origins of Marxism. Reading *The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, but particularly the *Grundrisse*, gave him the occasion to reassess the contemporary message of Marxism. He certainly remained far removed from the devastating critique of Marxism and of "really existing socialism" made by Leszek Kolakowski, but he was nonetheless one of the very few Romanian intellectuals who broached the challenging topic of "alienation under socialism." His cordial polemic with Adam Schaff, the Polish philosopher, was proof of his desire to go beyond the petrified *Diamat* codified by Soviet Marxism, a dialogue between comrades about values and ideals. In a certain sense, Schaff evolved along a somewhat similar trajectory (and was eventually expelled from the Party). Miron Constantinescu discovered in his works arguments against scepticism increasingly pervading his Marxist faith.

His thorough knowledge of the history of socialism did not prevent Miron Constantinescu from maintaining an optimistic perspective on the

[10] Miron Constantinescu and Vasile Liveanu, *Problems of History and Social Theory* (Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1970); Miron Constantinescu et al. *Istoria Romaniei. Compendiu* (Editura didactica si pedagogica, Bucuresti, 1969); together with Ernö Gall and Ovidiu Badina, he wrote a history of sociological thought in Romania. He was the editor of two volumes dealing with the urbanization process in the Slatina and Brasov areas. Among his initiatives while President of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences was the publication of the Romanian sociological journal *Viitorul Social* ("The Social Future").

future of this movement. Like Georg Lukács, he could use Zola's famous phrase: "*L'avenir est en marche et finalement rien ne pourra l'arrêter*." He obstinately refused to take the measure of actual communist practices and persevered in an abstract, unconvincing doctrinairism. Hence, he could not envision even the redemptive realm of heresy and was forced to comply with the rules of a system which, had he abided by his own professed intellectual and ethical standards, he should have execrated.

CALL FOR PAPERS

WORKSHOP ON EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A six-day workshop is planned as a special project of the Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford. The aim of the workshop is to bring together a number of scholars who are conducting research on refugees from Europe and the Middle East during the twentieth century. It will be co-sponsored by the Refugee Studies Programme and the Refugee Documentation Project, York University, Toronto, Canada.

Tentative topics for discussion include the concept and causes of refugees, the role of international and voluntary organizations (including religious organizations), government responses to refugees, and refugee settlement in terms of language, housing, employment etc.

The registrants at the workshop will be both participant scholars and observers. We intend to restrict the number of papers to thirty. Those wishing to participate should send details of their intended papers as soon as possible to the Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

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Submission to Moscow (in Hungarian)*

R. L. Somlay

THE main claim to fame of *Mission to Moscow* is that it was written by no less a person than the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union in the crucial years 1936 to 1938. He attended regularly the trials in Moscow and sent due accounts of them to his superiors. He had no doubts that the accused were guilty. In his own words:

> . . . it would be difficult for me to conceive of any court, in any jurisdiction doing other than adjudging the defendants guilty of violations of the law as set forth in the indictment by the statutes.[1]

Not unnaturally, the book was quickly published in Eastern Europe after the end of the Second World War in an attempt to convince those who might still have reservations about the veracity of the official account. There was however a tiny fly in the otherwise perfect ointment. Here and there Davies expressed some little doubts and some of his remarks were not fully complimentary.

The decision was apparently taken to introduce some modifications into the text. Such " modifications " were of course routinely made after the communist take-over in 1948. We believe however that this is the first proof of such action, as early as 1945, in a country which still enjoyed considerable freedom and in which it would have still been possible (though perhaps unwise) to register objections.

In the remainder of this article we shall show examples (comparing the original with a text translated back into English from the Hungarian translation) of these modifications by distinguishing four different types, namely omissions, mistranslations, inventions and obfuscation.

A1 Omission of a few words to change the meaning

Original (p. 55): " He didn't believe that direct physical cruelties (contradistinguished with nervous cruelties) were employed . . . " In the translation (p. 73) the bracket is omitted.

Original (p. 60): " Here burocracy (*sic*) has an iron-clad tie-up with the industrial workers against the farmers." In the translation there is a full stop after " workers."

Original (p. 76): " . . . presupposing that there will be no civil war by reason of counter-revolutions and ' the revolution chewing up its own

* *Moszkvai Jelentes*, Budapest, 1945.

[1] Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow* (Left Book Club Edition, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1942), p. 39.

children.' " In the translation (p. 98) there is a full stop after " counter-revolutions. "

Original (p. 136): " Dearth of facts as to the Red Army plot. " In the translation (p. 171) " Dearth of facts " is omitted.

A2 Omission of a few lines

On p. 155 in the original, commenting on a film, the following lines are written:

> Propaganda was of course omnipresent. Stalin was quite obviously dragged into the picture for several " shots " apparently to establish that affectionate confidence existed between Lenin and Stalin.

In the translation (p. 196) these lines are omitted.

On p. 176 in the original, giving an account of a conversation with an ambassador, the following lines are written:

> He said: That conditions are worse here now than at any time during his first five-year tenure in Moscow viz. the purge and the imprisonment of so many members of the Communist Party.

In the translation (p. 222) these lines are omitted.

On p. 178 in the original, commenting on some of the evidence in the Bukharin trial, the following lines are written:

> . . . a prejudice arising from the confession evidence and a prejudice against a judicial system which affords practically no protection for the accused . . .

In the translation (p. 225) these lines are omitted.

On p. 113 in the original, commenting on a new defence loan, the following lines are written:

> Second, it shows that frozen labour (capital) commands payment for use—contrary to the basic Communist idea that compensation shall be paid only for human labour, that no man shall be paid for the use of frozen labour (capital) because that is the vice of capitalism. Interest is payment for the use of capital, and here it is paid by the state itself, in direct violation of the fundamental principle of Marxist philosophy.

In the translation (p. 144) the lines starting with the word " contrary " are omitted.

A3 Omission of a whole passage

In the original (pp. 32–33) there is a section headed " Background of the Principal Defendants. " There are references in it to Trotsky and Stalin which are different from the official Soviet version, as shown for example by the following lines:

> After the death of Lenin in 1924, a struggle developed among the leaders for the succession. The two outstanding contenders were Trotsky and Stalin. The former was of the brilliant, versatile, dynamic type; the latter, a Georgian, was simple, hard-working, with great capacity for work—a genius for organization and a man of great physical and mental power and an Oriental patience. As Secretary of the Communist Party, he slowly built up his party machine which resulted in the defeat of Trotsky and his final banishment in 1927. Apparently the struggle at the time was not so much a conflict of principles as a conflict of these two personalities; as is indicated by the fact that many of the things which Stalin is now projecting were a part of the Trotsky programme.

All these and some subsequent references to Trotsky and his followers are omitted in the translation (p. 45).

In the original there are three sections on pp. 196–198 called " Industrial Progress, " " Public Works—Schools " and " The Terror. " In the translation there is only one section called " Industrial Progress " which incorporates " Public Works—Schools " and incorporates also the second part of " The Terror." The first part of that section which is omitted in the translation (p. 249) is as follows:

> The Terror here is a horrifying fact. There are many evidences here in Moscow that there is a fear that reaches down into and haunts all sections of the community. No household, however humble, can discount the fear of a nocturnal raid by the secret police (usually between one and three in the early morning). Once the person is taken away, nothing of him or her is known for months—and many times never—therafter. Evidences of these conditions come from many sources. They are: statements made to myself or members of the staff from first-hand witnesses; statements based on actual personal observations of members of the staff (as in one instance the sight of a struggling unfortunate being arrested and torn from his eleven-year-old child on the street in front of the adjoining apartment house at 3.30 am); or statements made by Russian citizens who for some reason or other come to the Embassy in search of aid. The popular psychology in this situation and the extent of this terror is again indicated by the fact that, almost daily through the kitchen and servants' quarters, there come reports of whispered and fearful confidences of new arrests, new hardships, new apprehensions, and new fears among their friends. The activities of the secret police have extended and reached down to the arrest of Soviet employees of foreign missions, including our own. It is commonly alleged that the secret police of this proletarian dictatorship are as ruthless and as cruel as any during the old tsarist regimes. It seems to be an old Russian custom.

B Mistranslation

By mistranslation we shall understand here some subtle modifications which change the tone of the writing. For example, Davies makes

frequent references to the " GPU boys. " In the translation these appear as the " young men of the GPU. "

Or see the following sentence on p. 58 of the original: " Stalin, in his opinion, would ' ditch ' the Comintern in a minute if he were assured of peace. " Also on p. 64: " Hitler and Stalin are calling each other all the vile names under the sun. "

The above two sentences were apparently regarded as showing insufficient respect for Stalin. The translations (on p. 77 and 84 respectively) are as follows: " It may be assumed that Stalin might abolish the Comintern if by this he can assure the peace for a while. " And, " There are at the moment sharp differences between the Soviet Union and Germany. "

An example of a somewhat cruder change in the meaning is: (original, p. 89) " The idea of a ' classless society ' has been and is being destroyed in practice, " whereas the translation (p. 118) says: " The idea of a classless society has been somewhat modified in practice. "

Our final example in this section shows a change from a somewhat ironic tone to a respectful one.

The original (p. 137) is as follows:

> Communism is their religion and in executing speedy justice for the violation of party principle they were in the strong position of " serving the Lord. " It also served their interests well, or by such action they were entrenching themselves in power. By adding the charge of treason to the state, they became the bulwark of defence for that Russian nationalism that is being constantly stimulated by every form of propaganda available.

The corresponding translation (p. 172) is:

> They have the strongest belief in Communism and while they condemned those who violated the party principle, they felt naturally that they were serving their principles and their country. Moreover the charge of treason served to corroborate that Russian nationalism which nowadays agrees completely with the aims of the party and of its leaders.

C Invention

By this we mean that something is added to the translation that is not in the original. A quite simple example (which should perhaps have gone into the mistranslation section because it affects a change of meaning) is as follows:

Original (p. 177), " . . . it discounts the real strength of this government as a reliable factor against Hitler. "

Translation (p. 223), " . . . it discounts to a certain extent the real strength of this government as a reliable factor against Hitler. "

A somewhat more interesting example refers to the living standard of the Soviet leaders:

Original (p. 54), " These Commissars certainly treat themselves well. " Translation (p. 71), " These Commissars live relatively well but according to American concepts modestly and unpretentiously. "

Our third example is quite remarkable. On p. 40 of the original Davies summarizes his views about the trial of Radek and Pyatakov in the following lines:

> In conclusion, I wish to say that this whole trial and surrounding circumstances shock our mentality. It is, however, a most powerful demonstration of the blessings which real constitutional protection of personal liberty affords. The right of the accused to have counsel before trial, the right to refuse to testify against oneself, and, above all, the presumption of innocence and the application of the old common-law principle that better a thousand guilty men escape rather than one innocent man should be unjustly condemned—all these take on a very real meaning when faced with a trial such as this.

Not surprisingly, these lines are missing in the translation (p. 55). It was however deemed necessary to have some conclusions which were given in the translation as follows:

> In conclusion I wish to say that this trial revealed to me the grandiosity of the political system of the Soviet Union and showed at the same time its ability to crush its opponents.

It must appear to any objective observer that the translation has strayed from the original.

D Obfuscation

There are quite a number of passages where the meaning of the author is hidden by the simple means of giving a translation which is devoid of meaning. It is difficult to conceive why such a technique was applied. It would have been much simpler to omit the offending sentences. Whether it was desirable to do so or not, such obfuscation was attempted in a number of places.

The best example occurs in the discussion of the Radek trial. In the original (p. 39) the point is made that if Trotsky wanted the aid of the Japanese and the Germans for overthrowing Stalin's rule he would have only acted in the same spirit as Lenin who also got help from the Germans. The sentence of interest is as follows: " . . . it was consistent with Lenin's conduct in acquiring power through the use of the German military in 1917. . . . " This is an obvious reference to the " sealed wagon " theory which is of course denied by the official Soviet line. The meaning is therefore changed in the translation (p. 54). It reads: " . . . this is fairly consistent with Lenin's conduct in 1917 when he acquired power with the aid of the military leaders. . . . " But now the sentence is entirely irrelevant. It does not fit into the text at all. The aim is however achieved. The offending reference is no longer there.

The Questionnaire

Vladimir Voinovich

QUESTIONNAIRES and application forms are a topic worthy of celebration in prose and poetry. If I were a writer of odes, I would dedicate one to this indispensable bureaucratic invention.

There are various types of questionnaires: some are fairly simple, some give you a bit of trouble, and then there are the ones that the devil himself couldn't figure out. The intricacy of a questionnaire increases with the importance of the position you are trying for. When I applied for a carpenter's job, for example, I was given the simplest kind to fill out. In fact, it was not even really a questionnaire at all, but just a form for personnel records. I don't remember it in detail any more, but, as I recall, they only wanted to know my full name (first, last and patronymic), date of birth, trade and level of qualification. Then I was handed a saw and told to go to work; the Party had confidence in me. But the higher the position a comrade wants to occupy, the less confidence the Party has in him—the more questions he is asked, and the more carefully his application form is scrutinized.

The first time I had to fill out a detailed questionnaire was in 1950, when I applied for admission to the Zaporozhe amateur flying club. I don't know how many questions there were—40 or 50—but some of them impressed me so much that I remember them to this day. Although I was born 15 years after the October revolution, I had to state whether I had served in the White Army and, if so, where and in what rank? Had I been a member of any political parties? And of course I was asked whether I had any relatives abroad and, if so, where, who and why—in as much detail as possible. I answered almost all the questions sincerely and truthfully: No, I had not served in the White Army, had not been a member of any political parties, and had no relatives living abroad. That is what I wrote, but later I found out that one of my distant relatives was indeed living abroad and, what is more, was a close associate of Marshal Tito (who at that time was never called anything but a bloodthirsty dog by the Soviet press). Luckily, in those days I had never even heard of this relative. There was one question, though, that I consciously lied in answering: whether anyone in my family had ever been convicted of a crime. I answered this in the negative, though I knew perfectly well that my father had spent five years in concentration camps. To make a long story short, those who read the completed form were satisfied with my answers, and the Fatherland consequently entrusted me with flying a glider with a speed of 65 kilometres an hour.

This modicum of trust transformed itself into a great deal of mistrust three years later, when I was serving as an Air Force mechanic in Poland. Although, as the Russian saying goes, a chicken is not a bird and Poland is

not a foreign country, the living conditions there were slightly better than they were at home. The pay was higher, and the food was better; we were even given butter (something a soldier in the Soviet Union never even sees), and we smoked " Belomor " cigarettes instead of *makhorka*—the coarse tobacco usually issued to soldiers. But then, unexpectedly, I was summoned by the regiment's commanding officer, who said: " Listen, I understand you're a pilot! " " Well, a sort of pilot; I've flown in gliders. " " But you know how to steer a glider? " " Sure. Moving the stick this way or that is no great feat. " " Well, since you know to move the stick, go on back to the Soviet Union to be trained as a helicopter pilot. " So I collected my belongings and went back to the Soviet Union. But when I arrived in the town of Kinel', in Kuibyshev Region, I discovered that at least a hundred more aces like myself had been assembled there. Some of them had come from Poland, some from the GDR and some from Austria, part of which was still occupied by Soviet forces at the time. And then I found out that nobody had the slightest intention of training me to become a helicopter pilot; I had simply been kicked out because, shortly before, some aircraft mechanic had escaped from the Soviet zone of Germany to the American one flying a small staff plane.

Thus, the fact that I had filled out that questionnaire a few years earlier did me a real disservice in the end, and I have been suspicious of all kinds of questionnaires ever since and have hated to fill them out.

In the late 1950s, after my military service, I worked as a carpenter in Moscow and also wrote poetry, which nobody would publish at that time. My work brought me little satisfaction, as I longed to be closer to the world of art. One day, as I was walking past the Moscow Arts Theatre, I saw a notice that they were looking for stagehands. Well, this work would suit me fine, I decided. I stopped by the personnel department, where I received a warm welcome because the stagehands' pay is negligible and nobody wants to volunteer for the work. " Here is the application form, " I was told. " Please study it carefully, complete it, and return it to us. It will take another three weeks to check up on you, after which we'll let you know when you can start working. " I asked in amazement why the form was so long and why the checking-up process should be so slow. " You must understand this yourself, " I was told. " Our theatre is special, our plays are sometimes attended by Party and government leaders, and, what is more, we travel on tours abroad from time to time. "

I took the questionnaire and studied it at home. It contained countless questions not only about myself and my parents but also about my wife's grandparents on both sides. Some of the questions I was simply unable to answer. So I threw the questionnaire into the bin, and my theatrical career never materialized.

I DON'T think there is anybody in the Soviet Union who does not feel a little chill of fear when filling out a questionnaire. One cannot help imagining the mysterious person behind it who will study the completed form carefully, checking it against the autobiography attached to it,

comparing this answer with that, searching for contradictions, and marking each answer with either a minus or a plus sign. Plus for being a Communist Party member, minus for not being one. Plus for not having lived on the territory occupied by the Germans 40 years ago. Minus for having relatives abroad. Plus for being a Russian. Minus for being a Jew.

There was a brief period in Soviet history, though, when the door opened a little for emigration to Israel, and at that time being a member of the Jewish race and having relatives abroad was a great advantage: it gave one a chance to be relieved of these questionnaires and unpleasant queries forever. But a Jew applying for a job in the Soviet Union always encounters obstacles—sometimes insurmountable ones. The same can be said of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Germans (though the latter also either have or had a chance to emigrate). There are some small national minorities, however, whose members sometimes have an advantage over everyone, including the Russians. I know of one case, for instance, when a physicist applied for a job with a prestigious research institute. The institute's director, who was a Jew and was very sensitive in regard to the national composition of his staff (in other words, he didn't want to be accused of hiring too many Jews), interviewed the applicant, ascertained his professional qualifications and the sphere of his scientific interests, and then hesitantly asked: " And what about the rest? " The applicant understood the question immediately and promptly answered: " As for the rest, everything is in order. I am a Nanai. "

Sometimes a personnel manager or the head of an organization is not satisfied with the nationality stated in an applicant's passport and requests information concerning each of the parents. An acquaintance of mine, when applying for a radio job, was interviewed by the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, Sergei Kaftanov. Kaftanov first questioned my acquaintance about his professional and other qualifications and then asked: " And who is your mother? " " My mother is Greek, " was the prompt answer. " And your father? " " My father is an engineer. "

Despite the fact that all personnel managers do little else than pore over questionnaires looking for contradictions and flaws in the biographies of staff members, their watchful eyes occasionally miss the most unbelievable absurdities. Some people, out of pure mischief, make nonsensical statements such as alleging to have been a general in the White Army. Others write similar absurdities not out of mischief but for practical considerations. Occasionally this results in big scandals—for example, when it is revealed that the director of such-and-such an institute, a doctor and a professor, in reality never finished the seventh grade, certainly never wrote a dissertation, and has only a very approximate idea of the scientific work of which he is in charge.

I happened once to be present when one such scandal was uncovered. In the mid-1960s, when I was on the Bureau of the Prose Section of the Writers' Union, I was invited to attend an investigation into the affair of a writer who had been accused by a woman of having plagiarized her plays

and published the results under his own name. As the first order of business, the people investigating the case studied the man's autobiography. This was very colourful. He was born in Iraq and sold into slavery at the age of four. Having escaped from his slave-owner, he joined the Turkish Communist Party and after a while became a resident Soviet intelligence agent in Istanbul. But when his autobiography was checked against the data in the application he had filled out for the Writers' Union, it turned out that he must have joined the Communist Party at the tender age of nine and become a spy when he was 11! And there were other, equally fantastic fabrications. In reality, the man's life story was much more modest. He had been born not in Iraq but in Soviet Azerbaidzhan, had never travelled abroad, and had joined the Writers' Union twice in his life; the first time, he had become a member in Tadzhikistan, but he had soon been expelled for plagiarism and other shady dealings. (It is interesting, incidentally, that in the so-called department of creative personnel, which is run by the KGB's most qualified experts, this man's documents, replete as they were with absurd fabrications, aroused no suspicion until the scandal broke.)

The meeting to discuss the affair was held, understandably, behind closed doors. The defendant—an elderly and corpulent Oriental-looking man—was not only not the least bit embarrassed, but behaved quite aggressively. At the very start of the proceedings, he declared that the investigation was of no interest to him and that, instead, he would like to submit an application for travel to Syria, where he intended to collect materials for a book about the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples. " Wait a minute, " he was told, " we must first clarify some points in your biography. How could it have been possible for you to join the Communist Party at the age of nine? " To this and other questions, he had one and the same evasive answer: " Those who need to know, know. " " But you couldn't have been a resident Soviet intelligence agent at the age of 11, after all? " " Those who need to know, know. " " But where were you born—in Baghdad or in Baku? " " Those who need to know, know. "

To my surprise, some of the members of the Bureau, about whose literary activities I had not the slightest idea, displayed great concern in this case and began to ask questions about the exact identity of " those who know. " " What are their names? Which department do they work in? " And then they cited some names and departments themselves, thus demonstrating their familiarity with such matters. But, in contrast to them, the defendant kept this military secret to himself, refused to disclose the names of any people or departments, and kept on repeating monotonously that " those who need to know, know. " What is more, he kept insisting that he be immediately issued a recommendation for his trip to Syria. A vote was taken on this question, and all the members of the Bureau except me voted against. I abstained and nearly got reprimanded myself. Asked about the reasons for my abstention, I replied that I was willing to vote for the man's expulsion from the Writers' Union on the

grounds of his plagiarism and lies but that I did not think I had the right either to allow or to forbid him to travel wherever he wanted, especially since I myself was banned from travelling abroad. The meeting ended at this point. The secretary of the Moscow Section of the Writers' Union, Viktor Ilyin—a former KGB general—then invited some members of the Bureau into another room (I was also invited for some reason; I think he wanted to get me more involved in " public " activities) and said we should be better prepared, at the next meeting, to unmask the defendant. " He must be trapped like a wolf, " said Ilyin, and his eyes glittered rapaciously. Then he shifted his glance to me, and his face turned somewhat sour: " But you'll probably make yourself scarce? " " Yes, I will, " I promised confidently, since I wanted nothing to do with these beasts of prey.

I kept that promise and therefore have no idea about the details of any further investigation into the affair of the former resident Soviet agent in Istanbul. But I do know that the matter was decided in his favour, because he was still listed as a member of the Writers' Union at the time of my departure from the Soviet Union in 1980. And he probably still is a member, provided that he is still alive. Apparently those mysterious persons he referred to really were in the know about some kind of meritorious services he had performed and were unwilling to let him be " trapped like a wolf. "

Boris Souvarine 1895–1984

Boris Souvarine was a personal friend and a contributor to Survey. *He was one of the pioneers of Soviet studies in the West, a " Sovietologist "* avant la lettre. *His profound knowledge was combined with understanding. But he could not break through the climate of opinion prevailing in the West. His classical biography of Stalin, published in the mid-'30s, has been virtually ignored. After he wrote an article in* Le Figaro *predicting (three months before the event!) the Soviet–German pact, the paper refused to publish anything more by him. This pattern was repeated during the war, which he spent in the USA, and after the war. He was not consulted by politicians or civil servants and was almost ostracized as an intellectual. But he lived long enough to see his own " rehabilitation " in France, after a lifetime of frustration.* Survey *published a special homage to him (Vol. 23, no. 3, Summer 1977–78).*

Leopold Labedz

BORIS Souvarine died in a fortunate way—practically with no illness, full of thoughts, new projects, at the peak of work on his next book. His was a long and stormy life, full of passion; he was a participant in and privileged witness of the most important events of this century, a friend and adversary to many of those who shared the fate of our world.

His parents brought him to France from Russia when he was a small boy of 18 months. The youngest son of the family, which led a very modest life, Boris began to work at the age of 14. In France, where university degrees carry such weight, he remains a brilliant self-educated man who acquired enormous learning of his own account, making him one of the most cultured people of his time. A passion for socialist ideas came to him very early on. Called up in 1913, Boris was a soldier when war broke out. Pacifism and a hatred of war, deepened by the death in the trenches of his older brother, shaped the views of the young socialist. He gave expression to them in the articles which were published in the small socialist paper *Populaire*, which he signed " Souvarine," a pen-name borrowed from Zola's novel *Germinale*. In the novel, the character Souvarine is an activist who organizes the miners to strike.

In November 1916, Boris Souvarine wrote an article which may be considered a turning point in his life, although this was not yet apparent to him. In the article, which he addressed to " our friends " now in Switzerland, the young French socialist criticized Lenin. The future leader of the October revolution, whom practically no one in France had

heard of at this time, replied with an " Open Letter to Comrade Souvarine." Thus began their friendship by correspondence.

The February revolution raised hopes for peace. Souvarine told how both he and many of his comrades-in-arms at this time saw in Lenin " a sort of Tolstoy," a convinced pacifist. Souvarine accepted the offer to be a correspondent on Gorky's *Novyi Zhizn* printed in Petrograd.

After the October revolution, Souvarine became one of the active conveyers of Lenin's ideas in France, especially the ideas of the Third International. In 1920, a prisoner in the Paris gaol of La Sainte, he wrote the resolution which was passed by the Socialist Party Congress in Tours about the founding of the French Communist Party. Souvarine became a member of its executive leadership and was in the delegation which went to Moscow in 1921. He was pleased at the opportunity to visit the capital of the revolution and of the country in which he was born.

Immediately after his arrival an incident took place which revealed Souvarine's nature and sowed the first seeds of doubt in his heart. He discovered much in Moscow that was for him, a believer in the revolution, unexpected and strange. He was surprised, for example, by the fact that the anarchists—fellow revolutionaries—had been put in prison. He set off to have a chat with the prisoners in Butyrki. He questioned the communists who could speak French (he spoke Russian with difficulty), especially A. Shlyapnikov, A. Kollontai and D. Ryazanov. The official representative of the Russian Communist Party to the French delegation, Victor Taratuta, informed on him. A special commission was set up to investigate the " affair." It came to the conclusion that " the critical air, characteristic of Comrade Souvarine, who strives to investigate everything for himself, his straightforwardness, often acute . . . led Comrade Taratuta to come to certain conclusions about the distrust, so to speak, which Comrade Souvarine displayed towards Soviet power. . . . Comrade Taratuta even came to the point of suggesting the possibility of Comrade Souvarine's betrayal." The commission believed that Comrade Taratuta " was guided exclusively by his devotion to communism," but that he was none the less mistaken. Lenin, when he learned of these " conclusions," insisted on the elevation of Boris Souvarine into the ranks of the executive committee of the Comintern, the Small Office and the Secretariat.

Boris Souvarine was the only foreign communist to have been a member of all three leading bodies of the Comintern for three years in succession. Lenin underlined his benevolent attitude to Souvarine by giving him Inessa Armand's daughter as a secretary.

BORIS Souvarine was actively involved in three of the most important activities of the Comintern in 1921–24: the organization of international aid to starving people in the Soviet Republic—the West's favourable response convinced Lenin that capitalism would do everything to support Soviet power; the preparations for revolution in Germany; the nascent struggle for Lenin's mantle.

Lenin's death was a watershed: quarrels, clashes and conflicts among the leaders of the Bolshevik party, who were at the same time the bosses of the Comintern, did not stop, even while the leader of the revolution was still alive. The directness, acuteness and " critical air " of Souvarine did not permit him to acclimatize himself to communist heights. He remembered the word " *chelyad*' " (retainer), the name the Bolsheviks gave to the Cominternists, to the end of his days. His character did not allow him to enter the ranks of the " retainers."

At the 12th Party Congress he stepped into the defence of Trotsky and sharply criticized the communist leaders for washing their dirty linen in the Comintern. Lunacharsky, who translated Souvarine's speech, kept on adding after every sentence: " it's not me saying this, it's him . . ." Souvarine also spoke at the Fifth Comintern Congress. He declined from choosing blindly between Stalin and Trotsky—according to the example of the other Cominternists. In 1924 he published, without Moscow's permission, a pamphlet by Trotsky called " The New Course," and in the foreword he announced:

> We speak out against the emerging tendency to deify Lenin, to turn Leninism into a religion, his teaching into the Gospel. In connection with this practice, communists all over the world, now and in the future, will of necessity limit themselves by the machine-like repetition of formulations more or less accurately interpreted by official and semi-official campaigners, which will free them from the need to think, learn, criticize, understand, analyse.

At the Fifth Comintern Congress, Souvarine was expelled from the Comintern, and was then expelled from the French Communist Party. He managed to leave Moscow with some difficulty at the beginning of 1925, and returned to Paris.

In 1929, when Trotsky was exiled from the USSR, Souvarine refrained from becoming a " Trotskyist," as he had earlier declined from being a " Stalinist ": he had a complete break with Trotsky. The first chapter in the life of Boris Souvarine drew to a close. It was as though it had been summed up by the 1930 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia*: " The biographical note," consisting of exactly nine lines, ends with the epitaph:

> He entered the ranks of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. Later he was one of the leaders of the French Trotskyists and turned into a Rightist renegade; at the present time he has left the political platform.

BORIS Souvarine did leave political life, if this is to be understood as Party life. In 1930, he started work on the first (not only in the West but in the Soviet Union) biography of Stalin. The book came out in 1935. Not without problems: it turned out to be difficult to find a publisher in America, England and France, who would agree to publish a biography of Stalin, who had only just successfully completed collectivization, accompanied by peasant genocide and the first five-year plan, and who

had only just organized the murder of Kirov and was about to start a huge " purge " of the country. André Malraux, who refused to recommend *Staline* to the publishers Gallimard, explained the reason: " I think that you and your friends are right, Souvarine, but I will come over to you when might is on your side."

Staline did not arouse excessive interest when it was published; the " interested party " read it with greater attention than others—Souvarine discovered that one copy of his book had been translated into Russian. The " interested party " gave his opinion. In the most bloody of his speeches in a report to the February–March plenum of the Central Committee of 1937, Stalin named the non-existent " Souvarine group " among " the reserve forces of the Trotskyist-espionage-wrecker enterprise," whom he included in his list of personal enemies.

In the many obituaries which appeared in the French press after the death of the author of *Staline*, special emphasis was put on the first decade of his life. This can be explained by the fact that Souvarine during these years was at the forefront of world history, meeting Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin. . . . When Krupskaya decided to make public Lenin's last letter, his " testament," she sent the text marked " strictly confidential " to Souvarine in Paris, who published it in France and gave it to his friend Max Eastman for publication in the USA. . . . Ten bright years spent in the beams of floodlights cast into shadow almost six decades of significantly richer and more important activity. In the 1920s, Boris Souvarine, attracted by a mirage of Utopia, went with the current—deceiving himself and quite innocently deceiving others—in the stream of Western intelligentsia who saw " the light from the East." And then, for the rest of his life, Boris Souvarine went against the current, exposing the illusoriness of the communist mirage.

THE second chapter in the life of Souvarine—exceptionally productive, fruitful and valuable—was the time of the " voice in the wilderness." Very few people listened to Souvarine when he exposed the falseness of the Moscow trials or revealed the unbelievable scale of the Stalinist terror of the '30s. On 7 May 1939, he published an article in *Le Figaro* in which—alone in the world's press—he warned about the preparations being made for an agreement between Stalin and Hitler. The French Foreign Ministry swiftly took measures: *Le Figaro* was firmly recommended not to publish similar commentaries by Souvarine. Having left occupied France for the USA, Souvarine could not find work there in his profession, for his anti-communism turned out to have no place in the atmosphere of universal love for " Uncle Joe " which erupted after Hitler's breach of the pact of friendship and non-aggression with the USSR.

Returning to France after the end of the war, Boris Souvarine continued to go against the current. Turned down by all the " major " papers and magazines, he published his own small, or altogether minuscule, ones in which he wrote what he thought. In 1948, for example,

he issued a four-page bulletin called " Observer of Two Worlds." He gathered and analysed facts for a small circle of readers. Were you to read the bulletin today, you would be struck by the clarity and precision with which the author of all the articles saw the reality of the situation, and how, even today, it accommodates itself to contemporary problems. In the September issue, for example, Souvarine gathered together the pronouncements of the then leaders of the Western world on Soviet politics. Truman firmly maintained that " Joe [i.e. Stalin] is a prisoner of the Politburo "; the deputy Secretary of State was categoric that " The gap between Molotov and Zhdanov is getting wider "; a prominent French diplomat foresaw "the victory of the liberals over the extremists in the Politburo . . ." Souvarine cites the perspicacious Adenauer, who affirmed: " Russia acts as the peaceful go-between for India and Pakistan. For me this is evidence that the USSR has entered the ranks of peaceloving nations." The analysis which Souvarine gave of all these, and many other similar pronouncements could be published even today, if you changed the names of the Western figures of state and political life, who still repeat everything that their predecessors said.

On the initiative of Boris Souvarine, a twice-weekly bulletin began to be published in Paris in 1948, later called " Est-Ouest." He actively collaborated on the magazine, which became the sole, regular publication in France (perhaps the only one in the West) devoted to problems of communism—to the Soviet Union, the " People's Democracies," soon to become " socialist," to the world communist movement. Souvarine categorically insisted in the pages of this magazine on the guilt of the Rosenbergs, provoking embittered protests from " progressive society." In 1951, he broke the next " taboo " and published the work of the American historian George Fischer on the Vlasovsky movement—the first serious investigation of the theme. He untiringly exposed the falsification—the " diaries," the " secrets "—which flooded the book market in the '40s and '50s, and he mercilessly derided Professor E. H. Carr who had supplied the foreword to Litvinov's " diary," and Isaac Deutscher who promoted the appearance of the " memoirs " of " Budu Svanidze," who had never even existed. . . .

Khrushchev's report to the 20th Congress confirmed everything that Souvarine had been writing about Stalin for many years. But the third chapter in the life of the author of the first people's leader began after the change in the atmosphere in France, which was linked with the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*. After a gap of many years, a new edition of *Staline* came out in 1977, supplemented with a foreword and voluminous postscript, and an afterword—the 80-year-old author brought the story of Stalin's life to its conclusion. To Boris Souvarine came long-deserved fame. Leroy Ladurie called *Staline* one of the most important books of the twentieth century. Other, seemingly forgotten, texts by Souvarine, striking for their fineness and accuracy of observation, and for their topicality, are being republished.

Regardless of his advancing years, Boris Souvarine continued his work. He began to write his memoirs—giving them for publication in separate chapters: on Isaac Babel, Pierre Pascale, Panaiti Istrati, the Congress of Tours; he prepared for publication his extremely valuable archive, anticipating the book (reckoned to run to several volumes) with a foreword, commenting on each document. He never stopped reflecting on the reasons for his youthful enthusiasm for communism, and the reasons for the bloody failure of the Russian revolution.

On the eve of the hundredth anniversary of Stalin's birth, Souvarine agreed to give an interview to the Russian journal *Kontinent* published in Paris (1980, No. 22). He did not like to give interviews, firmly convinced that he could better expound his thoughts on paper—clearly, precisely and at length. But he was always amenable to having dicussions with inmates of the Soviet world, and willingly answered all my questions about his meetings with those who had made the October revolution, who had dreamed—when Souvarine associated with them—of making world revolution, starting with Germany; he told stories about his meetings and conversations, to which he was now the only surviving witness. Finally, I asked the " key " question, which he himself regarded as the most important: the question of Lenin's responsibility for the Stalin business. I asked whether he considered Stalin the legitimate or illegitimate heir to Lenin. Souvarine had been searching for the answer for many years. And long ago he found it. In 1957, in a special edition of the magazine *Est-Ouest* devoted to the 40th anniversary of the October revolution, Souvarine wrote that the October revolution was the germ of the Soviet system. In an article in which he analysed in detail Roy Medvedev's book *Let History Judge* (in *Russkaya Mysl'*, 15 November 1973), Souvarine noted with gratitude the new facts and documents contained in it, but sharply criticized Medvedev for putting all the blame on Stalin alone: Stalin turned out to be worthy of Lenin's teaching. His conclusion was that Roy Medvedev, by expunging Lenin of blame, has turned his work from being a " History into a Story for illiterate *Komsomoltsy*." Souvarine hesitated when he gave his answer to my question: " There is no doubt that without Lenin there could have been no Stalin."

But Boris Souvarine, the historian, was at the same time a contemporary of Lenin, the man, who held him in friendly affection. And loyalty to his friends was one of Souvarine's major qualities. " Friendship is a sacred business," he used to love to say. Therefore, in no doubt that Stalin received his legitimacy from Lenin, Souvarine nevertheless flinched from placing an equals sign between them. He wrote: " Lenin was a Utopian, ready to do the most terrible things in order to realize his ideas. Stalin was a cynic who believed only in Stalin, who was prepared for everything and did everything only for himself." Souvarine made a distinction between Lenin the man and Lenin the politician, laying at the feet of the politician the full responsibility for the birth of the Soviet system.

FOR Souvarine the most important meeting in the last 20 years was his epistolatory meeting with Solzhenitsyn. Not only because, excited by the literary works of the author of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which stressed the great significance of the " Gulag Archipelago," Souvarine reckoned that he had found himself a sparring partner to equal himself, but also because the argument was about Lenin. Souvarine agonized because Solzhenitsyn could not see the difference between the man and the politician.

The passion with which Souvarine conducted the last argument in his life with a partner who was his equal and whom he held in deep esteem, can be explained similarly by the special feelings which he nurtured towards the country of his birth.

It would be amusing, and he would be the first to laugh out loud, to imagine Boris Souvarine as a Russian *émigré*, suffering from the usual nostalgia, yearning for the Motherland. But one must not forget that his incomparable learning about Russia and the Soviet Union was the fruit not only of intellect but of emotion. His feelings for Russia made his knowledge especially profound. A knowledge of Russia, and possibly a love for it, are essential for the historian concerned with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. Essential but not enough. Boris Souvarine was in command of a second vital element: a deep knowledge of Western culture—history, literature, philosophy, theology—and a love for it.

In the final years, the last decade, when seeking the reasons for his attraction for communism, an explanation for his actions at the beginning of the 1920s, Souvarine turned not only to the Russian revolution. He recalled the impression made not only on him, but on all his generation, of Clemenceau's celebrated speech to Parliament, in which he defended the terror of 1793 and first coined the phrase: " Revolution has no half-measures "; he was reminded that this was in accord with Robespierre, who had said: " Revolution is not justice, but a flash of lightning."

Boris Souvarine defined the singularity of his position and world-view in a remarkable way, calling the magazine he published for his friends " The Observer of Two Worlds." It was no accident that the name he chose for the periodical that continues to be published today was " Est-Ouest."

The unique place which Boris Souvarine occupies among the historians and political writers of the twentieth century is defined by the fact that he alone knew well both East and West, and was at home both there (spurned, judged, unwanted) and here (his value finally realized).

One of the first French communists, Boris Souvarine, after understanding the illusions and errors, became the first French anti-communist, bearing to the struggle against Falsity not only a remarkable intellect, high culture and a brilliant writing talent, but a tremendous knowledge of the enemy " from the inside " and the courage necessary to the battle.

Translated by Teresa Cherfas **Michel Heller**

George Hugh Nicholas Seton-Watson 1916–1985

ANOTHER outstanding authority in the field of Soviet and East European studies has disappeared from the scene. Hugh Seton-Watson, like his late colleague Professor Leonard Schapiro, was a major exponent of these studies in this country (and elsewhere). His primary interest was in the interrelated subjects of communism and nationalism and he wrote many books on these themes. They included: *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941*; *The Decline of Imperial Russia*; *The Pattern of Communist Revolution*; *Neither War Nor Peace*; *The New Imperialism*; *Nationalism and Communism*; *The Russian Empire (1801–1917)*; *The Sick Heart of Europe*; *Nations and States*.

He inherited his interests from his father, Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, the pioneer of East European Studies at the University of London. He was a fantastic linguist who was said to be able to master a language in six weeks. His range of interests and reading was enormous (I often wondered how he found the time to write all those books . . .).

In the early 1950s, he started a seminar at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies which provided an opportunity to debate subjects of common interest to scholars in the field of " Sovietology." This seminar was later transferred to the London School of Economics and Political Science (where it continued under Leonard Schapiro, and continues today under his successors).

Hugh Seton-Watson was a member of the Advisory Board of *Survey* and a contributor. He was the kindest of men and a good friend. I last saw him just before he went to the Smithsonian Institution in Washington DC as a visiting fellow. He was full of plans for his future work, now relieved of his teaching duties since his retirement (and he was a very conscientious teacher). He found his relaxation in bird-watching, a hobby about which he was enthusiastic.

His death deprives the field of Soviet and East European studies of a most versatile and profound analyst. His friends, students and readers will remember him with affection, admiration and gratitude.

L.L.

Our Contributors

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STEVEN L. SAMPSON has a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. He has conducted anthropological fieldwork in Romania on village-level planning, urbanization, and on the training and activities of village-level leaders. He is the author of *National Integration through Socialist Planning: An Anthropological Study of a Romanian New Town* (East European Monographs, dist. by Columbia University Press, 1984) and of *The Planners and Peasants* (South Jutland University Centre, Esbjerg, Denmark, 1982). He has published articles on bureaucracy and corruption as anthropological problems, the second economy in Eastern and Western Europe, local level leadership, and on the Polish crisis and its effect on Eastern Europe. He is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, University of Copenhagen, where he is conducting a study of the anthropology of bureaucracy and comparison of local leadership in Poland and Romania.

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VLADIMIR TISMANEANU received his PhD from Bucharest University in 1980, and is now a Research Analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. His articles on revolutionary ideology and the crisis of

Soviet-style regimes have appeared in *Orbis*, *Telos*, *Praxis International* and *Problems of Communism*. He is currently working on a book on " Revolutionary Mythologies and the Latin American Left " in co-authorship with Venezuelan writer Carlos Rangel. He is also engaged in writing a study on " dynastic socialism " (a comparative approach to the succession mechanisms in Romania, Cuba and North Korea), and a book on the dilemmas of French socialism.

Vladimir Voinovich came into literary prominence with the publication of a comic novel about Soviet life during the Second World War, *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin* (1970). In 1975 he wrote an open letter to Yuri Andropov (then head of the KGB) in which he complained that KGB agents had tried to poison him. Subsequently he published abroad *The Ivankiad*, a book which tells the story of his struggle with Soviet bureaucracy to protect his flat in the Moscow writers' cooperative from annexation by a KGB official who wanted the extra space. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1982 and now lives in Germany.

Adam Westoby teaches at the Open University's School of Education. His publications include articles on the sociology of communist countries, and *Communism Since World War II* (1981). His English edition of Bruno Rizzi's *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* will be published by Tavistock and the Free Press in 1985. His previous contribution to *Survey* (with Robin Blick) was entitled " Early Soviet Designs on Poland " (in Vol. 26, no. 4, Autumn 1982).

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